A Cure and a Rebuke for

the Gangrene of Arminianism

A Response to Mr. John Goodwin’s Redemption Redeemed

or, The Doctrine of Election and Reprobation

Opened and Defended in Six Sermons

Exposing the Ancient Pelagian and Modern Arminian Errors

By Richard Resbury,

Minister of the Gospel in Oundle, Northamptonshire

London, Printed for John Wright at the King’s Head in Old Bailey, 1651

Table of Contents

To the Reader

THE FIRST SERMON

THE SECOND SERMON

THE THIRD SERMON

THE FOURTH SERMON

THE FIFTH SERMON

THE SIXTH SERMON

To the Reader

Reader,

You have here a small work presented for your consideration, which has for over three years remained unpublished by the author, as you may observe from the Imprimatur. Nor would it now have seen the light of day, were it not for the fact that those great truths of God—concerning His electing and redeeming grace, upon which the throne of His glory is especially established, and wherein lies the peculiar treasure of His saints—have of late been so boldly attacked by the rash hand of that unfortunate man, Mr John Goodwin, in his wretched treatise, titled (though wrongly) Redemption Redeemed.

First, my heartfelt prayer is: The Lord rebuke him. And if that special grace which he presently scorns and openly defies should yet magnify itself by saving him—even if it be as one saved through fire—then let the zeal of the Lord for His most precious truth consume his work, for it is but stubble. Indeed, when that grace truly visits him with the knowledge of the truth as it is in Jesus, his own hands will be eager to tear down what he has built.

Secondly, my hope—and indeed my confident expectation—is that the Spirit of the Lord will raise up faithful defenders of His truth, not only to confront him, but to overturn his doctrine. This would be for the good of God’s elect in this nation, especially those among them who, through weakness of understanding and a lack of skill in the mystery of Christ, are vulnerable to being misled by such a spirit of error. (Yet the foundation of God stands firm.) I trust that his weapons will be struck from his hand, just as they were from the hands of his esteemed mentors—Arminius, Corvinus, and the rest of that pernicious school. Nor has he, as far as I can discern without bias, improved their cause in the least. He merely hides their teachings from the untrained, yet walks boldly in their well-trodden paths. And to ensure nothing is lacking to present his cause with flair, he challenges an entire university to disprove him. (Surely, such humility and candour must be the hallmark of the Spirit of Truth in him!)

In the meantime, until a more capable hand prepares a fuller antidote, I have taken the liberty to offer this work, which lay by me, in the hope that the Lord may be pleased to use it as a small restraint against that spreading poison.

Let me also note, though this is not a direct answer to his book (having been composed long before his discourse appeared), it nevertheless dwells upon the foundation of the matter—that is, the decrees of God. It seeks to explain, according to Scripture (the only key to this mystery), the doctrine of election and reprobation. When these are rightly understood, his errors on related doctrines—such as redemption, the perseverance of the saints, and so on—are struck at the root. Moreover, in exploring those aforementioned decrees, other disputed doctrines are also discussed. I have not avoided the principal objections typically raised by the Arminian school on these matters, so that the core of the whole controversy is addressed herein.

The best way to describe this work is by briefly outlining its structure, as follows:

- Sermons 1 & 2: Treat the doctrines of election and reprobation together, particularly in exposition of Romans 9:1–24, where the absolute decree is affirmed.

- Sermon 3: Focuses on the doctrine of election alone, further asserting the absoluteness of election.

- Sermon 4: Addresses the doctrine of reprobation on its own, establishing the absoluteness of reprobation.

- Sermon 5: Clarifies Scripture texts frequently used in opposition to these doctrines, and examines the Arminian errors:

1. The notions of antecedent and consequent will,

2. The use of natural ability to attain spiritual blessings.

- Sermon 6: Answers three further objections:

1. That the former doctrine makes God the author of sin;

2. That it portrays God as cruel, or less merciful than Scripture reveals;

3. That it strips man of the freedom of the will—this being their chief concern.

These are the main objections; I have chosen to address them, not because I consider myself among the most capable, but rather quite the opposite—far beneath many of my brethren. Yet:

1. It is not fair treatment of a controversy to avoid the main objections;

2. I hope that what is offered here may be of use in strengthening some in the truth;

3. I desired to encourage some more skilful scribe in our Israel, one more thoroughly instructed in the Kingdom of Heaven, to bring forth treasures both new and old to more beautifully present these precious truths of God to His people.

For this, I must now thank Mr Goodwin, whose darkness, I do not doubt, will prompt further light; whose boldness (I am certain) will provoke true humility. I need not dwell on how his at times imperial commands in place of arguments (as is the Arminian way), his bizarre conclusions, distorted citations, strange philosophy, and at times blasphemous implications may stir up the spirits of those whom the Lord shall honour to reclaim His truth from his hands.

Only this do I believe: the zeal of the Lord will accomplish it. And that, together with a fruitful blessing upon it, shall be the earnest prayer of

(Reader)

Your servant in and for the truth,

Richard Resbury

THE FIRST SERMON

"But the election hath obtained it, and the rest were blinded, or hardened." - Romans 11:7

The Apostle is here resuming the same discourse which he began in the ninth chapter and has continued until now, drawing everything to a conclusion.

For a clearer understanding of this, we must first observe the occasion, and then the discourse itself.

The Occasion: An objection which might arise from the Jews' rejection of the Gospel, which the Apostle anticipates and answers. In doing so, he clearly opens the great mystery of eternal predestination.

The objection arises in this way: The Apostle had previously preached the truth of the Gospel, particularly the central article of justification by faith alone without the works of the Law. From this comes the objection: if that is the truth, and the only way to life, how is it that the Jews—God’s covenanted Israel—generally reject it, clinging instead to the Law for righteousness and life? From this it would follow that God has made void His covenant established with Abraham for himself and his seed, in that He has now cast off His people—the seed of Abraham. This is raised in verse 1: "I say then, Hath God cast away his people?" But they assume that God has not made void His covenant; therefore, they conclude—wrongly—against the truth of the Gospel, that justification is not by faith, as the Apostle taught.

The Answer: The Apostle, while retaining the truth of the Gospel, first rejects, then refutes, the objection.

First, he rejects it: "God forbid!" God will fulfil His covenant completely.

Secondly, he refutes it:

1. By specific example—himself: "For I also am an Israelite..." (verse 1). This proves that God has not cast away all His people. But what if He has cast off some?

2. By distinction—he defends God's faithfulness by showing that not one of His true covenant people has been cast away. The essence of his answer is this: of the people of God—those outwardly called and within the outward administration of the covenant—some He foreknew, others He did not foreknow. Those whom He foreknew are truly His people, to whom not only the outward administration, but also the spiritual and eternal blessings of the covenant belong. These He has not cast off. The rest, He has. Yet in this, God's faithfulness remains beyond reproach, because they were never truly His covenant people—only outward claimants and mere participants in the external covenant.

This is the essential meaning of the words in verse 2: "God hath not cast away his people which he foreknew."

(By the way, observe: if any of God’s true covenant people could fall short of eternal life—falling away from the truth—then the Apostle would be leaving God under the guilt of the charge made in the objection, namely, that He breaks His covenant and casts away His people, contrary to what He undertook in His covenant. This is a point against that dreadful doctrine of the saints’ final apostasy.)

The Apostle, having thus answered by distinction, continues—first confirming, then concluding his answer. In the conclusion, he also explains what he means by this foreknowledge of God concerning His people.

To confirm that God has not cast off His people whom He foreknew, he refers to the condition of the Church in Elijah’s time, from verse 2 to verse 5. The summary is this: though the entire nation generally turned away from God to abominable idols, and no true worshippers appeared to be found, yet God still had His reserved number, clinging to the truth and obtaining life.

The conclusion appears in verse 5, by way of applying the former example. In essence: though at the present time the Jewish nation generally opposes the Gospel and brings condemnation upon themselves, there is still a remnant according to the election of grace who embrace the Gospel and find life. Alongside this conclusion, we find his interpretation: the people whom God foreknew are those whom He elected—and that purely by grace and special favour.

Then in verse 6, having spoken at length about this grace, he affirms that it excludes works. (Works, then, are as incompatible with the grace of election as they are with the grace of justification. The free favour by which God chooses unto life before time began is just as incompatible with works as the favour by which, in time, He brings one into the state of life. Therefore, works foreseen have no more to do with election—since they can only be considered as performed in time, and so cannot enter into a decree that precedes all time—than works already done have to do with justification.)

But to return: the Apostle, having drawn the conclusion that since election is by grace, it must therefore exclude works—and doing so with a special focus on the error of the reprobate Jews, who relied so heavily on works—then, in verse 7, reiterates the conclusion. He distinguishes, first, between Israel in general and the elect within Israel (the “election” here being the same as the “remnant according to election” in verse 5), and then between the elect and the rest. By "Israel" in the first part of the verse, he means those of Israel who are not among the elect—“the rest” who, in the latter part, were blinded, or more accurately, hardened. (The Greek word used here is elsewhere more often rendered as hardened—as in John 12:40, where it is contrasted with blinding, and in Mark 6:52—carrying the sense of a callous or stubborn insensibility. This aligns more precisely with the Apostle’s teaching elsewhere, such as in Romans 9:18.)

With this groundwork laid, we have two key observations to make from the passage:

1. A distinction between people, rooted in the heart of God: some are elect, others are the rest—distinguished even among His outwardly called people. Some are His people, foreknown with the knowledge of special love; others are His people only in outward appearance, whom He did not foreknow in that saving sense.

2. A differing outcome regarding eternal life for those so distinguished by God: the elect shall certainly have life—“The election hath obtained it”; the rest are hardened unto death—“And the rest were hardened.”

We may summarise both in the following doctrinal statement:

Doctrine: There is a distinction between one person and another, established in the heart of God. Some are chosen unto life, and therefore shall most certainly obtain it; others are passed over unto death, and so shall assuredly not escape it.

Before we proceed to confirm the doctrine, it will be necessary to begin with a few cautions.

1. In addressing this doctrine, we will be entering into the deep things of God—matters worthy of the highest reverence, even to the point of amazement—for this is a great mystery we are dealing with. As the Apostle concludes, in wonder and worship, Romans 11:33, we must therefore approach with all sobriety of spirit, with fear and trembling. Indeed, we must seek that sobriety where it may be found—at the throne of grace, through faithful prayer.

2. We shall encounter many things that will disturb human reason, against which it will protest endlessly. So in Romans 9:14, God is accused of unrighteousness, and in verse 19, of tyranny—by man’s corrupt reasoning. Here, therefore, we must resolve to set aside our own wisdom, and to follow—step by step—the thread of God’s Word, which alone can guide us through this maze. We must listen to what God says, even if it seems utterly contrary to our own understanding (and even our affections), and cease from all curious and unwarranted questioning. Where He stops speaking, we must stop enquiring, remembering the incomprehensible greatness of God, and His absolute authority over us. So the Apostle teaches in Romans 9:20.

3. We are likely to meet with many things which others are likely to abuse—some using them as an excuse for licentiousness, others for insolent murmuring against the Lord. Indeed, just as this doctrine sets forth a distinction between one person and another, it is likely, in its proclamation, to have a similarly different effect: opening the eyes of some, and making others even more blind than they were before; softening some, and hardening others. But, first of all, since God has revealed it in His Word, we may—and must—investigate it, only limiting our investigation by what is revealed in the Scriptures.

4. Properly understood, this mystery is of most excellent value: it is a source of true comfort, the foundation of genuine humility, and it gives light to other mysteries of the Gospel. It greatly serves to clarify the free and particular grace of God, which is, in truth, the very life of the Gospel. It is the hammer to crush, the rock to break in pieces, many of the most dangerous errors opposed to the truth of the Gospel—and for that reason it has been so frequently opposed throughout the ages by the devil and his agents.

5. This same distinction in fruit is found in the preaching of all God’s truths. To some, they are the aroma of life unto life; to others, the aroma of death unto death. Yet we, as ministers of the Word, are in the preaching of these truths a sweet savour unto God in Christ—both in those who are saved and in those who perish.

6. God’s children must not, therefore, be denied any portion of their spiritual food because the children of the wicked one will poison themselves with it—much less should they be denied their choicest and most nourishing food.

These things being laid down in advance, we now return to the doctrine, the confirmation of which depends upon the description of election, and then of reprobation, as they are to be drawn from the Scriptures, and opened by the Scriptures.

Now, since this mystery is most fully treated in Romans 9, both with regard to election and reprobation (from verse 1 to verse 24), and since what the Apostle says here in Romans 11 builds upon what he previously argued in chapter 9, it therefore seems very appropriate first to briefly open up that chapter, and then to move more particularly into the doctrines of election and reprobation separately—confirming each point as we go, using the exposition of Romans 9 as our foundation, and supplementing with other scriptural testimonies as necessary.

Now, concerning this eleventh chapter, the Apostle anticipates and responds to the objection previously mentioned and now taken up again in chapter 11—namely, the objection made against the truth of the Gospel based on the Jews’ rejection of it.

In the first 23 verses, he gives his answer to this great mystery—an answer which he first asserts, and then defends throughout, by presenting and refuting objections raised against it.

In the first five verses and the first part of verse six, we find the objection not directly stated, but implied in the Apostle’s answer. The summary is this: Though the Jews, in general, reject the Gospel and thereby fall short of eternal life—and are, indeed, accursed from Christ—yet the Word of the covenant made between God and their fathers still stands firm, and God fulfils His covenant to the utmost.

From this it becomes clear what the objection is, to which this answer is given—the same as previously mentioned (namely): If the Gospel truly is what the Jews reject, and if, by rejecting it, they miss out on eternal life, then does it not follow that God’s covenant has failed?

In this objection, two things are assumed:

1. That the Jews have, in fact, rejected the Gospel;

2. That this would imply unfaithfulness on God’s part.

The Apostle grants the supposition but denies the inference. He grants the supposition in the first five verses—not by expressly affirming the rejection of the Jews, but rather by taking it for granted—and expresses his deep sorrow for it in the first three verses. Note especially in verse 3 how the Apostle covertly reveals the state of that people, by wishing himself accursed from Christ for their sake. It is as if he had wished himself in their place, that they might become heirs of blessing.

It is impossible for a mere man to be man’s redeemer, yet such was the Apostle’s intense love that, for the salvation of the Jews, he was willing to bear the wrath that lay upon man’s Redeemer. Such love, so similar to the love of the Mediator, dwelled in his heart—as we see in Moses, toward the same people, who was once their typical mediator.

The Apostle, having thus expressed his grief, then explains the particular reasons for it: partly his personal connection with them (v. 3), and partly their relationship to God, in the many precious privileges they had uniquely received from Him (vv. 4–5).

Having granted the supposition, he now denies the inference in verse 6: “Not as though the word of God hath taken none effect.” This “word” refers to the word of the covenant: “I will be thy God, and the God of thy seed” (Genesis 17:7), as is clear from the surrounding context. The meaning, then, is this: God’s covenant remains firm, despite the general apostasy of the Jews. The Apostle proves this by three examples, all demonstrating that the covenant is limited to its true heirs.

The first example concerns the descendants of Jacob, the common ancestor of the Jews: “For they are not all Israel, which are of Israel.” In the first instance, “Israel” refers to Jacob’s physical descendants, according to the covenant. In the second, it refers to Jacob himself. The meaning is this: not all of Jacob’s physical descendants are his covenant children. They are not all his children as he is Israel—the name that signifies his prevailing with God to receive the blessing—simply by virtue of natural descent.

To better understand this and the examples that follow, let us observe that a people may be said to be in covenant with God in two different senses. According to the first, all of Jacob’s descendants were in covenant; according to the second, only the remnant according to election were.

A people, then, may be in covenant with God:

1. According to the outward and common administration of the covenant—in this way, all of Jacob’s descendants were in covenant, separated by outward calling and marked as the Lord’s by circumcision.

2. According to the special and primary purpose of the covenant, which is eternal life and all the effectual blessings that lead to it—and in this sense, not all of Jacob’s descendants were in covenant.

Those under the first category may still fall short of life, as they do not meet the condition of the covenant. Those under the second cannot fall short, for the covenant itself undertakes to fulfil the condition. Therefore, God’s faithfulness is pledged not only to grant them life upon believing, but to grant them faith unto life.

The second example concerns the descendants of Abraham, who was the head of the covenant, in whom “all the families of the earth shall be blessed.” Here again, the Apostle distinguishes between the natural and the covenantal offspring, following the second sense of covenant interest just explained.

“Neither because they are the seed of Abraham, are they all children” (i.e. covenant children), which he supports with Scripture: the covenant was established with Isaac and his descendants, excluding Ishmael—“In Isaac shall thy seed be called.”

Then in verse 8, he explains this verse of Scripture. The children of the flesh are those of natural descent; the seed are the children of the promise or covenant—those in whom the covenant is effectually fulfilled—and both groups are distinct. The latter are also referred to as the children of God.

In verse 9, he confirms this explanation by citing Genesis 18:10. The substance of the confirmation is this: Isaac was not born by natural strength (for Abraham’s body and Sarah’s womb were as good as dead), but by the power of God’s promise. Likewise, all covenant offspring of Abraham are such not by natural descent, but by promise. And since the promise does not belong to all, only those who are Abraham’s children by promise are the blessed seed.

Observations:

1. The chief purpose of Abraham’s covenant is eternal life.

2. Those who are the proper subjects and true heirs of this covenant do effectually obtain life.

3. The covenant not only offers life conditionally but effectually fulfils the condition required.

4. Although the majority under the outward administration of the covenant fall short of life, God’s faithfulness remains intact, for all the true subjects and heirs of the covenant certainly do obtain life.

These points make it clear that the objection—that if the Jews fell from the state of life, the covenant was thereby void—is mistaken. The Apostle’s answer preserves the firmness of the covenant, showing that its true heirs do indeed receive life.

The third example follows, taken from Isaac’s family, in verses 10 through 13, based on the history recorded in Genesis 25:23. Here, the Apostle:

1. First, addresses potential objections to the previous example (v. 10).

2. Second, lays out the same kind of distinction between Jacob and Esau, sons of Isaac, as he had earlier shown between Isaac and Ishmael, sons of Abraham (vv. 12–13).

3. Third, reveals the basis for that distinction in verse 11, where he opens up the profound mystery of predestination.

1. Objections to the previous example:

Two objections might be raised:

- First, that Isaac was born of the free woman, whereas Ishmael was born of the bondwoman.

- Second, that the promise concerning the blessed seed was made after Ishmael’s birth—so it would not be surprising that the covenant was established only in Isaac’s line.

However, this is not the case with Jacob’s line, who was the common ancestor of the Israelites. These objections are pre-emptively answered in verse 10. Jacob and Esau had the same father and the same mother and were conceived at the same time. Yet, just as the word of promise to Sarah secured the covenant for Isaac and his descendants, so the oracle to Rebekah secured it for Jacob and his.

2. The distinction made:

This distinction is laid out in verse 12. It is clear from the context:

- First, this distinction is not simply a national distinction—Jacob representing all his descendants, and Esau all his—because the Apostle uses it to prove the difference that exists even within Jacob’s descendants themselves (“All are not Israel that are of Israel”).

- Second, the difference is not merely civil but spiritual. That which places Jacob and his seed within the saving covenant—and identifies him not only as of Israel but as Israel—is the same that excludes Esau and his descendants from it. This distinction is central to the Apostle’s argument defending God’s faithfulness in keeping His covenant, even though most Jews have fallen away from salvation, since the remnant among them does obtain life.

This distinction is further confirmed and clarified to be spiritual. Esau’s service (symbolising his exclusion from the covenant) parallels Ishmael’s exclusion in the earlier example (v. 13). The differing conditions of Jacob and Esau arise from God’s declaration: “Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated.” Applied to this context, this love and hatred are clearly eternal in nature, relating to eternal life and death.

