




THE SOUL'S OWN EVIDENCE FOR ITS OWN
IMMORTALITY

PHILIPPE DE MORNAY



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Philippe de Mornay

Monergism Books

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Further revision and editing done by Monergism.

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Editor's Note – This text was originally transcribed by EEBO-TCP. This text was then updated to contemporary English spelling by Chat4o. As the Puritan Edward Leigh once said "If thou findest faults and Errata in the book, let love cover them, for to err (as the Satirist saith) is the sad privilege of mortality, and he (of all men) erreth most, who challengeth a privilege from error."

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PREF. To the Reader.

Judicious Reader, the iniquity of the times, having so far corrupted the minds of some, that the very innate and inbred principles of Nature (especially about a Deity, the sovereign welfare, and the Immortality of the Soul) seem in a manner to be quite obliterated and extinct in them; I thought it would not be unseasonable to recommend to thy most serious Meditations that excellent Treatise mentioned in the Frontispiece, as an Antidote against the atheistical and dangerous Tenets now abroad.

The Noble Author of it thou wilt soon find was a man of no mean parts, and of no common Learning. Delicacy of Wit, strength of Reason, streams of Eloquence, with varieties both of solid and curious notions, come all flowing from him. He will tell thee more, even from the ancient doctrine of the very Heathen, than happily thou ever heard'st of, or (at leastwise) ever took'st much notice of, though born and bred in so bright an Age, and among such too, as pass for no mean Proficients in Christianity. Those mysterious (though glorious) Truths, which like mines of gold underground,

run along more hiddenly, through the letter of the Scriptures, thou mayest there meet with discussed at large, with as much sobriety as clearness.

Dost thou desire to know by what arguments, even of reason, thou mayest prove a Deity? that Deity to be but one only? and yet distinguished by a Trinity of Beings, that which we call a Trinity of persons, viz. Father, Son, and Spirit? if thou wilt take the pains (I might say, the pleasure rather) to gain the knowledge of such high (yet necessary) points: In the first six Chapters of the said Treatise, thou mayest (more fully than thou art aware) instruct thyself.

Dost thou inquire after the highest and most sovereign Good? wherein it lies, and wherein it lies not? in the 18th and 19th Chapters thou findest that also very sweetly and fully resolved.

Lastly, next unto the knowledge of God, what He is in Himself, and what to His creatures, dost thou seek to understand thyself, what once thou wert, and what still thou art; Read but this ensuing Paragraph, peculiarly selected out for thy present use, and thou shalt easily perceive what Divine sparks lie raked up under ashes, within thine own bosom, sparks which (when once stirred up) do but blow a little, and thou shalt know further, as well what the duration as the excellency of thy being is, And that thou art a creature bearing in thee, besides a plurality of present lives, the very seed of Immortality.

In all which several inquiries whilst thou readest and considerest, thou mayest expect that, the reasonable part (dark and cloudy, notwithstanding as it may be) shall quickly receive an Irradiation, and that not only from the intrinsic operations of thine own mind, but also from the consent of the wisest men among all Nations.

Zoroaster the Chaldean, Trismegistus the Egyptian, Orpheus the Greek, Pherecydes the Syrian, after them, Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Porphyry, Amelius, &c., all teach thee in their several ages. And if that be not sufficient, Thou hast the confession of the very Devils; viz. that there is a God, and but one God, with Trinity of persons in unity of Essence. That the Soul is an Immortal substance, and the aforesaid Deity, the sovereign welfare of it, according to what thou believest from the only true sacred Oracle.

Let not then that Treatise, rare and singular as it is, be neglected by thee, for though it hath a long time lain obscurely, as a Diamond in the dark, little known and less looked after, yet I dare say, by that time thou hast well examined it, and shalt have tasted the sublime Heavenly matter contained in it, thou wilt estimate it at a very great value, even worthy (many passages of it) to be written in characters of gold.

Buy it therefore and read it, that from the very light of nature, thou mayest be enabled to confute blasphemers: Judge the whole by this little piece, which if thou readest through, and with diligent attention, thou mayest benefit thyself, and therein answer the desire of him, who heartily wisheth the true good of

Thine Immortal soul:

John Bachiler.

CHAP. I. That the Soul of Man is immortal, or does not die.

Hitherto I have treated of the world that is to be conceived in understanding, and of the sensible World (as the Platonists term them) that is to say, of God and of this World. Now followeth the examining of the little World (as they term it), that is to say, of man. Concerning God, we have acknowledged him to be a Spirit: and as touching the world, we have found it to be a body. In man, we have an abridgment of both, namely of God in respect of spirit, and of the world in composition of body, as though the Creator, on purpose to set forth a mirror of his works, intended to bring into one little compass both the infiniteness of his own nature, and also the vastness of the whole world together. We see in man's body a wonderful mixture of the four Elements, the veins spreading forth like Rivers to the uttermost members; as many instruments of sense as there be sensible natures in the world, a great number of sinews, flesh-strings, and knitters; a head by special privilege directed upward to Heaven, and hands serving to all manner of services. Whoever considers no more than only this instrument, without life, without sense, and without moving, cannot but

think verily that it is made to very great purpose; and he must needs cry out, as Hermes or as the Saracen Avicenna does, that man is a miracle which far surpasses, not only these lower Elements, but also the very Heaven and all the ornaments thereof. But if he could (as it were out of himself) behold this body receiving life, and entering into the use of all its motions with such forwardness, hands bestirring themselves so nimbly and after so sundry fashions, and the Senses uttering their force so far off, without stirring out of their place: do you not think he would be wonderfully ravished, and so much more wonder at the said life, moving and sense, than at the body, as he wondered afore at the body, to behold the excellence of the proportion thereof above the mass of some stone? For what comparison is there between a Lute and a Lute-player, or between a dumb instrument, and him that maketh it to sound? What would he say then if he could afterward see how the same man, being now quickened, attains in one moment from one side of the earth to the other, without shifting of place; descending down to the center of the world, and mounting up above the outermost circle of it both at once; present in a thousand places at one instant, embracing the whole without touching it; keeping upon the earth, and yet containing it; beholding the Heavens from beneath, and being above the Heaven of Heavens, both at once? Should he not be compelled to say that in this simple body there dwelleth a greater thing than the body, greater than the earth, yea greater than the whole world together? Then let us say with Plato, that man is double, outward and inward. The outward man is that which we see with our eyes, which forgoes not its shape when it is dead, no more than a Lute forgoes its shape when the Lute-player ceaseth from making it to sound, albeit that both life, moving, sense, and reason be out of it. The inward man is the Soul, and that is properly the very man, which useth the

