




THE SOUL'S OWN EVIDENCE FOR ITS OWN  
**IMMORTALITY**  
MODERNIZED VERSION

PHILIPPE DE MORNAY



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*The Souls Own Evidence -  
For Its Own Immortality*

*Phillip de Mornay*

This text has been initially updated from EEBO-TCP and further updated by Chat4o.

Further revision and editing done by Monergism.

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Editor's Note – This text was originally transcribed by EEBO-TCP. This text was then updated to contemporary English spelling by Chat4o. As the Puritan Edward Leigh once said "If thou findest faults and Errata in the book, let love cover them, for to err (as the Satirist saith) is the sad privilege of mortality, and he (of all men) erreth most, who challengeth a privilege from error."

# Contents

PREF. To the Reader.

1. CHAP. I. That the Soul of Man is immortal, or dies not.

2. CHAP. II. That the immortality of the Soul has been taught by the Philosophers of old times, and believed by all people and Nations.

# PREF. To the Reader.

Judicious Reader, the iniquity of the times, having so far corrupted the minds of some, that the very innate and inbred principles of Nature (especially about a Deity, the sovereign welfare, and the Immortality of the Soul) seem in a manner to be quite obliterated and extinct in them; I thought it would not be unseasonable, to recommend to your most serious Meditations that excellent Treatise mentioned in the Frontispiece, as an Antidote against the Atheistical and dangerous Tenets now abroad.

The Noble Author of it, you will soon find, was a man of no mean parts and of no common Learning. Delicacy of Wit, strength of Reason, streams of Eloquence, with varieties both of solid and curious notions, all flow from him. He will tell you more, even from the Ancient doctrine of the very Heathen, than happily you have ever heard of, or (at least) ever took much notice of, though born and bred in so bright an Age, and among such, too, as pass for no mean Proficients in Christianity. Those Mysterious (though glorious) Truths, which like Mines of Gold underground, run more hiddenly

through the letter of the Scriptures, you may find discussed at length, with as much sobriety as clarity.

Do you desire to know by what arguments, even of reason, you may prove a Deity? That Deity to be but one only, and yet distinguished by a Trinity of Beings, that which we call a Trinity of persons, namely, Father, Son, and Spirit? If you will take the pains (I might say, the pleasure rather) to gain the knowledge of such high (yet necessary) points, in the first six Chapters of the said Treatise, you may (more fully than you are aware) instruct yourself.

Do you inquire after the highest and most sovereign Good? Where it lies, and where it does not lie? In the 18th and 19th Chapters, you will find that also very sweetly and fully resolved.

Lastly, next unto the knowledge of God—what He is in Himself, and what to His creatures—do you seek to understand your Self, what once you were, and what you still are? Read but this ensuing Paragraph, peculiarly selected out for your present use, and you shall easily perceive what Divine sparks lie raked up under ashes, within your own bosom, sparks which (once stirred up) if you blow a little, you shall know further, as well the duration as the excellence of your being. And that you are a creature bearing in you, besides a plurality of present lives, the very seed of Immortality.

In all these several inquiries, whilst you read and consider, you may expect that the reasonable part (dark and cloudy as it may be) shall quickly receive an Illumination, not only from the intrinsic operations of your own mind but also from the consent of the wisest among all Nations.

Zoroaster the Chaldean, Trismegistus the Egyptian, Orpheus the Greek, Pherecydes the Syrian, after them, Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Porphyry, Amelius, &c., all teach you in their several ages. And if

that be not sufficient, you have the confession of the very Devils: namely, that there is a God, and only one God, with a Trinity of persons in unity of Essence. That the Soul is an Immortal substance, and the aforesaid Deity the sovereign welfare of it, according to what you believe from the only true sacred Oracle.

Let not then that Treatise, rare and singular as it is, be neglected by you, for though it has long lain obscurely, as a Diamond in the dark, little known and less looked after, yet I dare say, by the time you have well examined it, and have tasted the sublime Heavenly matter contained in it, you will estimate it at a very great value, even worthy (many passages of it) to be written in characters of gold.

Buy it therefore and read it, that from the very light of nature, you may be enabled to confute blasphemers: Judge the whole by this little piece, which if you read through, and with diligent attention, you may benefit yourself, and therein answer the desire of him who heartily wishes the true good of

Your Immortal soul:

John Bachiler.



# CHAP. 1. That the Soul of Man is immortal, or dies not.

**H**itherto I have treated of the world that is to be conceived in understanding, and of the sensible World (as the Platonists term them); that is to say, of God and of this World. Now follows the examination of the little World (as they term it), that is to say, of man. Concerning God, we have acknowledged him to be a Spirit; and as for the world, we have found it to be a body. In man, we have an abridgment of both: namely, of God in respect of spirit, and of the world in composition of body, as though the Creator, in purpose to set forth a mirror of his works, intended to bring into one little compass both the infiniteness of his own nature and also the vastness of the whole world together.

We see in man's body a wonderful mixture of the four Elements, the veins spreading forth like rivers to the outermost members; as many instruments of sense as there are sensible natures in the world, a great number of sinews, flesh-strings, and ligaments; a head by special privilege directed upward toward Heaven, and hands serving to all manner of tasks. Whoever considers no more than just this instrument, without life, without sense, and

without motion, cannot but truly think that it is made to a very great purpose; and must necessarily cry out, as Hermes or the Saracen Avicenna does, that man is a miracle which far surpasses, not only these lower Elements, but also the very Heaven and all the ornaments thereof. But if he could (as it were out of himself) behold this body receiving life and entering into the use of all its motions with such eagerness—hands stirring so nimbly and in so many various ways, and the Senses exerting their force so far away without moving from their place—don't you think he would be wonderfully captivated, and would marvel at the life, motion, and sense so much more than at the body, as he had previously wondered at the body alone when beholding its excellence over the mass of a stone? For what comparison is there between a Lute and a Lute-player, or between a dumb instrument and him that makes it sound?

What would he say then, if he could afterward see how the same man, now quickened, can in one moment reach from one side of the earth to the other without shifting place; descending down to the center of the world and mounting above the outermost circle of it both at once; being present in a thousand places at one instant, embracing the whole without touching it, remaining on the earth while containing it, beholding the Heavens from beneath while above the Heaven of Heavens, both at once? Would he not be compelled to say that in this simple body there dwells a greater thing than the body, greater than the earth, yes, greater than the whole world together?

Then let us say with Plato, that man is double: outward and inward. The outward man is that which we see with our eyes, which does not lose its shape when it is dead, any more than a Lute loses its shape when the Lute-player ceases to make it sound, although both life, motion, sense, and reason are absent from it. The inward man is the Soul, and that is properly

the very man, which uses the body as an instrument; whereunto, though it is united by the power of God, it does not move when the body runs. It sees when the eyes are shut, and sometimes sees not when the eyes are wide open; it travels while the body rests, and rests when the body travels; that is to say, it is able in itself to perform its own actions without the help of the outward man, whereas, on the contrary, the outward, without the help of the inward (that is, the body without the presence of the Soul), has neither sense, motion, life, nor even continuance of being.

In the outward man, we have a representation of the whole world, and if you examine them both piece by piece, you shall find a wonderful agreement between them. But my purpose in this book is not to treat of the things that pertain particularly to the body.

In the inward man, we have a summary of all life, sense, and motion found in all creatures, and, moreover, an Image or rather a shadow (for the Image is marred by our sin) of the Godhead itself. And that is the thing we have to examine in this Chapter. In plants, we perceive that, besides their bodies which we see, there is also an inner virtue we do not see, whereby they live, grow, bud, and bear fruit, which virtue we call the quickening Soul, and it makes them differ from Stones and Metals, which lack it. In sensitive living things, we find the same virtue, which works while they sleep and are, in a way, like the Plants; but along with that, we find another certain virtue or power which sees, hears, smells, tastes, and feels; which also in many of them stores up the things brought in by the senses, a manner of power Plants lack. This we term the sensitive Soul, because the effects of it are perceived and executed by the Senses.

In man, we have both the quickening and the sensitive; the former showing itself in nourishing and increasing, and the latter in the subtlety of

sense and imagination, whereby he is both Plant and Beast together. But yet, we also see a Mind which considers and observes, which reaps benefit from the things that the Senses bring in, which by seeing conceives what it does not see; which, from what is not, gathers what is; and finally, which pulls a man away both from earth and from all sensible things, yes, and (in a way) from himself too. This we call the reasonable Soul, and it is the thing that makes man to be man (and not a Plant or a brute Beast, as the other two do) and also to be the Image or rather a shadow of the Godhead, in that (as we shall say hereafter) it is a Spirit that may continue being alone by itself without the body.

And by the way, whereas I say that the inward man has a quickening power as a Plant has, a sensitive power as a Beast has, and a power of understanding whereby he is a man, my meaning is not that he has three Souls but only one Soul; that is to say, just as in the brute Beast, the sensitive Soul contains the quickening Soul, so in man, the reasonable Soul contains both the sensitive and the quickening and performs the duties of all three, so as it both lives, feels, and reasons, even as well and in the same manner as the mind of a man may tend to his own household matters, the affairs of the Commonwealth, and heavenly things all at once. Or, to speak more fittingly, these three degrees of Souls are three degrees of life, of which the second exceeds and contains the first, and the third exceeds and contains both the other two.

The one, without which the body cannot live, is the Soul or life of the Plant, and is so tied to the body that it shows not itself in any way outside of it. The second, which cannot live without the body, is the Soul or life of the Beast, which does indeed express its power and force abroad, but not otherwise than by the members and instruments of the body to which it is

tied. The third, which can live and continue without the body, but not the body without it, is the soul of man which gives life inwardly to all his parts, shows forth its life abroad in perceiving all things subject to sense, and retains still its force (as shall be said hereafter) yes, and increases it, even when the strength of the body and the very liveliness of the senses fail.

And in very deed, you shall see a man lose all his senses one after another as their instruments decay, and yet still have both life and reason unimpaired. The cause of which is that some of the instruments of life and sense do fail, but the life itself, which quickens them, fails not. And therefore, the Beast does not lose life in losing sense, but it utterly loses sense in losing life. And that is because life is the foundation of the abilities of sense, and the sensitive life is a more excellent life than the quickening life, as wherein those powers and abilities are rooted.

To be brief, he who deprives a man or beast of the use of senses, or a man of the right use of reason, does not thereby deprive him of life; but he who deprives the beast, or the outward man, of their life, also thereby deprives them of sense and reason. Therefore, it is a most certain argument that the soul which causes a beast to live, and the soul that causes it to have sense, are both one; that is to say, one certain kind of life, more lively and more excellent than the life in Plants. And likewise, that the soul which causes man to live, to have sense, and to reason, is but one; that is to say, one certain kind of life, more excellent, more lively, and of further reach than the life of the Beast.

But just as sense is, as it were, the form or Self-being (if I may so term it) of the life of a beast, so is reason or understanding the very form and Self-being of the soul of man; and (to speak properly) it is the soul or life of the soul, just as the apple of our eye is the very eye of our eye. And indeed,

when the mind is earnestly occupied, the senses are at a standstill; and when the senses are overbusy, nourishment and digestion are hindered, and vice versa: which thing could not happen if the soul were more than one substance, which, because it is but one, cannot exert its force equally in all places at once, but yields less attention in one place as long as it is earnestly occupied elsewhere.

In this soul of man (which nevertheless is but one) the diversity of powers and abilities is very apparent. The quickening power nourishes, increases, and maintains us; and Reason and Sense meddle not therewith, nor do they have the power to hinder its work. The truth of which appears in this, that those things are best done when our mind is at rest and our senses are asleep; insomuch that oftentimes we lose the sense and motion of some parts through some Rheum or some Palsy, and yet those same parts do not cease to be nourished still.

Also, the sensitive life sees and perceives from afar, yes, often without engaging the mind or considering what the Sense perceives. Some men who have weak Senses have very quick understanding, and likewise on the contrary. Again, some fall into Consumption, yet retain the perfect use of their Senses. Sometimes, the reasonable part is so earnestly engaged and occupied with the things it delights in that by its own growth, it harms and diminishes the part that quickens. Also, it stands in opposition to the Senses, reproves them for falsehood, and concludes contrary to their information. And it may be that a man who has perfect digestion and sound Senses may not have his wit or reason equally sound.

Now, if the Soul were only one ability, it could not be so. But now it is manifestly divided into wit or understanding, and will; the one serving to devise, and the other to execute. For we understand diverse things which we

will not, and we will diverse things which we do not understand: which contrary operations cannot both be attributed to one power.

Nevertheless, the uniting of all these powers together is with such distinctness, and the distinguishing of them is with such union, that ordinarily they meet altogether in one self-same action, each one as readily (by all likelihood) as the other, although each does its own work separately by itself, and one before another in respect of their objects.

Thus, we have three sorts of men according to the three powers or abilities of the inward man. Namely, the earthly man, who like the Plant, minds nothing but sleeping and feeding, making all his senses and all his reason serve that purpose, as in whom the care of this present life only has devoured and swallowed up his senses and understanding. The Sensual man (as St. Paul himself terms him), who is wholly given to these sensible things, embracing and casting down his reason so far as to make it a bond-servant to his senses and the pleasures and delights thereof. And the reasonable man, who lives properly in spirit and mind, who enters into himself to know himself, and goes out of himself to behold God; making this life serve the attainment of a better one, and using his Senses but as instruments and servants of his reason.

As any of these three powers reigns and bears sway in man, that is, as a man yields himself more to one than to another of them; so he becomes like the Spirits, the brute Beasts, or Plants, yes, and even the very Blocks and Stones. But it is our disposition, even by nature, to be carried away by our corrupt nature and by the objects that hem us in on all sides; but as for going against our nature or beyond our nature, our nature is unable to do anything at all.

Now, it is not enough for us to know that we have a soul whereby we live, feel, and understand, and which, being but one, has in itself alone so many various powers or abilities; for it will soon be demanded of us what this soul properly is. And truly, if I should say, I cannot tell what it is, I would not deceive myself at all, for I would only be confessing my own ignorance, as many great learned men have done before me. And I would do no wrong at all to the Soul itself, for since we cannot deny its effects, the less we are able to declare the nature and being of it, the more does its excellence shine forth.

Again, it is a plain fact that nothing can comprehend a thing greater than itself. Now, our Soul is, in a way, less than itself, inasmuch as it is wrapped up in this body, just as a man with shackles and fetters on his feet is, in a way, weaker than himself. Nevertheless, let us attempt to satisfy such demands as well as we can. And inasmuch as it is the Image of God, not only in respect of the governance and maintenance of the whole World, but also even in its very nature, as we said before when we spoke of the nature of God, if we cannot express or conceive what it is, let us at least be assured of what it is not.