The Apostle, uniquely taught by God, perceives more in God's hatred of Esau than merely the destruction of his earthly inheritance mentioned by the prophet in Malachi 1:3. Even in that visible judgment, the Apostle reads a pledge of God’s eternal hatred. This is even more evident when we consider the basis of this distinction, which is now brought forward.

3. The ground of this distinction (v. 11):

- First, the Apostle denies that the ground of their differing condition lies in their works. He confirms this by noting the timing: the declaration of their differing destinies was given before they were born or had done anything good or evil.

- Second, he not only denies works as the basis, but also any cause in themselves. Instead, he ascribes the cause entirely to God: “Not of works, but of him that calleth.” Therefore, the origin and ultimate cause of this distinction is not in the individuals themselves, but in God.

- Third, this distinction is rooted in God’s purpose—specifically, His purpose of election and reprobation.

The “purpose according to election” means nothing less than God’s purpose in electing; and while reprobation is not explicitly named here, it is implied in several ways:

1. In specifying election as a purpose of choosing Jacob, there must necessarily be a corresponding purpose of rejecting Esau—that is, the purpose of reprobation.

2. In removing works as the basis for the difference—both good works (in the case of Jacob’s acceptance) and evil works (in the case of Esau’s rejection)—the Apostle makes it clear that the distinction is not due to anything the individuals would do, but to God’s sovereign will.

Therefore, another basis must be found for Esau's condition, just as for Jacob's—and it can be no other than what is hinted about Esau in what is explicitly stated about Jacob.

3. The Different State and Condition of the Two Parties:

If only the purpose of election, as it is here expressed, were in view, then Jacob—as the beloved object of that purpose—would rightly be mentioned. But what room would there be for "hated Esau" in reference to election?

That the Apostle presents this double and opposing example serves to remove any imagined grounds found within the persons themselves—especially concerning Esau, from whom any possible ground is explicitly excluded. The Apostle attributes Jacob’s condition directly to God’s purpose as its original cause. It must therefore follow that God’s contrary purpose is likewise the original cause of Esau’s condition. Thus far, the argument shows:

- It is not of works.

- It is of God.

- It is of God in terms of His purpose—both in election and reprobation.

4. It Is According to the Purpose of Election That It Might Stand:

It is of God's purpose of election (in the case of Jacob) in such a way that it might endure.

5. It Is of God According to His Purpose of Election as the One Who Calls:

In our calling, we receive faith and the renewing work of the Spirit, by which we are brought into the state of life. It is therefore of God—according to His purpose of election—as the one who, by that very purpose, gives faith and brings the elect into the state of life through the renewing of the Holy Spirit.

Thus, His election stands firm in its outcome—eternal life for the elect—borrowing nothing, depending on nothing in man, but undertaking and providing everything.

From this it is clear: when the Apostle excludes works, he excludes both works foreseen and works performed. For the subject is election. He so thoroughly denies that it is of works that he insists it is of God. But if it were of foreseen works, then it would be of ourselves. Rather, it is of God—of His purpose—which (as we shall soon see) cannot rest on anything but Himself. It is of His purpose so that it may stand without change, and therefore must have a more secure foundation than foreseen works, or indeed anything foreseen in man.

It is, then, of God according to His purpose as the one who calls—therefore excluding not only works but also faith, whether performed or foreseen.

1. It is not: “Not of works, but of him that believeth”;

But rather: “Not of works, but of God.”

2. Nor is it: “Not of works, but of him that justifieth”;

But rather: “Not of works, but of him that calleth.”

Justification presupposes faith. In our calling, we receive faith. Therefore, it is of God—according to the purpose of election—not as one who foresees works or faith, but as one who gives faith. He cannot foresee it as existing before His purpose, but only within His purpose to grant it.

Now, that the foresight of evil works—or anything else in man—is not the foundational cause of his perishing condition is especially evident in Esau’s case. Evil works foreseen play no greater role than evil works committed, with respect to the matter at hand. This we will now demonstrate in two conclusions:

Conclusion 1:

The differing purpose of God—electing some and rejecting others—is the primary cause of the differing states of people: some embrace the truth and are saved, others reject the truth and are damned.

Conclusion 2:

This purpose is not grounded upon, nor does it depend on, anything in man; it is wholly self-originating and independent.

These two conclusions are clearly supported by the Apostle’s argument thus far, and their confirmation will reinforce the central point under discussion.

As to the first: we have already seen it in the examples of Jacob and Esau. These two serve as specific cases to establish the broader question concerning the Jews. The Jewish nation generally rejected the Gospel and thus perished, while the remnant embraced it and thereby obtained life—as is evident from the Apostle’s argument, which he later expands to apply to all of humanity.

Regarding the second point (setting aside that the Apostle presents the purpose of election and reprobation in a parallel manner), let these arguments be sufficient to establish it.

1. Whatever is done, God either does it as the first cause, or permits it to be done as the supreme ruler. It is clear: if God neither acts to bring something about nor allows it, it cannot happen. Nothing occurs without the will of the Almighty that it should occur—He either permits it or brings it to pass Himself. Augustine further states that whatever is permitted to occur, such as the evil of sin, still requires some involvement of God (in whom we live, and move, and have our being) for the performance of that action—which, being performed by man, is inseparable from sin. Otherwise, secondary causes in producing their effects would move independently of the first cause—and the creature would, in effect, be its own creator.

Therefore, God foresees what will happen in time only in so far as He sees His own will—either in doing it or permitting it to be done—by providing the concurrence without which it cannot be done.

The will of God, then, before all time—that is, His decree or purpose concerning the existence of any event in time—must be the basis of His foreknowledge that it shall come to pass, and thus must logically precede it. Therefore, His purpose arises solely from Himself. For whatever is imagined to be foreseen, as something that shall occur, and is thought to move God’s will to decree it, must already assume that He wills it to be.

To further clarify this truth (though it is a truth so radiant in its own light that it hardly needs further explanation), consider this: of things that do not yet exist, some are merely possible—they may or may not be (e.g., “God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham”). Others are future and certainly will occur. Both are known to God. But how is His knowledge of these things distinguished?

He knows all possible things in His own power; He knows all future things in His decree.

Secondly, if God foresees what shall happen in logical order before His decree that it will happen—and not merely within that decree—then He is stripped of all liberty, both in forming the decree and in acting upon it.

1. In regard to His decree: if He chooses to decree, then His rule is already determined by the creature—by what He foresaw would happen, prior to His decree. Thus, because it shall happen, He foresaw it would happen—and so, He no longer has liberty to decree otherwise. Either His decree becomes ineffective, or contradiction must be embraced: something shall happen (therefore God foresaw it), and at the same time, it shall not happen (for God has decreed it shall not). But since both cannot be true, God is forced to operate under the most extreme and unthinkable necessity. The summary of Stoic fatalism is: “He commanded once; now He must always obey.” But in this case, it is worse: “He never commanded; yet He must always obey.”

He must conform to what the creature has determined—even when the creature is not yet in existence, but is only that which shall be. This subjects God's will to the lowest form of slavery. How unjustly, then, do the opponents of divine truth raise loud objections against the idea of man being under necessity, merely because of God's decree! They oppose the idea that secondary causes should be determined by the first cause in such a way that, once the first cause has predetermined the outcome, the secondary cause can act only toward that outcome. And yet, their own notion of divine foreknowledge involves the very same kind of necessity.

Meanwhile, in terms of how things operate, rational and free agents are still free in their actions. The same decree that determines them to a particular outcome also determines that they will act freely to reach that outcome. This is orderly and proper: the first cause retains its proper supremacy; the second cause remains properly subordinate—without any injustice.

But to place the first cause beneath the foot of the second—especially when the second is at its weakest, not even in being yet, but only as that which shall be—is to destroy the foundations of eternity. Thus, God is stripped of liberty in His decree.

2. What liberty does He have in the decree itself? If something is already foreseen by Him as future, before He decrees it, what room is there left for His decree? In this case, His decree becomes an afterthought. The thing will happen whether He decrees it or not. How unworthy is it of divine wisdom to decree that which is already certain to happen, even before He has determined it? What purpose is served by such a decree?

3. By the differing conditions of men—according to God’s distinct purposes of election and reprobation—God is finally and eternally glorified. If, then, God has not determined, solely by the counsel of His own will and within Himself, the distinctions between men and the entire order of those distinctions, then He has not determined His own eternal glory for Himself. Rather, it occurs by chance, depending on the creature—as if God stumbled upon it accidentally, based on the unpredictable actions of a frail creature.

If things are as the opponents claim, then everything might have turned out otherwise. Adam fell—and so a way was made for the eternal display of God’s revenging justice and saving mercy in Christ. But Adam might have stood firm, for anything that God had determined. And therefore, for all God had decreed, such a way of glorifying Himself might never have existed. Thus, the greatest works—man's final condition, God's eternal glory, the giving of Christ, and the entire plan of salvation through Christ—become merely reactions to human decisions, not outworkings of the eternal counsel of God. They arise only as the creature “happens” to prompt Him into action.

But is there anything more plainly taught in Scripture and more reasonable to a sound mind than this: that the highest aim in all of God's works is His own glory? Did He not make all things for Himself? Are not all things of Him, and through Him, and to Him? Is He not the supreme being—and therefore must all things serve His glory? Is He not the supreme good—and therefore the most lovely? Does He not, therefore, love Himself above all? And for that reason, make and order all things for His own glory?

There is a natural obligation of justice in God towards Himself, by which He cannot but exalt His own glory as the chief end to which all His works are directed. That glory, being the foremost thing in His view and the purpose of all things, having been fixed in His eternal counsel, must determine the course of all His works. He therefore orders and governs all things in accordance with that aim.

From this it is manifest that God’s purpose for the differing conditions of men is wholly independent—based on nothing but itself. It transcends all works, whether good or evil, all faith or unbelief, and even the foresight of any of these. It includes all such things within itself, appointing and ordering them accordingly. This will become even more evident as the Apostle continues his argument.

THE SECOND SERMON

"But the election hath obtained it, and the rest were hardened." - Romans 11:7

Verses 14 to 19 contain an objection and the Apostle’s answer.

The objection appears in verse 14. The Apostle, knowing how persistently the flesh will argue against this truth, anticipates and addresses an objection: "What shall we say then? Is there unrighteousness with God?" This is the charge brought by man's corrupt reasoning against God, arising from the doctrine of predestination.

The substance of the objection is this: If God deals unequally with those who are, in themselves, equal, then He must be unrighteous. But, according to the Apostle’s teaching, this is indeed the case—for neither good nor evil works enter into God’s consideration as motives for His will or His decree. Therefore (the objector claims), He must be unjust.

The answer:

1. The Apostle utterly rejects the conclusion of that line of reasoning. Even if God does deal unequally (in terms of His decree) with people who are otherwise equal in themselves, it is blasphemy to accuse Him of injustice. God forbid.

2. He defends God’s righteousness in two ways:

1. In matters of election (verses 15–16):

In verse 15, the Apostle appeals to God’s sovereign liberty to will and to decree mercy upon whom He pleases—merely because He pleases. For this, he quotes Exodus 33:19. Then in verse 16, he draws a general conclusion: "So then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy."

The meaning is this: neither the good desires of man (“him that willeth”), nor his earnest efforts (“him that runneth”), precede or prompt God’s decree. God’s decree stands entirely on its own. His mercy is extended simply because He chooses to show mercy. The cause lies solely in God that showeth mercy.

2. In matters of reprobation:

The Apostle demonstrates the same sovereign liberty of God in the case of Pharaoh, quoting Exodus 9:16. From this, he concludes that God has full and equal liberty in both election and reprobation.

- Regarding Pharaoh (verse 17):

Two things are stated:

1. That God raised him up—which includes not only bringing him into the world but preserving him, elevating him to the throne, appointing him to stand in opposition to God, and hardening him in his rebellion.

2. The purpose for which God did this—namely, that by powerfully destroying such a wicked tyrant, God might glorify His own great name.

3. The Apostle shows that God’s use of Pharaoh demonstrates this same liberty:

- First, by the connecting word “for”, which links this example to the preceding verses where God’s sovereign freedom had already been asserted. It suggests that the same principle is now being applied again.

- Second, by the conclusion in verse 18, which affirms the same divine liberty already stated in relation to election. The Apostle draws this conclusion—especially the part concerning reprobation—from verse 17, as shown by the logical term “therefore”. He makes it clear that the example of God raising up Pharaoh should be understood in such a way that it clearly expresses God’s sovereign freedom to act entirely according to His own will.

Observations

1. From the objection: How reluctantly human nature receives the true doctrine of predestination! It would rather rise up with a bold and blasphemous accusation of unrighteousness against the Lord than submit to it. The pride of man cannot endure the true doctrine of justification—nor can either the pride or guilt of man accept the truth of predestination. Hence, in every age, there has been significant opposition. In St Augustine’s time, it came from the Pelagians; later, from their successors. Since the time of the Reformation, men such as Stapleton, Bellarmine, and the entire Jesuit order, along with other perverse heretics—Castellio against Calvin and Beza, Arminius against Perkins—have raised their voices against it. And now, the heretics of our own time have constructed a compound of former errors to oppose this truth.

From both the objection and the Apostle’s answer we observe:

1. That the Apostle had set forth both the doctrine of reprobation as well as of election in the preceding verses—because this objection arises from both doctrines, and the answer defends God in both.

2. That what the Apostle taught earlier, using the example of Jacob and Esau to show that their differing conditions depend originally upon God’s decree, applies not only to them and to the Jews, but to all people—because the general conclusions in verses 16 and 18, and the example of Pharaoh (who was outside the visible Church), demonstrate that the whole world, as well as those within the Church, are distinguished by God’s decree.

3. That neither good works nor evil, neither faith nor unbelief—even as foreseen—prompted God’s decree, but rather, were preceded by it. For if it were otherwise:

1. There would be no reason for this objection to arise. The Apostle, in stating the objection, shows that he intends in verse 11 to exclude all consideration of the creature. If God had loved Jacob because of foreseen faith or good works, and hated Esau because of foreseen unbelief or evil works, there would have been no room—not even in the mind of corrupt reason—to question God's justice. In that case, God would not have dealt unequally with equals, but justly with unequals in His sight.

2. The Apostle’s answer to the objection justifies the Lord on entirely different grounds—namely, His sovereign power to deal with mankind according to His own will. How easily the objector could have been silenced by pointing to foreseen differences in their moral character—if that had been the truth!

4. Whatever Scripture reveals as the will of God, we must conclude to be just—or if it surpasses our usual understanding of justice (which generally involves the concept of deserved reward), we must at least affirm that it is not unjust. This is the Apostle’s reasoning: because it is God’s will to have mercy on whom He will, and to harden whom He will—that is, to appoint some to mercy and others to wrath, by hardening them unto it. Since this ordaining will arises above all foreseen good or evil in the creature, the Apostle concludes it is just. Even if we can no more comprehend the righteousness of God in this than we can grasp the mystery of the Trinity, we must not therefore deny that it is God’s will simply because we cannot fully understand the justice of it. Rather, because Scripture affirms it as His will, we must conclude that it is righteous.

5. That not only comparative predestination (i.e. God choosing one person over another) is above all differing qualities in the creature, but also absolute or single predestination—whether in election or reprobation—is independent of anything foreseen in the person.

Some admit that, up to this point in the Apostle’s discourse, it is clear that Jacob and Esau were equal as they were presented to the decree of God—and that whatever difference existed between them originated in the decree itself. Therefore, in choosing one and rejecting the other, God acted solely according to His own will. If the question is asked, “Why did He choose Jacob rather than Esau?” or “Why did He reject Esau rather than Jacob?”—no other answer can be given but this: simply, His will.

This view applies to comparative election and reprobation. But when it comes to individual or single predestination, some suggest that there is a necessary and universal condition in all men—namely, the corruption of nature—which must be considered, in the order of nature, prior to the decree of either election or reprobation. Based on this, they make man in his fallen state the object of predestination, excluding both creation and the fall from consideration and locating the decree below both.

Against this opinion, the three arguments previously presented—that prove God's purpose to be wholly of itself—still stand. We shall have more opportunity to examine this fully in the following verses. For now, let us consider how the Apostle’s current argument refutes this idea, suggesting instead that the decree of predestination precedes both the fall and the creation, and that its object is man as not yet created, in God’s eternal view.

1. From the objection itself:

There would have been little reason for such an objection if fallen and sinful man were the object. For if all deserved to perish, what basis would there be for accusing God of injustice in saving some by mercy and leaving others to perish according to what they deserve?

2. From the answer:

The Apostle responds by asserting God's sovereign liberty to deal with mankind according to His own will. But if fallen man were the object, the Apostle could have offered an easier and more agreeable answer to his opponent—namely, that since all men deserve death, God would be just in condemning all. That He instead ordains some to life is an act of mercy.

3. From the subsequent discourse:

The following verses clearly present man—not yet created—as the object of God’s decree. Thus, the decree of predestination is shown to rise above both the fall and creation. And since this is the continuation of the Apostle’s former argument, it confirms that his meaning remains the same throughout.

Verse 19: “Why doth he yet complain? For who hath resisted his will?”

The meaning is this: By what right does God find fault with man or punish him for sin, since it is His will to harden him in sin?

The earlier objection accused God of unrighteousness; this one accuses Him of tyranny.

The answer:

- The will of God may be understood in two senses:

1. His decreeing will – what He has determined shall happen.

2. His declaring will – what He reveals as man’s duty, and what He approves when it is performed.

Here, the reference is to God’s decreeing will, which cannot be resisted. His declaring will is frequently resisted—every time sin is committed. The strength of the objection lies here: that although man resists God’s declared will (i.e., what He commands and approves), he cannot resist God's decreed will.

Thus, the objection, clearly formulated, is this:

If God has decreed that man shall sin and be hardened in sin, and no one can resist His decree, by what right does He then punish man for sin?

The Apostle’s answer:

He grants the premise of the objection (i.e., that no one can resist God's decreeing will), but he denies the conclusion (i.e., that God is unjust), by appealing to God's absolute sovereignty over mankind. He emphasises God’s sovereign freedom to deal with man entirely according to His own will—will that takes no direction or rise from anything within man.

To expose the arrogance of man in raising such a challenge against his Creator, the Apostle rebukes it with a comparison in verse 20. He illustrates this comparison more clearly through the example of the potter and the clay in verse 21.

Illustration from the Potter and the Clay

Potter and Clay

Theological Application

1. The Potter — God.

1. The Clay — Mankind.

2. The Potter’s power over the clay.

2. God’s dominion over man.

3. The clay, in one lump, not yet formed into vessels.

3. Mankind not yet created.

4. Of the same lump.

4. Mankind equally represented.

5. One vessel made for honour, another for dishonour.

5. One man created for eternal life, another for the day of evil.

Now let us consider, from this objection and the answer to it, whether fallen man or man not yet created is the object of predestination. Does the sin of the first man—and in him, the corruption of all mankind—come into view before the decree? Or does the decree of God include within it the sin of both the first man and all people? We shall consider this by certain steps.

1. The objection assumes that men are hardened in sin according to the decreeing will of God. This is not denied by the Apostle but rather justified. But the question is: does God’s consideration of sin in those who are to be hardened motivate His decree to harden them? Or does the sin for which they are hardened fall within God’s decree?

Answer: Though God foresees that they shall sin before He hardens them in their sin—since their hardening is a judgment upon them for their sin—yet the foresight of that sin does not precede His decree to harden. Rather, He decrees of His own good pleasure:

1. To permit them to sin, as a step toward hardening.

2. To harden them in sin, as a step toward condemnation.

3. Otherwise, there would be no ground for this objection. For it is agreed by all that once sin is committed, it is just for God to harden. And it would similarly follow that, upon foreseeing sin to be committed—even apart from any decree of God—it might be just for Him to decree hardening. And there would be no more basis for raising this objection against God in the latter case than in the former.