body as an instrument; whereunto though it be united by the power of God, yet doth it not remove when the body runneth. It seeth when the eyes be shut, and sometimes seeth not when the eyes be wide open: It travaileth while the body resteth, and resteth when the body travaileth, that is to say, it is able of itself to perform its own actions, without the help of the outward man, whereas on the contrary part, the outward, without the help of the inward, that is to wit, the body without the presence of the Soul, hath neither sense, moving, life, nor even continuance of being. In the outward man we have a Counterfeit of the whole world, and if you rip them both up piecemeal, you shall find a wonderful agreement betwixt them. But my purpose in this book is not to treat of the things that pertain peculiarly to the body.

In the inward man we have a summary of whatsoever life, sense, and moving is in all creatures, and moreover an Image or rather a shadow (for the Image is defaced by our sin) of the Godhead itself. And that is the thing which we have to examine in this Chapter. In Plants, we perceive that besides their bodies which we see, there is also an inward virtue which we see not, whereby they live, grow, bud, and bear fruit: which virtue we call the quickening Soul, and it maketh them to differ from Stones and Metals, which have it not. In sensitive living things, we find the same virtue, which worketh while they sleep and are, after a sort, as the Plants; and therewithal, we find another certain virtue, or power which seeth, heareth, smelleth, tasteth, and feeleth; which also in many of them doth hoard up the things brought in by the senses; which manner of power the Plants are void of. This do we term the sensitive Soul, because the effects thereof are discerned and executed by the Senses. In man, we have both the quickening and the Sensitive, the former uttering itself in the nourishing and increasing of him,

and the latter in the subtlety of sense and imagination, whereby he is both Plant and Beast together. But yet moreover, we see also a Mind which considereth and beholdeth, which reapeth profit of the things that are brought in by the Senses, which by its seeing conceiveth that which it seeth not; which of that which is not, gathereth that which is; and finally, which pulleth a man away both from earth and from all sensible things, yea and (after a sort) from himself too. This do we call the reasonable Soul, and it is the thing that maketh man to be man, (and not a Plant or a brute Beast as the other two do,) and also to be the Image or rather a shadow of the Godhead, in that (as we shall say hereafter) it is a Spirit that may have continuance of being alone by itself without the body. And by the way, whereas I say that the inward man hath a quickening power as a Plant hath, a sensitive power as a Beast hath, and a power of understanding whereby he is a man: my meaning is not that he hath three Souls but only one Soul; that is to wit, that like as in the brute Beast the sensitive Soul comprehendeth the quickening Soul; so in man the reasonable Soul comprehendeth both the sensitive and the quickening, and executeth the offices of them all three, so as it both liveth, feeleth, and reasoneth even as well and after the same manner, as the mind of a man may intend to his own household matters, to the affairs of the Commonwealth, and to heavenly things all at once. Or to speak more fitly, these three degrees of Souls are three degrees of life, whereof the second exceedeth and containeth the first, and the third exceedeth and containeth both the other two. The one, without which the body cannot live, is the Soul or life of the Plant, and is so tied to the body, that it showeth not itself in any wise out of it. The second, which cannot live without the body, is the Soul or life of the Beast, which doth well utter forth its power and force abroad, but yet not otherwise than by the members

and instruments of the body whereunto it is tied. The third, which can of itself live and continue without the body, but not the body without it, is the soul of man, which giveth life inwardly to all its parts, showeth forth its life abroad in the perceiving of all things subject to sense, and retaineth still its force (as shall be said hereafter) yea and increaseth it, even when the strength of the body and the very liveliness of the senses fail. And in very deed, you shall see a man forgo all his senses one after another as the instruments of them decay, and yet have still both life and reason unimpaired. The cause whereof is, that some of the instruments of life and sense do fail, but the life itself which quickeneth them faileth not. And therefore the Beast forgoeth not life in losing sense, but he utterly forgoeth sense in forgoing life. And that is because life is the ground of the abilities of sense, and the sensitive life is a more excellent life than the quickening life, as wherein those powers and abilities are as in their root. To be short, he that bereaveth man or beast of the use of senses, or man of the right use of reason, doth not thereby bereave him of life, but he that bereaveth the beast, or the outward man of their life, doth therewithal bereave them of sense and reason. Therefore it is a most sure argument, that the soul which causeth a beast to live, and the soul that causeth it to have sense, are both one, that is to wit, one certain kind of life more lively and more excellent than the life that is in Plants. And likewise, that the soul which causeth man to live, to have sense, and to reason, is but one, that is to wit, one certain kind of life more excellent, more lively, and of further reach than the life of the Beast. But like as sense is, as it were, the form or Self-being (if I may so term it) of the life of a beast; so is reason or understanding the very form and Self-being of the soul of man; and (to speak properly) it is the soul or life of the soul, like as the apple of our eye is the very eye of our eye. And