First of all, that the Soul and the Body are not both one thing, but two very different things, and also that the soul is no part of the body, appears evident without further proof. For if the soul were the body, or a part of the body, it would grow with the body, as the other parts of the body do, and the greater the body were, the greater also the soul would be. Nay, to the contrary, the body increases to a certain age and then stops; after which age is commonly the time that the Soul grows the most, and those strongest of mind are often the weakest of body, and the Soul is seen to be full of



liveliness in a languishing body and to grow even more in force by the decay of the body.

The Soul then does not grow with the body, and therefore it is not the body, nor any part of the body. And when I speak of growth in the soul, by growing I mean the advancing of it in power and virtue, as the body grows in size by further enlargement. Again, if the Soul were the body, it would lose its strength and soundness with the body, so that the maimed in body would also feel a lack in his understanding, just as he does in his limbs. Whoever were sick of any disease would also be sick in his reason; he who limps or halts would thereby halt in soul as well; the blind man's soul would be blind, and the lame man's soul would be lame. But we see, on the contrary, that the maimed and the sick, the crippled and the blind, have souls that are whole and sound, and their understanding perfect and clear-sighted in itself.

To be brief, many a man dies whose body is sound and differs not at all in any part from what it was when he was alive, and yet, notwithstanding, both life, motion, sense, and understanding are gone from it. Let us say then that in the body there was a thing which was not of the body but was far different from the body.

Some willful person might object here that the force and strength of the soul grow with the body, as is apparent in that a grown man can move what a child cannot, and that a child of two years old can walk, which a baby of two months old cannot do. But he should also consider that if that same man or child were to suffer a mishap in his leg or arm, he would thereby lose the strength and motion thereof, whereas, nonetheless, his soul would still have its former force and power to move the others as it did before.

Therefore, it is to be said, not that the child's soul grows or strengthens over time, but rather that his sinews have dried and hardened, which the soul uses as strings and instruments to move with; and therefore when age has loosened and weakened them, a man needs a staff to help them, though he has as good a will to run as he did when he was young. The soul, then, which moves them all at a single command, has the same power in infancy as it does in old age, and the same in old age as in the prime of youth; and the fault lies only in the instrument, which is unable to execute its operations. Just as the skill of a Lute-player is not diminished by the moisture or slackness of the Lute strings, nor increased by the overly tight and taut standing of them, although in the former he cannot show his skill at all, and in the latter, he may show it more or less.

Likewise, children's speech comes with their teeth, even though they prattle many things they cannot pronounce; and in old men, it goes away again with their teeth, although their eloquence is not reduced by it. As for Demosthenes, although he surpassed all the Orators of his time, there were still some letters he could not pronounce. Give to old age or to infancy the same sinews and teeth, and as strong and sturdy limbs and members as youth has, and the actions which the soul performs with the body and by the body, I mean as far as concerns the abilities of sense and liveliness, will be carried out as well in one age as in another.

But if you had as much impartiality in judging the force and power of your own soul as in the skill of a Lute-player (I do not mean by the nimbleness of his fingers, which may be knotted with gout, but by the plain and sweet Harmony of his Tablature, as they call it, which leads you to believe he has skill in his head, although he can no longer express it with his hands), so that you would consider how you have within you a desire to

go, though your feet may not bear you; a discretion to judge of things spoken, though your eyes cannot convey it to you; a sound eloquence, though for lack of teeth you cannot well express it; and, above all, a substantial quick and heavenly reason, even when your body is most earthly and drooping. You would soon conclude that the force and power of quickening, moving, and perceiving are whole and sound in your soul, and that the fault lies entirely with your body. Insomuch that if she had a new body and new instruments given to her, she would be as lively and cheerful as ever, and that the more she perceives the body to decay, the more she labors to retreat into herself, which is plain proof that she is not the body nor any part of the body, but the very life and worker of the body.

And since this is so, there is no need for lengthy debate about whether the soul is a substance or a quality. For, seeing that qualities have no being except in another thing than themselves, the life which causes another thing to be cannot be a quality. Since then the Soul makes a man to be a man, who otherwise would be but a carcass or carrion, doubtless (unless we will say that the only difference between a man and a dead carcass is but in accidents) we must necessarily grant that the soul is a forming substance and a substantial form, yes, and a most excellent substance infinitely surpassing the outward man, as it, by its power and virtue, causes another thing to have being, and perfects the bodily substance which seems outwardly to have so many perfections.

But hereupon follows another controversy, whether this substance is a bodily or an unbodily substance, which matter requires somewhat longer examination. Truly, if we consider the nature of a body, it has certain measurements, and does not contain anything which is not proportioned according to its size and capacity. For, just as it must itself have a place in

another thing, so must other things occupy a certain place in it; and consequently, it comes to pass that things cannot have a place within it if they are greater than it, without one hindering the other. In short, if the thing is smaller than the body that contains it, the whole body shall not contain it, but only some part thereof; and if it is greater, then some part of it must needs be outside of it, for there is no measuring of bodies except by quantity.

Now we see how our soul comprehends heaven and earth without either of them hindering the other, and likewise, past, present, and future time, without one troubling another; and finally, innumerable places, persons, and towns, without encumbering our understanding. Great things are there in their full greatness, and small things in their utmost smallness, both of them whole and sound in the soul, whole and sound, and not merely piecemeal or only in part of it. Moreover, the fuller it is, the more it is able to receive; the more things that are contained within it, the more it still desires; and the greater the things are, the more fit it is to receive them, even when they are at their greatest. It follows, therefore, that the soul (which in a way is infinite) cannot be a body. And so much the less can it be so, in that, whereas it harbors so many and so great things within itself, it is lodged in so small a body.

Again, just as a thousand different places are in the soul or mind without occupying any space, so is the mind in a thousand places without changing location; and at times, not by the succession of time, nor by turns, but often altogether at one instant. Bid your Soul or Mind go to Constantinople, then to turn back again to Rome, and immediately to be at Paris or Lyons; bid it pass through America or go about Africa; and it accomplishes all these journeys in an instant. Look wherever you direct it, there it is; and before

you call it back, it is at home again. Now, is there a body that can be in different places at once, or that can pass without moving, or that can move otherwise than over time, indeed in such time as (within a little under or over) is proportioned both to its pace and to the length of the way it has to go? Then it is certain that our Soul is not a bodily substance; which thing appears so much more plainly, in that being lodged in this body which is so movable, it does not move with the body.

Also, it is a sure principle that two bodies cannot mutually enter into each other, nor contain each other; but the greater must always contain, and the lesser must be contained. But through our Souls, we enter not only into each other's bodies but also into each other's minds, so that we comprehend one another by mutual understanding and embrace one another by mutual love. It follows then that this substance, which is able to receive a bodiless thing, cannot be a body; and so much the more so, for the body which seems to hold it does not contain it. Nay truly, this Soul of ours is so far from being a bodily substance, and is so evidently a Spirit, that to lodge all things in itself, it makes them all, in a way, spiritual, and deprives them of their bodies; and if it had any materiality in it, it would be unable to enter into the knowledge of a body.

So, in a mirror, a thousand shapes are seen; but if the clarity of the mirror had any peculiar shape of its own, the mirror could yield none of those shapes at all. Also, all visible things are imprinted in the eye; but if the sight of the eye had any peculiar color of its own, it would be a blemish to the sight, so that it should either not see at all, or else all things should seem similar to that blemish. Likewise, as the Tongue is the discerner of all tastes, if it is not clear but encumbered with humors, all things are of taste like the humor, so that if it is bitter, they also are bitter; and if it is watery, they are

watery too; and if it is bitter, it cannot judge of bitterness itself. That a thing may receive all shapes, all colors, and all tastes, it must be free from all shape, color, and flavor of its own. And that a thing may in understanding know and conceive all bodies, as our soul does, it must be altogether bodiless itself, for had it any materiality at all, it could not receive any body into it.

If we look yet more closely into the nature of a body, we shall find that no body receives into it the substantial form of another body without losing or altering its own, nor passes from one form into another without the marring of the first; as is seen in wood when it receives fire, in seeds when they sprout into buds, and so on. What is to be said then of man's soul, which receives and conceives the forms and shapes of all things without corrupting its own, and moreover becomes more perfected by receiving more? For the more it receives, the more it understands, and the more it understands, the more perfect it is.

If it is a bodily substance, from what is it and of what mixture? If it is of the four Elements, how can they give life, having no life of themselves? Or how can they give understanding, having no sense? If it is from the mixture of them, how may it be said that of diverse things which have no being of themselves, there should be made a thing that has being? Or that from different externals should be made one body? Or from different bodies, one Soul? Or from different deaths, one life? Or from various darknesses, one light? Nay rather, why do we not say that he who, beyond nature, has made the mixture of these bodies, has for the perfecting of our body, breathed a Soul also into it?

To be brief, the property of a body is to suffer, and the property of our Soul is to do. And if the body is not moved by some other thing than itself,

it is but a mere block; whereas the mind that is in our Soul ceases not to stir up and down within itself, though it has nothing to move it from without. Therefore, it is to be concluded by these reasons and the like that our Soul is a bodiless substance, notwithstanding that it is united to our body.

And hereupon it follows also, that our Soul is not any material thing, for as much as matter does not receive any form or shape except according to its own quantity, and only one form at once, whereas our Soul receives all forms without quantity, come there never so many at once or so great. Again, no matter admits two contrary forms at once; but our Soul, on the contrary, comprehends and receives them together, as fire and water, heat and cold, white and black; and not only together but also better by comparing and setting them together.

To sum up, seeing that the further we depart from matter, the more we understand, surely nothing is more contrary to the substance of our Soul than the nature of matter. Furthermore, if this reasonable soul of ours is neither a bodily nor a material thing, nor dependent upon matter in its best actions, then it must exist of itself, and not proceed either from body or from matter. For what does a body bring forth but a body, and matter but matter, and material but materials? And therefore, it is an immaterial substance, which has being of itself.

But let us see whether the same be corruptible and mortal or not. Truly, if Plutarch is to be believed, it is in vain to dispute thereof. For he teaches that the doctrine of God's providence, and the immortality of our Souls are so linked together that the one is as an appendant to the other. And indeed, to what purpose was the World created, if there were no one to behold it? Or to what end do we behold the Creator in the world, but to serve him? And why should we serve him without hope? And to what purpose has he

endowed us with these rare gifts of his, which for the most part do but put us to pain and trouble in this life, if we perish like the brute Beast or the Herbs, which know him not?

However, for the better satisfying of the simple Souls who go on still like witless Beasts, without taking so much leisure in all their life as once to enter into themselves, let us endeavor here by lively reasons to paint out to them again their true shape, which they labor to deface with so much filthiness. The Soul of man (as I have said before) is not a body, nor does it increase or decrease with the body; but on the contrary, the more the body decays, the more does the understanding increase; and the nearer that the body draws unto death, the more freely does the mind understand; and the more that the body decreases in flesh, the more active is the mind. And why then should we think that the thing which becomes stronger by the weakness of the body, and which is advanced by the decay of the body, should return to dust with the body?

A man's senses fail because his eyes fail, and his eyes fail because the spirits of them fail; but the blind man's understanding increases, because his eyes are not busy; and the old man's reason becomes more perfect by the loss of his sight. Therefore, why do we not say that the body fails the Soul, and not the Soul the body; and that the lenses are out of the Spectacles but the eyesight is still good? Why should we deem the Soul to be lost with the Senses? If the eye is the thing that sees, and the ear the thing that hears, why do we not see things double and hear sounds double, seeing we have two eyes and two ears? It is the soul then that sees and hears, and these which we take to be our senses are but the instruments of our senses. And if, when our eyes are shut or picked out, we then behold a thousand things in our mind; yes, and our understanding is then most quick-sighted when the



sharpest of our eyesight is as good as quenched or stark dead; how is it possible that the reasonable soul should be tied and bound to the senses? What reason is there to say that the soul dies with the senses, seeing that the true senses do then grow and increase when the instruments of sense die? And what a thing it would be to say that a beast is dead because it has lost its eyes, when we ourselves see that it lives after it has lost its eyes?

Also, I have proved that the soul is neither the body, nor an appendage of the body. Since it is so, why measure we that thing by the body, which measures all bodies; or make that to die with the body, by which the bodies that die, yes, many hundreds of years ago, do after a certain manner live still? Or what can harm that thing, whom nothing harms or hinders in the body? Though a man lose an arm, yet does his soul remain whole still. Let him lose half of his body, yet his soul is as sound as before; for it is whole in itself, and whole in every part of itself, united in itself and in its own substance, and by the force and power thereof it sheds itself into all parts of the body. Though the body rots away piecemeal, yet the Soul remains all one and undiminished. Let the blood drain out, the motion grow weak, the senses fail, and the strength perish; yet the mind remains nonetheless sound and lively even to the end. Her house must be pierced through on all sides before she is discouraged; her walls must be battered down before she begins to flee; and she never forsakes her lodging until there is no room left for her to lodge in.

True it is that brute beasts lose both life and action with their blood. But as for our soul (if we consider the matter well), it is then gathered home into itself, and when our senses are quenched, it most of all labors to surpass itself: performing as noble actions at the time that the body is on the verge of failing it, and often even nobler actions, than ever it did during the whole

lifetime thereof. For example, it takes care of itself, of our household, of the Commonwealth, and of a whole Kingdom; and that with more uprightness, godliness, wisdom, and moderation, than ever it did before; yes, and perhaps in a body so far spent, so bare, so consumed, so withered outside, and so putrefied within, that whoever looks upon him sees nothing but earth, and yet to hear him speak would raise one up to heaven, yes, and above heaven.

Now when one sees so lively a soul in so weak and wretched a body, may he not say, as is said of the hatching of chickens, that the shell is broken, but there comes forth a chicken?

Also, let us see what is the ordinary cause that things perish. Fire goes out for lack of fuel or is quenched by its contrary, which is water. Water is resolved into air by fire, which is its contrary. The cause why the Plant dies is extreme cold or drought, or unseasonable cutting, or violent plucking up. Also, the living creature dies through contrariety of humors, or for lack of food, or by feeding upon something that is contrary to its nature, or by outward violence. Of all these causes, which can we say have any power against our Soul? I say, against the Soul of man which (although it is united to matter and to a body) is itself a substance unbodily, immaterial, and only conceivable in understanding.

Contrariety of things? Nay, what can be contrary to that which holds contraries alike equally in itself: which understands one of them by the other: which contains them all within one skill? and (in short) in whom the contraries themselves abandon their contrariness, so they no longer oppose but rather follow one another. Fire is hot, and water cold. Our bodies dislike these contraries and are grieved by them; but our mind links them together without either burning or cooling itself; and it sets one against the other to

understand them better. The things which destroy one another throughout the whole world, maintain one another in our minds.