4. Nor would this fit the Apostle’s earlier argument. The decree by which God wills to harden the reprobate is the same decree by which He hated Esau, as is clear from the Apostle’s reasoning from verse 13 to 19. But that decree is shown to rise above any consideration of sin to be committed (v. 11).

So far, we have established this: that the actual sins, in response to which the reprobate are—by God’s righteous judgment—hardened unto death, fall within His decree. They are not foreseen apart from His decree as motives for it, but are themselves included in His decree, with the intention of hardening for those very sins.

But then secondly, does not the consideration of the natural corruption caused by the fall precede this decree of God? And does not this make God’s justice clearer? That even if He decrees to permit sin as a step toward hardening, He does so only with reference to sinful man, as already fallen apart from His decree—so that He decrees to permit sin only in those who are already in a sinful state?

Answer: But even then, what room remains for the objection?

That God may harden men for sins already committed is universally accepted. That He is not bound to recover fallen man, but may leave him to commit sins for which he will be hardened, is also agreed. That He may find fault with and punish hardened sinners with eternal wrath is likewise granted. So, if the corruption of nature is already in view before God's decree to harden the reprobate, there is no place for the objection—unless we suppose that God must decree either not to permit fallen man to sin further, or not to harden any sinner in sin, or not to punish hardened sinners. But this contradicts what is universally acknowledged.

Thus far, the objection actually supports the view that man, considered as not yet created, is the object of predestination.

Now, let us consider the Apostle’s answer, which makes this even clearer:

1. The Apostle appeals to God’s absolute power over man by right of creation (verses 20–21).

2. He further explains by:

- (1) The special purpose.

- (2) The just execution of His decree (verses 22–23).

3. He appeals to God's absolute power and sovereignty—His dominion (verse 20): “Who art thou that repliest against God?” This rebuke silences human objections. God is so far above us, and has such dominion over us, that He is under no obligation to explain or justify what He does with us.

4. This power concerns man not merely as created (and certainly not as fallen), but as yet to be created: “Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus?” From the Apostle’s answer, we understand the real nature of the objection—it is an accusation of tyranny: that God decrees to harden the reprobate in sin, based on a decree that precedes even their creation. In that very decree of creation, God is understood to have had this intention. Hence the protest: “Why hast thou made me thus?” This is made even more explicit in the following words, where the Apostle refers to the potter’s power to make vessels for different uses—some for honourable, others for dishonourable purposes. In the same way, God has the power to create men—some for salvation, others for destruction (cf. Proverbs 16:4).

Now suppose that fallen man were the object of predestination—a quick and satisfactory answer could have been given, appealing to God’s righteousness rather than His dominion. It might have gone like this: even though God decrees to harden the reprobate in sin, He first sees them as sinners, and that apart from His own decrees.

2. He decrees to harden them in a particular order:

1. Not to restore them from their sinful condition, but to allow them to continue multiplying their transgressions.

2. To harden them as a righteous judgment for those very transgressions.

This would suggest that God's decree is in response to human sin—that it derives its direction from man’s sin rather than determining it beforehand. Such an explanation, rooted in God's justice, would likely have satisfied even a contentious opponent. For who could doubt that, once man has fallen—apart from any divine decree—God is not obligated to recover him? Or that, when transgressions increase, the Lord may justly harden him, that is, withhold the operations of His Spirit which He previously supplied, especially after those means have been repeatedly abused by sinful man, delivering him over fully to his own heart and to Satan?

The only situation in which a defence based on God's power is needed is when the first step itself proceeds from God's decree—and that decree of creation includes the intention to harden. As the learned Cameron rightly observed: some of God’s attributes relate to an already established object—such as His mercy and justice—while others pertain to the very constitution of the object—such as His wisdom and power. God’s power, as it is appealed to here, does not assume man as already created and fallen, but rather as one who is yet to be created and to fall—according to God’s decree.

To suppose man as already sinful in this context contradicts the nature of the Apostle’s argument, which is based on power or dominion, not justice.

1. It also contradicts the flow of the argument:

1. “Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus?” If man were already viewed as sinful, it should have read instead: “Shall the thing deformed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou marred me thus?”

2. “Hath not the potter power over the same lump…”?

- Those who argue that the distinction arises from foreseen faith or works must assume not one and the same lump, but two—and those of very different qualities.

- Those who insist that fallen man is the object of predestination will not allow the potter to make vessels for dishonour from any other lump than one already corrupt and spoiled. This is the opposite of what the Apostle’s argument implies. Where, then, is the potter’s power over the clay?

Thus, from both the objection and the Apostle’s answer, we see that man, considered as not yet created, is the object of predestination.

Let us now add another argument—from the case of the angels.

The purpose of election and reprobation regarding the angels must consider them as not yet created, or else it is based on works. One of these two must be the case—because in no individual fallen angel is there the collective corruption and fall that is found in man. But that election or reprobation is based on works must be denied on the same grounds that it is denied in the case of man.

Those who admit that man is not elected or reprobated on the basis of works, yet still want man considered as fallen in God’s decree, find themselves in a difficulty here. For if, as they admit, it would be absurd to say that election or reprobation is based on works or even foreseen faith in the case of men, then the same must be said about the angels—it would be equally absurd to base it on their works.

If it can be admitted, without absurdity, that the angels are viewed in God’s purpose as yet to be created, then so too can man. And if it can be, it must be—for the Scriptures clearly speak in this manner. It is only in an effort to avoid what they perceive as theological difficulties that some have interpreted these passages differently.

Let us add another argument to confirm the doctrine of God’s absolute power in this matter.

If, in another case of equal importance, the Lord acts according to His absolute power, then it is entirely reasonable to affirm that He does so here as well. And indeed, this is the case. Consider, for example:

1. The imputation of Adam’s sin to all his descendants.

By what principle of ordinary, human justice am I—conceived in the womb five or six thousand years after Adam’s sin—charged with that sin? Would it be acceptable between men that, because a father sinned against his king, all his descendants through every generation should be liable to death? Or that any one of them, who had not even been conceived when the father committed his offence, should bear his guilt? Some may answer: if such a covenant were made, it would be valid. But by what justice may such a covenant be made? And if made, why would it be more reasonable to keep it than to break it?

2. The imputation of man’s sin to Christ, and His suffering the punishment for all the elect.

Would any earthly king be permitted to hang, draw, and quarter the most innocent and noble man in the land—even his own heir—for the sake of pardoning a group of vile traitors? Yet all this is just when done by God, because He has absolute power over man—even over the human nature of Christ. The fact that Christ was willing to suffer this does not change the question of justice, because as man, He was appointed and created by the Father for this very purpose. If it had been possible for Christ as man to refuse this role, it would have been a sin.

What then causes so many to insist on fallen man—the corrupt mass—as the object of predestination?

1. A simple fallacy: because election is a decree of mercy and reprobation of justice, and both relate to saving or condemning fallen sinners, they conclude that sin must be considered before the decree. Sparing mercy and condemning justice seem to imply that sin is presupposed.

Answer:

1. All that can be concluded from this is that the decree determines that sin will exist prior to the salvation of the elect or the condemnation of the reprobate. But it does not follow that the consideration of sin as something future must come before the decree, or that God’s foresight of sin is a motive for His decree.

Consider this clear example:

The decree of election is a decree to save all and only those who persevere in faith (in the case of adults); the decree of reprobation is to condemn all and only those who die impenitent. Therefore, salvation presupposes final perseverance in faith, and condemnation final impenitence in sin—according to the decree. Yet, the decree itself does not presuppose those conditions, nor does it arise from them—it includes and ordains them. Otherwise, it would be a decree based on works (for in this case, faith is effectively made into a work, making the purpose dependent on the one who believes, rather than on the one who calls), which contradicts the Apostle in Romans 9:11.

This error wrongly assumes that everything necessary to fulfil the decree in its final outcome must have been foreseen beforehand and used as a motive in forming the decree. In truth, the decree itself ordains everything necessary to bring about its final effect.

Another simple illustration:

A man purposes to leave behind a legacy through legitimate children. This cannot happen without a wife. According to the mistaken view, he must foresee that he will have a wife before making such a plan, and that foresight must motivate his decision to desire children. But in reality, the truth is the reverse: because he purposes to have children and a legacy, he therefore purposes to take a wife. Nor does he see that he will have a wife in any other way than in his own intention. So too with God: the decree that determines the end also includes and ordains the means. Otherwise, it would be a decree with no true goal, a purpose without a purpose.

2. Because man’s sin exists in time before his salvation or condemnation, and because God’s glory is displayed in both His sparing mercy and His avenging justice, it is wrongly assumed that God's intention to permit sin must come after His intention to glorify Himself. But anything that serves the end must be appointed in view of that end, and by virtue of it. Hence the well-known rule: What is first in intention is last in execution.

For example:

A man builds a house in a certain location, of a certain structure, with a certain number of rooms, in order to dwell in it. The last act is his dwelling in the house, but that was the first in his intention. Therefore, for the sake of that dwelling, he chose the location, gathered the materials, and built it accordingly.

By this rule, if God foresaw man’s sin as something future before decreeing to glorify Himself through the salvation or condemnation of sinners, then He would have intended to permit sin prior to intending His own glorification. But sin could not be foreseen apart from God's intention to permit it. So, for God to foresee it, He must first intend to permit it.

However, permission of sin, if it were first in intention, would have to be last in execution—meaning man would need to be first condemned or saved, and then permitted to sin. This results in a gross absurdity.

To conclude, then:

1. Election is a decree of sparing mercy, and reprobation is a decree of avenging justice—rather than being decrees derived from mercy or justice. Each of them is an act of absolute and sovereign power, either to show favour or to withhold it, entirely according to God’s pleasure.

2. Yet there is a twofold sense in which we speak of justice in God:

1. Toward Himself, whereby He does for Himself whatever His wisdom determines to be for His own glory.

2. Toward the creature, whereby He dispenses good or evil according to certain conditions.

In the first sense, election and reprobation are both acts of justice—God is to be justified in all that He does, as long as it is consistent with His wisdom and directed toward His glory.

In the second sense, they are better said to be for justice and mercy than of them. This addresses the first basis of the common misunderstanding.

Secondly, a needless fear: Some are afraid to say that God decreed and willed the fall of Adam, fearing they might make Him the author of sin.

Answer:

1. To be the author of sin is to act in such a way as to become guilty of it. But guilt presupposes submission to a law that one transgresses. So, let it be shown what law God violates by willing that man (even the first man, and his first sin) should fall into sin.

2. Did not God will the fall of Adam? Then what are the alternatives?

1. Was it against His will? But He is omnipotent—nothing can thwart His will.

2. Was it without His knowledge? But He is omniscient—nothing escapes His understanding.

3. Was it beside His will? Then:

- Not even a single hair could fall from our heads, nor a sparrow fall to the ground, nor the outcome of a lot be cast into the lap, without His sovereign disposal (cf. Matthew 10:29–30; Proverbs 16:33).

- Then He would not have determined what the final destiny of man should be when He intended to create him, nor what his path in life would be.

- By the same reasoning, the same must be said of the angels.

- Then He would not have determined how He would glorify Himself in the fallen condition of men and angels.

- Nor would He have determined the sending of Christ, nor the giving of the Gospel to the world.

- The entire plan (or “economy”) of man’s salvation and condemnation, the Kingdom of God in this world and the next, redemption through Christ, and God’s glory in it all—would all be outside the will of God, happening merely by chance.

I would just as soon subscribe to that foolish philosophy which teaches that the world was made by the random collision of atoms, as to this even more foolish theology, which teaches that the entire administration of this world—and the world to come—has come about merely by accident and occasionally, rather than by the eternal counsel and will of God.

We have previously, in the first sermon on Romans 9:11, presented three arguments proving that the purpose of God is wholly from Himself. These same arguments apply here and fully demonstrate that both the sin of the first man and all other sins whatsoever are decreed by God. Let us apply those arguments specifically to this point:

1. God decrees to permit sin—

Otherwise, He could not even foresee it (as was previously shown). Moreover, since He permits it in time, if He did not from eternity will to permit it, then He would be like man, with new counsels rising up within Him as situations unfold. Therefore, He decrees that sin shall exist upon His permission. The permission of sin cannot be thought of as having no purpose beyond the mere act of permission; indeed, the very act of permitting sin necessarily implies the actual existence of sin.

Furthermore, since there is no evil without good, and every sinful action involves both the act itself (which is good, as a creaturely motion) and the sinfulness attached to it, we must distinguish between the two. The act, and everything good in it, is caused by God—the first cause, the fountain of all being and goodness, in whom we live and move. The sinfulness that cleaves to the act, He permits. Hence, in events like the sale of Joseph by his brothers, the crucifixion of Christ, or the stripping of Job of all he had, God’s will and hand are openly acknowledged.

If God had not willed the crucifixion of Christ (which is the greatest sin ever committed), how then did He will man’s salvation by Christ? Yet He did will that salvation from all eternity (Ephesians 1:4). Likewise, if God did not will Adam’s fall (the original sin), how did He will the salvation of man through Christ? The fall was the necessary first step to bring that salvation about.

2. He who wills from all eternity an end that cannot come to pass without the existence of sin, must also will that sin shall be.

God willed that end: the glorification of His sparing mercy, tempered with justice in Christ—by saving some, and His revenging justice in condemning others. This kind of glorification presupposes sin. Without sin, there would be no occasion for this display of either kind of mercy or justice. Therefore, God wills that sin shall be—both the first sin and all that follows it—since without that first sin, none of the others could occur.

3. Though sin is evil, yet the fact that sin should exist is good—

Good inasmuch as it is necessary to the glorification of God, who has determined in His counsel to be glorified in this particular way. But God wills all that is good; therefore, He wills that sin should exist. Sin, as sin, is evil—therefore God does not will it by way of approval. But that sin should exist, in order to serve His good ends, is itself good; and thus God does will it—by decree, though not by moral approval.

Hence Augustine says: “It is not to be doubted that God does well, even in permitting those things to be done which are done evilly. For He suffers them not except by a righteous judgment. And whatsoever is righteous is good. Therefore, although those things which are evil, insofar as they are evil, are not good—yet that those things, both good and evil, should be, is good.” And so, in a marvellous and inexpressible way, it does not happen apart from God’s will that even those things which happen against His will come to pass—not against His decretive will, but against His approving will.

4. The argument from God’s liberty in His decrees also applies here—

Apply it to His will in permitting sin (whether the first sin or any other), and it shows that His will would otherwise be determined beforehand by the creature—unless we acknowledge that He freely, of Himself, decreed that these sins should exist.

Many other arguments could be added, such as:

5. Otherwise, God’s will would not be the first in the order of causes, and would be subject to outside motives—

Both of which contradict the perfection of the Divine nature. If this were so, God would not be perfectly happy, for there would be some higher happiness conceivable—namely, that all things be perfectly aligned with His will. But because God is perfectly happy—beyond the highest possible measure—it must follow that His will encompasses even those things which He does not approve as good, but nonetheless wills to exist, because they serve the greater good, namely, His own glory.

Another objection arises against this doctrine of God’s absolute power:

Did God make man in order to damn him, and to this end decree that he should sin?

Answer:

Scripture does not shy away from such language: “He made the wicked for the day of evil”, “vessels of wrath fitted for destruction”, etc. But Scripture does not use these expressions in the sense implied by the objection—that is, as though the torments of perishing sinners are the ultimate resting point (terminus acquiescentiae) in the heart of God, as if He wills their condemnation for its own sake.

God wills the condemnation of the reprobate from Himself and for Himself, but not for its own sake. Likewise, He does not will the salvation of the elect for its own sake. Rather, He wills all things, and has made all things, for His own glory. Therefore, God did not make man simply to damn him or to save him. Instead, having determined to glorify—on the one hand—His mercy tempered with justice, and—on the other—His revenging justice in man’s final condition, He consequently determined to accomplish that end through the necessary means: to create man, to permit him to sin, to recover some from sin and save them, and to harden others in sin and condemn them.

So, the condemnation of the reprobate is not the end of God's decree, but a means to the end—namely, the manifestation of His revenging justice. Thus, when it is said, “He made the wicked for the day of evil,” it is also said, “He made all things for Himself,” and of “vessels of wrath fitted for destruction,” it is also said, “that He might show His wrath, and make His power known.”

And now we come to the second part of the Apostle’s answer, where he discusses:

1. The supreme end, and

2. The righteous execution of God’s decree.

1. The supreme end:

“What if God, willing to show His wrath and to make His power known…” (v. 22), and “…that He might make known the riches of His glory…” (v. 23)?

We have already seen that the objection raised in verse 19 is prompted by the decree of God, which clearly precedes both the fall and the creation of man. The Apostle refers back to this and justifies it by the end that God has proposed for Himself: the glorification of His justice and mercy.

The glory of God is the chief end of all things (Romans 11:36): as all things are from Him, so all things are for Him. And just as God is to be glorified by all, so He is to be glorified in all ways, through the full display of all His attributes—wisdom, power, holiness, mercy, justice, and so on.

This is what theologians call “the good of the universe”—that is, the manifestation of the Divine Majesty in and through all created things, like a mirror reflecting His glory. The wisdom of God has appointed this way for the glorification of His mercy and justice (attributes into which the glory of all His works ultimately resolves), and thus God is justified in His decree.

This—His acting according to His wisdom for His own glory—is the only kind of justice that applies to God’s decrees, which theologians call justitia condecentiae (the justice of what is fitting). Therefore, the very proposal of such an end, as His wisdom dictates for His glory, justifies God.

Yet, God does not only decree to glorify His justice—He also decrees to glorify His power, or His dominion over His creature. This relates again to the freedom of His decree. So, when it is said that they are “vessels of wrath fitted for destruction”, this has reference to God's intention—just as a potter makes some vessels for honour and others for dishonour, as he pleases. Hence, it is pointless to object that they are “fitted of themselves”—though that is true in the sense that they corrupt themselves and thus are fit for destruction. Yet the text also refers to God’s intention, because His power and dominion are displayed over man to be created, just as the potter exercises power over his clay (Proverbs 16:4).

2. The righteous execution:

God does not condemn until they have sinned. In fact, He endures them in their sin with much patience. We may also add, as other texts affirm, that He condemns none without their also condemning themselves. Even as they question God's justice and argue against it, their own conscience testifies to the righteousness of God in condemning them.

Here we must distinguish between the decree and its execution:

- In the decree, the sovereignty and liberty of God are expressed—and the only righteousness required is that which pertains to Himself: to be true to His own glory.

- In the execution, God’s righteousness toward the creature is displayed.

In His decree, God is not moved by any consideration of sin.

In His execution, He punishes only for sin.

Therefore, His decree is absolute in itself, but regular in execution. It is above sin, and above any consideration of sin—even as foreseen—as a motive for His will. Yet it is indeed His will that the reprobate be condemned for sin, and for sin only. For, the ultimate end of His decree being the glory of His justice, He can condemn only in a way that is consistent with that justice—for sin.

Thus we have followed the Apostle’s argument through this great mystery. Having laid this foundation, we shall proceed more clearly and concisely through what follows.

THE THIRD SERMON

"But the election hath obtained it, and the rest were hardened." - Romans 11:7

We now proceed to confirm the doctrine:

1. Concerning that part which relates to election.

2. And then to the part concerning reprobation.

1. Concerning Election, let us define it as follows:

Election is the eternal decree of God, whereby He has, out of mere love and sovereign pleasure, ordained a certain number of men—those being the fewer—to eternal life and to all blessings that lead to life in Christ, to the praise of His glorious grace.