in very deed, when the mind is earnestly occupied, the senses are at a stay; and when the senses are over-busied, the nourishment and digestion is hindered, and contrariwise: which thing could not come to pass if the soul were any more than one substance, which by reason that it is but one, cannot utter its force alike in all places at once, but yieldeth the less care one where so long as it is earnestly occupied another where. In this soul of man (which yet notwithstanding is but one) the diversity of the powers and abilities is very apparent. The quickening power doth nourish, increase and maintain us; and Reason and Sense meddle not therewith, neither have they power to impede the working thereof. The truth whereof appeareth in this, that those things are best done when our mind is at rest, and our senses are asleep; insomuch that oftentimes we forgo the sense and moving of some parts by some Rheum or some Palsy, and yet the same parts cease not to be nourished still. Also, the sensitive life seeth and perceiveth afar off, yea oftentimes without setting of the mind thereupon, or without considering what the Sense conceiveth. Some men who have but weak Senses, have very quick understanding; and likewise on the contrary part. Again, some fall into a Consumption, which want not the perfect use of their Senses. Sometimes the reasonable part is so earnestly bent and occupied about the things that it liketh, that by the increasing of itself, it hurteth and diminisheth the part that quickeneth. Also it standeth in argument against the Senses, and reproveth them of falsehood, and concludeth contrary to their information. And it may be that the man who hath his digestion perfect and his Senses sound, hath not his wit or reason sound in like case. Now, were the Soul but only one ability, it could not be so. But now is the same divided manifestly into wit or understanding, and will; the one serving to devise, and the other to execute. For we understand diverse things which we

will not, and we will diverse things which we understand not: which contrary operations cannot be attributed both to one power. Nevertheless, the uniting of all these powers together is with such distinctness, and the distinguishing of them is with such union, that ordinarily they meet altogether in one self-same action, the one of them as readily (by all likelihood) as the other, albeit that every one of them doth his own work severally by himself, and one afore another as in respect of their objects.

Thus have we three sorts of men, according to the three powers or abilities of the inward man. Namely, the earthly man, who like the Plant mindeth nothing but sleeping and feeding, making all his senses and all his reason to serve to that purpose, as in whom the care of this present life only, hath devoured and swallowed up his senses and understanding. The Sensual man (as St. Paul himself termeth him) who is given wholly to these sensible things, embracing and casting down his reason so far, as to make it a bond-slave to his senses and the pleasures and delights thereof: And the reasonable man, who liveth properly in spirit and mind, who entereth into himself to know himself, and goeth out of himself to behold God; making this life to serve to the attainment of a better, and using his Senses but as instruments and servants of his reason. After as any of these three powers do reign and bear sway in man, that is to wit, after as a man yieldeth himself more to one than to another of them; so becometh he like unto the Spirits, the brute Beasts, or Plants, yea and the very Blocks and Stones. But it is our disposition even by kind, to be carried away by our corrupt nature, and by the objects which hem us in on all sides; but as for against our nature yea or beyond our nature, our nature is not able to do anything at all.

Now, it is not enough for us to know that we have a soul whereby we live, feel, and understand, and which being but one hath in itself alone so many

sundry powers or abilities: for it will be demanded of us by and by what this soul properly is. And soothly if I should say, I cannot tell what it is, I should not belie myself a whit; for I should but confess mine own ignorance, as many great learned men have done before me. And I should do no wrong at all to the Soul itself; for sith we cannot deny the effects thereof, the less that we be able to declare the nature and being thereof, the more doth the excellency thereof shine forth. Again, it is a plain case, that nothing can comprehend the thing that is greater than itself. Now, our Soul is after a sort less than itself, inasmuch as it is wrapped up in this body, in like manner as the man that hath gyves and fetters on his feet, is after a sort weaker than himself. Nevertheless, let us assay to satisfy such demands as well as we can. And forasmuch as it is the Image of God, not only in respect of the government and maintenance of the whole World, but also even in the very nature thereof: as we said heretofore when we spake of the nature of God, if we cannot express or conceive what it is, let us at leastwise be certified what it is not. First of all, that the Soul and the Body be not both one thing, but two very far differing things, and also that the soul is no part of the body, it appeareth of itself without further proof. For if the soul were the body, or a part of the body, it should grow with the body, as the other parts of the body do, and the greater that the body were, the greater also should the soul be. Nay, contrary wise, the body increaseth to a certain age and then stayeth; after which age is commonly the time that the Soul doth most grow, and those that are strongest of mind are commonly weakest of body, and the Soul is seen to be full of liveliness in a languishing body, and to grow the more in force, by the decay of the body. The Soul then groweth not with the body, and therefore it is not the body, nor any part of the body. And whereas I speak of growing in the soul, by growing I mean the

profiting thereof in power and virtue, as the body groweth in greatness by further enlarging. Again, if the Soul were the body it should lose her strength and soundness with the body so as the maimed in body should therewith feel also a maim in his understanding, as well as in his members: whosoever were sick of any disease, should also be sick in his reason; he that limpeth or halteth, should therewith halt in soul also: the blind man's soul should be blind, and the lame man's soul should be lame. But we see contrariwise, that the maimed and the sick, the cripples and the blind, have their souls whole and sound, and their understanding perfect and clear-sighted in itself. To be short, many a man dieth whose body is sound, and differeth not a whit in any part from that it was when it was alive, and yet notwithstanding, both life, moving, sense, and understanding are out of it. Let us say then that in the body there was a thing which was not of the body, but was a far other thing than the body.

Some willful person will object here, that the force and strength of the soul groweth with the body, as appeareth in this, that a man grown will remove that which a child cannot, and that a child of two years old will go, which thing a babe of two months old cannot do. But he should consider also, that if the selfsame man or the selfsame child should have a mischance in his leg or in his arm, he should thereby forgo the strength and moving thereof, whereas yet notwithstanding his soul should have her former force and power still to move the other as she did before. Therefore it is to be said, not that the child's soul is grown or strengthened by time; but rather that his sinews are dried and hardened, which the soul useth as strings and instruments to move withal, and therefore when age hath loosened and weakened them, a man hath need of a staff to help them with, although he have as good a will to run as he had when he was young. The soul then