Again, nothing is more contrary to peace than war; and yet man's mind knows how to make or maintain peace by preparing for war, and to lay earnestly for war in seeking or enjoying peace. Even death itself (which ends our life) cannot be contrary to the life of our Soul, for it seeks life by death, and death by life. And what can that thing encounter in the whole world, that may be able to overthrow it, which can command obedience from things most contrary?

What then? Want of food? How can that lack food in the world, which can understand to feed on the whole world? Or how should that lack food, when the fuller it is, the hungrier it is, and the more it has digested, the better able it is to digest? The bodily creature feeds upon certain things, but our mind feeds upon all things. Take from it the sensible things, and the things of understanding remain with it still; deprive it of earthly things, and the heavenly remain abundantly. In short, deny it all worldly things, yes, and the world itself, and even then it feeds at greatest ease, and makes the best feast agreeable to its own nature.

Also, the bodily creature fills itself to a certain measure and delights in certain things. But what can fill our mind? Fill it as full as you can with the knowledge of things, and it is still eager and keen to receive more. The more it takes in, the more it still craves; and yet for all that, it never feels any rawness or lack of digestion.

What more shall I say? Discharge our understanding from the mindfulness of itself, and then it lives in him and by him in whom all things live. Again, fill it with the knowledge of itself, and then it feels itself most empty, and sharpest set upon the desire of the other.

Now then, can that die or decay for lack of food, which cannot be glutted with anything, which is nourished and sustained by all things, and which lives truly upon him by whom all the things which we marvel at here below are upheld?

And what else is violence but a jostling of two bodies together? And how can there be any such between a body and a spiritual substance? Yes, or of two spirits one against another, seeing that oftentimes when they would destroy one another, they uphold one another? And if the Soul cannot be pushed at, either inwardly or outwardly, is there anything in nature that can naturally hurt it? No, but it may perhaps be weakened by the very force of its encounter, as we see it happens to our senses. For the more excellent and the more sensible the thing is in its kind which the sense receives, so much the more also is the sense itself offended or grieved thereby. For example, feeling is hurt by fire, taste by bitterness, smell by odors, hearing by the hideousness of noise, whether it be of a Thunderclap or of the falling of a River, and sight by looking upon the Sun, upon Fire, and upon all things that have a glaring brightness.

I omit that in most of these things, it is not properly the sense itself but only the outward instrument of sense that is offended or hurt. But let us see if there is the like in our reasonable soul. No, on the contrary, the more understanding and excellence the thing is, the more does it refresh and comfort our mind. If it is dark so that we understand it only in part, it does not harm us, yet it does not delight us. Indeed, as we increase in understanding it, so does it please us more, and the higher it is, the more does it stir up the power of our understanding, and (as you would say) reach out a hand to draw us to the attainment thereof.

As for those who are dim-sighted, we forbid them to behold things that are too bright. But as for those of rawest capacity, we offer them the things that are most understandable. When the sense begins to perceive most sharply, then it is forced to stop, as if it felt its own very death. On the contrary, when the mind begins to understand, then it is most desirous to hold on. And why is that, but because our senses work by bodily instruments, while our mind works by a bodiless substance which does not need the help of the body? And seeing that the nature, the nourishment, and the actions of our soul are so far different from the nature, nourishment, and actions of the body, and from all that ever is done or wrought by the body, can there be anything more childish than to deem our soul to be mortal by the weakening and decay of our senses, or by the mortality of our bodies? No, on the contrary, it may be most soundly and substantially concluded that man's soul is by its own nature immortal, seeing that all death, both violent and natural, comes of the body and by the body.

Let us see further what death or corruption is. It is, they say, a separating of the matter from its form. And forasmuch as in man the soul is considered to be the form, and the body to be as the matter, the separation of the soul from the body is commonly called death. Now then, what death can there be of the soul, since it is immaterial, as I have said before, and a form that abides by itself? For (as one says) a man may take away the roundness or squareness from a table of copper, because they have no abiding except in the matter; but if they had such a round or square form as might have an abiding without matter or stuff in which to be, without doubt, such form or shape should continue forever.

Indeed, (which is more) how can that be the corrupter of a thing which is its perfection? The less coarseness a man has, the more has he of reason and

understanding. The less our minds are tied to these bodily things, the more lively and cheerful they are. In a word, the full and perfect life of the soul is the complete and utter withdrawal from the body and all that the body is made of. All these things are so clear as they need no proof. Now, we know that everything works according to its proper being, and that the same which perfects the operations of a thing perfects the being thereof also. It follows, therefore, that since the separation of the body from the Soul, and of the form from the matter, perfects the operation or working of the soul (as I have said before), it does also make perfect and strengthen the very being thereof, and therefore cannot in any way corrupt it.

And what else is dying but to be corrupted? And what else is corrupting but suffering? And what else is suffering but receiving? And how can that which receives all things without suffering receive corruption by anything? Fire corrupts or mars our bodies, and we suffer in receiving it. So does extreme cold; but if we suffered nothing by it, it could not freeze us. Our senses likewise are harmed by the excessive force of the things they encounter. And that is because they receive and perceive the thing that grieves them, and because the manner of their behavior towards their objects is subject to suffering. But as for the reasonable Soul, which receives all things in one manner, that is to say, by way of understanding, whereby it always works and is never worked upon, how is it possible for it to corrupt or mar itself?

For what is the thing whereat our Soul suffers anything in its substance, I mean whereby the substance of our Soul is in any way impaired or hurt by minding or conceiving the same in understanding? Fire harms it as little as the air, and the air as little as the fire. It receives as little harm by the frozen ice of Norway as by the scorching sands of Africa. Likewise, vice annoys it

as little as virtue. For vice and virtue are so far from encumbering the substance of the soul that our mind never conceives or understands them better than by setting them together one against the other. That thing, therefore, which does not impair itself but takes the ground of perfecting itself by all things, cannot be marred or harmed by anything.

Again, what is death? The uttermost point of moving, and the uttermost bound of this life. For even in living we die, and in dying we live, and there is not a step we set down in this life which does not continually step forward unto death, after the manner of a Dial or a Clock, which mounting up by certain degrees loses its motion by moving from minute to minute. Take away motion from a body, and it lives no more. Now let us see if the soul also is carried with the same motion. If it is carried with the same motion, then does it undoubtedly move therewith. On the contrary, whether the mind rests or is busy with its proper operations, it is not perceived either by any panting of heart, by any beating of pulses, or by any breathing of Lungs. It is then as a Ship that carries us away with it, whether we walk or sit still; the anchoring or tying of it to a post does not hinder our going up and down in it still.

Again, if the soul is subject to the same corruption of the body, then it is subject to its alterations also; and if it is subject to alterations, it is subject to time as well. For alterations or changes are kinds, or rather consequences, of motion, and motions are only made in time. Now man in respect of the body has certain full points or stops, at which he receives manifest changes, and thereafter grows or decays. But commonly where the decay of the body begins, there begins the chief strength of the mind. Although in some men, not only are their chins covered with down, but their beards become gray, whose minds for lack of exercise show no sign either of ripeness or growth.

Moreover, time (as it relates to the body) cannot be called back, but with respect to the mind, it is always present. Yes, and time perfects, accomplishes, and increases our mind, and in a way renews and refreshes it from day to day, whereas on the contrary it wears out, washes away, and quite consumes both itself and the body with the life thereof. It follows then that the reasonable Soul is not subject to time, nor consequently to any of the changes and corruption that accompany time. Indeed, we may say even more; that nothing in the whole world is nourished by things better than itself, nor does any of them contain greater things than itself. But the things that are corruptible live by corruptible things and cannot live without corrupting them; as, for example, beasts live by herbs, men by beasts, and so forth. And therefore things which live by incorruptible things, and can so receive and digest them as to turn them into the nourishment of their nature, yet not corrupt them, are incorruptible themselves also.

Now the Soul of man, I mean the reasonable soul or mind, conceives reason and truth and is fed and strengthened by them. And reason and truth are things unchangeable, not subject to time, place, or alteration, but steady, unchangeable, and everlasting. For that twice two make four, and that there is the same ratio in the proportion of eight to six as there is of four to three, or that in a Triangle, the three inner angles are equal to the two right angles; and the like; are truths, which neither years nor thousands of years can change; as true at this day as they were when Euclid first spoke them. And so forth of other things. It follows then that the Soul, comprehending reason and truth, which are things free from corruption, cannot in any way be subject to corruption.

Again, who is there among all men that does not desire to be immortal? And how could any man desire it if he understood not what it is? Or how



could he understand it unless it were possible for him to attain it? Surely none of us covets to be without beginning, for none of us is so, nor can any of us be so. And as we cannot be so, neither can we comprehend what it is. For who is there that is not at his wit's end merely to think upon eternity without beginning? On the contrary, there is no mind so base that does not covet to live forever, insomuch that whereas we do not expect it by nature, we seek to obtain it by skill and policy—some by books, some by images, and some by other devices; and even the grossest sort can well imagine in themselves what immortality is, and are able both to conceive and to believe it.

Whence comes this, but that our souls, being created, cannot conceive of an everlastingness without beginning, and yet, nonetheless, that because they are created immortal, they do well conceive an immortality or everlastingness without end? And to what purpose serves this universal desire, if it is not natural? Or how is it natural if it is in vain?—and not only in vain but also to bring us to hell and torment?

Let us go yet deeper. Who can dispute, or even so much as doubt, whether the soul is immortal or not, but he who is capable of immortality? And who can understand the difference between mortal and immortal, except he who is immortal? Man is able to discern the difference between that which is reason and that which is not, and thereupon we term him reasonable. Whoever would hold the opinion that man is not reasonable would need no other disproof than his own disputing thereof, for he would go about to prove it by reason.

Man has the skill to discern mortal natures from the immortal, and therefore we may well say he is immortal. For he who would dispute the contrary shall be driven to bring such reasons as shall of themselves make

him prove himself immortal. You say the soul cannot be immortal, and why? Because (you say) that to be so, it would have to work separately by itself from the body. When you think that in your mind, consider what your body does at the same time. No, even further, who has taught you so much about the immortal nature, if you yourself are not immortal? Or what worldly being can say what the inworking of a reasonable being is, but the being that in itself has the use of reason?

Yet you still say, if the soul is immortal, it is free from such and such passions. How do you enter so far into a nature that is so far above you, if you yourself are mortal? All the reasons you allege against the immortality of the soul fight directly to prove it. For if your reason rose no higher than to things that are mortal, you would know neither mortal nor immortal. Now it is not some one covetous man above all others that desires immortality, nor some one man excelling all others in wisdom that comprehends it, but all mankind without exception. It is not then some particular skill or one natural property that makes such a difference between man and man as we see to be between many, but rather one and the same nature common to all men, whereby they are all made to differ from other living beings, which by no act show any desire to outlive themselves, nor know how to live, and therefore their lives vanish away with their blood and are extinguished with their bodies.

If you have ever expected to die, consider what thoughts you then made in your mind; you could never persuade your conscience, nor make your reason conceive, that the soul should die with the body. But even at the same time when it disputes against itself, it somehow shifts from all your conclusions, and fails to consider in what state it shall be, and where it shall go when it is out of the body. The Epicurean who has disputed of it all his

life long, when he comes to death, bequeaths a yearly pension for the keeping of a yearly feast on the day of his birth. I pray you, to what purpose serve feasting for the birth of a swine, seeing he esteems himself to be no better than that? No, what else is this but his nature crying out against him, which with one word confutes all his vain arguments?

Another labors by all means possible to blot out in himself the opinion of immortality; and because he has lived wickedly in this world, he insists that there is no justice in the world to come. But then is the time that his own nature wakes and starts up, as it were, from the bottom of a water, and at that instant paints again before his eyes the very same thing which he took so much pain to deface. And in good truth, what a number have we seen, who, having been despisers of all religion, have at the hour of death been glad to vow their souls to any saint for relief; so clear was then the presence of the life to come before their eyes.

“I would rather,” said Zeno, “see an Indian burn himself cheerfully than to hear all the philosophers of the world discoursing of the immortality of the soul”; and indeed it is a much stronger and better concluded argument. No, rather let us say, I would rather see an atheist or an Epicurean witness the immortality of the soul and willingly take an honorable farewell of nature upon a scaffold than to hear all the doctors of the world discoursing of it in their pulpits. For whatever the Epicureans say there, they speak it advisedly and (as one would say) fresh and fasting; whereas all that they have ever spoken all their life before is to be accounted but as the words of drunkards—that is to say, of men besotted and fallen asleep in the delights and pleasures of this world, where the wine and the excess of meat and the vapors that rise from them spoke, and not the men themselves.

What shall I say more? I have told you already that in the inward man there are (as one would say) three men: the living, the sensitive, and the reasonable. Let us say therefore that in the same person there are three lives continued from one to another, namely, the life of the Plant, the life of the Beast, and the life of the Man or of the Soul. So long as a man is in his mother's womb, he not only lives and grows; his spirit seems to sleep, and his senses seem to slumber, so that he seems to be nothing more than a plant. Nevertheless, if you consider his eyes, his ears, his tongue, his senses, and his movements, you will easily judge that he is not made to be forever in that prison, where he neither sees nor hears, nor has any room to walk in, but rather that he is made to come forth into a more open place, where he may have things to see and behold, and wherewith to occupy all the powers we see to be in him.

As soon as he is born, he begins to see, to feel, and to move, and gradually he comes to the perfect use of his limbs, and finds in this world a peculiar object for each of them, as visible things for the eye, sounds for his hearing, bodily things for his feeling, and so forth. But besides all this, we find there a mind, which by the eyes as by windows beholds the world, and yet, in all the world, finding nothing worthy to rest upon entirely, it mounts up to him that made it; which mind, like an empress, lodges in the whole world, and not only in this body; which by the senses (and often also without the senses) mounts above the senses and strains itself to go out of itself, as a child does to get out of his mother's womb. And therefore we ought surely to say that this Mind or Reason ought not to be forever in prison. That one day it shall see clearly, and not through these dim and cloudy spectacles; that it shall come to a place where it shall have the true

object of understanding; and that it shall have its life free from these fetters and from all the affections of the body.

In short, just as man is prepared in his mother's womb to be brought forth into the world, so is he also, in a way, prepared in this body and in this world to live in another world. We then understand it, when by nature it is time for us to depart out of the world. And what child is there who (if nature did not by her skill drive him out) would willingly come out, or who is not born as good as forlorn and half dead; or who, if he had knowledge and speech at that time, would not call that death which we call birth, and that a departure from life which we call the entrance into it?