In this description, we observe the following points:

1. Election is the decree or purpose of God.

2. It is His eternal decree.

3. It is a decree unto eternal life.

4. It concerns persons, and specifically a certain, definite number, each chosen by name.

5. It is a decree concerning the fewest of men.

6. It arises from love and sovereign good pleasure.

7. It is founded upon mere love and arbitrary pleasure, above and beyond any consideration of merit or worth in man.

8. It includes not only eternal life, but also all blessings in Christ which lead to life.

9. It is an effectual decree—accomplishing what it purposes.

10. Its ultimate aim is the praise of the glorious grace of God.

- That it is His purpose or decree—these are the two words Scripture uses here:

1. πρόθεσις (purpose), meaning a deliberate setting down beforehand—Romans 9:11, Romans 8:28: “His purpose,” and “the counsel of His will,” Ephesians 1:11.

2. προορίζω (His distinguishing purpose), translated as predestination, which means to ordain beforehand—to determine, within set bounds, who shall receive what others outside those bounds shall not. See Ephesians 1:11, Romans 8:29. Here, the eternal distinction and separation between one man and another, regarding their final state, has its beginning.

- It is His eternal decree.

If it is a decree—an immanent act in the heart of God—it must be eternal. Nothing is new in God, even though all things are new from Him.

And if this reasoning is not clear to some, Scripture is unmistakably clear:

- Ephesians 1:4 — “Chosen us in him before the foundation of the world.”

- Matthew 25:34 — “The kingdom prepared for you.”

- 1 Peter 1:20 — Christ as Redeemer, ordained before the foundation of the world to bring His people into that kingdom.

- It is a decree unto eternal life.

Stapleton the Jesuit (and others, even among Protestants, have followed him) tries to reduce what the Apostle says about election in Romans 9 to nothing more than the inheritance of the land of Canaan, the birthright, and other temporal privileges—not eternal life. They claim that God’s love for Jacob and hatred for Esau (spoken of by the Apostle) applied not to their persons individually but to their descendants corporately: Jacob’s seed receiving the land of Canaan, and Esau’s losing his inheritance—as later described by Malachi.

But that this election is unto eternal life is very clear—especially in Romans 9, by several arguments:

1. From the objection itself, which centres on the Jews rejecting the Gospel and thus falling short of eternal life. The Apostle, in his passionate lament, clearly implies this, and the entire argument proceeds from that assumption.

2. The Apostle draws a distinction—rooted in election and reprobation—within Jacob’s own lineage (v. 6), and he supports this by showing the same distinction within Abraham’s and Isaac’s families. He then traces all these differences back to God’s decree, using Jacob and Esau as specific examples.

3. The Apostle gives Pharaoh as an example of reprobation. And if anyone doubts that the Apostle is referring to Pharaoh’s eternal condemnation—despite the clear testimony of his hardening—then the Apostle’s subsequent argument certainly confirms it.

4. The Apostle concludes that the reprobate are “vessels of wrath fitted for destruction,” while the elect are “vessels of mercy, prepared unto glory.”

5. Furthermore, what he says about the vessels of mercy being fitted for glory, he applies not only to the Jews, but also to the called among the Gentiles. Can anyone seriously think this refers only—or even mainly—to outward privileges?

This same point is made again in Romans 11, where the Apostle returns to the same objection and answers it in the same way—by distinguishing between the elect and the rest.

1. The Apostle contrasts the election's obtaining with the hardening of the rest—and does not the hardening, along with the following testimonies against them (verses 7, 8, 9, 10), relate to eternal wrath? Then election must likewise relate to eternal glory. Furthermore, that which the hardened Jews, through their fall, failed to obtain, the called Gentiles—together with the elect Jews—did obtain. And what is that? Not the land of Canaan, nor the outward birthright, nor any such temporal privilege, but Gospel salvation (verse 11), reconciliation (verse 15). And is not the inclusion of the Gentiles, their being grafted into the covenant of life? Many are included outwardly by administration, but the elect among them by effectual calling.

Again, what is the essence of the Jews' future restoration (verses 25–26)? Is it merely outward privilege? No—it is that state of salvation by embracing the Gospel, which the Gentiles now enjoy. The fullness of the Gentiles in this regard depends upon the Jews’ return.

And just as these passages—where this doctrine is directly handled—are plain, so too are others. In Romans 8:29–30, we find the chain of eternal life. Election is the first link, and glory the last; all the intermediate steps are those which lead to glory. As this passage speaks of the chain, so elsewhere Scripture refers to the Book of Life:

Revelation 13:8, 17:8, 20:12, 15, 3:5, Philippians 4:3.

Objection: Some argue that Revelation 3:5 implies election is changeable—that names once written in the Book of Life may be blotted out.

Answer: The unchangeableness of election will be fully dealt with later. For now, to prevent misunderstanding, note that this is spoken after the manner of men, and consistent with the metaphor. To blot out of the Book of Life means no more than to deny eternal life to someone, or to not plead for it on his behalf. It simply reveals that, although his name seemed to be written there, in truth it never was.

A similar example is found in Matthew 13:12, regarding knowledge of the mysteries of the Gospel:

"Whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken away even that he hath"—explained in Luke 8:18 as, “that which he seemed to have.”

But if he only seemed to have it and did not truly possess it, how could it be taken from him? Only in this way: it will be made manifest that he only appeared to have it, but did not possess it in truth.

Returning to the point: election is called the Book of Life—therefore, it pertains to eternal life. Consistent with this, the elect are said to have their names written in heaven. Add to this what Scripture clearly teaches: the land of Canaan, the birthright, etc., were outward pledges of the eternal inheritance (Hebrews 11:9–10). The Apostle’s discourse on Esau's subjection to Jacob in Romans 9 expresses the spiritual difference between them in relation to eternal life. As we've now seen, the Apostle's doctrine of election and reprobation relates to eternal life and death—and clearly confirms this.

Esau's spiritual subjection is typified in the loss of the birthright, which he profanely despised (Genesis 25:32, etc.).

4. That election concerns persons—a specific and definite number, chosen by name in the counsel of God.

1. The Apostle’s discourse in Romans 9:11 plainly teaches this. The main point is that, while the majority of the Jews rejected the Gospel to their own condemnation, a remnant embraced it to their salvation. The ultimate reason for this difference is God's distinct decree: loving some with a view to eternal life, and hating others with a view to eternal death. Jacob and Esau are clear examples. By virtue of this distinct decree, some are called and brought to eternal life, while others are hardened unto death—in accordance with the earlier mention of election in Romans 8:28–30. God’s purpose is set upon some for life from the outset, and from that He administers the whole plan for their salvation.

2. This is further confirmed by the metaphor used so often for election: the Book of Life. It is not a law book setting out rules for attaining life, but a register in which the heirs of eternal life are enrolled.

3. The points already made individually all support this conclusion—and taken together, they confirm it even more strongly.

1. That election is of the fewest of men.

If it is not a decree concerning persons, but only concerning a general way of salvation—such as, "believers shall be saved, unbelievers shall be damned," without determining who shall believe and be saved and who shall not—then it cannot properly be said to be of the fewest or the greatest, but rather of all alike, or none in particular.

2. That it is of love and good pleasure.

3. That it is of mere love and sovereign (arbitrary) good pleasure.

Love must necessarily relate to persons. So in the example, “Jacob have I loved”, love clearly applies to an individual. This love and sovereign good pleasure must rise above all distinctions or qualities, whether existing or foreseen, in men. But there is no room for this kind of personal love if election is only a general decree describing the conditions upon which men may be saved, rather than a specific choice of persons.

4. That election is not only unto eternal life, but also unto all blessings leading to life in Christ.

If the faith and holiness of those who are saved, and all other graces and privileges, depend on this decree and are the fruit of it, then the decree must first select the persons, before they are considered as believing or holy. Because God has set them apart in love, to be the recipients of His grace, He therefore bestows upon them these graces and privileges.

5. That election is effectual unto eternal life.

This means the decree is not suspended upon man's response—whether he obeys the call of God and perseveres. Rather, by virtue of the decree itself, he is effectually brought to obey and to persevere.

6. In this is the glory of divine grace, that God makes vessels of honour—He does not merely find them so. He has “afore prepared them unto glory” (Romans 9:23), meaning in His eternal counsel.

Therefore, it remains for us to prove these points, which together both confirm what was stated before and further unfold this great mystery of election.

5. That election is of the fewest of men:

This is a truth that natural human reason does not willingly receive. Nevertheless, Scripture clearly teaches it—Matthew 20:16: “Many be called, but few chosen.”

First, if we compare those who are outwardly called with those who are not, we find that the called are the minority. For the first 4,000 years of human history, the world was largely overlooked in terms of outward calling—Acts 17:30, where it is said:

ὑπεριδὼν τοὺς χρόνους τῆς ἀγνοίας—“God winked at the times of ignorance,” meaning that He was pleased, in those ages, to overlook the children of men by not revealing His will to them or calling them to repentance through His Word.

For many generations, only certain families from the line of Seth (such as Noah) were called. Later, only one small nation—the Jews, descended from Abraham—was called (Psalm 147:19–20).

Second, even since the time of the Gospel, how many great nations—still today—remain unreached by the Word of God? And yet, all the elect are called: those of age, generally by an outward call; even their infants, by virtue of their church membership and federal inclusion, receive an outward call. All the elect are also inwardly called—justified and ultimately glorified (Romans 8:30).

That God's election usually takes place among those who are outwardly called—for themselves and their children—is evident, because He has appointed the Word and Sacraments to be the means of life. And generally, where God has chosen someone to the end (eternal life), He has also chosen them to the means.

Otherwise, these means would not be the precious and excellent blessings that Scripture describes them to be. If, therefore, the elect are generally outwardly called, and salvation ordinarily occurs among those outwardly called—and these are the fewest—then the elect are indeed the fewest.

But there is another step: All the elect are, in time, inwardly and effectually called, and only those who are effectually called were elect before time. Yet among those who are outwardly called, only a few are thus inwardly called. Hence, few are saved. So in Romans 11, the Apostle says: “a remnant according to the election of grace.”

6. That election is of love and good pleasure:

1. ἀγάπη (love) — Romans 9:13 with verse 11: “Jacob have I loved.”

2. εὐδοκία (good pleasure) — Ephesians 1:5, 9: “according to the good pleasure of his will.”

This love is expressed in singling out and foreordaining unto life. Of similar meaning is:

- προέγνω (he foreknew) — Romans 8:29, Romans 11:2: “the people whom he foreknew,” that is, the remnant according to the election of grace.

To “know” in Scripture often means to embrace in love. As in Galatians 4:9: “After ye have known God, or rather are known of God.”

God is said to “know the way of the righteous,” but says to the wicked: “I know you not.” So also in:

- 1 Peter 1:2, 20

- 2 Timothy 2:19: ἔγνω Κύριος τοὺς ὄντας αὐτοῦ — “The Lord knoweth them that are his.” That is, He knows them in a special, loving way—having built them upon the sure foundation of His own purpose.

2. It is a decree of distinguishing love—a love that chooses, embracing some while passing over others. This is what ἐκλογή (election) signifies: it limits His love and good pleasure to those whom, in His purpose, He has gathered apart from others.

As προορισμός (predestination) or προθεσις (purpose) stands in relation to the execution of God's eternal plan, so ἐκλογή (election) stands in relation to ἀγάπη καὶ εὐδοκία—God’s love and good pleasure.

7. That election is of mere love and absolute pleasure, not based on either good works or faith foreseen, is clear:

8. From Romans 9:11, where the Apostle defines election as the purpose of God, and describes Him as the one who calls, and that "the purpose of God according to election might stand." Now, it is the effectual call of God that gives faith, and in this call is the renewing work of the Holy Ghost, by which the elect are brought into the state of life and enabled for good works unto life.

This call of God is a firm and unchangeable foundation of eternal life to the elect, depending not on man, but entirely on the unchanging purpose of Him “with whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning” (James 1:17). Since we receive both faith and the Spirit through our calling, and since election is of God as one who calls, He does not foresee faith or good works in anyone before their calling. Rather, it is in His decree to give those gifts that He foresees them.

2. The arguments presented in the explanation of Romans 9:11 (towards the end of the first sermon), which prove the general conclusion that no purpose of God can depend on anything outside of Himself, apply equally here.

3. Likewise, the discourse in the second sermon—almost from beginning to end—proving that not only comparative predestination (i.e., preferring one over another) but individual predestination stands above all conditions in the creature, and therefore concludes that man considered not as fallen, but as not yet created, is the object of predestination.

4. This absolute and sovereign good pleasure of God is also clearly seen in His dispensations among mankind.

Why did He choose one nation—Israel—to be the only nation of the covenant, among whom His secret election largely prevailed, while overlooking all the other nations of the world?

Was it because He foresaw in them, independently of His decree, a greater inclination toward faith and holiness than in the rest of the world? Surely not. Moses himself says the contrary in Deuteronomy 9:4–5.

Why does God send the Gospel—since the door of faith has been opened to the Gentiles—to one people rather than to another? Is He not thereby found of those who sought Him not?

Why was it in a certain age that the mystery of the Gospel was first made known to all nations for the obedience of faith, and for life through Jesus Christ—a mystery that had been hidden since the world began (Romans 16:25–26)?

What can be said to all this but what Christ said: “Even so, Father: for so it seemed good in thy sight.” (Matthew 11:26)

5. It is called the election of grace in Romans 11:5, and therefore not of works—verse 6: “And if by grace, then is it no more of works.”

If election is not of works, then it is not of foreseen works, either. For election is God's eternal purpose, as has already been proven—and the Apostle reasons on this as a principle taken for granted throughout his discourse.

There is no other way that election could be considered “of works” than if those works were foreseen. But if not of foreseen works, then not of foreseen faith either—because in this matter, faith takes on the nature of a work, being a qualification in ourselves, supposedly recommending us to God before His gift is bestowed.

Therefore:

6. If faith or works—foreseen—are the grounds of election, then the very doctrine of free grace is overthrown at its foundation.

Scripture repeatedly affirms that our calling is of grace (2 Timothy 1:9), that faith is the gift of God (Ephesians 2:8), and that grace excludes works and prevents boasting. Yet if anything in ourselves, even from eternity, could move God to choose us—then we have, in effect, pre-empted God's grace with our faith or works foreseen. To what end, then, are all these declarations of grace?

7. This principle is clearly seen in the example of Christ, the head of the elect.

What reason can be given—other than God's absolute will and sovereign pleasure—for this: that the man Christ, born of the seed of David, a mortal man, should in the womb be appointed Head of the angels, the only begotten Son of God, the image and glory of the Father, the light, righteousness, and life of the world?

Can anyone suppose that something foreseen in the human nature of Christ could have moved God to ordain such things concerning Him? Certainly not. As Augustine says, “In the Head of the Church we have the clearest example of the most free election.”

Therefore, that election is of mere love and sovereign good pleasure, and not of faith or works foreseen, is further confirmed by the next point.

8. In God’s purpose of election, He decrees not only eternal life, but also all spiritual blessings that lead to life to be freely given in Christ.

In Romans 8:29–30, the entire method of salvation flows from election. Similarly, in Ephesians 1:3–5, we are “blessed with all spiritual blessings” according to election, which is the foundation of all.

It is from that election that Christ is given to us, in whom we receive all blessings:

- Our holiness (verse 4),

- Our adoption (verse 5),

- Our redemption and the forgiveness of sins (verse 7),

- The revelation of the mystery of the Gospel (verse 9),

- Our inheritance of eternal life (verse 11).

The Greek word used in verse 11 is ἐκληρώθημεν (eklērōthēmen)—"we have obtained an inheritance," or literally, "we were assigned by lot"—further suggesting how little the human will contributes to election.

Objection:

We are elected in Christ, but we are in Christ only by faith. Therefore, our faith foreseen is the cause of our election.

Answer:

1. We shall give the correct interpretation:

We are elected in Christ, that is, we are elected to receive, in union with Him—as members united to the Head—all blessings prepared for us in election. Christ is not the motive or reason of God's decree, but the means of accomplishing it. Thus says the Apostle in 1 Thessalonians 5:9: “For God hath not appointed us to wrath, but to obtain salvation by our Lord Jesus Christ.”

2. We shall also confirm that this must be the correct understanding:

1. Christ Himself is ordained as the mediator of the new covenant by virtue of election.

Romans 4:16 shows that in God's design of the covenant of grace—of which Christ is both head and mediator—He had a special eye to the elect seed: “Therefore it is of faith, that it might be by grace; to the end the promise might be sure to all the seed.”

That seed includes all to whom the covenant is sure for eternal life. Therefore, Christ was not the cause or motive for God's decree, but for their sakes—those to whom God had decreed eternal life—He ordained Christ as mediator, placing the covenant of grace in His hand.

2. Faith, by which we might be thought to be represented to God's decreeing eye as in Christ, is given to us by virtue of election—and therefore is not foreseen in us except within that decree whereby God determined to give it to us.

- Acts 13:48: “And as many as were ordained to eternal life believed.”

- John 10:26–27: “But ye believe not, because ye are not of my sheep… My sheep hear my voice.”

They believe and respond to the call of Christ because they are already His sheep—i.e., according to election. Their effectual calling proceeds from election, not vice versa.

- Titus 1:1: Paul refers to “the faith of God’s elect.” Faith, therefore, is the fruit, not the cause, of election.

And likewise, so is holiness, or any other grace that might be imagined to commend us to God:

1. All depends upon faith. If faith is not prior to the decree, then neither is holiness.

2. As previously shown, holiness itself depends upon predestination: Romans 8:29: “Whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son.”

3. Otherwise, it would be we who choose God in Christ, rather than God who chooses us: John 15:16: “Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you.”

4. Then election would be based on works, directly contradicting Romans 9:11:

“(For the children being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil,) that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works, but of him that calleth.”

From this we learn the correct meaning of such texts as:

- 2 Thessalonians 2:13: “God hath from the beginning chosen you to salvation through sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth.”

- 1 Peter 1:2: “Elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, through sanctification of the Spirit, unto obedience.”

In both, we are said to be chosen in sanctification of the Spirit (for so the Greek reads: ἐν ἁγιασμῷ Πνεύματος). That is, we are chosen so that, by the sanctification of the Spirit (to which we are also chosen), we might attain salvation and glory.

9. As election is unto life, and to all blessings leading to life, so it is effectual unto life. Not one of God’s elect shall ever ultimately perish. As they alone are elected, so every one of them shall most certainly obtain eternal life.

1. The purpose of election is firm, unchangeable, and irrevocable:

- 2 Timothy 2:19: “Nevertheless the foundation of God standeth sure, having this seal, The Lord knoweth them that are his.”

- Romans 9:11: “That the purpose of God according to election might stand.”

Therefore, it has an immovable foundation—the will of God alone.

- Hebrews 6:17: speaks of “the immutability of his counsel”—a counsel that cannot be otherwise, as the Greek word (ἀμετάθετος, ametathetos) implies.

2. By virtue of election, the elect are most certainly preserved against all temptation. Though they are, in themselves, before their calling, children of wrath by their present condition—and though after their calling, due to weakness and remaining corruption, they might a thousand times fall—yet by virtue of God's unchangeable election:

1. Every one of them shall, in due time, be effectually called.

2. After their calling, they shall be upheld against all temptation and surely brought to glory.

1. That every one of them shall be effectually called is confirmed not only by the Scriptures already cited under the previous point, but also by several others:

- John 6:37–40:

1. It is from the gift of the Father, originally, that we are entrusted into Christ’s care. We are the Father’s by election before we are Christ’s by redemption. Thus, we are not chosen because we were foreseen as redeemed and believing in Christ, but because we were chosen, we are given to Christ, that by Him we might be redeemed.

2. Every one of the elect, being given by the Father, shall come to Christ. This is their effectual calling—not merely that they can come, but that they will come.

3. Every one who comes shall certainly have life. This is stated in verse 37 and further confirmed in verses 38–40.

- John 6:44–45 also gives us these conclusions:

1. No one can come to Christ except he be drawn by the Father.

2. Whoever is drawn does come.

3. Whoever, being drawn, comes, shall have eternal life. This is implied by the promise: “I will raise him up at the last day.”