which moveth them all at one beck, hath the selfsame power in infancy which it hath in age, and the same in age which it hath in the prime of youth: and the fault is only in the instrument, which is unable to execute the operations thereof: like as the cunning of a Lute-player is not diminished by the moistness or slackness of the Lute-strings, nor increased by the over high straining and tight standing of them; but indeed in the one he cannot show his cunning at all, and in the other he may show it more or less. Likewise the speech of children cometh with their teeth, albeit that the speech do manifestly utter itself first, in that they prattle many things which they cannot pronounce: and in old men it goeth away again with their teeth, and yet their eloquence is not abated thereby. As for Demosthenes, although he surmounted all the Orators of his time, yet were there some letters which he could not pronounce. Give unto old age or unto infancy the same sinews and teeth, and as able and lusty limbs and members as youth hath; and the actions which the soul doth with the body and by the body, I mean so far forth as concern the abilities of sense and liveliness, shall be performed as well in one age as in another. But hadst thou as great indifference in judging of the force and power of thine own soul, as of the cunning of a Lute-player, (I say not by the nimbleness of his fingers which are perchance knotted with the gout, but by the plain and sweet Harmony of his Tabulature as they term it, which maketh thee to deem him to have cunning in his head, although he can no more utter it with his hands,) so as thou wouldest consider how thou hast in thyself a desire to go, though thy feet be not able to bear thee; a discretion to judge of things that are spoken, though thine eyes cannot convey it unto thee; a sound eloquence, though for want of thy teeth thou canst not well express it; and which is above all the rest, a substantial quick and heavenly reason, even when thy body is most earthly and drooping.

Thou wouldest soon conclude that the force and power of quickening, moving, and perceiving, is whole and sound in thy soul, and that the default is altogether in thy body. Insomuch that if she had a new body and new instruments given unto her, she would be as lusty and cheerful as ever she was, and that the more she perceiveth the body to decay, the more she laboreth to retire into herself which is a plain proof of that she is not the body nor any part of the body, but the very life and in-worker of the body.

And sith it is so, there needeth no long scanning whether the soul be a substance or a quality. For, seeing that qualities have no being but in another thing than themselves; the life which causeth another thing to be, cannot be a quality. Forasmuch then as the Soul maketh a man to be a man; who otherwise should be but a carcass or carrion: doubtless (unless we will say that the only difference which is between a man and a dead carcass, is but in accidents) we must needs grant that the soul is a forming substance and a substantial form, yea and a most excellent substance infinitely surpassing the outward man, as which by the power and virtue thereof causeth another thing to have being, and perfecteth the bodily substance which seemeth outwardly to have so many perfections.

But hereupon ensueth another controversy, whether this substance be a bodily or an unbodily substance: which cause requireth somewhat longer examination. Soothly, if we consider the nature of a body, it hath certain measurings, and comprehendeth not anything which is not proportioned according to the greatness and capacity thereof. For, like as itself must be fain to have a place in another thing; so must other things occupy some certain place in it, by reason whereof it cometh to pass, that things can have no place therein if they be greater than it, without annoying the one the other. To be short, if the thing be less than the body that containeth it, the

whole body shall not contain it, but only some part thereof: And if it be greater, then must some part thereof needs be out of it: for there is no measuring of bodies but by quantity. Now we see how our soul comprehendeth heaven and earth, without annoying either other; and likewise, time past, present, and to come, without troubling one another; and finally innumerable places, persons and towns, without encumbering of our understanding. The great things are there in their full greatness, and the small things in their uttermost smallness, both of them whole and sound, in the soul whole and sound, and not by piecemeal or only but in part of it. Moreover, the fuller it is, the more it is able to receive, the more things that are couched in it, the more it still coveteth; and the greater the things be, the fitter is she to receive them even when they be at the greatest. It followeth therefore that the soul (which after a sort is infinite) cannot be a body. And so much the less can it so be, for that whereas it harboreth so many and so great things in it, itself is lodged in so small a body. Again, as a thousand diverse places are in the soul or mind without occupying any place; so is the mind in a thousand places without changing of place; and that sometimes not by succession of time, nor by turns, but oftentimes altogether at one instant. Bid thy Soul or Mind go to Constantinople, and forthwith to turn back again to Rome, and straightway to be at Paris or Lyons: Bid it pass through America, or to go about Africa; and it dispatcheth all these journeys at a trice: look whithersoever thou directest it, there it is; and or ever thou callest it back, it is at home again. Now, is there a body that can be in diverse places at once, or that can pass without removing, or that can move otherwise than in time, yea and in such time as (within a little under or over) is proportioned both to his pace, and to the length of the way which it hath to go? Then is it certain that our Soul is not a bodily substance; which

thing appeareth so much the more plainly, in that being lodged in this body which is so movable, it removeth not with the body. Also it is a sure ground, that two bodies cannot mutually enter either into other, nor contain either other: but the greater must always needs contain, and the lesser must needs be contained. But by our Souls, we enter, not only either into others' bodies, but also either into others' minds, so as we comprehend each other by mutual understanding, and embrace each other by mutual loving. It followeth then that this substance which is able to receive a bodiless thing, can be no body; and that so much the rather, for that the body which seemeth to hold it, containeth it not. Nay verily, this Soul of ours is so far off from being a bodily substance, and is so manifestly a Spirit; that to lodge all things in itself, it maketh them all after a sort spiritual, and bereaveth them of their bodies; and if there were any bodiliness in it, it were unable to enter into the knowledge of a body. So in a Glass a thousand shapes are seen: but if the clear of the Glass had any peculiar shape of its own, the Glass could yield none of those shapes at all. Also all visible things are imprinted in the eye; but if the sight of the eye had any peculiar color of its own, it would be a blemish to the sight, so as it should either not see at all, or else all things should seem like to that blemish. Likewise, whereas the Tongue is the discerners of all tastes; if it be not clear but cumbered with humors, all things are of taste like to the humor, so as if it be bitter, they also be bitter; and if it be watery, they be watery too; yea and if it be bitter, it cannot judge of bitterness itself. That a thing may receive all shapes, all colors, and all tastes; it behoveth the same to be clear from all shapes, from all color, and from all savor of its own. And that a thing may in understanding know and conceive all bodies, as our soul doth, it behoveth the same to be altogether bodiless itself, for had it any bodiliness

at all, it could not receive any body into it. If we look yet more nearly into the nature of a body, we shall find that no body receiveth into it the substantial form of another body, without losing or altering its own, nor passeth from one form into another, without the marring of the first; as is to be seen in wood when it receiveth fire, in seeds when they spring forth into bud, and so in other things. What is to be said then of man's soul, which receiveth and conceiveth the forms and shapes of all things without corrupting its own, and moreover becometh the perfecter by the more receiving? For the more it receiveth, the more it understandeth; and the more it understandeth, the more perfect it is.