As long as we are there, we see nothing, though our eyes be open. Many also do not so much as stir, except it be at some sudden scare or some other similar chance; and as for those who stir, they know not that they have either sense or motion. Why then should we think it strange that in this life our understanding sees so little, that many men never consider the immortal nature until they are at the last cast, yes, and some think not themselves to have any such thing, although even in so thinking they show themselves to have part thereof? And do we imagine that the unborn babe has less difficulty by nature to leave the poor skin in which he is wrapped, than we have hindrance in our senses and in our imprisoned reason, when we are at the point of leaving the goods and pleasures of this world, and even the flesh itself which holds us as in a grave?

Or had the babe some little knowledge, would he not say that no life were comparable to the life where he then is, as we say there is no life like the life of this world in which we are? Or would he not account the stage of our senses a fable, as many of us consider the stage prepared for our souls? Yes, surely; and therefore let us conclude where we began, namely that man is

both inward and outward. In the outward man, which is the body, he resembles the being and the proportion of all the parts of the world. And in the inner man, he resembles whatever kind of life exists in all things, or in anything that bears life in the world. In his mother's womb he lives the life of a plant, but with the added quality that he has a certain commencement of sense and motion which exceed the plant, and prepare him to be endowed with senses as a beast is.

In this life, he has sense and motion in their perfection, which is the property of a sensitive being; but yet besides these, he has also a beginning of reason and understanding, which are the beginnings of another life that the sensitive being does not have, and this life is to be perfected in another place. In the life to come, he has his actions free and fully perfected, a large field to work upon, able to suffice him completely, and a light to his understanding in place of a light to the eye. And just as in coming into the world, he came as it were out of another world, so in going into yet another world, he must also go out of this one. He comes out of the first world into the second, as it were failing in nourishment but growing in strength unto motion and sense; and he goes out of the second into the third, failing in senses and motion but growing in reason and understanding.

Now seeing we call the passage out of the first world into the second a birth, what reason is there that we should call the passage out of the second into the third a death? To be brief, he who considers how all the actions of man's mind tend to the time to come, without possibility of staying upon the present time, however pleasant and delightful it may be, may well discern by them all, that his being (which in everything, as says Aristotle, follows its working) is also wholly bent towards the time to come; as if to say this present life were to it but as a narrow channel, on the other side of which

(as it were on the bank of some stream or running water) it would find its true dwelling place and very home indeed.

But now it is time to see what is said to the contrary: wherein we have to consider again that which we spoke of before; namely that if all that ever is in us were transitory and mortal, we should not be so wise to examine immortality as we are; for the knowledge of contraries is the same. If a man were not mortal, that is to say, if he had no life, he could not dispute about mortal life; nor could he speak of the immortal if he himself were not immortal. Therefore, let us go back and retrace. Someone will say that the soul dies with the body because the soul and the body are but one thing, and he believes that they are both but one because he sees nothing but the body. This argument is the same as theirs who denied that there is any God because they saw him not. But yet by his deeds you may perceive that there is a God; discern likewise by the deeds of your soul that you have a soul. For in a dead body you see the same parts remain, but you do not see the same deeds that were in it before. When a man is dead, his eye sees nothing at all, and yet there is nothing changed in his eye; but while he is alive, he sees countless things that are diverse. The power then which sees is not of the body.

Yet, no matter how lively and quick-sighted the eye may be, it does not see itself. Do not wonder, therefore, though you have a soul and that this same soul does not see itself. For if your eyesight saw itself, it would not be a power or ability of seeing, but a visible thing; likewise, if your soul saw itself, it would no longer be a Soul, that is to say, the worker and quickener of the body, but a very body, unable to do anything of itself, and a massive substance subject to suffering. For we see nothing but the body and bodily substances. But in this you perceive something else than a body (as I have

said before), that if your eye had any peculiar color of its own, it could not discern any other color than that. Seeing then that you conceive so many diverse bodies at once in imagination, you must have a power in you which is not a body.

Be it (say they) that we have a power of sense; yet we have no power of reason; for what we call the power of reason or understanding is nothing but an excellence or rather a consequence of sense, insomuch that when sense dies, the rest dies with it as well. Truly, in this which you have said, you have surpassed sense; which you would not have done if you had nothing in you beyond sense. For whereas you say, if the sense dies, the rest dies also, it is a reason that proceeds from one term to another, and it is a gathering of reasons which conclude one thing by another. Now, the senses do indeed perceive their objects, but no matter how lively they are, they do not reason.

We see smoke; thus far extends the sense. But if we infer, therefore, there must be fire, and thereupon seek who kindled it: that surpasses the ability of sense. We hear a piece of music; that any beast may do as well as we. But his hearing of it is as of a mere sound; whereas our hearing of it is as of a harmony, and we discern the cause of the concords and discords, which either delight or offend our sense. The thing that hears the sound is the sense; but the thing that judges of that which the sense perceives is something other than the sense. The same is to be said of smelling, tasting, and feeling. Our smelling of scents, our tasting of flavors, and our feeling of substances are indeed the work of our senses. But as for our judging of the inward virtue of the thing by the outward scent thereof, or of the wholesomeness or unwholesomeness of food by its taste, or of the heat or severity of a fever by feeling the pulse; yes, and our probing even into the



very bowels of a man, where the eye, being the quickest of all senses, is not able to reach; surely it is the work of a more powerful force than sense.

Indeed, there are beasts that hear, see, smell, taste, and feel much better and more quickly than man does. Yet nonetheless, none of them compares the contraries of colors, sounds, scents, and flavors, nor sorts them to serve one another, or to serve themselves. Whereby it appears that man surpasses the beasts by another power than sense, and that where a man is a painter, a musician, or a physician, he has it from somewhere other than his senses. Indeed, I say further, that often we conclude completely contrary to the report of our senses. One eye perhaps tells us that a tower seen from afar is round, whereas our reason deems it to be square; or that a thing is small, which our reason tells us is great; or that the ends of lines in a long walk meet in a point, whereas our reason certifies us that they run straight forward with equal distance from one another.

For lack of this discretion, certain elephants (says Vitellio) which were passing over a long bridge, turned back being deceived; and yet they lacked no sight, no more than we do. But their guides were not deceived. Their guides then, besides their eyesight, had in them another virtue or power which corrected their sight, and therefore ought to be of higher estimation. The same applies to the rest of the other senses. For our hearing tells us that the thunderclap follows the lightning; but skill assures us that they are both together, for there is a certain power in us that has the skill to discern the proportion between hearing and seeing. Also, the tongue of him who has a fever persuades him that even sugar is bitter, which thing he knows by his reason to be untrue. In short, those who have the liveliest and sharpest senses are not the wisest and most understanding. A man therefore differs from a beast and excels man by some power other than sense.

For whereas it is commonly said that those who have seen most are often the wisest, we see that many have traveled far both by sea and land, who have come home as wise as they went forth. A horse has as good eyes as he that rides upon him, and yet for all his traveling, neither he nor perhaps his rider whom he bears becomes any wiser by that which they have seen: whereby it appears that it is not enough to see things unless a man also considers them to his benefit.

Now there is great difference between the liveliness of the Sense and the power that governs the Sense; just as the report of a spy is one thing, the spy himself is another, and the wisdom of the Captain that receives the report of the spy is yet another. Indeed, who can deny that sense and reason are different things; or rather, who will not grant that in many things they are entirely contrary? Sense bids us shun and avoid pain; whereas reason directs us to offer our leg sometimes to the surgeon to be cut off. Sense pulls our hand out of the fire, and yet we ourselves put fire to our bare skin. He who would see a Scaevola burn off his own hand without so much as once gnashing his teeth at it, would think he was utterly senseless: so mightily does reason overrule sense.

In short, Sense has its peculiar inclination, which is appetite, and reason likewise has its own, which is will. And just as reason often overrules sense and is contrary to it, so will corrects the sensual appetite or lust that is in us and wars against it. For in a fever we crave to drink, and in an apoplexy we crave to sleep, and in hunger we crave to eat, and yet from all those things does our will restrain us. The more a man follows his lust, the less he is led by will; and the more he stands upon pleasing his senses, the less reason he ordinarily uses.

Again, let us consider the brute beasts which have the sensitive part as well as we. If we have no more than that, how does it come to pass that a little child drives whole flocks and herds of them wherever he pleases, and sometimes where they would not go? Why is it that each of them, in their kind, lives, nests, and sings in one manner, whereas men have their laws, commonwealths, manners of building, and forms of reasoning not only diverse but often contrary?

Now what can harbor these contrarieties together, but only that which has nothing contrary to it, and wherein all contrary things lay aside their contrariety? Surely it is not sense that can do it, whose proper or peculiar object is most contrary to the sense. Besides this (as I have said before), whereas we conceive wisdom, skill, virtue, and such other things which are all bodiless, our senses have no other thing to work upon than the qualities of bodily substances. And whereas we make universal rules of particular things, the senses attain no further than to the particular things themselves. And whereas we conclude of the causes by their effects, our senses perceive no more than the bare effects; and whereas concerning the things that belong to understanding, the more understandable they are, the more they refresh us; on the contrary, the stronger that the sensible things are, the more they offend the sense. In short, the very thing which we speak in behalf of the senses proceeds from somewhere other than the senses. And we will easily discern that he who denies that besides the common sense, there is in man a reason or understanding, distinct and separate from sense, is void both of understanding and of sense.

But here is a gross reason of theirs. This reason or power of understanding (say they) which is in man, is corruptible as well as the power of perceiving by the senses. I think I have proved the contrary already; nevertheless, let us

examine their reasons yet further. The form or shape of everything (say they) perishes with the matter. Now the soul is, as you would say, the form or shape of the body, therefore it corrupts with the body. This argument would be rightly concluded if it were meant of the material form. But I have proved that the soul is immaterial and has a continuance of itself. And indeed, the more it is freed from matter, the more it retains its own peculiar form. Therefore the corruption of the matter does not affect the soul at all.

Again, if men's souls live (say they) after their bodies, then they are infinite, for the world is without beginning and without end, and (as we know) nature cannot tolerate anything infinite: therefore they do not live after their bodies. Yes, say I, for I have proved that the world has a beginning, and that with such substantial reasons that you are not able to disprove. Therefore it follows that the inconvenience you allege can have no place. Another says, If dead men's souls still live, why do they not come to tell us so? And he thinks he has stumbled upon a wonderfully subtle device. But how does this follow in reason? No man has come to us from the Indies for a long time; ergo, there are no Indies. May not the same argument serve as well to prove that we ourselves are not, because we never went there?

Again, what intercourse is there between things that have bodies and things that have no bodies, or between heaven and earth, considering that there is so little intercourse even between men who live under the same Sun? He who is made a magistrate in his own country does not willingly return to the place of his banishment. Likewise, the soul that is lodged in the lap of his God and has come home to his native soil, lets go of the desire of these lower things, which to his sight appear less than the point of a needle from above. On the other side, he who is put in close prison, no

matter how desirous he may be, cannot go out; so that soul which is in the jail of his sovereign Lord God has no respite or idle time to come and tell us what is done there. To the one, the sight of the everlasting God is like a paradise wherein he is willing to remain; and to the other, his own condemnation is an imprisonment of his will.

But we would have God send both the one and the other to us to make us believe. As if to say, it stood greatly for God to have us believe, rather than for us to need to believe. And in effect, what is all this but desiring that some man might return into his mother's womb again to encourage young babes against the pains they endure at birth, which they would be as shy of as we are of death, if they had similar knowledge of them? But let us let such vanities pass and come to the substance.

You tell us (say they) that the soul of man is but one, though it has diverse powers. Whereof we see the sensitive and the growing powers to be corrupted and to perish; therefore it would seem that the understanding or reasonable power should do the same. In a word, this is the same as if a man should say, you tell me that this man is both a good man, a good sword-player, and a good lute-player altogether, and that because his sword falls out of his hand, or his hand itself becomes lame, he cannot be a good or honest man still as you reported him to be. No, though he loses those instruments, he ceases not to be an honest man, yes, and both a sword-player and a lute-player too, as far as skill is concerned.

Likewise, when our souls have left these exercises, they cease not to be the same as they were before. To shed further light on this point; of the powers of our soul, some are exercised by the instruments of the body, and others without any help or furtherance of the body at all. Those which are exercised by the body are the senses and the powers of the senses, and the

powers of growth, which may bear a resemblance to a lute-player and a lute. Break the lute-player's lute, and his skill remains, but his ability to put it into practice fails. Give him another lute and he resumes playing anew. Put out a man's eye, and yet the ability of seeing remains with him, though the very act of seeing is hindered. But give to the oldest person the same eyes he had when he was young, and he shall see as well as he ever did.

The same is true of the power of growth. Restore a good stomach, a sound liver, and a perfect heart; and it shall perform its functions as well as ever. The power that works by itself and without the body is the power of reason or understanding, which, if we will, we may call the mind. And if you still doubt it, consider when you think on something earnestly what help your body gives your mind in that; and you shall see that the more intently you think on it, the less you see the things before you, and the more your mind wanders, the more your body rests. As if to say that the workings of the body are the greatest hindrance to the particular workings of the mind.

This ability of understanding may be likened to a man who, though he has lost both his hand and his lute, ceases not to be a man still, and to do the true deeds of a man, that is, to discuss things, to think on them, to use reason, and the like; yes, and to be both a lute-player and a man as he was before, though he cannot put his lute-playing into practice for lack of instruments. Indeed (which is more) this understanding part grows stronger and greater the less it is occupied with these base and corruptible things, and is altogether drawn home wholly to itself, as seen in those who lack their eyes, whose minds are often most apt to understand and most firm to remember.

Do we debate on something in ourselves? Neither our body nor our senses are occupied with it. Do we will it? They stir as little for that too. To

understand and to will (which are the operations of the mind) the soul has no need of the body, and as for working and being, they accompany each other, says Aristotle. Therefore to continue still in being, the soul has no need of the body: but rather, to work well and to be well, the soul ought either to be without the body, or at least to be utterly unsubject to the body.

Yes (say they) but we see men lose their reason, as fools and melancholy persons; and if reason can be lost, it may also be corrupted, and if corrupted, it may also die; for what is death but an utter corruption? No, rather say, I have seen many who, having seemed to have lost their wits, have recovered them again by good diet and medicines. But if they had been utterly lost, no remedy could have restored them; and if they had utterly perished, the people themselves would have had neither sense nor life remaining. Therefore, of necessity, the soul was as sound as before.