Verse 45 further clarifies this drawing: “They shall all be taught of God.” Two truths follow:

1. All who are given to Christ shall be taught of God.

2. This teaching is not external alone, but inward and effectual—a heart-teaching. “Every man therefore that hath heard, and hath learned of the Father, cometh unto me.”

From this, it is evident:

1. The elect receive a peculiar and effectual teaching from the Father.

There is not a common grace given to all, leaving them to distinguish themselves by how they respond. Rather, everyone who partakes of this divine teaching comes to Christ. Since not all come, it follows that not all are thus taught.

Hence, Augustine writes:

“If every one who has been taught comes, then it must be that he who does not come has not been taught.”

Again:

“Everyone who has heard and learned of the Father comes; but if not all come, then not all have heard and learned. For if they had, they would have come.”

2. As they are effectually called by this divine teaching, so they also persevere to the end, and every one of them obtains life.

They are so drawn and so taught that they are raised up at the last day—that is, raised unto glory. This raising is the fruit of the Father’s drawing, as seen by comparing John 6:44 with verses 39 and 40.

3. It is also further evident that only the elect—to whom it is given to come—have the power to come.

Those who do not come do not have that power:

- John 6:44: “No man can come to me, except the Father which hath sent me draw him.”

- And, as we have seen, whoever is drawn, does come.

Thus, the argument is clear:

- All who are drawn, come.

- All who have power to come, are drawn.

- Therefore, all who have power, come.

But not all come. Therefore, not all have power to come. Only the elect—those given by the Father to Christ—come. And so, only they have the power to come.

As for the objection from John 17:12, it carries little weight. Some argue from it that certain individuals given by the Father to Christ, according to election, may perish.

1. This is contrary to verse 2 of the same chapter (John 17:2) and to John 6:37, and the surrounding context, as we have previously demonstrated.

2. The form of speech used in John 17:12 does not necessarily imply that Judas was given to Christ by the Father in accordance with eternal election. At times, such phrasing carries the appearance of an exception, while in truth it serves as an exclusion. For example:

- Matthew 12:4: “It was not lawful for him to eat, neither for them which were with him, but only for the priests” (Greek: εἰ μὴ τοῖς ἱερεῦσιν).

At first glance, this might suggest that some in David’s company were priests. But the true sense is: it was not lawful for any of them, except in the case of priests (who were not present), to eat the shewbread.

In the same manner, John 17:12—“None of them is lost, but the son of perdition”—might seem to imply Judas was one of those given to Christ. Yet, according to the usage just shown, the meaning could rightly be this: None of those truly given by the Father to Christ perished; Judas, not being one of them, is the exception in appearance, but in truth, never belonged.

3. But even if we grant that Judas was in some sense given by the Father to Christ, it must be understood not as a giving according to eternal election:

1. Judas was given in regard to external status—just as all who are outwardly called and profess Christ may be said to be given to Him—yet many are called, but few are chosen.

2. He was given in regard to his apostolic office, in which sense he is said also to be chosen, John 6:70: “Have not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil?”

But that deeper giving—wherein lies the foundation of eternal life, previously discussed—Judas never received. Had he truly been given to Christ in that eternal sense, he would never have fallen away, per 1 John 2:19: “If they had been of us, they would no doubt have continued with us.”

Indeed, Christ makes this explicit when He speaks of election:

John 13:18: “I speak not of you all: I know whom I have chosen.”

Here Judas is expressly excluded.

Thus far we have shown that all the elect shall, in time, be effectually called.

2. They shall also be preserved after their calling against all temptation, so that they will certainly persevere in the grace they have received until they enter into eternal life.

The same Scriptures that prove their effectual calling also confirm their certain attainment of eternal life, as we have seen already. To these, let us add:

- 2 Timothy 2:19: “The foundation of God standeth sure…”

- Matthew 24:24: “…if it were possible, they shall deceive the very elect.”

- Revelation 13:8: “…whose names are not written in the book of life…”

- Revelation 17:8

- Revelation 20:15

- Romans 8:33–34: “Who shall lay any thing to the charge of God’s elect?”

All these texts make it clear that the foundation of life and perseverance is laid in election, so that not one of God's elect shall ever fall short of eternal life.

It was with a special eye to the elect that the covenant of grace was established—so structured that life would be made sure to them, as Romans 4:16 teaches:

“…to the end the promise might be sure to all the seed…”

Before we pass to the tenth and final particular in this doctrine of election, let us take notice of a few grotesque distortions that the Arminian doctrine has nourished—errors that stand in stark contrast to what Scripture clearly affirms.

1. The uncertainty of the called man's spiritual and final condition.

Arminianism teaches that those effectually called may yet fall away and perish, leaving every believer suspended in doubt regarding their salvation.

2. The uncertainty—or rather, the impossibility—of God’s foreknowledge of who will ultimately be saved.

If God’s election depends upon the foreseen faith or perseverance of man, then He must wait upon man’s will to act before He can know. But this would be to make man sovereign and God subject—an inversion unworthy of the divine nature.

3. The notion of temporary election and reprobation.

That one may be elect today and reprobate tomorrow is a gross contradiction to all that Scripture teaches about the eternal, immutable, and effectual nature of God’s decree (Romans 8:29–30, Ephesians 1:4–5, 2 Timothy 2:19).

1. As to the first point: Since, according to their doctrine, it is inconsistent with the liberty of man’s will that God should, in the calling of a sinner, determine that will by the work of the Holy Ghost in such a way that the sinner cannot but obey the call—so also, with regard to perseverance in the grace of that calling, they assert that the liberty of man's will requires that, even after God has done all he does for anyone, man may still fail to persevere. Hence it must necessarily follow that everything is a matter of sheer chance: whether any of the sons or daughters of men shall be saved; whether there shall ever be a Church Militant upon earth or a Church Triumphant in heaven; whether Christ should have taken on our nature, fulfilled his offices, and suffered all that he did—to no purpose or in vain.

2. As to the second point: Since man’s condition—both in receiving grace here and glory hereafter—depends, according to them, upon his use of free will (whether embracing or resisting God's call, whether continuing in grace or falling from it), and since they will not allow that God by his decree particularly determines how any individual shall use his will, asserting instead that man's will must be left free to accept or reject the Spirit's motions both at and after his calling—how can it be that what is in no way certain (having no certain foundation in God or man) can be certainly foreknown? To say that something utterly undetermined is certainly foreknown is a contradiction. Hence, they are commonly known to avoid or minimise this argument from God's foreknowledge—and, in some cases, they do not hesitate to deny God's foreknowledge altogether.

3. As to the third point: It follows from their position that no one can be said to be elect until the very last moment of life, nor anyone reprobate until the moment they persist in final unbelief. For they make faith and final perseverance the foundation for election, and unbelief and final obstinacy the foundation for reprobation. But this must be either actual (in time) or foreseen in the knowledge of God. However, according to their doctrine—as we have just shown—it cannot be in the foreknowledge of God. Therefore, it must be actual, and so election and reprobation would be temporal, not eternal; not decrees or immanent acts of God from eternity.

Accordingly, they have sometimes spoken in terms not far from this inevitable outcome of their doctrine. Arminius speaks of an “external act” of reprobation, and we hear from his followers—particularly the more prominent among them—that election is not confirmed from everlasting, that it is revocable, and that men who are at one time elect may become reprobate, and vice versa.

What monstrous opinions are these! Even as the poet wrote:

Qualia credibile est rictu ructasse trifauci / Cerberon, et Stygii monstra tremenda lacus

(“Such horrors as it is believable Cerberus with his three mouths might have belched forth, and the dreadful monsters of the Stygian lake.”)

But the former doctrine—of eternal, unchangeable election and reprobation—has already been proven by the clear light of Scripture and truth, to the praise of his glorious grace:

“To the praise of the glory of his grace” (Ephesians 1:6).

There are four aspects of the decree of Election which greatly exalt the glory of God's grace:

1. That it is unto such great blessings in Christ—the greatest of blessings, and the foundation of all others. “Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings in heavenly places in Christ: According as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world... having predestinated us unto the adoption of children... to the praise of the glory of his grace” (Ephesians 1:3–6).

2. That it is so effectual unto that end, that as at the building of the Temple, when the topstone was laid, there were great shouts of “Grace, grace unto it” (Zechariah 4:7), so here, in the full accomplishment of all blessings prepared in Election, God shall be admired in all them that believe (2 Thessalonians 1:10). In his decree of Election—which is the foundation of faith and every blessing that follows it—this admiration shall ultimately find its rest.

3. That it is so free, standing in direct opposition to all works and faith in man. It remains wholly dependent on the One who calls—not upon believers, but calling unto faith; not upon the holy, but calling unto holiness—as has been previously shown.

4. That it is particular, embracing some while passing over others. It is accompanied by the decree of Reprobation: “What if God, willing to shew his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much longsuffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction: And that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he had afore prepared unto glory” (Romans 9:22–23). There is nothing more humbling and soul-ravishing to the heart of a believer—whether in this life or in glory—than to consider: Why did God set his love upon me, and choose me unto life, while passing by so many others?

Those who make great claims about magnifying free grace, yet advocate for universal grace, universal redemption, and a form of “election” that is no true election at all—so that it might align with such a scheme—betray a deep ignorance (however wise they may appear in their own eyes) of the true nature of God's grace, and of the real grounds upon which his glory is magnified through that grace.

THE FOURTH SERMON

“But the rest were hardened.” - Romans 11:7

We now come to the doctrine of the Decree of Reprobation.

1. Concerning the word itself, which is opposite to Election, see Isaiah 41:9.

2. Concerning the doctrine, it may be gathered partly from the preceding doctrine of Election, and partly from express Scripture teaching on the subject.

Reprobation is the eternal decree of God, whereby He has, merely because it pleased Him to do so, passed over and hated the rest of mankind (the same being true also of the angels, though our focus here is on man). This He has done so as to appoint them to dishonour and everlasting destruction by means of sin, for the display—

- partly of His sovereign power over man,

- partly of His revenging justice upon perishing sinners, and

- finally, of the riches of His mercy toward His chosen and redeemed people.

This description will be plainly confirmed in its various parts by reviewing the earlier discourse, so that we will not need to dwell on it at length.

1. That there exists in God a decree opposite to the eternal decree of Election is evident from Romans 9:11, as has already been proved by a threefold argument in the exposition of that verse in the first sermon, and again in the exposition of verses 14–18 at the beginning of the second sermon, and the second observation drawn from them.

(I must here, and at various points later in this discourse on Reprobation, refer the reader back to what has already been said in the exposition of Romans chapter 9, etc., both because to repeat those things would unnecessarily lengthen this discussion, and because it would risk confusion in the reader’s understanding.)

2. That this decree is one of hatred is also clear. This hatred, being the opposite of electing love, is demonstrated in Romans 9:13—“Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated.” That this hatred refers to exclusion from the covenant of life and ultimately to eternal death has already been proved in the treatment of the third instance (vv. 10–13) in the first sermon, as well as early in the third sermon under the third point, which asserted that Election is unto eternal life. That argument also establishes this parallel truth: that Reprobation is unto eternal death.

But for our clearer understanding, we must now consider three questions:

1. What is the nature of this hatred—what does it consist in?

2. Who are the objects of this hatred?

3. What is the ground or basis of this hatred?

Concerning the first — what the hatred of reprobation consists in — it involves two things:

1. The decree to permit sin, in order to harden in it.

2. The decree to harden in sin, in order to condemn for it.

Or more precisely, it is the decree of God concerning two things:

First, to permit sin in order that the sinner be hardened in it.

Second, to harden the sinner in that sin, in order to condemn him for it.

That God decrees the existence of sin in the world has been demonstrated by several arguments towards the end of the second sermon, showing that sin arises by divine permission — without which it could not exist. Now further, regarding the reprobate, God decrees the permission of sin in order to harden them in it, and their hardening in sin in order that they be justly condemned for it.

Hence, the pathway by which the reprobate are carried towards condemnation — according to God’s decree opposite to Election — is by hardening, as stated in Romans 9:18:

"Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth."

This looks backward to His love for Jacob, and forward to the honour (v. 21) and glory (v. 23) of the vessels of mercy prepared for that end — those on whom He would make known the riches of His glory. Likewise, "whom he will he hardeneth" also looks backward to His hatred of Esau, and forward to the dishonour (v. 21), and to His wrath and power displayed (v. 22) upon the vessels of wrath fitted for destruction — those who, by abusing God’s long-suffering towards them, bring judgment upon themselves. So too Romans 11:7: "The election hath obtained it, and the rest were blinded (or hardened)."

By divine permission, then, the fall into sin is common to both the elect and the reprobate — both in Adam and in themselves personally — but with a different intention on God’s part, and a different outcome on man’s. By the sins of the elect, a way is made for their redemption through Christ. By the sins of the reprobate, a way is made for their final hardening in sin, and thus for their eternal destruction. Just as the love of God toward the elect is revealed,

1. In their effectual calling, and

2. In their final perseverance,

so also His hatred toward the reprobate is revealed,

3. In His leaving them to their sins, and

4. In their final hardening in sin.

For further clarity, let us address the following question:

Q. What does it mean to be hardened in sin?

A. It is the exercise of God’s righteous judgment upon sinners, whereby He gives them over so completely to the power of their own lusts and to the dominion of Satan, that they are no longer capable of receiving spiritual good. On the contrary, not only do they grow worse through every temptation to sin, but even the most powerful means used against sin serve only to make them worse still.

We read in Scripture of a twofold hardening:

- One befalls the disciples of Christ, as in Mark 6:52, where it is expressed in terms of dullness or spiritual blindness — “For they considered not the miracle of the loaves: for their heart was hardened.” (Greek: ἐπωρώθη ἡ καρδία αὐτῶν.) This speaks of lack of understanding.

- The other hardening is peculiar to the reprobate, and is expressed in terms of wilful stubbornness — a resistance to rightful submission. Thus Pharaoh is addressed in Exodus 9:17: “As yet exaltest thou thyself against my people, that thou wilt not let them go?” This is the hardening under discussion here.

Concerning this, three things are to be considered:

1. What is the state of a sinner thus hardened?

It is this: he is no longer capable of spiritual good, and so forth. Consider Pharaoh, whom the Apostle presents as an example of Reprobation — he continued to grow worse and worse despite all the great works of God performed before him and upon him. After each new plague, his heart was hardened again (Exod. 7:2–4). Even when the magicians were forced to confess the power of God, still Pharaoh’s heart was hardened (Exod. 8:19). Likewise, the reprobate Jews, Isaiah 6:9–10 with Matthew 13:14–15, continued in hardness of heart despite all they heard and saw in the Word and works of God through the prophet, through Christ himself, and through his apostles — both spiritual dullness and stubbornness prevailed in them.

2. What is God’s way of hardening the reprobate?

He gives them over so fully, and in this description two key aspects must especially be noted:

1. He gives them over fully to the power of their lusts, and he does this by withholding those operations of his Spirit which formerly he had provided — enlightening, convincing, restraining, and inclining works. There is a time when even the reprobates — many of them — appear, with regard to the means offered and the Spirit’s work upon them, to be in a hopeful path toward life. But when they abuse that light and those motions of the Spirit, the Lord withdraws those operations, no longer restraining them as before, but allowing them to rush headlong into all wickedness, wholly inclined to follow their lusts. Hence, God is said to harden them (John 12:40, referring to Isaiah 6:9–10), by giving them over; and they are said to harden themselves (Matt. 13:15 — “their eyes have they closed”, compare the context). God gives them over, and they increase in stubbornness against him. So, in the history of Pharaoh, sometimes God is said to harden his heart, and at other times Pharaoh is said to harden his own heart.

2. He gives them over to the dominion of Satan, whom they have chosen to serve rather than God. Satan becomes the instrument of God's wrath — to blind them further, to strike them with greater hardness of heart, and to stir up in them yet more enmity against God. Thus, in 2 Thessalonians 2:10–12, God gives over those who “received not the love of the truth” to the strong delusions of Satan, aiming certainly at their damnation. Likewise, 1 Samuel 16:14, 18:10, and 19:9 describe an evil spirit from the Lord coming upon Saul, stirring him to rage and murder — an evil spirit, therefore the Devil, yet “from the Lord”, that is, by his permission and commission (as with the lying spirit in the mouths of Ahab’s prophets). Saul was given up by God to the effective working and dominion of that evil spirit.

3. The Lord, as the supreme mover, acts upon them, these who are destitute of grace and influenced by Satan. Hence, the Lord is said to harden, to fatten, to strengthen, to turn the heart of the reprobate unto evil. For example, in Psalm 105:25 it is said that God turned the hearts of the Egyptians to hate his people. On this divine work upon the wills of men — even when they move sinfully — while God himself remains free from their sin, see further the response to the first objection in the last sermon.

3. The ground of this hardening work is their former sins; therefore we say it is the exercise of the Lord's righteous judgment upon sinners when he hardens. Though the decree of permitting sin in order to hardening, and of hardening in order to condemnation, rises above sin either acted or foreseen as that which shall be — the Lord in this decree foreseeing that it shall be, as has formerly been proved — yet the execution of this decree in hardening always follows sin committed. So, 2 Thessalonians 2: because they received not the love of the truth — there was their sin — God gave them up, etc. — there is their judgment. So, Romans 1:24, 26.

Thus we see wherein this hatred consists, further clarifying for us that such a decree exists, and that in this method we are to understand what is expressed in the description: that God appoints the reprobate to dishonour and destruction forever by sin. Hence, they are called vessels for dishonour and of wrath, fitted to destruction (Rom. 9:21–22). The Apostle also tells us, by clear implication, that some are appointed to wrath — 1 Thessalonians 5:9 — where he speaks of the great happiness of himself and the saints, that God had not appointed them to wrath. Some, then, he had appointed thereto. Hence Jude 4: Certain men were foreordained (or forewritten) to that judgment. As election is the book of life, so reprobation is the book of death — the names of the reprobate there registered for destruction.

It is vainly objected that the forewriting in Jude refers only to Enoch's prophecy in verse 14. For:

1. How does it appear that Enoch’s prophecy was written?

2. In that these men in Jude’s time were prophesied of so many ages before, it is evident they were ordained to judgment long before — and if so many ages before, then from all eternity; there being no reason why God would first decree it in that age alone. Especially since all God’s decrees are eternal, and his love in election and hatred in reprobation are not at all grounded on works either done or foreseen.

Hence, 1 Peter 2:8: They stumble at the word, being disobedient: whereunto also they were appointed. The Greek word there, τίθημι (tithēmi), means they were formerly placed or set to stumble. So also Proverbs 16:4: The Lord hath made all things for himself: yea, even the wicked for the day of evil. God, in the creation of man, had the condemnation of the reprobate in view for the manifestation of his glory. Therefore, they are vessels designed for dishonour and destruction from their very formation (Rom. 9:20–22).

Thus far, we have shown that there is such a decree of hatred in God concerning the reprobates, and wherein it consists.

2. As to the object of this hatred — who are the reprobates here spoken of?

Answer: All but the elect.

1. The election hath obtained it, says the Apostle, but the rest were hardened (Rom. 11:7), speaking of the Jews. But in his broader discourse, he divides the whole world into these two ranks — as was formerly observed in the second sermon, under the second observation on Romans 9:14–19.

2. Since God has chosen some, and only some, to life, then he must have determined the rest to death — or else there are people upon whom the Lord has passed no certain determination either for life or death. But not for life — else he would have chosen them. Not for death — as is here assumed. Then:

1. He has not determined how he shall be finally glorified by them.

2. Nor what their final state shall be.

3. Nor what their course shall be in this life.

But this would nullify a great part of divine providence. And by the same logic, the same would have to be affirmed of the angels — thereby further reducing the scope of God's providential reign, and effectively denying that he is the universal and supreme ruler.