If it be a bodily substance, from whence is it and of what mixture? If it be of the four Elements, how can they give life, having no life of themselves? Or how can they give understanding, having no sense? If it be of the mixture of them, how may it be said that of diverse things which have no being of themselves, should be made a thing that hath being? Or that of diverse outsides should be made one body? Or of diverse bodies, one Soul? Or of diverse deaths, one life? Or of diverse darknesses, one light? Nay rather, why say we not that he which beyond nature hath made the mixture of these bodies, hath for the perfecting of our body, breathed a Soul also into the body? To be short, the property of a body is to suffer, and the property of our Soul is to do. And if the body be not put forth by some other thing than itself, it is a very block; whereas the mind that is in our Soul ceaseth not to stir up and down in itself, though it have nothing to move it from without. Therefore it is to be concluded by these reasons and by the like, that our Soul is a bodiless substance, notwithstanding that it is united to our body.

And hereupon it followeth also, that our Soul is not any material thing, forasmuch as matter receiveth not any form or shape but according to its own quantity, and but only one form at once, whereas our Soul receiveth all forms without quantity, come there never so many at once or so great. Again, no matter admitteth two contrary forms at once; but our Soul contrariwise comprehendeth and receiveth them together, as fire and water, heat and cold, white and black; and not only together, but also the better by the matching and laying of them together. To be short, seeing that the more we depart from matter, the more we understand: surely nothing is more contrary to the substance of our Soul, than is the nature of matter. Furthermore, if this reasonable soul of ours is neither a bodily nor a material thing, nor depending upon matter in the best actions thereof: then must it needs be of itself, and not proceed either from body or from matter. For what doth a body bring forth but a body; and matter but matter; and material but materials: And therefore it is an immaterial substance, which hath being of itself.

But let us see whether the same be corruptible and mortal or no. Soothly, if Plutarch be to be believed, it is in vain to dispute thereof. For he teacheth, that the doctrine of God's providence, and the immortality of our Souls are so linked together, that the one is as an appendant to the other. And in very deed, to what purpose were the World created, if there were nobody to behold it: Or to what end behold we the Creator in the world, but to serve him? And why should we serve him upon no hope: And to what purpose hath he endued us with these rare gifts of his, which for the most part do but put us to pain and trouble in this life: if we perish like the brute Beast or the Herbs, which know him not? Howbeit, for the better satisfying of the silly Souls which go on still like witless Beasts, without taking so much leisure

in all their life, as once to enter into themselves; let us endeavor here by lively reasons to paint out unto them again their true shape, which they labor to deface with so much filthiness. The Soul of man (as I have said afore) is not a body, neither doth it increase or decrease with the body: but contrariwise the more the body decayeth, the more doth the understanding increase; and the nearer that the body draweth unto death, the more freely doth the mind understand; and the more that the body abateth in flesh, the more workful is the mind. And why then should we think, that the thing which becometh the stronger by the weakness of the body, and which is advanced by the decay of the body, should return to dust with the body: A man's Senses fail because his eyes fail, and his eyes fail because the Spirits of them fail: but the blind man's understanding increaseth, because his eyes are not busied: and the old man's reason becometh the more perfect by the loss of his sight. Therefore why say we not that the body faileth the Soul, and not the Soul the body; and that the Glasses are out of the Spectacles but the eyesight is still good: Why should we deem the Soul to be forgone with the Senses: If the eye be the thing that seeth, and the ear the thing that heareth; why do we not see things double, and hear sounds double, seeing we have two eyes and two ears? It is the soul then that seeth and heareth; and these which we take to be our senses, are but the instruments of our senses. And if when our eyes be shut or picked out, we then behold a thousand things in our mind; yea, and that our understanding is then most quick-sighted, when the quickest of our eyesight is as good as quenched or stark dead: how is it possible that the reasonable soul should be tied and bound to the senses? What a reason is it to say that the soul dieth with the senses, seeing that the true senses do then grow and increase, when the instruments of sense do die? And what a thing were it, to say that beast is

dead, because he hath lost his eyes, when we ourselves see, that it liveth after it hath forgone the eyes? Also I have proved that the soul is neither the body, nor an appurtenance of the body. Sith it is so, why measure we that thing by the body, which measureth all bodies; or make that to die with the body, whereby the bodies that die, yea many hundred years ago, do after a certain manner live still? Or what can hurt that thing, whom nothing hurteth or hindereth in the body? Though a man lose an arm, yet doth his soul abide whole still. Let him forgo the one half of his body, yet is his soul as sound as afore: for it is whole in itself, and whole in every part of itself, united in itself and in the own substance, and by the force and power thereof it sheddeth itself into all parts of the body. Though the body rot away by piecemeal, yet abideth the Soul all one and undiminished. Let the blood drain out, the moving wax weak, the senses fail, and the strength perish; and yet abideth the mind nevertheless sound and lively even to the end. Her house must be pierced through on all sides, ere she be discouraged; her walls must be battered down ere she fall to fleeting; and she never forsaketh her lodging, till no room be left her to lodge in. True it is, that the brute beasts forgo both life and action with their blood. But as for our soul (if we consider the matter well) it is then gathered home into itself, and when our senses are quenched, then doth it most of all labor to surmount itself: working as goodly actions at the time that the body is at a point to fail it, yea and oftentimes far goodlier also, than ever it did during the whole lifetime thereof. As for example, it taketh order for itself, for our household, for the Commonwealth, and for a whole Kingdom; and that with more uprightnes, godliness, wisdom; and moderation, than ever it did afore, yea and perchance in a body so far spent, so bare, so consumed, so withered without, and so putrefied within, that whosoever looks upon him sees

nothing but earth, and yet to hear him speak would ravish a man up to heaven, yea, and above heaven. Now when a man sees so lively a soul in so weak and wretched a body, may he not say as is said of the hatching of chickens, that the shell is broken, but there cometh forth a chicken.