But we see our souls only through the body and by the instruments of the body, as it were, through spectacles, and our mind, which sees through its imaginations as if through a cloud, is somewhat troubled by the dimming of the spectacles and by the smokiness of the imaginations. Similarly, the Sun seems to be dimmed and eclipsed, and that is only by the moon or some clouds coming between him and us, for there is no decrease in his light at all. Likewise, our eyesight perceives things according to the spectacles it looks through, or according to the color that lies across the things it looks upon. Take away the impediments, and our eyes shall see clearly; purge away the humors, and our imagination shall be pure; and so our understanding shall see as brightly as it did before, just as the Sun shines after the clouds are gone.

Our souls do not fare like our bodies, which after a long sickness retain either a hardness of the spleen, or shortness of breath, or a falling of rheum

upon the lungs, or a scar of some great wound that cannot be worn away because of the break in the whole. For neither in their understanding nor in their will do our souls feel any diminishment, except that some maim or blemish remains in the instruments; to wit (as I will explain hereafter) so far as it pleases God, as a just punishment, to put the soul in subjection to the body, whose sovereign it was created to have been, because it neglected the will of the Creator to follow the lusts and likings of the body.

This appears in lunatic folks and others whose wits are troubled at times and by fits. For they are not vexed except at the stirring of their humors, being at other times sober and well enough in their wits. The same is seen in those that have epilepsy. Their understanding seems eclipsed, and as if struck with a thunderclap, during their fits; but afterward, they are as discreet as though they had no ailment. In short, the body is subject to a thousand diseases which we see the understanding to be no whit affected by, because they do not touch the instruments of sense and imagination, which move the understanding. It is troubled indeed by only those few things which affect the sense and imagination, which by that means report things unfaithfully to the mind's debate.

Thus, you will never see anyone out of his wits or out of his right mind in whom physicians cannot clearly perceive either some defect of the instruments, as a misshapen or disproportionate head; or else an overabundance of some melancholic humor, which troubled and damaged his body before it troubled or impaired his mind. Just as the wisest men, deceived by false spies, make wrong deliberations, though grounded upon good reason—which they could not do unless they were indeed wise. So the reason that is in our mind makes false conclusions based on the false reports of the imagination; which it could not do if it were either diminished,



impaired, or destroyed. This aligns with the ancient saying, that there are certain follies which only wise men can commit, and certain errors which only learned men can fall into: for in some cases, discretion and wisdom are required in the person to be deceived so he may be deceived; and learning is needed for a man to conceive and hold a wrong opinion.

For example, to be beguiled by a double-dealing spy or by a deceiving letter belongs only to a wise man. For a dull-witted fool never troubles himself about such matters as might lead him to make false conclusions by mistaking likelihoods for truth. Likewise, to fall into heresy by misconceiving some high and deep point happens not to an ignorant person, for he lacks the capacity, and his understanding does not rise so high.

In short, whoever says that man's soul perishes with the body because it is troubled by the distemper or misproportion of the body may as well claim that the child in the mother's womb dies with his mother, because he moves with her and shares her harms and pains, due to the close connection between them; yet many children have lived safe and sound, even though their mothers have died; yes, and some have come into the world even by the death of their mothers.

And whereas some say, that because our mind conceives nothing here but with the help of imagination; therefore when imagination is gone with the instruments to which it is tied, the soul cannot work alone by itself, nor consequently be alone by itself: surely it is as if they should say, that because a child, being in his mother's womb, takes nourishment from her blood through his navel; therefore he cannot live when he is out of her womb if his navel string is cut. On the contrary, then is the time when the mouth, the tongue, and the other parts of the child do their duty, which served before to no purpose, except that they were prepared for the time to

come. In the same manner also, we nourish our mind by imagination in this second life; which in the third life, being (as you would say) escaped from prison, shall begin to show its operations by itself, and that so much the more certainly, because it shall not be subject to false reports, nor to the senses either inward or outward, but to the very things themselves which it shall have seen and learned.

In short, it shall live, but not in prison; it shall see but not through spectacles; it shall understand, but not by reports; it shall desire, but not by way of lusting: the infirmity which the body casts upon it now shall then be gone: the force which it brings to the body now, shall then be more fresh and lively than before. Now then, despite these vain reasons of theirs, let us conclude, that our soul is an understanding or reasonable power; over which neither death nor corruption naturally has any power, although it is fitted to the body to govern it. And if any man doubts this, let him but examine himself, for even his own doubts will prove it to him. Or if he will still contend, let him reason with himself: for by concluding his arguments to prove his soul mortal, he shall give judgment himself that it is immortal. And if I have left anything unsaid that might add to this purpose (for why may I not, seeing that even the very things which I have been able to bring up on behalf of my adversaries drive them to this conclusion?), let us also think that he who feels himself convicted within, and for whose own benefit it would be greatly advantageous both to believe it and to confess it, needs no more proof than has already been made. But if any man will yet out of spite stand willfully still against himself, let him try how he can answer my previous arguments; and in the meantime, let us see what the opinion of the wisest men, yes, and of the whole world has been on this matter.

CHAP. 11. That the  
immortality of the Soul  
has been taught by the  
Philosophers of old times,  
and believed by all people  
and Nations.

**T**ruly it would have been a very hard case if this mind of ours, which searches so many things in nature, had not taken some time to search itself and its own nature, and by searching attained to some point in that regard. And therefore, as there have at all times been men, so we shall also see that men have at all times believed and accepted the immortality of the soul. I say not some one man, or some one nation, but the whole world with general consent, because all men universally and individually have learned it in one school, and at the mouth of one teacher, namely even their own knowledge within themselves.

The Holy Scripture, which teaches us our salvation, uses no school arguments to make us believe that there is a God: and that is because we cannot step outside of ourselves even slightly, without finding him present to all our senses. And it seems to speak less explicitly of the immortality of our souls, especially in its first books, because we cannot enter within ourselves, even slightly, without perceiving it. But inasmuch as from one end of Scripture to the other it declares to us the will of God: in doing so, it leads us to understand that it is something we are not permitted to doubt. And when it sets forth so precisely, from age to age, the great and manifold troubles and pains which good and godly men have suffered in endeavoring to follow that will, it shows infallibly that their purpose was for something other than this present wretched life.

For who is he that would part with any portion of his own comfort in this life, except in the hope of better things? And what would it mean for him to lose his life, if there were not another life after this? This serves as an answer in one word to such as demand explicit texts of Scripture and are reluctant to find that which is contained there, not only in every leaf, but almost in every line. For when God created man after the world was fully finished and perfected: it was as much as if he had brought him into a theater prepared for him, albeit in a different way than for all the other living things which were to serve him.

As for beasts, birds, plants, and other things, the elements brought them forth, but man received his soul by inspiration from God. Also, the brute beasts are placed in subjection to man, but man is subject only to God. And the conveyance of that good man Enoch out of this life for his godliness, was for no other purpose than to set him in another life, void of all evil, and full of all good.

But when we read of the persecutions of Noah; the hardships of Abraham, the banishment and wanderings of Jacob, and the distresses of Joseph, Moses, and all the rest of the Fathers; they are all demonstrations that they certainly trusted and believed that the soul is immortal, that there is another life after this, and that there is a judgment to come. For had they been of the opinion that there is no other life after this; the flesh would have persuaded them to hold themselves in peace here, and they would have chosen nothing better than to have followed comfortably the common way of the world—Noah among his friends, Abraham among the Chaldeans, Moses in Pharaoh's court, and so forth.

Thus, although the Scripture seems to conceal it, yet it speaks very loudly of it indeed, considering that all the cries of the good and godly, and all the despairs of the wicked which it describes to us, speak of none other thing to us, if we have ears to hear it. And it may be, that for this reason, this article of the immortality of the soul was not put into the ancient Creed of the Jews, nor specifically into the Creed of us Christians, because we believe beyond reason, and this is within the bounds of reason; and whoever treats of religion must necessarily presuppose God eternal and man immortal, without which two, all religion would be in vain.

Also, when we see that godliness, justice, and virtue were commended among the heathens of all ages: it is as if we should hear them preach in express words the immortality of the soul. For their doing so is built entirely upon that as a foundation, without which those things could not stand. I will spend my goods or my life for the maintenance of justice. What is this justice but a vain name, or to what end have I so many considerations, if I look for nothing beyond this present world? I will (said a man of old time) rather lose even the reputation of an honest man than

behave myself otherwise than honestly. But why should I do so, if I expect no good in another world, seeing I have nothing but trouble here?

Surely if there is no other thing than this life, then virtue is to be pursued no further than profit and benefit may arise from it; and so it would become a trade and merchandise, and not truly virtue. Yet those are the ordinary words, even of those who speak doubtfully of the immortality of the soul. Therefore, they only deny the foundation while granting the consequence; which is the same as if a man, having once been burned, should fall to disputing whether fire is hot or not. But now (which is better for us), I will here gather together their own words, one after another.

Hermes declares in his Poemander how, at the voice of the everlasting, the elements yielded forth all senseless living creatures as if out of their own bosoms. But when he comes to man, he says, "He made him like unto himself; he linked himself to him as to his son (for he was beautiful and made after his own image) and gave him all his works to use at his pleasure." Again, he exhorts him to forsake his body (though he greatly wonders at the skillful workmanship thereof) as the very cause of his death, to cultivate his soul, which is capable of immortality, and to consider the original root from whence it sprang, which is not earthly but heavenly. He is to withdraw himself even from his senses and from their treacherous allurements, to gather himself wholly into that mind of his which he has from God, and by which, following God's word, he may become as God. "Discharge yourself," he says, "of this body which you bear about you, for it is but a cloak of ignorance, a foundation of infection, a place of corruption, a living death, a sensible carrion, a portable grave, and a household thief. It flatters you because it hates you, and it hates you because it envies you. As long as it lives, it deprives you of life, and you

have no greater enemy than that." Now, to what purpose would it be for him to forsake this light, this dwelling place, and this life, if he were not certain of a better in another world (as he himself says more extensively afterward)?

On the other side, what is the soul? The soul, he says, is the garment of the mind, and the garment of the soul is a certain spirit by which it is united to the body. And this mind is the thing we properly call "the man," that is to say, a heavenly being not to be compared with beasts but rather with the gods of heaven, if he is not even more than they. The heavenly cannot come down to earth without leaving heaven, but man measures heaven without moving from the earth. The earthly man, then, is as a mortal god, and the heavenly God is as an immortal man. In short, his conclusion is that man is dual: mortal in regard to his body and immortal in regard to his soul, which soul is the substantial man and the true man created immediately by God (he says), as light is born immediately of the sun. And Chalcidius says that at his death he spoke these words: "I return home again to my own country, where my better forefathers and kinfolk are."

Of Zoroaster, who is yet of greater antiquity than Hermes, we have only fragments. Nevertheless, many report this argument to be one of his: that men's souls are immortal and that one day there shall be a general resurrection of their bodies; and the answers of the wise men of Chaldea (who are the heirs of his doctrine) sufficiently testify for him. One of them exhorts men to return swiftly to their heavenly Father, who has sent them from above a soul endowed with much understanding; another urges them to seek paradise as the soul's peculiar dwelling place. A third says that the soul of man has God, as it were, shut up within it and that it contains no mortality. For (he says) the soul is as if it were drunk with God and shows

forth his wonders in the harmony of this mortal body. And again, another says, "It is a clear fire proceeding from the power of the heavenly Father, an incorruptible substance, and the sustainer of life, containing almost the whole world with its full abundance in its bosom." One of them goes further, affirming that he who sets his mind upon godliness shall save his body, frail though it may be. And by these words, he acknowledges the glorification of the body itself.

Now, all these sayings are reported by the Platonists, and namely by Psellus; and they do not deny that Pythagoras and Plato learned them from the Chaldeans. Some even think that the aforementioned Hermes and Zoroaster, along with the rest previously mentioned, are those to whom Plato refers in his second Epistle and in his eleventh book of Laws, when he says that the ancient and holy oracles are to be believed, which affirm men's souls to be immortal and that in another life they must come before a judge who will require an account of all their actions. The essence of this teaching is that the soul of man proceeds immediately from God, meaning that the father of the body is one, and the Father of the soul is another; that the soul is not a bodily substance but a spirit and a light; that upon departing from here, it is to go into a paradise and therefore ought to hasten unto death; and that it is so far from being mortal that it even makes the body immortal. What more can we say today, even in this time of enlightenment in which we live?

Pherecydes the Syrian, the first known among the Greeks to write in prose, taught the same. And what Virgil says in his second Eclogue concerning the drug or spice of Assyria and its growing everywhere is interpreted by some to mean the immortality of the soul, the doctrine which Pherecydes brought from there into Greece, implying that it should be



understood everywhere throughout the world. Phocylides, who was of the same time, speaks of it in these words:

*The soul of man immortal is, and never wears away  
With any age or length of time but lives fresh for aye.*

And again:

*The remnants which remain of men unburied in the grave,  
Become as gods, and in the heavens a life most blessed have.  
For though their bodies turn to dust, as daily we do see,  
Their souls live still forevermore from all corruption free.*

And in another place, he says again:

*We hope that we shall come again  
Out of the earth to light more plain.*

And if you ask him the cause of all this, he will answer you in another verse thus:

*Because the soul, God's instrument and image also is.*

This saying seems to have been inspired by a verse of the Sibyl:

*In very reason, man should be  
The image and the shape of me.*

Of the same opinion also are Orpheus, Theognis, Homer, Hesiod, Pindar, and all the poets of old time; who may answer both for themselves and their own countries, and for the rest of their ages. Likewise, Pythagoras, a disciple of Pherecydes, held the opinion that the soul is a bodiless and immortal substance, placed into this body as into a prison for sinning. And although the idea of the soul moving from one body to another is attributed to him, many believe this to be a misinterpretation of his teachings, even though it does not directly contradict the immortality of the soul. His disciple Timaeus of Locres reports otherwise of him. For what punishment

would it be to a voluptuous man to have his soul placed into a beast, allowing him to indulge his passions without guilt? Surely it would be the same as if, to punish murder or theft, one forced the murderer to harm his own parents or the thief to betray God. Regardless, he teaches in his verses that man is of heavenly race, and that (as Iamblichus reports) he is set in this world to behold God. His disciple Archytas says that God breathes reason and understanding into man. Likewise, Philolaus affirms that the divines and prophets of old time bear witness that the soul was joined with the body for its sins and is buried in it as in a grave.