3. That a decree of reprobation exists for some has already been proved. And since there is no indication anywhere in Scripture — nor any reasonable supposition — as to why only some of the non-elect should be reprobate and not all, it must be concluded that all the non-elect are reprobate.

4. Since in election, life and all blessings leading to life are prepared — and since all that makes for God’s glory depends upon election — and since all men are either ultimately saved or damned — it must follow that all but the elect are reprobate. So Revelation 20:15: And whosoever was not found written in the book of life was cast into the lake of fire. Thus, the condemnation of all who perish on the day of judgment is ultimately traced to their non-election. From this it is evident that eternal life is originally dependent upon election.

We may therefore say of all but the elect, as in Habakkuk 1:12: Thou hast ordained them for judgment... But we do not need to press this point further, as very few — if any — who admit the reprobation of some deny it of all but the elect.

3. As to the ground of this hatred — why does God decree to permit the rest of mankind, besides the elect, to sin, with the certain aim of hardening them in sin, and to harden them in sin with the certain aim of condemning them for sin?

Answer. There is no ground at all but his own will for his own glory. Therefore, we say he has hated merely because he willed to do so. For this, the Apostle is clear in Romans 9:

1. He explicitly removes all works of man, attributing everything instead to the purpose of God (v. 11).

2. He clearly resolves the difference between the Elect and the Reprobate entirely into the will of God (vv. 15–24).

For a fuller explanation of this passage and its support for the matter at hand, see the first sermon, beginning at verse 11 of Romans 9 and continuing to the end of the second sermon. There, we find under verse 11:

1. Three arguments to prove that the purpose of God must be entirely self-determined.

2. The Apostle’s entire discourse, both in raising and answering objections from verses 14 to 22, clearly demonstrates this point.

Thus far, it has been shown that Reprobation is:

- God’s eternal decree,

- His decree of hatred,

- His decree for permitting sin with a definite purpose of hardening in it,

- His decree for hardening in sin with a definite purpose of condemning for it,

- And that the object of this decree is all people, apart from the Elect.

Now follows the end or ultimate purpose of it: His own glory.

1. In his sovereign power over mankind.

2. In his revenging justice upon perishing sinners.

3. In the riches of his mercy upon his chosen and saved ones.

That the glory of God is the end of all things — and that he is to be glorified in all his attributes, in every possible way — and that whatever his wisdom determines to be for his glory must come to pass: see towards the end of the second sermon, where this is addressed in the second part of the Apostle’s answer, Romans 9:22–23.

Now these attributes—the glorifying of which the Lord had in view, especially in the decree of Reprobation—are:

1. His sovereign power over man, considered neither as pure nor impure, but as not yet created; his decree ordaining all the rest, except the Elect, unto sin, and destruction by sin (Rom. 9:20–21). This is more fully discussed and, I believe, clearly proven in the second sermon, beginning around the fifth observation and continuing through the Apostle's plea for God's absolute power, and the explanation of that plea in verses 20–21. It is also further clarified in this sermon, where the hatred of God is unfolded—what we have just examined.

2. His just wrath, or revenging justice, upon perishing sinners, along with his power or might for their destruction (v. 22). Here we may observe:

1. The power mentioned in this verse is his δύναμις (dynamis), that is, his might for the execution of judgment upon the Reprobates unto their destruction. The power mentioned in verse 21 is his ἐξουσία (exousia), that is, his right or authority. This refers to the creation of man—God has the right to create man for whatever final state he pleases, and accordingly to order him unto that state, including the condemnation of sinful man.

2. The Reprobate are “vessels of wrath fitted (or prepared) for destruction,” which refers not only or even primarily to their corrupting themselves and thus bringing damnation upon themselves—though that is certainly true—but it refers primarily to God and his purpose in their creation. This is evident both from the metaphor (the potter prepares or fits a vessel of dishonour for its dishonourable use), and from the earlier discourse, which has been discussed at length. It aligns with other Scriptures, such as Proverbs 16:4—"The LORD hath made all things for himself: yea, even the wicked for the day of evil." In his decree of creation, God had their final destruction in view, and therefore ordered all that would contribute to it (see also 1 Peter 2:8 and Jude 4).

3. His mercy towards his Elect (v. 23). This has already been addressed at the end of the third sermon, under that part of the description of Election that speaks of it being “to the praise of his glorious grace.”

THE FIFTH SERMON

"But the rest were hardened." - Romans 11:7

Having laid down the positive doctrine of Reprobation, we now come to answer objections:

1. Express texts of Scripture.

2. Other arguments by which opponents of this doctrine attempt to fasten great absurdities upon it.

1. For the texts of Scripture, the main ones are those in which there appears to be, at first glance, as much seemingly in favour of the opposing view as in all other Scripture put together:

- 1 Timothy 2:4, where it is said that God "will have all men to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth."

- 2 Peter 3:9, where it is affirmed that God is "not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance."

- Ezekiel 33:11, where the Lord declares with an oath that He has "no pleasure in the death of the wicked; but that the wicked turn from his way and live."

- Ezekiel 18:23, where the Lord says He has "no pleasure at all that the wicked should die," and in verse 32 affirms again that He has "no pleasure in the death of him that dieth."

These are the Scriptures they are accustomed to press vehemently, emphasising that:

- The Lord declares positively that He wills all to be saved.

- Negatively, He is not willing that any should perish.

- He wills that they might be saved through knowledge and repentance.

- He has no pleasure—no, none at all—in the death of a sinner, not even of him who dies.

- On the contrary, He desires that the sinner should turn and live.

- And for this, they argue, the Lord engages His own life.

Answer:

1. We must provide general responses to these Scriptures, which have been misused by them collectively.

2. Then we will give specific responses to each individually.

General Answer 1: Consider, on the other hand, what has already been clearly established from Scripture:

- That the Lord does hate some in view of their condemnation.

- That this hatred is expressed in His decree to permit sin in order to harden, and to harden in sin in order to condemn.

- That this decree arises above all considerations of sin in man (though not without eventual reference to sin).

- That, as the potter from the same lump makes some vessels to honour and some to dishonour, so the Lord, from mankind equally presented to His decree (not yet created), prepares some for glory as vessels of mercy, and others for destruction as vessels of wrath.

- That the different decrees of Election and Reprobation are the original grounds of the difference seen in the spiritual and eternal state of men—“The Election hath obtained it, and the rest were hardened.”

- That in both of these decrees, the will of God reigns: “I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and whom I will, I harden.”

- That some were "of old ordained"—forewritten unto condemnation (Jude 4).

- That, as God has made all things for Himself, even the wicked are made for the day of evil (Proverbs 16:4).

- That some are appointed or set to stumble at Christ and His Word, disobedient thereto (1 Peter 2:8), in contrast to the "chosen generation" of verse 9.

Conclusion: We must interpret Scripture so that it is consistent with itself. Therefore, we must interpret the former texts in such a way that they do not contradict these other passages, nor the main truths clearly set forth in them.

Answer 2: By Distinguishing the Will of God

The will of God is understood in two ways—sometimes as His decreeing will, or will of intention; at other times as His declaring will, or will of administration.

1. His decreeing will determines what shall or shall not be. This is referenced in Psalm 115:3 and Romans 9:19: “Whatsoever the Lord pleased, that did he in heaven, and in earth...” and “Who hath resisted his will?” Whatever God wills in this sense is certainly brought to pass; whatever does not come to pass, it is certain He did not will it in this way. For this will of His cannot be frustrated—as the Psalmist affirms and the Apostle grants. Even the most opposing wills of men and devils, contrary to His commands, still fulfil this will of God.

To will and not to will is so in the liberty of Him who wills or nills, that no creature can either hinder His will or overcome His power. — Augustine

2. His declaring will shows what is man’s duty—what, being done or left undone, God approves or disapproves. This is expressed partly by His commands, partly by the means He provides. In dealing with men, the Lord speaks in a way suited to human understanding. When men command something, or provide the means to accomplish it, it is usually (though not always) their intention that it should be done.

This will of God is frustrated as often as His commands are broken or His means are abused. This will does not always relate to the outcome. When God commanded Abraham to offer Isaac, that was His declaring will. It was Abraham’s duty to prepare to do it, and God approved his obedience. But that Isaac should actually be sacrificed—this God did not intend, as is clear from the outcome. So, this is not properly the will of intention, but rather a sign of His will, as revealed to us. Sometimes it agrees with His will of intention; sometimes not. Often, God’s will of intention is that His declaring will not be fulfilled—especially when sin is committed.

Regarding this, see Leviticus 13:34 (contextually understood), “I would, ye would not.” Meaning: “I would—through all my prophets in the past, and now by myself—I called upon you and gave you means to turn to me. But you would not. You resisted my call and abused the means I gave you.”

So when God is said to will the salvation of all, or not that any should perish, or that He has no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, etc., either the terms of universality (“all,” “not any”) must be properly limited, or the will of God must be rightly distinguished—or both. Nothing must be ascribed to God's will of intention but what certainly comes to pass.

Therefore, this conclusion must be drawn in answer to all such texts, and others of like kind:

God never intended the salvation of any but those who are—and shall be—saved.

Otherwise, His will of intention would be frustrated, which cannot be.

1. As previously shown from Psalm 115:3 and Romans 9:19.

2. The truth of this conclusion will appear by examining that supposed will of intention in God which some imagine for the salvation of all without exception. It must either be:

- A complete and determinate act of God's will, or

- A natural inclination not amounting to a full will.

If it is the first, then God is not unchangeable—first determining all men to salvation, then reversing that determination. But with God, “there is no variableness, neither shadow of turning” (James 1:17). Nor can there be any change in Him, for all change arises from imperfection—whether in wisdom, power, or blessedness.

Therefore, God does not will one thing now and another later. Though He executes His will in parts, step by step, and in time, His will itself is one constant, eternal act—unchanging from everlasting to everlasting.

But the adversaries here prefer the latter option, affirming it to be a natural inclination in God—not in complete operation—to this end distinguishing the will of God into antecedent (foregoing) and consequent (following).

The antecedent will they define as a natural inclination in God, whereby He wills the salvation of all, prior to considering a certain act (such as Adam’s sin), or other specific acts of sin in man. The consequent will is that whereby He actually determines the condemnation of many. This determination, they claim, issues from the final judgment of divine wisdom, based on the consideration of certain acts in the creature foreseen as future events—but not decreed by God to occur.

Answer:

1. Even if this distinction were granted, it could not support their case. For this so-called consequent will of God—has it not already taken place in the mind of God long ago? Has not God, even now, considered everything that can possibly fall within the scope of His understanding concerning the creature, whether in relation to eternal life or death? Or by what sluggish degrees do they imagine the divine mind advances in consideration? Can they truly conceive of God so grossly as to suppose that He had not considered all things before the world began? If that be so, then even by their own admission, God’s consequent will for the condemnation of many has long since passed.

2. This distinction must be rejected, as it makes God out to be like a worthless idol, for the following reasons:

1. It contradicts the simplicity of God’s spiritual nature, by which He is what He is—purely and completely in act. This is evident from the perfection of His being. The purer an inclination is, the more perfectly it exists in operation. Among angels and men, the more their love and fear of God exist not only in inclination but in action, the more perfect their state. The light in the sun always shines actually and continually. But God’s nature is of the highest perfection. Therefore, there is no inclination in Him that is not also in full and actual operation. For this reason, all orthodox theologians in agreement on this point have affirmed that God is actus purus—pure act.

2. It contradicts the perfection of His wisdom. There is no time or moment in which God does not actually consider all that can possibly be considered concerning the creature’s acts and all dependent things. Therefore, there is no moment in which God does not fully and determinately will whatever He wills concerning His creatures.

3. The conclusion is supported by the power of God: If He wills the salvation of all, and has power to bring it about, then all will be saved. It is a settled principle: Quod volunt potentes, agunt omnes—whatever the powerful truly will, they will accomplish, if they have the power. What more is needed for an action than will and power?

What does Arminius say to this? He claims that God wills the salvation of all modo convenienti—“in a suitable manner.”

Answer: Either the salvation of all can be brought about in a suitable manner, or it cannot.

- If it can, then the argument remains: God wills it, it can be rightly accomplished, and He has the power to do it—so why is it not done? Indeed, it is clear that it can be done suitably, because God does this very thing for some—giving them grace and causing them to persevere in it. He could do the same for all, if He so pleased.

- If it cannot be done suitably, and yet God still wills it (according to their claim), then God wills something that cannot be suitably done. What an absurdity to ascribe such a will to God—the very rule of all righteous, wise, and fitting action! That would be a will more appropriate to a child than to the all-wise God.

Or will they say further? That though He wills it, yet because it makes more for His glory that not all should be saved, therefore not all shall be saved?

Answer: But if it goes against His glory that all should be saved, then He does not will it. If God could will what opposes His own glory, and the way by which He has determined finally to be glorified, then He would be sinning against Himself. According to this supposition, there are conflicting purposes within the heart of God, and He is at strife with Himself. What the poet says about the weak elements being at odds with each other, these prophets say of the one perfect God:

Frigida pugnabant calidis, humentia siccis,

Mollia cum duris, sine pondere habentia pondus.

Cold things with hot, moist things with dry did fight,

Soft things with hard, and weighty things with light.

This last point especially—weighty things with light—suggests that His former will, being as it were of no weight, opposes the weighty aim and pathway of His own glory (which is the end, the measure, the rule, and the balance of all things). Thus, it must give way to His latter will, as being that in which true weight and value are found.

4. From the happiness of God:

If He is perfectly happy, then whatsoever He wills must certainly come to pass. Happiness is an entire and perfect good. It is a greater happiness to have all that one wills than to lack it. For if the absence of one willed thing does not in any degree lessen happiness, then neither does the absence of another. For nothing added to nothing still results in nothing. And if so, then a being could be equally happy who possesses none of what he wills as one who possesses everything he wills—a conclusion which common sense rejects.

5. From the knowledge of God:

If, from all eternity, He knows who will be condemned, then He has willed their condemnation; and that antecedently to this knowledge. He knows it, because He has willed it. For whatsoever He knows as that which shall be, He knows either in itself or in Himself. He does not know it in itself, since, as yet, it is not. But before the creation of the world, nothing existed but Himself. Therefore, nothing could have been known to Him in itself—only in Himself.

Objection. But just as we see what is present in certain moments of time, so God in His eternity—comprehending at once and altogether all time (for His eternity is the full possession, all at once, of an endless life)—sees before all time whatsoever is in any part of time.

Answer. That in His eternity He may see anything in itself, there is required not only the existence of His endless life all at once, but also the co-existence of the thing itself to be seen. Therefore, just as man cannot see anything in itself in one moment of time which does not yet exist in that moment but will exist in a future moment, so neither does God see anything in itself before all time which is not yet, but will be in time. Otherwise, He would see time in itself before time existed—which is a contradiction. And this is not a shadow of imperfection in God, but an impossibility in the thing itself.

What is here said regarding the thing itself applies just as clearly to all created causes of the thing. They too cannot be seen in themselves before all time, since they only exist in time. Therefore, what God knows from eternity as that which shall be, He knows in Himself. If in Himself, then in His will.

There is in God a threefold knowledge:

1. First, an apprehension of the nature of things. This may be illustrated by the forms we find in our own minds, when we conceive of something merely according to its essential nature—just as a builder may have the design of a house in his mind without yet determining whether it shall or shall not be built. In like manner, the divine nature includes the apprehension of all things—possible and impossible, possibilities and impossibilities. But in this apprehension, He does not determinately know what shall be, because otherwise it would follow that He apprehends only those things that are and shall be.

2. Secondly, the knowledge of what is possible—what may or may not be. This He knows in His own power; for whatsoever is possible to be done, is so because He has power to bring it to pass. But this does not mean He knows determinately what shall be, for then He would only be able to do what He does, and no more.

3. Thirdly, it remains that the knowledge of what shall be is founded in His will. How did He know the world would exist, and that it would be this world and no other, before it was? In His mind were thousands of other forms and representations. He was able to have made the world in another form, with other kinds of creatures. So, He could not have known that it should be, and that it should be this, except by His will. He knows both that it shall be, and what it shall be, because He willed it to be, and to be just as it is.

Therefore, if God knew from all eternity that all would not be saved, and who specifically would not be saved, He knew this because it was His will that all would not be saved, and that these would be the ones who would not be saved.

But, as has already been noted, the Arminians are very evasive when it comes to God's knowledge of the state of man in relation to eternal life. They allow no determinate and certain ground of it—neither in God nor in man.

Thus far we have given a general answer to these Scriptures collectively; we now proceed more particularly.

1. To the two Scriptures, 1 Timothy 2:4, where it is said that God "will have all men to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth," and 2 Peter 3:9, where it is said that God is "not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance": these Scriptures correct the false assumption that God’s will of intention (or His decreeing will) is that every individual without exception should be saved. For as He wills that all should come to the knowledge of the truth, so He wills that all should repent—but is this His intending will, His decreeing will? The contrary is evident.

2. From His denial of means.

3. From His denial of His Spirit to many who even possess the means.

1. Regarding the denial of means: He does not afford all people the necessary means. This is plainly evident and cannot reasonably be denied. For nearly the first 4,000 years, the world at large was overlooked; the means of knowledge, the revelation of God’s covenant, were confined to the Church—and that Church restricted first to the families of the Patriarchs, and later to the small nation of the Jews. Hence the Apostle declares, Acts 17:30, and Romans 16:25–26. It is for this reason that the Jews were so startled when the door of faith was widely opened to the Gentiles. Even the Apostle Peter had to receive a vision from heaven to understand God's purpose concerning the calling of the Gentiles (see Acts 10).

Since the coming of Christ, is the Gospel preached in every nation without exception, even to this day? Are there not still many Pagan nations throughout the world?

2. He has at times denied the means of grace to those whose hearts, had they received them, would have been less obstinate than others to whom He sent the means, who then hardened their hearts against them and perished. This is evident in our Saviour’s comparison between Tyre and Sidon on the one hand, and Capernaum on the other, as recorded in the Gospels.

Objection. All in Adam were taken into the covenant of grace.

Answer.

1. Even if that were true, it would not suffice. How does it follow that Adam’s descendants in later generations should be included in the call of grace, or brought to a knowledge of the Gospel, merely because Adam once possessed it on their behalf?

2. But it is utterly false. For if Adam had been a root of Gospel righteousness to his descendants, then Gospel grace would have come to all through him. But Scripture teaches the very opposite: it is Christ, not Adam, who is the root of Gospel righteousness—in opposition to Adam—Romans 5.

Objection. They had the means of knowledge in their ancestors long ago, who, by their unworthy conduct, lost them—for themselves and their descendants.

Answer.

1. Even if that were granted, it would not therefore follow that God wills their descendants should come to the knowledge of the truth.

2. This assumes their ancestors were a kind of common stock, forfeiting Gospel privileges for their posterity throughout the whole world; but it is plain that some nations never had the Gospel among them until many years after the death of Christ.

Objection. The creation reveals so much of God, that if man would only improve it as far as he could by the power of nature, God would then reveal the Gospel to him and grant him prevenient grace. This, they say, is the law God made with Christ, on account of the merit of His passion. Thus, they argue, all men have the means of saving knowledge initially in the creation, and it is within their ability to improve those initial means to obtain the ultimate means in the word of the Gospel. Hence they teach that the sun, moon, and stars preach the Gospel, referring to Romans 10.

Answer.

This tenet is purely Jesuitical, and it has been refuted even by the more orthodox of the Papists themselves—by these or similar arguments:

1. In revealing the Gospel, God is "found of them that sought me not" (Romans 10:20). Therefore, the Gospel does not depend upon man's prior seeking or natural powers.

2. "It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy" (Romans 9:16). According to this theory, however, mercy is shown only to the one who, by improving natural ability, wills and runs—thus contradicting Paul.

3. "He will have mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth" (Romans 9:18). In that passage, the original ground of salvation is ascribed solely to the sovereign will of God. But according to this theory, God's will is made to depend on man's natural effort.