Also let us see what is the ordinary cause that things perish. Fire doth either go out for want of nourishment, or is quenched by his contrary which is water. Water is resolved into air by fire, which is his contrary. The cause why the Plant dieth, is extremity of cold or drought, or unseasonable cutting, or violent plucking up. Also the living creature dieth through contrariety of humors, or for want of food, or by feeding upon something that is against the nature of it, or by outward violence. Of all these causes, which can we choose to have any power against our Soul: I say against the Soul of man which (notwithstanding that it be united to matter and to a body) is itself a substance unbodily, immaterial, and only conceivable in understanding: The contrariety of things: Nay, what can be contrary to that which lodgeth the contraries alike equally in himself: which understandeth the one of them by the other: which coucheth them all under one skill? and (to be short) in whom the contrarieties themselves abandon their contrarieties, so as they do not any more pursue but ensue one another: Fire is hot, and water cold. Our bodies mislike these contraries, and are grieved by them; but our mind linketh them together without either burning or cooling itself; and it setteth the one of them against the other to know them the better. The things which destroy one another through the whole world, do maintain one another in our minds. Again, nothing is more contrary to peace than war is; and yet man's mind can skill to make or maintain peace in preparing for war, and to lay earnestly for war in seeking or enjoying of peace. Even death itself (which dispatcheth our life) cannot be contrary to

the life of our Soul: for it seeketh life by death, and death by life. And what can that thing meet withal in the whole world, that may be able to overthrow it, which can enjoin obedience to things most contrary? What then Want of food: How can that want food in the world, which can skill to feed on the whole world: Or how should that forsake food, which the fuller it is, so much the hungrier it is; and the more it hath digested, the better able it is to digest: The bodily creature feedeth upon some certain things, but our mind feedeth upon all things. Take from it the sensible things, and the things of understanding abide with it still: bereave it of earthly things, and the heavenly remain abundantly. To be short, abridge it of all worldly things, yea and of the world itself, and even then doth it feed at greatest ease, and maketh best cheer agreeable to its own nature. Also the bodily creature filleth itself to a certain measure, and delighteth in some certain things. But what can fill our mind? Fill it as full as ye can with the knowledge of things, and it is still eager and sharp set to receive more. The more it taketh in, the more it still craveth: and yet for all that, it never feeleth any rawness or lack of digestion. What shall I say more: discharge our understanding from the minding of itself, and then doth it live in him and of him in whom all things do live. Again, fill it with the knowledge of itself, and then doth it feel itself most empty, and sharpest set upon desire of the other. Now then, can that die or decay for want of food, which cannot be glutted with anything, which is nourished and maintained with all things, and which liveth in very deed upon him by whom all the things which we wonder at here beneath are upheld?

And what else is violence, but a jostling of two bodies together: and how can there be any such between a body and a spiritual substance: yea or of two spirits one against another, seeing that oftentimes when they would

destroy one another, they uphold one another: And if the Soul cannot be pushed at, neither inwardly nor outwardly: is there anything in nature that can naturally hurt it? No: but it may perchance be weakened by the very force of its encounter, as we see it doth befall to our senses. For the more excellent and the more sensible the thing is in its kind which the sense receiveth, so much the more also is the sense itself offended or grieved therewith. As for example, the feeling, by fire; the taste, by harshness; the smelling, by savors; the hearing, by the hideousness of noise, whether it be of Thunderclap or of the falling of a River; and the sight, by looking upon the Sun, upon Fire, and upon all things that have a glistering brightness. I omit, that in the most of these things, it is not properly the sense itself, but the outward instrument of sense only that is offended or hurt. But let us see if there be the like in our reasonable soul. Nay, contrariwise the more of understanding and excellence that the thing is, the more doth it refresh and comfort our mind. If it be dark so as we understand it but by halves, it hurteth us not, but yet doth it not delight us. Nay, as we increase in understanding it, so doth it like us the better, and the higher it is, the more doth it stir up the power of our understanding, and (as you would say) reach us the hand to draw us to the attainment thereof. As for them that are dim-sighted, we forbid them to behold the things that are over-bright. But as for them that are of rawest capacity, we offer them the things that are most understandable. When the sense beginneth to perceive most sharply, then it is fain to give over, as if it felt the very death of itself. Contrariwise, when the mind beginneth to understand, then is it most desirous to hold on still. And whereof cometh that, but that our senses work by bodily instruments, but our mind worketh by a bodiless substance which needeth not the help of the body. And seeing that the nature, the nourishment, and the actions of our

soul, are so far differing, both from the nature, nourishment, and actions of the body, and from all that ever is done or wrought by the body, can there be anything more childish than to deem our soul to be mortal by the abating and decaying of our senses, or by the mortality of our bodies? Nay contrariwise it may be most soundly and substantially concluded thereupon that man's soul is of its own nature immortal, seeing that all death as well violent as natural cometh of the body and by the body.

Let us see further what death or corruption is. It is (say they) a separating of the matter from its form. And forasmuch as in man the soul is considered to be the form, and the body to be as the matter, the separation of the soul from the body is commonly called death. Now then, what death can there be of the soul, sith it is immaterial, as I have said afore, and a form that abideth of itself? For (as one saith) a man may take away the roundness or squareness from a table of copper, because they have no abiding but in the matter: but had they such a round or square form, as might have an abiding without matter or stuff wherein to be, out of doubt, such form or shape should continue forever. Nay (which more is) how can that be the corrupter of a thing, which is the perfection thereof: The less coarseness a man hath, the more hath he of reason and understanding. The less our minds be tied to these bodily things, the more lively and cheerful be they. At a word, the full and perfect life thereof, is the full and utter withdrawing thereof from the body and whatsoever the body is made of. All these things are so clear as they need no proof. Now, we know that everything worketh according to the proper being thereof and that the same which perfecteth the operations of a thing, perfecteth the being thereof also. It followeth therefore, that sith the separation of the body from the Soul, and of the form from the matter, perfecteth the operation or working of the soul (as I have said afore) it doth

also make perfect and strengthen the very being thereof, and therefore cannot in any wise corrupt it. And what else is dying but to be corrupted? And what else is corrupting but suffering: And what else is suffering, but receiving: And how can that which receiveth all things without suffering, receive corruption by anything? Fire corrupteth or marreth our bodies, and we suffer in receiving it. So doth also extreme cold: but if we suffered nothing by it, it could not freeze us. Our senses likewise are marred by the excessive force of the things which they light upon. And that is because they receive and perceive the thing that grieveth them, and for that the manner of their behaving of themselves towards their objects, is subject to suffering. But as for the reasonable Soul; which receiveth all things after one manner, that is to wit, by way of understanding, where through it always worketh and is never wrought into, how is it possible for it to corrupt or mar itself?