We have this saying from Epicharmus: "If you are a good man at heart, death can do you no harm, for your soul shall live happily in heaven," etc. Also, Heraclides says: "We live the death of the blessed," meaning we are not buried with our bodies, and "we die their life," meaning we continue existing after our bodies die. Thales, Anaxagoras, and Diogenes share similar views; even Zeno concurs, though he thought the soul was begotten of man, a view which contradicts itself. In short, among the ancient philosophers, scarcely any except Democritus and Epicurus held contrary opinions; Lucretius later imitated their views in his verses. Yet, when Epicurus was about to die, he commanded an anniversary to be held in remembrance of him by his disciples, delighting in a vain shadow of immortality while denying the reality of it. It is said that Lucretius composed his book in bouts of madness, creating it during the times when his fits were least intense, yet was more mad when he thought himself wisest than when his frenzy was at its strongest.

Anyone who reads the profound discourses of Socrates upon drinking poison, as reported by Plato and Xenophon themselves, cannot doubt his belief in this matter. For he not only believed in it himself but also

persuaded many others with compelling reasons, and he demonstrated his conviction much more by his death than by his life. Thus, we arrive at Plato and Aristotle, in agreement with all the wise men of old, opposed only by a few irreverent detractors whom modern times would consider mere drunkards or fools. Certainly, Plato (who may have been familiar with the books of Moses) brings forth in his *Timaeus* that God commanded the lesser gods whom he created to make man of both mortal and immortal substances. Here, he may have been alluding to the Genesis phrase, "Let us make man in our image and likeness." The Jews interpret this as God addressing his angels, while Christian theologians believe he spoke to himself. Soon after, however, both in this book and in many other places, Plato, as if returning to himself, teaches that God created man by himself, including his liver, brain, and all his senses; that is, he created man's soul, not only endowing it with reason and understanding but also with senses and growth and the instruments by which these work.

Moreover, he makes such a clear distinction between the soul and the body that he does not pair them as matter and form, as Aristotle does, but rather as a pilot with a ship, a commonwealth with a magistrate, or a bearer with an image. What can be greater than to be like God? Now, says Plato in his *Phaedo*, the soul of man is very like the Godhead: immortal, rational, uniform, indissoluble, and always the same in nature—qualities, he notes (in his works on the state), that can only belong to things most divine. Therefore, as he departed from this world, he instructed his soul to return to her kin and her first origin, that is, to the wise and immortal Godhead, the source of all goodness, as if being called back from exile to her own native country. He often refers to the soul as "kindred to God," and thus as everlasting, bearing the same name as the immortal beings, a heavenly plant

rather than an earthly one, rooted in heaven, not in earth, born from above and not from below, and ultimately such that it cannot die here, for it lives on elsewhere.

In short, seeing that it comprehends divine and immortal things, such as the Godhead and unchangeable truths, it cannot be thought of as any other than these. Plutarch also attributes this opinion to him, and it appears on nearly every page of his writings. The earlier Platonists all agree on the immortality of the soul, though some derive it from God, others from the soul of the world. Some argue that only the mind or reason is immortal, while others believe the entire soul is; this disagreement can be reconciled by saying that the whole soul is immortal in its potential, though the execution of actions that require the body ceases when the body's instruments are gone.

The disagreement among those who could be called philosophers on this point appears to have begun with Aristotle, although his disciples count it a merit that he left his opinion on the matter open to doubt. Certainly, his doctrine of the eternity of the world led him to doubt other issues, as one error often leads to others. "Because nature," he says, "could not make every man individually live forever, she preserves him in the species by coupling male and female." This statement is either crudely put or ambiguously phrased. But when he says that if the mind has any action of its own, independent of the senses or body, it may also continue on its own, concluding from this that it may be separated from the body as an immortal thing from a mortal one, he implies that the soul has continuity. He utters these words, namely, that "the soul comes from outside and not from man's seed," as the body does, and that "the soul is the only part of us that is divine." Now, to be divine and to be human, to be of seed and to be from

outside, that is, from God, are clearly contradictory; the one is subject to corruption, the other is not.

In the tenth book of his *Ethics*, he acknowledges two types of life in man: one based on the combination of body and soul, and the other based on the mind alone. The first engages the bodily powers, accompanied by a happiness belonging to this life; the second engages the virtues of the mind, accompanied by happiness in another life. This life of contemplation is better than the former, and the happiness associated with it, which he describes in his writings on the heavens, transcends time, being rooted in the free workings of the mind and in the contemplation of the supreme God. Rightly, then, does Michael of Ephesus conclude from this that the soul is immortal; all of Aristotle's ethics also support this, as to live well, whether for oneself or others, would be pointless if it ended with death.

In his books on the soul, Aristotle not only separates the body from the soul but also distinguishes the soul from the mind, defining the soul as the operator of the body and its instruments, while describing the mind as the rational substance within us, whose actions are unrelated to bodily functions and for which the soul serves merely as a garment, as Plato says. This mind, he argues, can be separated from the body; it is not mixed with it, cannot be affected or acted upon, exists independently, and, even when separated from the body, is immortal and everlasting. In short, it is unlike the body in every way. Since it cannot be one of those bodily things it understands, what bodily thing could it be?

Elsewhere he states: "As concerning the mind and the contemplative power, it is not yet sufficiently apparent what it is; nevertheless, it seems to be another kind of soul, and it is that alone which can be separated from the corruptible, as the everlasting." In short, when he asks whether a natural

philosopher should discuss all types of souls or only the immortal one, it is clear that he acknowledges such a soul. When he argues, "Look, what God is everlastingly, we are potentially, according to our measure; but God is eternally separated from bodily things, so one day we too shall be." He implies that there is in us an image of God, even of the divine nature, which endures. Simplicius rightly concludes from this the immortality of the soul, as it rests upon this separation and self-sustained continuity.

Furthermore, he says that hunting is permitted to man by the law of nature, as man claims only what is naturally his own. But what right would man have if there were no difference between himself and the animals? And if they have a soul equal to his, what is in man that is greater than in them? His commendations of godliness, religion, blessedness, and contemplation support this conclusion; otherwise, these would only burden us in this world. Thus, as he speaks doubtfully in some passages, he nevertheless tends toward a consistent view in many others, as evidenced by his disciple Theophrastus, who speaks even more clearly on this matter.

The Latins (as I have said before) came to philosophy somewhat later than the Greeks. And as for their general opinion, the exercises of superstition among them, the manner of speeches we notice in their histories, their contempt of death, and their hope for another life, can give us sufficient warrant. Cicero speaks to us in these words: "The origin of our souls and minds cannot be found in this low earth, for there is no mixture in them, nor any compound that seems to be born or made from the earth. Nor is there any moisture, wind, or fiery matter in them. For no such thing could contain the power of memory, understanding, and imagination, to remember things past, foresee things to come, and consider things present, which are altogether divine matters." His conclusion is that, therefore, souls are

derived from the mind of God—that is, not born or begotten of man but created by God: not bodily, but bodiless. From this, it follows that the soul cannot be corrupted by these transitory things. Cicero also says in another place that there is a kinship of reason between God and man, just as there is kinship of blood between men. The fellowship between man and man comes from the mortal body, but the fellowship between God and man comes from God himself, who created the soul in us. Because of this, he says, we may say we are allied with the heavenly beings, as people descended from the same race and root, which we must always remember as we look up to heaven, the place of our birth, to which we must one day return. And so, again, he concludes about himself, "Think not," he says, "that you yourself are mortal; it is only your body that is so. For you are not what this outward shape pretends to be. The mind of man is the true man, not this lump that can be pointed to with a finger. Assure yourself, therefore, that you are a god; for it must be a god that lives, perceives, remembers, foresees, and finally reigns in your body as the great God, the maker of all things, does in the universal world. For as the eternal God rules and moves this transitory world, so does the immortal spirit of our soul move and rule our frail body." All the writers of his time agree with him on this point, such as Ovid, Virgil, and others, whose verses are well-known:

*"There wanted yet the being that should exceed all others,  
In lofty reach of stately mind, who like a lord indeed  
Should reign over all the rest; then man soon appeared,  
Whom either the maker of the world, and all things that began,  
Created out of divine seed, or else the earth, still young  
And newly separated from the sky, retained in her fruitful womb  
The seed thereof, which Japetus's son took,*

*And tempering it with pure water, made a being,  
Resembling even the gods who hold sovereign state.  
While other creatures gaze upon the ground,  
He gave to man a lofty look full of majesty,  
Commanding him to behold the starry sky."*

One could quote almost all of Seneca's writings, but I will content myself with a few of his sayings. "Our souls," he says, "are a part of God's spirit, and sparks of holy things shining upon the earth. They come from somewhere other than this lowly place. Although they seem to dwell in the body, the better part of them remains in heaven, always near to the one who sent them here. And how could they possibly be from below, or anywhere else but above, seeing they look down on all earthly things as nothing and scorn all that we might hope or fear?" Thus, you see how he teaches that our souls come into our bodies from above. But where do they go again when they leave here? Let us hear what he says of Lady Martia's son, who was dead: "He is now everlasting," he says, "and in the best state, freed from this earthly baggage, which was never his, and now given wholly to himself. For these bones, sinews, this coat of skin, this face, and these serviceable hands are but fetters and prisons for the soul. Through them, the soul is weighed down, beaten, and oppressed. It faces no greater battle than with this mass of flesh. Fearing it will be torn apart, it yearns to return to its origin, where it has ready a happy and everlasting rest." He adds, "This soul cannot be outcast, for it is kindred to the gods, equal to the whole world, and to all time; its thought or conception extends over the entire heaven, spanning from the beginning of time to the very end."

The wretched body, being the jail and fetters of the soul, is tossed to and fro, enduring torments, murders, and diseases. The soul, however, is holy



and everlasting, beyond harm's reach. When it is freed from this body, it is liberated, set free from all bondage, and taken to a beautiful place (wherever that may be) that receives souls into its blessed rest as soon as they are released from here. To be brief, he seems to come close to the idea of the resurrection of the dead. In an epistle to Lucilius, he writes, "Death, which we so greatly fear, does not rob us of life but merely pauses it for a time; a day will come that shall bring us to light again." This should be enough to demonstrate the opinion of that great person, in whom we see that, as he grew older, he drew ever closer to the truth. For in his later books, he treats these subjects with more assurance and clarity.

Also notable is a saying of Favorinus: "There is nothing great on earth," he says, "but man; and nothing great in man, but his soul. If you ascend to it, you rise above heaven. And if you descend to the body and compare it with heaven, it is less than a fly or a thing of nothing." In short, this is as much as to say that in this clod of clay dwells a divine and incorruptible nature: for how could it otherwise be greater than the whole world?

As for the nations of old, we read that they all had certain religions and divine services, believing in a Hell and certain fields they called the Elysian Fields, as we see in the poets Pindar, Diphilus, Sophocles, Euripides, and others. The more superstitious they were, the more they testify to us what was in their conscience. For true religion and superstition share the same foundation: the soul of man. And there could be no religion at all if the soul did not live on after it leaves here. We read of the Indians, who burned themselves before reaching extreme old age, calling it "setting men free" and the "release of the soul from the body," and the sooner one did it, the wiser he was deemed. This custom is still observed among the people who

live along the Niger River, known as the Senegambians in Africa, who willingly allow themselves to be buried alive with their masters.

"All the demonstrations of logic and mathematics," says Zeno, "do not prove the immortality of the soul as powerfully as their actions alone do." Also, when Alexander the Great captured ten of their philosophers (whom they call Gymnosophists), he questioned one to test his wisdom, asking whether there were more living men or dead. The philosopher replied that there were more living, "for there are no dead." This response could be seen as a sly rebuke to all of Aristotle and Callisthenes' arguments, as these philosophers had clearly taught Alexander poorly. The Thracians are said to have mourned births and rejoiced at deaths, even for their own children, because they viewed what we call death not as death but rather as a blessed birth.

These are the people whom Herodotus calls the "Immortal Getae," and whom the Greeks referred to as the "Immortal Thracians," believing that when they left this world, they went to Zamolxis or Gebeleizis, meaning (in their tongue) "the one who grants health, salvation, or well-being and gathers them together." The same is said of the Gauls, especially those living around Marseilles and their Druids; of the Etruscans and their priests; of the Scythians and their sages, all of whom based their wisdom on this point. Just as men spread across the world, so did this doctrine, which is so deeply embedded in humanity that it cannot be shed. This can be seen further in what we read about the followers of Hegesias the Cyrenaic, who willingly died after hearing him speak of the state of souls after this life, and about Cleombrotus of Ambracia, who killed himself after reading a certain treatise on the immortality of the soul. If this doctrine had not been most evident to the human mind, they would never have been so moved by

it as to harm their bodies. And if among so many peoples, there are a few miserable souls who hold to the contrary opinion (though they can never quite rid themselves of doubt), surely we may believe that they struggled greatly and were utterly confounded, like drunkards, before reaching this point. Thus, we may well say of them what Hierocles the Pythagorean said: that the wicked do not wish their souls to be immortal so they might avoid punishment, yet they end up condemning themselves to death beforehand. But if they will neither hear

God, nor the world, nor themselves, then let them at least listen to the Devil as they do in other matters, who, as Plutarch tells us, made this reply to Corax of Naxos and others in these verses:

*"It would be a great sin for thee to say,*

*The soul to be mortal or to decay."*

*And to Polytes he said:*

*"As long as the soul to the body is tied,*

*Though loath, it must all sorrows abide.*

*But when from the body death does it remove,*

*To heaven at once it flies above,*

*And there, ever youthful, in bliss it rests,*

*As God by his wisdom has ordained best."*

Not that any saying of the Devil's own is to be alleged in witness of the truth, further forth than to show that he speaks it by compulsion of God's mighty power, as wicked men diverse times do when they be upon the rack. Now we be come to the time, or near to the time, that the heavenly doctrine of Jesus Christ was spread over the whole world, unto which time I have proved the continual succession of that doctrine, which could not but be inseparably joined with the succession of men. But from this time forth it

came so to light among all nations and all persons; that Saint Austin after a short triumphing over ungodliness, cries out in diverse places, saying: Who is now so very a fool or so wicked, as to doubt still of the immortality of the Soul?

Epictetus a Stoic philosopher, who was had in very great reputation among all the men of his time, is full of goodly sayings to the same purpose. May we not be ashamed (says he) to lead an dishonest life, and to suffer ourselves to be vanquished by adversity? we be allied unto God, we came from thence, and we have leave to return thither from whence we came. One while, as in respect of the soul, he terms man the offspring of GOD, or as it were a branch of the Godhead; and another while he calls him a divine Imp or a spark of God: by all which words (howbeit that they be somewhat improper) (for what words can a man find to fit that matter:) he shows the uncorruptibleness of the substance of man's soul. And whereas the philosopher Simplicius has so diligently commented upon his books, it does sufficiently answer for his opinion in that case, without expressing his words here.