4. "Who maketh thee to differ? and what hast thou that thou didst not receive?" (1 Corinthians 4:7). If the various levels of grace among the saints are due to what they have received from God, then even more so is the essential difference between the saint and the sinner. But according to this theory, the difference lies in how man improves natural light.

5. The greatest sinners—those who most abused their natural gifts—such as publicans, harlots, and others listed by the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 6:9–10, are often the ones called to salvation, while many others, more moral and externally restrained, are passed by. As Augustine beautifully writes:

"There is nothing that I can observe in choosing men to saving grace—should I, in my thoughts, undertake to test this election—but either greater intelligence, or fewer sins, or both; and if we add, let us say, honourable and useful acts: whoever then is entangled and defiled with even the smallest sins (for who is entirely free?), and yet has quick wit and is accomplished with the finest acts, seems a fit man to be chosen to grace. But if I determine thus, He will laugh at me, who has chosen the weak things of the world to confound the strong, and the foolish things of the world to confound the wise. And so I, beholding Him and being corrected with shame, am mocked—alongside many who, compared with some sinners, are more chaste, and compared with some fishermen, are orators."

—Augustine, To Simplicianus, Book 1, near the end.

6. According to this supposition, there is no room left for prevenient grace. Rather, it becomes a debt—earned by man's improvement of nature. Thus, it overthrows itself: it is not grace, because it is of works, and not prevenient, because it is preceded by merit from the use of natural powers.

Objection. But it is for the merits of Christ, and therefore of grace.

Answer. But where it is of works, it is not of grace, says the Apostle; therefore this—that Christ has merited no more by it (being the overthrow of grace)—is no better than saying we are justified by works. In both cases, grace would cease to be grace. As for that text, Romans 10:18 compared with Psalm 19, it is a most ridiculous twisting of Scripture to apply it in this way. It is plain from Romans that those whose sound goes forth, etc., are the Apostles and sent teachers, preaching the word of the Gospel to the ear; by whose preaching faith is immediately produced, upon hearing (verses 14, 15, 16, 17). Not the sun, moon, and stars, which merely display the works of God to the eye—by which men may be remotely prepared for the Gospel, but not brought to faith by it. What is quoted from Psalm 19 is used allusively: the course of the Gospel in the hands of the Apostles and their successors is likened to the course of the sun in the sky. So much for the denial of means.

2. Regarding the denial of the Spirit in terms of saving operation to many who have the means:

The same word preached is to one the savour of life unto life, to another the savour of death unto death. While some are converted, others are hardened. Observe here:

1. It is God who makes the difference (1 Corinthians 4:7). The effectual call of a sinner in saving illumination, faith, and repentance is a gift (Ephesians 1:17; 2:8; Philippians 1:29; 2 Timothy 2:25; Ezekiel 36:26–27).

2. It is of mere grace, without regard to previous works (2 Timothy 1:9; Romans 11:5–6; Romans 9:11).

3. The Lord acts in this with absolute liberty (John 3:8).

4. In calling a converted sinner, the Lord gives both the power and the actual exercise of that power; to those who remain unconverted, He gives neither. The first part of this is evident from the texts above, which prove it is His gift. Both aspects are clear from John 6:44–45: no one can come unless the Father draws and teaches them. Where this is lacking, there is not even the power to come. But where it is given, not only do they have the power, but they do in fact come. Hence, the conversion of a sinner is an effectual and particular work of God. If God did the same for those who are not converted as He does for those who are, they too would be converted—something we've already seen to be untrue.

5. The Lord proceeds in accordance with His decree—converting some, while hardening others against the means (Romans 9:18). For conversion: Acts 13:48; Romans 8:30; Ephesians 1:4–5. For hardening: John 12:37–42. That the Jews were not converted under the powerful ministry of Christ, says the Evangelist, was because the Lord had long before decreed their hardening and foretold it. Isaiah, in his time, beheld the glory of Christ as He was to be revealed in the flesh and in His preaching (with miracles added to His sermons), and he prophesied of these Jews that they would be hardened by His word and works.

Hence, it is evident upon reviewing these points that "all" cannot be taken to mean every individual without exception. Not even the declaring will of God—in providing means—applies to all in that sense. Much less does His decreeing will, according to which He dispenses Himself so differently, both in offering and applying the means.

We conclude here with Augustine:

“God could,” says he, “turn the will of the wicked to good. He could, clearly, because He is omnipotent. Why then does He not? Because He will not. And why He will not—this remains with Himself (penes ipsum est); for we ought not to be wise above what is fitting.”

Here the wisdom and sovereignty of God ascend to their highest. Whoever tries to strain their eyes to see further will lose their sight; whoever tries to sound the depths will lose their plumb line; whoever seeks to comprehend His majesty will be overwhelmed by His glory.

So much for the specific answers to those two Scriptures jointly. Now, finally, we turn to each individually.

For the first, 1 Timothy 2:4. It is clear from the context that “all men” refers to all ranks and classes of people—whether kings and those in authority, or subjects and those under authority (as in Galatians 3:28, where no difference of nation, sex, or condition excludes anyone from Christ). There was particular reason in the state of those times for the Apostle to address this point: the kings and rulers of the world were then severe persecutors of the truth and avowed enemies to it. It might have seemed a waste of effort to pray for such a depraved class of people. Therefore, the Apostle gives this reason—that among people of that order, just as among others, God has His elect whom He will save.

For the second, 2 Peter 3:9: “To us-ward,” says the Apostle. Who are these? The Apostle, himself an elect and believing person, is writing to the dispersed Jews who suffered persecution for the Gospel—elect, believing, and sanctified themselves (1 Peter 1:1–2 and 2 Peter 3:1). The point is this: God delays the day of His great judgment so that He may first gather in all His elect—not willing that any of them should perish. Though applied to those of that generation among the Jews, it also looks forward to that future harvest of God's elect among them, which shall come in their great calling yet to come (Romans 11:28, etc.).

For the other two Scriptures, Ezekiel 33 and 18:

1. The Lord does not will their death by His declaring will, inasmuch as He has commanded them to turn and given them the means to do so.

2. Concerning His decreeing will, the Lord does not will their death in the sense implied by the accusations brought against Him, which He answers in these chapters.

They accuse the Lord, first, of injustice—punishing children for the offences of their fathers, when the children themselves are innocent (Ezekiel 18:2); and second, of unmercifulness, as though He is unbending toward repentant sinners. The Lord refutes both charges. He repeatedly affirms in Ezekiel 18 that the wicked who turn shall find mercy. Both these accusations are repeated in Ezekiel 33—unmercifulness in verse 10, and injustice in verse 17. If these accusations were true, God would delight in the death and torment of perishing sinners—as a tyrant delights in the blood of his subjects—and would will their death as a cruel executioner rather than as a righteous judge.

The answer, then, is this: God does not will the death of the sinner in such a way as to be guilty of injustice (condemning without fault) or of unmercifulness (being unmoved by repentance). Rather, to truly encourage repentance, He has clearly declared that He takes no pleasure in the death of the sinner—even of him that dies. Yet, based on the unchangeable grounds previously established, the Lord does will the death of those who die impenitent, for the glory of His power and justice revealed in their condemnation.

[The same general answers apply to those Scriptures frequently cited—and just as often misused—in support of Universal Redemption. These verses are commonly raised in objection to the doctrine of Predestination. Further and more detailed responses arise (1) from the very context of the main texts they cite; and (2) from the analogy of faith seen in many other foundational doctrines clearly taught in Scripture—of which Predestination holds the leading place. Anyone truly instructed in it will be securely anchored against that stormy error.]

We have thus answered these two final Scriptures—Ezekiel 18 and 33—assuming they referred to eternal death. But in truth, the context shows they concern temporal judgments, as is clear from Ezekiel 18:2 when compared with Jeremiah 27 through verse 31, and Ezekiel 33 from verse 24 to 30. It is evident from these passages that their complaint was about the desolation of their land—not that God had given them over to hardness of heart, thereby ordaining them to eternal death. Indeed, they justify themselves as suffering unjustly. That sort of complaint—of divine hardening—was made by humble and repentant people (see Isaiah 63:17), but these complainants are of an entirely different spirit.

The Lord’s reply is this: they are the authors of their own ruin. Far from taking pleasure in undeserved suffering, God says that if they would be righteous, they would be spared from misery. He has commanded them to turn from their iniquities and has provided means for them to do so—so that, in obeying, they might live.

The Arminian camp makes a great deal of noise over these texts, while all the while disputing from a false interpretation and completely misrepresenting the issue at hand.

THE SIXTH SERMON

"The election hath obtained it, and the rest were hardened." - ROMANS 11:7

We come now to their other main objections, which, based on the assumption of the former doctrine, either aim to accuse God or excuse man.

Objection 1. They say, according to this doctrine of Reprobation, God must be the author of sin, and therefore guilty of sin. This they insist on for three main reasons:

1. That He decrees it, and so there is a necessity for man to sin.

2. That He acts in it, producing as the first cause those actions in and through man to which sin is inseparably attached.

3. That He denied to Adam that grace without which it could not happen, that, as to the outcome, he should persevere in righteousness.

Answer. What is here stated as the grounds of this objection is indeed affirmed by this doctrine. However, the charge itself—that God is the author of sin—is firmly denied, for it has no true basis.

1. Concerning the decree:

- That God decrees that sin should exist has already been demonstrated. But it does not follow that He is thereby the author of sin. This is clear because the decree, as such, is an immanent act within God Himself—not an act that is immanent upon the creature. It is the nature of immanent acts that they impose nothing upon their object.

- There is indeed, as a result of God's decree, a necessity for man's sin. As Augustine rightly said, “The will of God is the necessity of things.” However:

1. This is not an absolute necessity, but a conditional or hypothetical necessity—not one of compulsion, but of consequence. Because God has decreed it, it must come to pass; yet man still sins freely, by his own choice, neither coerced nor compelled, nor acting from a necessity of nature. (We shall explore this further in response to the third objection, which argues that such necessity is incompatible with the essential freedom of man's will.)

2. There is a necessity of the same kind for man's sinning if we grant that God foreknows it. If God foreknows that man will sin, then it must indeed come to pass. Otherwise, God would foreknow that something shall be which shall not be—an evident contradiction. We must therefore either accept a conditional necessity for man's sinning, or deny God's foreknowledge.

3. If it were supposed that man shall sin without the decree of God, then God Himself would be subject to the same kind of necessity—a necessity of consequence. For if man shall sin (and this is foreknown to God, or even if it is not), God no longer has the liberty to prevent it. Thus, in our eagerness to preserve man's liberty from the necessity flowing from God's decree, we end up diminishing God's liberty, subjecting Him to a like necessity that arises from man.

2. Concerning God's acting in the sins of men.

Answer.

1. That the great Creator, as the first cause, produces all motion in all creatures seems to be clearly taught by the Apostle in Acts 17:28. There, God is presented as the Author of life—"in him we live"—of being—"in him we have our being"—and of motion—"in him we move." As the Apostle cites Aratus, one of the heathen poets, so fittingly another poet declares: Est Deus in nobis, agitante calescimus illo—"God is in us; by His stirring we grow warm."

To me, it seems to be one of the key truths contained in the divine name Jehovah—that He is the Author of all being, and therefore of all operations. The operations of creatures are not nothing, and to ascribe to any creature, merely upheld and not moved by God, the power to produce its own motion, seems to transfer divinity to the creature and diminish it in God. I would consider the motion of the creature, in dependence upon the Creator’s movement, to be like that engine seen in Ezekiel 1:16—a wheel within a wheel—the motion of God surrounding and moving the creature’s motion from within.

I would also ask this question: Does God uphold all being? I know of no one who denies this. Divine preservation and sustaining of whatever exists is widely acknowledged. But if motion is upheld by Him, then it is produced by Him; for motion, being a successive action, can only be upheld through continual production. And if life is upheld, so is motion—for "life" in a living creature includes movement. Life is the supreme and universal principle and power of action, actively operating within the living.

But not to dwell longer here, we affirm plainly, whatever becomes of the above, that all creatures in all their motions depend upon God.

2. That God, as the supreme and universal Governor, acts upon the wills of men, turning them as He pleases in their movements, is plainly declared in Scripture—and much depends on this truth both for our duty and our comfort.

1. For Scriptural testimony:

Proverbs 16:1: "The preparations of the heart in man, and the answer of the tongue, is from the Lord." What are these preparations but the thoughts, desires, and inward stirrings of the heart? These are from the Lord.

Proverbs 21:1: What is said of the king's heart applies equally to all others: "The king's heart is in the hand of the Lord, as the rivers of water: he turneth it whithersoever he will." Is anything more easily turned than a stream of water? So easily does the Lord turn human hearts. How are they turned but through their own motions? Thus, they act by their own principles, yet God is the first and sovereign mover.

Psalm 106:46: "He made them also to be pitied of all those that carried them captives."

Exodus 11:3: God gave His people favour in the sight of the Egyptians.

Psalm 105:25: He had earlier turned the Egyptians' hearts to hate His people and to deal craftily with His servants.

Other testimonies will follow as we discuss the duties that stem from this, which we now briefly consider:

2. Therefore, it is our duty:

1. To seek after the Lord, that we may know Him and devote ourselves to Him. From these testimonies, it is plain how we are to understand the Apostle's words: "In him we move." Thus, Paul urges this as the duty of all living men—having in themselves the experience of their Creator through their life, being, and motion. They are not, nor do they act, apart from Him.

2. To glorify God with all humble adoration as the great Lord in whose hands is our very breath and whose are all our ways (Daniel 5:23)—even the inward preparations of the heart and every outward act.

3. To take heed with fear and trembling to the motions of God's Spirit within us, especially in matters of salvation, that we neglect them not (Philippians 2:12–13). Since we cannot act except as we are acted upon by God—and He moves us through our own wills, first principled and then moved by His grace and Spirit—we must be diligent to respond rightly to those holy stirrings.

4. To pray unto God, that He would incline our hearts to Himself and His ways (Song of Solomon 1:4; Psalm 119:35–36; Jeremiah 31:18).

5. To praise God for every good inclination and holy act found in our hearts (1 Chronicles 29:14). There, David blesses God for two things:

- That they had something to offer.

- That they had hearts willing to offer it.

The willingness of their hearts was from the Lord, just as much as the abundance they gave. David acknowledges this again in prayer (vv. 18–19).

Other duties might be mentioned, such as humility—as seen in the previous example, verse 14: "What am I, and what is my people?" In giving the most to God, they received the most, in that they were given hearts willing to give, and so on. But I will refrain from more examples, except one particular case that offers great comfort during seasons of intense temptation, especially when the wicked seem to prevail against us.

The Lord has both the hearts and the hands of such men in His power—to make them show pity or grant favour to us, as we have seen. He has made promises to this effect, as in Proverbs 3:4. And again: “When a man's ways please the Lord, he maketh even his enemies to be at peace with him” (Proverbs 16:7). It must not remain in man's power alone to decide whether the Lord's promises will prove true or not. But this would be the case if God did not act upon and turn the hearts of men as He pleases. Jacob trusted this when he prayed in Genesis 43:14, supposing Joseph to be a godless Egyptian.

Now let anyone judge: do these testimonies and the duties that follow from them imply no more than this—that God merely preserves man, sustains his faculties, sets objects before him, persuades, and then stands as a passive observer? Does He leave everything entirely in man's power, so that for any given event it may or may not come to pass—this or that—nothing fixed or determined?

From this we affirm: God, as the great Creator and universal Ruler, produces all operations and movements in the heart of man—even those to which sin in man is inevitably attached. “God works in the hearts of men to incline their wills whithersoever he will; whether to that which is good, for his own mercy; or to that which is evil, for their own deserts.” —Augustine.

But now to answer the objection: How then is God Himself free from sin?

1. God works as the supreme mover; man acts as the proper subject—that is, the one in whom lies the principle of the sinful action. This alone begins to clear God in the case before us. To make it plain with examples:

- The sun shining on a dung heap causes a foul smell; yet the sun is not defiled—it is the dung heap, which contains the source of the stench. And it is by the sun’s operation that the dung heap smells.

- A badly made clock, moved by its weights, strikes the wrong time; the weights move correctly, even if the clock does not.

- A false sundial gives inaccurate readings, but the sun is true in its course; without its motion, the dial would not err.

- A skilled writer, using a pen with a bent hair in it, causes blots—yet he writes with as much skill as he would with a clean pen. The fault lies in the pen.

- A master musician playing on an untuned instrument produces discord, yet his skill is unchanged, and he follows the rules of music no less than if the instrument were properly tuned.

Sinful man is the faulty clock, the false dial, the blotting pen, the jarring instrument. God, in His motion, is the weight, the sun, the writer, the musician. From God comes the motion; in man lies the principle of evil in the action.

2. God works as the Author of nature; man acts as a moral agent—that is, one who stands under a law. When he obeys the law, his actions are free from sin; when he breaks it, his actions are sinful. Sin is the transgression of the law of God. Yet the actions themselves may be the same in their natural aspect, even if they differ completely in moral character. God works uniformly in those actions which are naturally the same, even when morally they are vastly different and, in terms of good and evil, utterly opposed.

Take this example: Adam eating the forbidden fruit. The act of eating, considered naturally, is the same as if the fruit had not been forbidden. Had the fruit not been forbidden, his eating would have been lawful and blameless. But because it was forbidden, it was sinful. Even the desire to eat—assuming he had desired it when it was not forbidden—would have been the same in nature as the desire he had when it was forbidden. In one case, there is no sin; in the other, deep guilt. What makes the difference? Not the exertion of natural power or the operation of the will in its natural aspect, but Adam’s condition as a man under law in one case, and free from law in the other.

Now, God works here as the Author of nature and does so uniformly. The difference in man’s moral condition does not alter God’s operation. The sun shines equally on a dung heap and a garden, though the effects are contrary. The same weights move both a true and a faulty clock.

Another example: Suppose one man, in righteous zeal, slays his enemy justly; another unjustly slays his friend. In natural terms, the action is the same in both cases: the same exertion of physical strength, the same internal stirring of passion. Therefore, God’s operation—as the Author of nature—is the same in both. The moral difference lies entirely in the men themselves—one acting according to God’s law, the other contrary to it.

3. God works according to a pure rule; man works contrary to a pure rule. God’s rule is the dictate of His own wisdom, for His own glory. Whatever the wisdom of God reveals as making for His glory, that God wills and acts accordingly. Now, it is plain by the outcome, and by the testimony of Scripture, that the wisdom of God has appointed the way for His final glory in man’s final state, which presupposes the sin of man, making way for that glory. Therefore, God, according to this rule, both determines that man shall sin and acts in the sinful actions of man, to which, in and from man, sin unavoidably clings.

Man’s rule is the law of God. In sinning, though man fulfils God’s intention (for “who hath resisted his will?”—the Jews in crucifying Christ “did whatsoever the hand and counsel of God had before determined to be done”), yet this is not man’s rule. He acts against the law, which is his rule. Therefore, God, acting according to His pure rule, is blameless; man, working contrary to his pure rule, is guilty.

The third ground on which some would charge the doctrine of Predestination with making God the author of sin is this: That Adam was denied that grace without which, as to the outcome, he could not actually persevere in righteousness.

Answer: To affirm that God is the author of sin is blasphemy—granted on both sides. Therefore, whatever the Scriptures teach concerning God’s dealings with man in the first sin or the fall of Adam, this conclusion cannot rightly be inferred: that God is the author of sin.

Now, the only question is: what do the Scriptures teach here?