For what is the thing whereat our Soul suffereth ought in the substance thereof, I mean whereby the substance of our Soul is any whit impaired or hurt by minding or conceiving the same in understanding: As little doth the fire hurt it as the air, and the air as the fire. As little hurt receiveth it by the frozen ice of Norway, as by the scorching sands of Africa. As little also doth vice annoy it as virtue. For vice and virtue are so far off from encumbering the substance of the soul, that our mind doth never conceive or understand them better, than by setting them together one against another. That thing therefore which doth no whit impair itself, but taketh the ground of perfecting itself by all things, cannot be marred or hurt by anything.

Again, what is death: The uttermost point of moving, and the uttermost bound of this life. For even in living we die, and in dying we live, and there is not that step which we set down in this life, which doth not continually

step forward unto death, after the manner of a Dial or a Clock, which mounting up by certain degrees forgoeth his moving in moving from Minute to Minute. Take away moving from a body, and it doth no more live. Now let us see if the soul also be carried with the same moving. If it be carried with the same moving, then doth it undoubtedly move therewithal. Nay contrariwise, whether the mind rest, or whether it be busied about the proper operations thereof, it is not perceived either by any panting of heart, or by any beating of pulses, or by any breathing of Lungs. It is then as a Ship that carrieth us away with it, whether we walk or sit still; the sticking fast whereof or the tying thereof to a post, hindereth not our going up and down in it still. Again, if the soul be subject to the same corruption of the body, then is it subject to the alterations thereof also; and if it be subject to the alterations, it is subject to time also. For alterations or changes, are spices, or rather consequences of moving, and movings are not made but in time. Now man in respect of the body hath certain full points or stops, at the which he receiveth manifest changes, and thereafter groweth or decayeth. But commonly where the decay of the body beginneth, there beginneth the chief strength of the mind. Howbeit that in some men, not only their chins are covered with down, but also their beards become gray, whose minds for want of exercise, show no sign at all either of ripeness or growing. Moreover, time (as in respect of the body) cannot be called again, but in respect of the mind it is always present. Yea and time perfecteth, accomplisheth, and increaseth our mind, and after a sort reneweth and refresheth it from day to day, whereas contrariwise it forweareth, washeth away and quite consumeth, both itself, and the body with the life thereof. It followeth then that the reasonable Soul is not subject to time, nor consequently to any of the changes and corruption that accompany time.

Nay we may say thus much more; That nothing in the whole world is nourished with things better than itself; neither doth any of them contain greater things than itself; But the things that are corruptible do live of corruptible things, and cannot live without corrupting them: as for example, beasts live by herbs, men by beasts, and so forth. And therefore things which live by incorruptible things, and can so receive and digest them, as to turn them into the nourishment of their nature, and yet not corrupt them; are incorruptible themselves too. Now the Soul of man, I mean the reasonable soul or mind, conceiveth reason and truth, and is fed and strengthened with them. And reason and truth are things unchangeable, not subject to time, place or alteration, but steady, unchangeable, and everlasting. For that twice two be four, and that there is the same reason in the proportion of eight unto six that is of four unto three, or that in a Triangle, the three inner angles are equal with the two right angles; and such like; are truths, which neither years, nor thousands of years can change; as true at this day, as they were when Euclid first spake them. And so forth of other things. It followeth then that the Soul comprehending reason and truth, which are things free from corruption, cannot in any wise be subject to corruption.

Again, Who is he of all men that desireth not to be immortal? And how could any man desire it, if he understood not what it is? Or how could he be able to understand it, unless it were possible for him to attain unto it? Surely none of us coveteth to be beginningless, for none of us is so; neither can any of us be so. And as we cannot so be, so also can we not comprehend what it is. For who is he that is not at his wits' end, but only to think upon eternity without beginning? On the contrary part, there is not so base a mind which coveteth not to live forever, insomuch that whereas we look not for it by nature, we seek to obtain it by skill and policy, some by books, some by

Images, and some by other devices; and even the grossest sort can well imagine in themselves what immortality is, and are able both to conceive it, and to believe it. Whence comes this, but that our souls being created cannot conceive an everlastingness without beginning, and yet nevertheless, that forasmuch as they be created immortal, they do well conceive an immortality or everlastingness without end? And whereto serves this universal desire, if it be not natural? or how is it natural if it be in vain? and not only in vain, but also to bring us to hell and to torment? Let us wade yet deeper. Who can dispute, or once so much as doubt whether the soul be immortal or no, but he that is capable of Immortality? And who can understand what difference is betwixt mortal and Immortal, but he that is Immortal? Man is able to discern the difference between that which is reason, and that which is not, and thereupon we term him reasonable. Whosoever would hold opinion that a man is not reasonable, should need none other disproof than his own disputing thereof; for he would go about to prove it by reason. Man can skill to discern the mortal natures from the immortal, and therefore we may well say he is immortal. For he that should dispute to the contrary, shall be driven to bring such reasons, as shall of themselves make him to prove himself immortal. Thou sayest the soul cannot be immortal: and why? Because (sayst thou) that to be so, it would behoove it to work severally by itself from the body. When thou thinkest that in thy mind, consider what thy body doth at the same time. Nay, yet further, who hath taught thee so much of the immortal nature, if thou thyself be not immortal? Or what worldly wight can say what the inworking of a reasonable wight is, but the wight which in itself hath the use of reason.