Plotinus, the excellentest of all the Platonists, has made nine treatises expressly concerning the nature of the soul, besides the things which he has written dispersedly here and there in other places. His chief conclusions are these. That men's souls proceed not of their bodies, nor of the seed of the Parent, but come from above, and are as ye would say grafted into our bodies by the hand of God: That the soul is partly tied to the body and to the instruments thereof, and partly frank, free, workful, and continuing of itself; and yet notwithstanding that it is neither a body nor the harmony of the body, but (if we consider the life and operation which it gives to the body) it is after a sort the perfection [or rather the perfecter] of the body; & if we

have an eye to the understanding whereby it guides the movings and doings of the body; it is as a Governor of the body: That the further it is withdrawn from the Senses, the better it discourses of things; insomuch that when it is utterly separated from them, it understands things without discoursing, reasoning or debating, yea even in a moment; because this debating is but a certain lightning or brightness of the mind, which now takes advisement in matter whereof it doubts, & it doubts wheresoever the body yields any impediments unto it; but it shall neither doubt nor seek advisement any more when it is once out of the body, but shall conceive the truth without wavering: That the soul in the body is not properly there as in a place, or as in a ground, because it is not contained or comprehended therein, and may also be separated from it; but rather if a man had eyes to see it withal, he should see that the body is in the soul, as an accessory is in a principal, or as a thing contained in a container, or a shedding or liquid thing in a thing that is not liquid, because the Soul embraces the body, and quickens it, and moves it equally and alike in all parts. That every ability thereof is in every part of the body, as much in one part as in another, as a whole soul in every part; notwithstanding that every several ability thereof seems to be severally in some particular member or part, because the instruments thereof are there; as the sensitive ability seems to rest in the head, the wrathful in the heart, and the quickening in the liver, because the sinews, heart-strings, and veins come from those parts: Whereas the reasonable power is not in any part, saving so far forth as it works and has its operation there, neither has it any need of place or instrument for the executing of itself. And to be short, that the soul is a life by itself, a life all in one, unpartable, which causes to grow, and grows not itself; which goes through the body, and yet is not contained of the body; which unites the senses, and is not divided by the

Senses, and therefore that it is a bodiless substance, which cannot be touched, neither from within nor from without, having no need of the body either outwardly or inwardly, and consequently is immortal, divine, yea and almost a very God: Which things he proves by many reasons, which were too long to be rehearsed here. Yea. he proceeds so far as to say, that they which are passed into another world, have their memory still, notwithstanding that to some men's seeming, it goes away with the senses as the treasury of the senses. Howbeit he affirms it to be the more excellent kind of memory, not that which calls things again to mind as already past, but that which holds and beholds them still as always present. Of which two sorts this latter he calls Mindfulness. and the other he calls Remembrance. I will add but only one sentence more of his for a full precedent of his Doctrine. The soul (says he) has had company with the Gods, and is immortal, and so would we say of it (as Plato affirms) if we saw it fair and clear. But for as much as we see it commonly troubled, we think it not to be either divine or immortal, howbeit that he which will discern the nature of a thing perfectly, must consider it in its very own substance or being, utterly unmingled with any other thing. For whatsoever else is added unto it, does hinder the perfect discerning of the same. Therefore let every man behold himself naked, without anything save himself, so as he look upon nothing else than his bare soul: and surely when he has viewed himself in his own nature, merely as in respect of his mind, he shall believe himself to be immortal. For he shall see that his mind aims not properly at the sensible and mortal things, but that by a certain everlasting power, it takes hold of the things that are everlasting, and of whatsoever is possible to be conceived in understanding: insomuch that even itself becomes after a sort a very world of understanding and light. This is against those which pretend a

weakness of the soul, by reason of the inconveniences which it endures very often in the body.

Of the same opinion are Numenius, Jamblichus, Porphyrius, and Proclus, notwithstanding that now and then they pass their bounds, suffering their wits to run riot. For in their Philosophy they had no other rule, than only the drift of their own reason. It was commonly thought that Alexander of Aphrodise believed not the immortality of the soul, because he defined it to be the form of the body, proceeding of the mixture & temperature of the Elements. Surely these words of his do us to understand, either that he meant to define but the sensitive life only (as many others do) and not the reasonable soul, or else that he varies from himself in other places. And indeed he says immediately afterward, that he speaks of the things which are subject to generation and corruption. But speaking of the soul he says it is separable, immaterial, unmixed, and void of passions, unless, perchance we may think as some do, that by this soul he means but only God, and not also the soul that is in us; for the which thing he is sharply rebuked by Themistius, who notwithstanding spoke never a whit better thereof himself. Howsoever he deals elsewhere, these words of his following are without any doubtfulness at all. That the Soul (says he) which is in us, comes from without, and is uncorruptible. I say uncorruptible because the nature thereof is such, and it is the very same that Aristotle affirms to come from without. And in his second Book of Problems, searching the cause why the abilities of the soul are oftentimes impeached: If a man's brain be hurt (says he) the reasonable soul does not well execute the actions that depend thereon. But yet for all that, It abides still in itself, unchangeable of nature, ability, and power, through the immortality thereof. And if it recovers a sound instrument, it puts her abilities in execution as well as it did before. But I

will reason more at large hereafter against the opinion that is fathered upon him.

What shall we say of Galen, (who fathers the causes of all things as much as he can, upon the Elements, and the mixture and agreeable concord of them) if after his disputing against his own soul, he be constrained to yield that it is immortal? Surely in his book concerning the manners of the soul, he does the worst that he can against Plato: and in another place he doubts whether it be immortal, and whether it have continuance of itself or no. Yet notwithstanding in his book of the doctrine of Hippocrates and Plato, It must needs be granted (says he) that the Soul is either a sheer body, and of the nature of the sky, (as the Stoics and Aristotle himself, are enforced to confess) or else a bodiless substance, whereof the body is, as it were, the Chariot, and whereby it has fellowship with other bodies. And it appears that he inclines to this latter part. For he makes the vital spirit to be the excellentest of all bodily things, and yet he grants the soul to be a far more excellent thing than that. What shall we then do? Let us weigh his words set down in his book of the conception of a child in the mother's womb. The Soul of man (says he) is an influence of the universal Soul that descends from the heavenly Region, a substance that is capable of knowledge, which aspires always to one substance like unto itself, which leaves all these lower things to seek the things that are above, which is partaker of the heavenly Godhead, and which by mounting up to the beholding of things that are above the heavens, puts itself into the presence of him that rules all things. Were it reason then that such a substance coming from elsewhere than of the body, and mounting so far above the body, should in the end die with the body, because it uses the service of the body?



Now hereunto I could add infinite other sayings of the ancient authors, both Greek and Latin philosophers, poets, and orators from age to age, wherein they treat of the judgment to come, of the reward of good men, of the punishment of evil men, of Paradise and of Hell, which are appendants to the immortality of the Soul: but as now I will but put the reader in mind of them by the way, reserving them to their peculiar places. To be short, let us run at this day from East to West, and from North to South, I say not among the Turks, Arabians, or Persians (for their Alcoran teaches them that man's soul was breathed into him of God, and consequently that it is uncorruptible), but even among the most barbarous, ignorant, & beastly people of the world, I mean the very Caribies and Cannibals, and we shall find this belief received and embraced of them all. Which gives us to understand, that it is not a doctrine invented by speculations of some philosophers, conveyed from country to country by their disciples, persuaded by likelihoods of reasons, or (to be short) entered into man's wit by his ears: but a native knowledge, which every man finds and reads in himself, which he carries everywhere about with himself, and which is as easy to be persuaded unto all such as view themselves in themselves, as it is easy to persuade a man that never saw his own face, to believe that he has a face, by causing him to behold himself in a glass.

There remain yet two opinions to be confuted. The one is the opinion of Averrhoes, and the other is the opinion of Alexander of Aphrodise, who affirm themselves to hold both of Aristotle; namely in that they uphold that there is but one universal reasonable soul or mind, which works all our discourses in us, albeit diversely in every several person. And this thing (if we believe Averrhoes) is done according to the diversity of the Phantasies or imaginations wherewith the mind is served as with instruments. But if we

believe Alexander, it is done according to the diversities of the capable mind, as they term it, that is to say, of the ability or capability that is in men to understand things, by receiving the impression of the universal mind that works into every of them which in respect thereof is called of them the worker. Soothly these opinions are such as may be disproved in one word. For this only one mind, whether in possibility or in action, could not have received or imprinted in every man one self-same common belief and conceit of the immortality of the Soul, in so great diversity of imaginations, and in so many nations, as we see do believe it, considering that the very same conceit is directly repugnant against it. Nay, it may well be said that Averrhoes and Alexander had very diverse conceits and imaginations one from another, and very contrary to all other men's, seeing they had so diverse and contrary opinions imprinted either in their mind or in their imagination. However, for as much as there may be some that will make a doubt of it, let us examine them severally yet more advisedly.

First, Averrhoes will needs bear Aristotle on hand, that Aristotle is of that opinion. Let us see how this furnish of his can agree with the propositions which Aristotle has left us. Aristotle tells us that the soul is knit to the body as the form or shape to the matter; that the soul has three chief powers, namely, of life, of sense, and of understanding; and that the understanding part contains in his power both the other two powers, as a five-square contains both a foursquare and a triangle. Whereupon it follows, that if any one of the three powers of the soul be joined to the body as a form to the matter; all the three be joined so too, as which are all in one soul as in their root. Now Averrhoes neither can nor will deny that the powers of growing and of perceiving by the senses are joined after that manner to the body; and therefore it follows that the understanding power is so joined also, and

consequently that according to Aristotle, as every body has his form, so every body has his soul.

The same Aristotle finds fault with the former philosophers for holding opinion that a soul might pass out of one man into another: because (says he) that every certain soul must needs be apportioned and appointed to some one certain body. Now look by what soul a man lives, by the same soul does he understand: for it is but one soul endued with three diverse abilities, as he himself teaches openly. One understanding or mind therefore, must (according to Aristotle) work but in one several body, and not in many bodies. Also according to Aristotle, a man and a beast agree in this, that both of them have one sensitive power, and one self-same imagination of things perceived by the senses, and that they differ in this, that man has yet further a mind and reason above the beast, which thing the beast has not. Now if this understanding or mind be without the man, as the sun is without the chamber, that it shines into and enlightens, then cannot he be called reasonable, or endued with understanding, neither does he consequently differ from a beast. For the difference must be in nature, and not in accident. And so should it ensue that Aristotle's aforesaid definition of a man is false, as if he should define a chamber by the shining of the sun into it: Or say that a dog differs not from a man in kind; yea, and that beasts are capable of understanding, for as much as they have imagination ready beforehand to receive the influence thereof as well as we. But Aristotle is always one in his defining both of beast and of man; and Averrhoes also holds himself to it, without doubting thereof at all. This conclusion therefore cannot in any wise be upheld by such grounds.

Again, if there be not in every several man a several mind, but only one universal mind common to all men, which becomes diverse by the only

diversity of our imaginations: Then in respect that we have sundry imaginations, we shall be sundry living wights; and in respect that we have all but one mind, we shall be all but one man. For man is not man in respect of the sensitive power, but in respect of the reasonable part which is the mind. But Aristotle grants that we be not only diverse living wights, but also diverse men. And therefore he must needs mean also, that we have not only diverse imaginations, but also diverse minds. Now besides many other reasons that might be alleged, ye might add this also, That otherwise Aristotle's Morals and his discourses concerning Justice, Freewill, the Immortality of the soul, the happy bliss, the reward of the good, and the pains of the wicked, were utterly fruitless and to no purpose: For as our fancies or imaginations did come and go, so would all those things come and go likewise, and so should they have no continuance of themselves, but only be as a shadow and vain fantasy.

But let Aristotle alone, (for he has wrong) and let us come to the matter itself. The philosophers do ordinarily make a double mind; the one which they call possible or impossible, which is capable and of ability to understand things; and this they liken to a smooth table; the other they call working or workful, which brings the ability into act, whereas notwithstanding they be not two minds, but two several abilities of only one mind. Now, as for this ability or possibility of understanding, we affirm it to be in the soul of every man. Contrariwise, Averrhoes affirmed only one universal capable mind to be shed abroad everywhere throughout all men; & that the same is diversely perfected and brought into act in every several man, according to the diversity of the imaginations which the man conceives, even by the help or influence of the said universal workful mind, which he says is also a substance severed from man, and (in respect of the

understanding in possibility) is as the sun is to the sight of our eyes, and the understanding in possibility is to the imaginations as the sight is unto colors.

Now, I demand first of all, whether these universal minds of his be substances created or uncreated. If they be created, where becomes then his conclusion, That the world is without beginning, and without ending, seeing that he will have them to be continued everlastingly in all men that have been, are, or shall be? If they be uncreated, how can so excellent substances be made subject to our fond imaginations, to yield influence into them at their pleasures? Or rather how happens it that they correct them not? How happens it that they leave them in such errors, yea even in the knowledge of themselves, seeing that by the erring of the imaginations, the very understanding and reason themselves must also needs be so often beguiled?

Again, as concerning these substances, which extend into so many places; are they Bodies or Spirits? How can they be bodies, seeing they be in infinite places at one instant, and do infinite things, yea, and flat contraries? And if they be Spirits, does it not follow thereupon, that they be wholly in all men & wholly in every man; that is to say, that every man has them wholly to himself? And therefore that if they be deceived by the fantasy of any one man, they be consequently deceived in all men? And whereof comes it then, that one man overcomes his imaginations, and another man not? Or that one man resists them, and another suffers himself to be carried away by them?

Moreover, who can deny that a man wills things, whereof he has understanding; and likewise that he wills some things which he understands not: and that he understands some things which he wills not? And also that he wills things even contrary to his appetites, and concludes oftentimes

contrary to his imaginations, as comes to pass in dreams and in looking-glasses; which thing the brute beasts do not? When a man wills contrary to his appetites, wills he not contrary to his senses, yea, and contrary to his imaginations too: for what else is fancy or imagination, than the rebounding back of the senses? And if this workful understanding be the only worker in his possible understanding by means of imagination; how comes it to pass that a man wills contrary to his imagination?

Again, when either in dreaming or in debating, reason concludes clean contrary to that which fancy or imagination offers; whereof comes it that a man is contrary to himself, or that the deed is contrary both to that which imprinted it, and to that wherein it is imprinted? Also what else is imagination (according to the opinion of Averrhoes), than a certain operation annexed to the body, steaming up from the Heart to the Brain: And on the contrary part who can say nay, but that the Will and Understanding are able to perform their operations without the instruments of the body, seeing that a man does both will and debate things that are most repugnant to the body: Yea and that (as Aristotle says) those be not actions which pass into the outward man, but those which abide within & make perfect the inner man. And who can make Will and Understanding to be things depending upon imagination, seeing that both waking and sleeping and all manner of ways else, they daily utter infinite judgments and determinations against it: Now, if we have nothing in us above Imagination: then considering that we do both will and understand, it must needs be that this power or ability to will and understand is shed into us from without.