We affirm this: that Adam was denied that grace without which, as to the event, he could not stand. And we clarify this in the following steps:

1. Adam was created in the image of God (Genesis 1:26)—that is, whatever else may be included, in righteousness and true holiness (Ephesians 4:24). This included a state of habitual righteousness, by which he was able to do all the good he might will to do. All the faculties of his soul were fitted to operate according to the rule of righteousness without interruption. It was not as it now is with the regenerate (Romans 7:18), who find the will present with them, but how to perform it they find not. Adam had, through that habitual righteousness, the power to will what was good—indeed, all that God might require of him according to the law written on his heart—free from any inward principle biasing him toward evil. This power and righteousness were also possessed by all his posterity in him.

2. That he was denied the grace whereby he should actually persevere is evident from the event—he fell. But God could have granted him that effectual grace by which his fall might have been prevented, as He did with the angels who kept, and will forever keep, their first estate. Had that grace been given, he would have stood; for it is a contradiction to say he had grace sufficient to make him actually stand, and yet that he did not stand. He had both the power to will all that was good and to do all that he willed. But the actual willing and doing of that for which he had the power was not given.

A sound eye has the faculty of seeing—that is the power; but to see an object actually, there must be light. An instrument rightly made and tuned has the capacity to sound harmoniously, but to produce harmony, it must be touched by the skilled hand of a musician.

Hence Augustine says: “The first man had not that grace by which he could never become evil; but he had that grace in which, if he had remained, he never would have become evil. He had such aid of grace as he might forsake if he would, and in which he might remain if he would; but not such as would ensure that he would will to remain.”

Then, comparing this with the grace believers receive in Christ, Augustine continues: “So much greater is the grace given by Jesus Christ our Lord to those whom it pleases God to save, that we not only have that without which we cannot persevere, even if we will, but also such that we shall will to persevere. For by this grace, in both the receiving and holding fast of that which is good, there is not only ability to do what we will, but to will what we are able to do.”

Again: “To the first man, who in that goodness in which he was created upright, had the ability not to sin, not to die, not to forsake that goodness, there was given an aid of perseverance—not such as would ensure that he would persevere, but without which he could not, by his free will, persevere. But now to the saints predestined to the kingdom of God, there is given, not only such aid of perseverance, but perseverance itself; not only such that without it they cannot persevere, but such that by it they cannot but persevere.” And much more to the same effect may be found frequently in Augustine.

3. It could not be that he should have that grace whereby, in terms of the outcome, he might stand. In terms of his own fitness, he had, by his habitual righteousness, a power of standing—he was habitually fitted for it. But that he might stand, as to the event, there must further be a vigorous influx from God: light upon his mind, holiness upon his will, actuating his habitual power. Now, that this should be afforded him could not be the case, that being supposed for which Scripture is clear.

4. That God knew certainly that he would fall. It is a hard position indeed for any man to deny God’s certain foreknowledge, from all eternity, of Adam’s fall—or of any event whatsoever. And the honest confession of this is, in most people’s understanding, a sufficient refutation (the impression of God’s perfection—especially in regard to His knowledge—is too deeply impressed on the human heart to be erased by mere weak sophistry) of that unfortunate opinion which can only be supported by stripping God of His essential attributes.

Now, if God certainly knew that Adam would fall, then it cannot be that Adam had that aid of grace whereby he might, in the event, stand—for then God would know certainly that something would happen which, in fact, certainly might not happen: namely, Adam’s fall. But if God knows it will happen, it cannot fail to happen.

2. That God decreed his fall. If God decreed that Adam should fall by His permission (and in that decree of His own permission it was that He foreknew Adam’s fall), then it could not be that Adam had that grace whereby, in the event, he might stand. For then God's own administration toward man would make void His own decree. But that God decreed Adam’s fall has already been proved. Let us briefly summarise the matter:

3. That God decreed the creation and ordering of all the works of His hands for His own glory, as the end of all things, is absolutely unquestionable.

4. That He decreed, in particular, the glory that comes to pass from His creature. Either He decreed that glory particularly, or another kind particularly, or none particularly but His glory in a general, indefinite way. But not another particularly—since it is absurd to say that He decreed what does not come to pass, and did not decree what does come to pass. Such an opinion utterly overthrows both His wisdom and power. Nor did He decree only His glory generally or indefinitely—for that view implies a defect in His wisdom, in that He could not determine distinctly and particularly the means of His glory. It also ascribes to God the weakness of man, who reasons from generalities to particulars, a process that always implies incomplete knowledge and limited power.

5. That He decreed His glory comprehensively—that is, every particular instance of glory that arises to Him from the creature—is clear (to say nothing of other arguments) from the two previous points. For His glory is the end of all His works, and His glory in particular, as it actually occurs, must therefore have been decreed.

6. That glory of His in the final state of man presupposes sin (for how shall some be saved in mercy, and others condemned in justice, without sin?), and specifically Adam’s fall—and in him the fall of all his posterity. It must therefore be the case that God decreed that aspect of His glory, and the means of it.

Objection. Is it not great cruelty in God to appoint His creature, by His decree, to destruction? And here they usually raise a loud outcry, using odious comparisons to heighten the charge: "Tigers," they say, "and bears, and all the most savage creatures are kinder to their young than this."

Answer. To clarify the question:

1. God does not appoint the innocent but the guilty creature to destruction. Though the foresight of sin does not precede His decree concerning sin and destruction, His decree does appoint that sin shall precede destruction, and that destruction shall be because of and by means of sin.

2. To refute the objection:

- Must they not acknowledge that, by God's permission, man sins? That by God's appointment, the sin of one man has cast the whole world into a state of condemnation? That, in the end, the greater part of mankind is destroyed? That once the whole world was given up to reigning sin and perished, eight persons excepted? That for many ages, the Lord allowed all nations to walk in the ways of their own hearts, without God and without hope in the world? That even now He allows many nations to perish without the knowledge of Christ, there being no other name under heaven whereby salvation is given? That many to whom the Gospel is preached are hardened by it?

Yet it was fully within the power of the Almighty to prevent all this, and that without the least effort or difficulty to Himself. Now, if God's dominion over His creature does not exempt Him from being brought to trial at the bar of nature's law—as this objection implies—how can the objectors avoid this same charge of cruelty against Him based on what they themselves must admit? Would it not be considered cruelty in a creature, and against the law of nature, to watch its offspring be torn in pieces when it had the power to prevent it—especially without the least trouble?

In the same way, they argue that to suppose God wills that man should sin is to make Him the author of sin—since in man, it is sin to will that another should sin. If that is sound reasoning, then every sin in the world would make God its author, whether He willed it or not. For it is sin in man to permit another to sin when he has the power to prevent it—especially without effort.

3. Is there the same kindred and natural bond between God and every human being without exception, as there is between animals and their offspring? It is true, we are His "offspring" (Acts 17:29), inasmuch as we have our life and being in Him and were created in His image. But to be His sons and daughters depends upon His covenant, in the hand of Christ, made on behalf of His peculiar and chosen seed. And as for them, let the whole world perish—not one of them shall miscarry (Rom. 4:16; John 8:35; John 11:52; 2 Tim. 2:19; Isa. 53:10).

4. Their objection turns fully upon themselves, those who teach the ruinous doctrine of final apostasy—that those who are truly God's children, having embraced His covenant by true faith, may yet fall away totally and finally, and so perish forever.

5. Where, then, does this supposed cruelty lie?

- That God condemns hardened sinners? Is that cruelty? No.

- That He hardens wilful sinners—that is, gives them up to hardness of heart as a punishment for their prior sins? Is that cruelty? No.

- That He does not recover from sin all the sons and daughters of Adam without exception? Is that cruelty? No.

- That He allowed Adam to sin and imputed Adam’s sin to his posterity? Is that cruelty? No.

They admit all these things because Scripture so clearly teaches them—though some (true sons of their father Pelagius), would deny the imputation of Adam’s sin and therefore original sin, if shame did not hold them back. So, if any cruelty exists, it must lie in one of two things—or in both: that Adam was denied that aid of grace without which he could not, in the outcome, stand; or that God decreed the sins of men antecedently to their being foreseen. But both have already been shown not to be cruelty in God. To say otherwise is to charge God with blasphemy.

Instance. “But at the very least,” say they, “God is not as merciful, according to this doctrine, as Scripture portrays Him.”

Reply.

1. And is He then as powerful and perfect as Scripture presents Him, if anything comes to pass contrary to His decree and will?

2. The Scriptures that speak most plainly on this matter have already been addressed, and we have shown how inconsistent it is with God’s nature and blessedness that His will should be frustrated in anything.

3. There are two kinds of mercy:

- Common mercy, shown in the blessings of this life—these extend to all mankind (Acts 14:16–17).

- Special mercy, found in the blessings of eternal life—those blessings that infallibly lead to salvation. These, the Apostle affirms, are given only to the elect (Rom. 9:18), and this distinction is founded entirely in God’s will (Rom. 9:11, 13). These mercies are only for the elect (Eph. 1:3–4).

We have previously demonstrated how clearly Scripture distinguishes between these. The greatness of God’s mercy is shown extensively in the former—that He blesses even His enemies in this life—and intensively in the latter:

1. In how excellent they are in nature.

2. In how exclusively they belong to His chosen.

This we saw clearly at the end of the third sermon.

So, if the Holy Spirit knows best how to set forth God's mercy, then anyone who denies that the former mercies belong to all, or claims that the latter mercies belong to all, actually diminishes God's mercy.

These are the two main objections raised against the preceding doctrine, both directed at accusing God. A third now follows, which seeks rather to excuse man.

Objection 3. The doctrine previously stated removes the liberty of man’s will, and thereby absolves him from all guilt; for liberty of will is necessary to every sinful action.

They perceive the liberty of man’s will to be overthrown on two grounds:

1. That God has decreed his sin.

2. That God moves the will of man when he sins, by a motion proceeding from God that determines man’s will in its action.

From this they argue that man must sin of necessity, and therefore not freely—and thus, his sin is no sin. This objection, they say, applies equally to non-sinful actions.

Answer.

1. Concerning the decree:

1. It is abundantly clear from Scripture, as already shown, that the actions of man's will—both good and evil—are decreed by the Lord. Let us now add some striking and specific examples.

- Good actions: The embracing of God’s call in the conversion of a sinner is decreed (Romans 9:11; Romans 8:28–30; Acts 13:48). The faith and obedience of converted sinners in a life of holiness is decreed (Ephesians 1:4; 2 Thessalonians 2:13). The obedience of Christ in accomplishing the great work of redemption was decreed (1 Peter 1:20; Hebrews 10:7).

- Evil actions: The crucifixion of Christ by the Jews and Romans was decreed (Acts 4:27). Absalom’s incest was decreed, as is evident from the fact that it was foretold by God (2 Samuel 12:11). And in general, whatsoever God has foretold as certainly coming to pass—and not conditionally, as in the case of Nineveh’s threatened destruction—must necessarily have been decreed. For if God has not determined by His works or by His permission that what He foretells shall come to pass, then His word could be falsified.

Hence, the bitter persecutions of the Church by her most wicked adversaries, and the faith and patience of the martyrs throughout the ages, are all decreed. Consider also the rage of mystical Babylon, and the steadfastness of the virgins’ company—that is, the true Church of Christ—overcoming her temptations. Consider the kings of the earth, who first subject themselves to the harlot, and later hate and destroy her. Consider the conversion of the Jews, and with them, the fullness of the Gentiles. These are all foretold as events that shall surely come to pass, and therefore they are decreed. And how much of the will of man, and its inward operations, is involved in all these things—who can fail to see?

2. Yet from this there is no infringement upon the liberty of man’s will. For the decree, in itself, is an act internal to God, which causes no change in man or in his condition until it comes to execution.

3. In fact, the decree establishes man’s liberty. For since God has decreed that man shall will, it is now beyond all doubt that he shall indeed will, for the counsel of the Lord shall stand. But however certain it is that man shall will, it is equally certain that he shall will freely. For to will is, by its very nature, to act freely. To will, and not to act with liberty of will, is a contradiction.

Not only do all things and all operations fall under the decree of God, but also their various types and modes of operation. As God has fitted necessary causes to work necessarily (e.g., fire burns necessarily), so too has He fitted voluntary and contingent causes to work voluntarily—that is, freely—and contingently.

Objection. But what God has decreed must necessarily come to pass, otherwise His decree might be frustrated.

Answer. It must necessarily come to pass—that is, it must infallibly come to pass—yet not necessarily in the sense of being produced by a necessary operation. On the contrary, if it depends on a free and contingent cause, it must necessarily come to pass freely and contingently. Here is only a necessity of the event, not of the manner of production; and therefore, it is a necessity of consequence, not of the cause—a necessity neither natural nor violent. And the necessity of consequence, as we have seen before, must be granted, or else we must both deny God’s foreknowledge and subject Him to the same kind of necessity that we consider unworthy for man to be subjected to.

Objection. But can one and the same effect come to pass both necessarily and contingently?

Answer. It can, if the necessity is rightly understood—namely, not as simple or absolute, but as respective or conditional.

Take two examples:

1. In the actions of God: God created the world freely; it was within His liberty whether to create a world at all, and whether it would be this world or another. Yet, once He had decreed it, it became necessary that the world should be created in time. It could not happen otherwise. So here, what was originally contingent (whether He would create) becomes necessary upon the decree.

2. In the actions of man: When Christ was crucified, His legs were not broken. Why? That the Scripture might be fulfilled, which had said, “A bone of him shall not be broken”. God had so determined it, and declared it in His Word. Therefore, it could not happen that His bones would be broken. Yet, the soldiers freely and voluntarily refrained from breaking them. They were neither naturally nor forcibly constrained. Their forbearance was free and contingent, yet the outcome was necessary—because of God’s decree.

Another example: whether in the actions of God or the creature, what is done, must of necessity be done. It is impossible for something to be done and not done at the same time. Yet, if any act in the world is truly free or contingent—and this is agreed upon by all—then liberty and contingency must be compatible with that necessity.

This objection is further clarified by two rules:

Rule 1: All effects produced by the creature are either necessary or contingent, depending on how the creature—the immediate or next cause—operates:

- Natural agents (like fire, the sun) are necessary causes. They act necessarily—the fire burns, the sun shines—always producing the same kind of effect, acting to the utmost of their power. Therefore, their effects are necessary.

- Voluntary agents (like humans and angels) are free and contingent causes. They act freely and contingently; they act one way but have within themselves the power to act another way. They will something, but they could just as well not will it. They refuse something, but they could have chosen otherwise. Therefore, their effects are free and contingent.

Rule 2: In relation to God, the first cause, all events in the world are both necessary and contingent or free.

- In respect of His intrinsic liberty, God is free to produce or not produce any effect. Thus, even the necessary workings of second causes—like the sun shining or fire burning—are contingent with respect to God, since He may withhold His influence at any moment.

- Likewise, the creation of the world, and all effects that immediately depend on the will of God, whether concerning angels or men, are in regard to their immediate causes free and contingent.

- Even the most seemingly accidental events—like the lot cast into the lap (cf. Proverbs 16:33)—are contingent in this same sense. Yet, all these, upon the supposition of God’s decree, are also necessary in the outcome.

Conclusion: Thus much for the decree and the kind of necessity that arises from it. God’s sovereign determination does not abolish the liberty of second causes, but rather establishes it within the framework of His infallible counsel.

2. That the will of man is moved by God, and by that motion of His determined in its operation, does not take away the liberty of man's will.

To clarify this, we must distinguish between two kinds of liberty:

1. Liberty of independence

2. Liberty of choice

1. The liberty of independence is where the will acts without being moved by any higher cause. This belongs uniquely to the will of God. He alone is independent in the motion of His will. The wills of all men and angels are subject to His dominion, being moved by Him. This has already been demonstrated—particularly regarding mankind—that God, as the great Creator and universal Ruler, moves the wills of men whichever way He pleases. Many more arguments could be offered to show that man's will must allow for the effective motion of God upon it, such that it acts as it is acted upon—especially clear in the doctrines of conversion and perseverance. But to dwell on those here would be an untimely digression, especially since the matter has already been proven.

2. The liberty of choice is where the will, in its operation, acts in accordance with what it approves in the light of the understanding. There are two acts of the will: to will and to not will (or “to nill” in older English); to choose, and to refuse.

Now, here is how the liberty of the will is expressed:

1. That in these operations, it does what it likes. It wills with approval, and it refuses with approval. Yes, it even refuses what it dislikes, yet does so with liking—in other words, it is never compelled contrary to its present inclination. Therefore, it wills or refuses the present object while still having the power to do the opposite if it were inclined. However, although it has the power to perform contrary actions, it does not have the ability to do so simultaneously, since to both approve and disapprove of the same thing at once is a contradiction.

2. That it acts in the light of the practical understanding—that is, the understanding as it perceives and decides what constitutes present happiness or the greatest good, and what is necessary or helpful in achieving it. This must be present for the liberty of the will, because the will is a rational appetite, and therefore cannot will or refuse anything except as it is represented by the understanding as good or evil.

Therefore, whatever the will chooses, it chooses as something good; it cannot will anything as evil, for then it would not act as a rational appetite—that is, it would not act as the will at all. It's true, of course, that the understanding can often mistake evil for good and good for evil. This is why the good that the will pursues may be either true or merely apparent. Yet whatever it is that the will chooses, it is what the understanding presents as good. Consequently, even though the will retains the power to refuse what it currently wills, so long as the understanding presents it as good to will it and evil to refuse it, the will cannot desire to refuse it.

Hence, it is clear how man’s will differs from necessary agents—whether natural agents (like fire) or sentient creatures (like animals). These are determined by the force and instinct of nature:

- Natural agents act without any perception or volition—without even the faintest shadow of either.

- Sentient agents (like animals) operate only by the light of sense, according to which they like or dislike. Their reactions more closely resemble instinct than true choice.

But man, in the operation of his will, acts according to what he approves or disapproves in the light of his understanding.

To apply this in response to the objection: the liberty of independence belongs to God alone. But where there is the liberty of choice, there is all the liberty of will that any created being—angel or man—can possess.

Objection. But how does determination to one option align with this liberty of choice?

Answer. There is a twofold kind of determination:

1. Determination to one of two opposite moral objects, either good or evil. That this kind of determination is compatible with the liberty of the will is clear. On the one hand, God himself, Christ, the angels, and the glorified saints can will only what is good; neither do they have the power to will what is evil. Yet within them is the highest liberty of will—without which there is no holiness. On the other hand, the devil, the damned, the hardened, and (we may add) all the unregenerate, can only will what is evil. And yet in all these, the will is free—naturally free, though morally enslaved—without which there would be no sin. Determination, then, to one of these contrary objects does not remove liberty from the will.

2. Determination to one of two opposite acts—to will or not to will (i.e., to "nill"). Neither does this destroy the liberty of the will. For then, the very exercise of its liberty would destroy its liberty: whenever it wills or refuses, it is, for the moment, not indifferent toward the object but determined. Now, just as the opponents suppose the will determines itself in and unto its own operation (and by doing so, they believe it exercises rather than loses its liberty), so we affirm that God, by his motion, determines it—moving it by its own principle, and according to its own nature. That is, he moves it through the understanding, determining it to its operation; and so moves it in such a way that, by virtue and efficacy of his motion, it does whatever it chooses in the light of the understanding, with the power to choose otherwise, if it were so inclined.

Thus, whatever is required for true liberty stands in harmony with God's motion in determining the will. In fact, the more firmly the will is fixed upon the object in its operation, the more fully it exercises its liberty—because it approves more strongly what it does. But this approval remains in the light of the understanding.

These are the main objections. If the answers given here satisfy, any remaining objections will prove insignificant. Where these fail to satisfy, it would be a waste of effort to pursue further objections.

THE END

June 5, 1648

Imprimatur:

John Downame

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A Cure and a Rebuke for the Gangrene of Arminianism by Richard Resbury, Copyright © 2025

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Table of Contents

To the Reader

THE FIRST SERMON

THE SECOND SERMON

THE THIRD SERMON

THE FOURTH SERMON

THE FIFTH SERMON

THE SIXTH SERMON