And if it but only one universally in all men; then seeing that the actions thereof are executed without the imagination, without the senses, and without the instruments of the body, yea and against them: it follows that it

wills and understands in us whatsoever it liketh and listeth, even in despite of all impediments and lets of the body; and that as it is but one, so it shall will but one self-same thing, and likewise also understand but one self-same thing in all men. For if (as Aristotle confesses) our imaginations make not our will and reason subject unto them; much less do they make the foresaid universal mind subject to them as Averrhoes pretends. But now contrariwise we see there be as many Wills as men, yea even in one matter; and that the understandings of men are not only diverse, but also contrary. It follows then that every particular person has in that behalf a particular substance, which wills and understands, frank and free from all imaginations whensoever it listeth to retire into itself; and not that there is but one universal mind which wills and understands all things in all men. Besides this; by the judgment of Aristotle as I said afore, this universal mind could not work will and understanding in us: for to will and understand (says he) are operations that pass not into the matter nor into the outward thing, but abide still in the worker, that is to say in the mind, as actions and perfections thereof.

Let us yet again take of that which hath been said afore. If the said universal only one working mind, have wrought from everlasting in the said universal only one capable mind, by the Imaginations of men: then hath the knowledge of all things been evermore imprinted in the said capable mind; for it shall evermore have brought the ability into act: And therewithal, the working and perfection of the thing that is everlasting, shall have depended upon a thing that is temporal; which is impossible. And although Averrhoes supposed not the World to be everlasting: yet notwithstanding the said capable mind which hath been set awork so many hundred years, by so many imaginations of men, and in so many sundry Nations, could not now

meet with any new thing whereof it had not the knowledge afore. For this capable mind (saith Averrhoes) is a certain spiritual substance, which spreads itself forth into all men and into all ages, and the nature of such sort of substances is to be all in the whole, and all in every part thereof. For they be not tied to any one place, but are wheresoever they work, and their working is in respect of the whole, and not in respect of any one part, forasmuch as they be undividable. Therefore it should follow by his opinion (as I have said afore) that the one universal capable mind is and works whole & unparted in every man. And if it be so, then is that being of it there, not in way of mere ability or possibility only, but in way of operation and perfect inworking, as a wicked spirit is in a witch, in a Pythoness or in a possessed person: which spirit (were he possessed of the man as he himself possesses the man, (after which manner Averrhoes affirms us to possess the understanding in possibility, by our imaginations); would make the man capable of all that ever the Spirit himself knows or is. Whereupon it will follow, that this understanding in possibility, shall everlastingly in all men from their very birth, actually understand and know all things that all men understand, as well in the old as the young, and in the ignorant as the skillful; so as we shall have no more need of senses; nor of imagination to understand withal. To be short, although Averrhoes, admits not the World to be without beginning: yet at leastwise he will not deny, but that [by his reckoning] they which come into the world at this day, should come far more skillful than all their predecessors, and the children of them more skillful than their fathers, and the offspring of those children more skillful than those children themselves, and so forth on, because they should succeed in the knowledge continued throughout all ages. Whereupon it will also ensue, that all Sciences shall be equal in all men that make profession



of them. As for example, we will speak here, but of some one special Science, as Grammar and Arithmetic, Now if there be any diversity in the skill thereof, that diversity cannot come but of the diversity of the subject or ground wherein the skill is. Now the ground of the skill is the capacity of the mind or understanding, (which Averrhoes supposes to be but only one, common to all men) and not the Imagination, which is but a reflection or rebounding back of the Sense. And so forasmuch as there is (by his saying) but one ground in all men; it follows that the knowledge or skill of this or that Science must needs be equal and alike in all men: or else that if it be not equal, but do vary, as we see it doth in divers degrees; then the same varying or diversity happens through the diversity of the ground wherein the skill is, and consequently that there is one particular understanding or one peculiar mind in every man, and not one universal mind common to all men.

Also, it is a general rule that the receiver of a thing has not the thing before he receives it. For (as Aristotle says) that which is to receive a thing must necessarily first be utterly void of the thing it receives. Now, before our Sense and Imagination had any being at all, this universal common mind had received and possessed all things beforehand; and not only received them but also kept them together. For, as Aristotle himself says, that manner of mind is the place of all under-kinds and sorts of things, and thereto has no less power than the Imagination, to retain whatsoever the Senses receive. In vain, therefore, should that universal mind understand by our Imaginations, considering that it understands by itself: in vain, likewise, should the Imaginations imprint those things in it which were imprinted in it so long before; and in vain is Aristotle's setting down of a workful understanding, which should bring our understanding into ability, from

possibility into action; if the said only one universal mind or understanding is perfect of itself from everlasting, as it follows to be upon the opinion of Averroes. Neither is it to be said, that although the conceivable under-kinds of things have been imprinted everlastingly in the said universal mind; yet, nevertheless, there needed an Imagination for the understanding of them, as there needs now whenever we wish to use the things we have seen or learned before. For by that reasoning, to learn all manner of Sciences, we would need no more than to think by imagination of the things already beforehand in the said only universal one mind, as we do the things imprinted sometime in our memories and are somewhat slipped out of our remembrance; and so we might ourselves learn all sciences without a teacher, because in the said universal mind of ours, we would have all the knowledge that any man had ever attained to, in like manner as the person who once had the knowledge of Arithmetic or Cosmography thoroughly settled in his mind needs no teacher to teach it to him again, but only to turn his own imagination and to search his memory for the finding again of that which he had laid up there.

Now, we know that whosoever learns nothing knows nothing, and that ordinarily he who studies the most, learns the most: and that all the tossing and turmoil of a man's imagination all his life long will never make him attain of himself to so much as the very principles of the least science that is. By reason of which, it follows that we do not have the knowledge of any science in us until we are either taught it or find it out by beating our wits about it: and that our imagination does not serve to revive the Sciences in us, but to bring them into us and plant them in us. And as all the Sciences would be in all men from the beginning if there were but one universal mind in all men [which is not so] it follows that there is in every individual

person a particular and peculiar mind, and not one universal mind common to all men.

Moreover, our mind attains after a sort to the understanding of itself: which it could not do in very deed if there were but one universal mind common to all men. For to understand itself, it must necessarily work upon itself. But if we believe Averroes, our mind shall only be wrought upon and receive into it from the Imagination, as a window receives light from the Sun. Again, the capacity of the universal understanding in possibility could not do that. For it would need something besides itself to bring itself into action. And surely Imagination could not help it, for it only offers up the sensible things to it and does not reach so far as to the things that are to be discerned by reasoning. Yet, nevertheless, we understand that we understand, and we reason and judge both of our Imagination and also of our reasoning and understanding itself. The thing, then, which so enters and pierces into itself, is another kind of power than Imagination or that of a universal understanding in possibility.

What is to be said to this, that from one self-same Imagination, one self-same person concludes one way now and by-and-by concludes another way; and from it draws both contrary arguments and contrary determinations? Or that diverse persons with diverse imaginations agree together in one will and one mind? Is it possible that this should proceed from an everlasting substance in one self-same person, seeing that everlastingness is not subject to any change of time or place? Or that it should proceed from any one self-same substance in many men, seeing that their imaginations are so diverse from one another? at least, if the said substance does not work except by such instruments?

As for the opinion of Alexander of Aphrodisias, who upholds a certain universal working mind that imprints things in the understanding in possibility, that is, in each man's individual capacity, and brings it forth into action: most of the reasons given above against Averroes will also serve against him. However, as by this workful mind, he seems to mean God himself, there is thus more to be added to it. That God, who is altogether good and altogether wise, would not imprint in our mind the foolish and wicked notions we find there, nor leave so much ignorance and darkness as we feel there, but would, in all men, overcome the infection which the body brings. And although he may not inspire all men alike with his gracious gifts, according to the diversity of their capacities after the manner of a blank Table, yet he would not at least imprint the world with so many false Portraitures and Traps as each of us may perceive in ourselves.

Again, if there were any such inspiration or influence, it would be either continual or occasional. If continual or everlasting, we should, without labor and without skill, understand all that our imagination offers to us. And if it were only occasional, then we would not be able to choose to understand anything, no matter how much we desired to. Contrarily, we have much difficulty understanding some things, so that we must often win them from our ignorance piece by piece, and there are some other things which we understand immediately as soon as they are presented to us, and whenever we choose ourselves. There is then in us a power of Understanding, though very weak; but yet nevertheless obedient to our will: which cannot be attributed to God. Also, if there is only one mind working in all men, there would be only one self-same understanding in all men, I mean naturally, though it would differ in degrees. For in whatever place the Sun sheds his beams, he both enlightens and heats it, yet differently

according to the nature and condition of the places and things that receive him, some more, and some less, some brighter, and some dimmer. But, however the case stands, his light yields no darkness, nor his heat any cold.

So then if the diversities of men's imaginations cause diversities of effects in the inspiration or influence that flows into the capacity of our understanding; surely it must be after this manner: that one man shall understand one self-same thing more, and another man less; but not such that any man shall take untruth for truth, wrong for right, or one thing for another. Now, we see how many errors we are subject to, not only in things such as one man seeing better far off, and another better up close; but that one man sees white, and another sees black (which are contrary things) on the same ground and at the same time. It follows, therefore, that diverse minds work in different persons, and not one self-same mind in all persons. By force of these reasons and such others, I say that every man will find in himself and of himself that each man has a particular soul by himself, that is, a spiritual substance united to his body, which in respect of giving life to the body is as the form thereof, and in respect of giving reason, is as the guide of our actions: That in each man there is a certain Sunbeam of reason, whereby they conceive things and debate upon them; by which it happens that oftentimes they agree both in the reason itself which is one, and in the manifest grounds thereof, and in whatsoever evidently depends upon the same: That each man has also a peculiar body by himself, and likewise peculiar complexion, humors, imaginations, education, custom, and way of life: from which it happens that each man takes a different path, and that even the same person diverges differently from the unity of reason, of which the path is one, and the ways to stray from it are infinite: That this Sunbeam of reason which shines and sheds itself from our mind is properly

that understanding termed, The understanding in ability or possibility, which is increased and augmented by all the things it sees, hears, or encounters, like fire, which gains strength by the abundance of fuel put upon it, and becomes, in a way, infinite by spreading itself abroad: Also, it is the same we call the Memory of understanding, or mindful Memory, and it is nothing but an abundance of Reason, and as it were a storehouse of the continual influence of the Mind: That the Mind from which this flows as from its spring, is properly that which they, Averroes and Alexander, term the working or workful Mind, which is a certain power or force capable of extending reason from one thing to another, and proceeding from sensible things to things insensible, from things movable to unmovable, from bodily to spiritual, from effects to causes, and from beginnings to ends by the intermediate cause. This Mind is, with respect to Reason, as skill is to an Instrument or tool; and Reason, with respect to imagination and to things that are sensible, is as an Instrument or tool with respect to the matter or stuff it works upon: Or to speak more fittingly, this Mind is to Reason as the mover of a thing is to the thing that is movable, and Reason is to her objects as the movable thing is to the thing it is moved to. For to reason or debate is nothing else but to proceed from a thing understood, to a thing not understood, with the purpose to understand it: and the understanding thereof is a resting that follows upon it, like a stopping or resting after movement: That both of them, as well as each, are but only one self-same substance; and just as a man, both when he moves and when he rests, is all one and the same man, or as the power that moves the sinews is still the same, both when it stirs them and when it holds them still, so the reasonable or understanding soul that is in each man is but only one self-same bodiless and immortal substance, executing its powers partly of itself, and partly by

our bodies. And seeing that Averroes and Alexander, make so great estimation and account of the effects which are wrought in us, that they are compelled to attribute them to some incorruptible and everlasting mind; let us take of them, that in very truth the thing which works so great wonders in the body can be neither sense, nor body, nor imagination, but a divine, incorruptible, and immortal mind, as they themselves say.

But let us learn the thing of more than them, which all wise men teach us, and which every of us can learn of himself; namely that this understanding or mind is not one universal thing as the sun is that shines into all the windows of a City, but rather, a particular substance in every several man, as a light to lead him in the darkness of this life; for surely it was no more difficulty to the everlasting GOD, to create many sundry souls, that every man might have one severally alone by himself, than to have created but only one soul for all men together. But it was far more for his glory, to be known, praised, and exalted of many souls, yea and more for our welfare to praise, exalt, and know him, yea, and to live of ourselves both in this life, and in the life to come: then if any other universal spirit, soul or mind whatsoever, should have lived and understood either in us or after us. Now then for this matter let us conclude, both by reason and by antiquity, and by the knowledge that every of us hath of himself; That the soul and the body be things diverse: that the soul is a spirit and not a body: That this spirit hath in man three abilities or powers, whereof two be exercised by the body, and the third works of itself without the body: That these three abilities are in the one only soul as in their root: whereof two do cease whensoever the body fails them, and yet notwithstanding the soul abides whole without abatement of any of her powers, as a craftsman continues a craftsman though he wants tools to work withal: And finally, that this soul is a

substance that continues of itself, and is unmaterial and spiritual, over which neither death nor corruption can naturally have any power.

And for a conclusion of all that ever I have treated of hitherto in this book, let us maintain, That there is but only one God, who by his own goodness and wisdom is the Creator and Governor of the world & of all that is therein: That in the world he created Man after his own image as in respect of mind, and after the image of his other creatures as in respect of life, sense, and moving, mortal so far forth as he holds the likeness of a creature, and immortal so far forth as he bears the image of the Creator: That is to wit, in his soul: That he which goes out of himself to see the world, does forthwith see that there is a God, for his works declare him everywhere: That he which will yet still doubt thereof, needs but to enter into himself, and he shall meet him there, for he shall find there a power which he sees not: That he which believes there is one God, believes himself to be immortal; for such consideration could not light into a mortal nature: and that he which believes himself to be immortal, believes that there is a God, for without the unutterable power of the one God, the mortal and immortal could never join together: That he which sees the order of the world, the proportion of man, and the harmony that is in either of them compounded of so many contraries, cannot doubt that there is a Providence for the nature which hath furnished them therewith, cannot be unfurnished thereof itself; but as it once had a care of them, so can it not shake off the same care from them. Thus have we three Articles which follow interchangeably one another. Insomuch that he which proves any one of them, does prove them all three, notwithstanding that I have treated of every of them severally by itself. Now let us pray the everlasting God, that



we may glorify him in his works in this world, and he vouchsafe of his mercy to glorify us one day in the World to come.

AMEN.