Yet sayest thou still, if the soul be immortal, it is free from such and such passions. How enterest thou so far into the Nature that is so far above thee,

if thou thyself beest mortal? All the reasons which thou allegest against the immortality of the soul do fight directly to the proof of it. For if thy reason mounted no higher than to the things that are mortal, thou shouldest know neither mortal nor immortal. Now it is not some one covetous man above all other, that desireth immortality, nor some one man excelling all others in wisdom, that comprehendeth it, but all mankind without exception. It is not then some one several skill or some one natural property, that maketh such difference between man and man as we see to be between many, but rather one selfsame nature common to all men, whereby they be all made to differ from other living wights, which by no deed do show any desire to overlive themselves, nor know how to live, and therefore their lives do vanish away with their blood, and is extinguished with their bodies. If ever thou hast looked to die, consider what discourse thou madest then in thy mind, thou never couldest persuade thy conscience, nor make thy reason to conceive, that the soul should die with the body; but even in the selfsame time when it disputeth against itself, it shifteth itself I wot not how from all thy conclusions, and faileth to consider in what state it shall be, and where it shall become when it is out of the body. The Epicure that hath disputed of it all his life long, when he cometh to death, bequeatheth a yearly pension for the keeping of a yearly feast on the day of his birth. I pray you to what purpose serve feastings for the birth of a Swine, seeing he esteemeth himself to be no better than so? Nay, what else is this, then a crying out of his nature against him, which with one word confuteth all his vain arguments? Another laboreth by all means possible, to blot out in himself the opinion of immortality; and because he hath lived wickedly in this world, he will needs bear himself on hand, that there is no Justice in the world to come. But then is the time that his own nature waketh and starteth

up, as it were out of the bottom of a water, and at that instant painteth again before his eyes, the selfsame thing which he took so much pains to deface. And in good sooth, what a number have we seen, which having been despisers of all Religion, have at the hour of death been glad to vow their souls to any Saint for relief; so clear was then the presence of the life to come before their eyes. I had lever (said Zeno) to see an Indian burn himself cheerfully, then to hear all the Philosophers of the World discoursing of the immortality of the soul; and in very deed it is a much stronger and better concluded argument. Nay then, let us rather say, I had lever see an Atheist or an Epicure witness the immortality of the soul, and willingly taking an honorable farewell of nature upon a scaffold, than to hear all the Doctors of the world discoursing of it in their pulpits. For whatsoever the Epicures say there, they speak it advisedly and (as ye would say) fresh and fasting; whereas all that ever they have spoken all their life afore, is to be accounted but as the words of Drunkards, that is to wit, of men besotted and fallen asleep in the delights and pleasures of this world, where the wine and the excess of meat, and the vapors that fumed up of them did speak, and not the men themselves. What shall I say more? I have told you already, that in the inward man there are (as ye would say) three men, the living, the sensitive, and the reasonable. Let us say therefore that in the same person there are three lives continued from one to another: namely, the life of the Plant, the life of the Beast, and the life of the Man or of the Soul. So long as a man is in his mother's womb, he doth not only live and grow; his spirit seemeth to sleep, and his senses seem to be in a slumber, so as he seemeth to be nothing else than a plant. Nevertheless, if ye consider his eyes, his ears, his tongue, his senses, and his movings, you will easily judge that he is not made to be forever in that prison, where he

neither seeth nor heareth, nor hath any room to walk in, but rather that he is made to come forth into an opener place, where he may have what to see and behold, and wherewith to occupy all the powers which we see to be in him. As soon as he is come out, he beginneth to see, to feel, and to move, and by little and little falleth to the perfect using of his limbs, and findeth in this world a peculiar object for every of them, as visible things for the eye, sounds for his hearing bodily things for his feeling and so forth. But besides all this, we find there a mind; which by the eyes as by windows beholdeth the world, and yet in all the world finding not any one thing worthy to rest wholly upon, mounteth up to him that made it; which mind like an Empress lodgeth in the whole world, and not alonely in this body; which by the senses (and oftentimes also without the senses) mounteth above the senses, and straineth itself to go out of itself, as a child doth to get out of his mother's womb. And therefore we ought surely to say, that this Mind or Reason ought not to be ever in prison. That one day it shall see clearly, and not by these dim and cloudy spectacles: That it shall come in place where it shall have the true object of understanding: and that he shall have his life free from these fetters and from all the affections of the body. To be short, that as man is prepared in his mother's womb to be brought forth into the world; so is he also after a sort prepared in this body and in this world, to live in another world. We then understand it, when by nature it behoveth us to depart out of the world. And what child is there which (if nature did not by her cunning drive him out,) would of himself come out of his Covert, or that cometh not out as good as forlorn and half dead; or that if he had at that time knowledge and speech, would not call that death, which we call birth; and that a departure out of life, which we call the entrance into it? As long as we be there, we see nothing though our eyes be open. Many also do not

so much as stir, except it be at some sudden scaring or some other like chance; and as for those that stir, they know not that they have either sense or moving. Why then should we think it strange, that in this life our understanding seeth so little, that many men do never mind the immortal nature, until they be at the last cast, yea, and some think not themselves to have any such thing, howbeit that even by so thinking they show themselves to have part thereof? And imagine we that the unborn babe hath not as much ado by nature to leave the poor skin that he is wrapped in, as we have hindrance in our senses and in our imprisoned reason, when we be at the point to leave the goods and pleasures of this world, and the very flesh itself which holdeth us as in a grave? Or had the babe some little knowledge; would he not say that no life were comparable to the life where he then is, as we say there is no life to the life of this world wherein we be? Or would he not account the stage of our senses for a fable, as a great sort of us account the stage that is prepared for our Souls? Yes surely: and therefore let us conclude where we began, namely that man is both inward and outward. In the outward man, which is the body, he resembleth the being and the proportion of all the parts of the world. And in the inner man he resembleth whatsoever kind of life is in all things, or in anything that beareth life in the world. In this mother's womb he liveth the life of a plant, albeit with this further, that he hath a certain commencement of sense and moving which exceed the Plant, and do put him in a readiness to be endowed with Senses as a Beast is. In this life he hath Sense and moving in their perfection, which is the property of a sensitive wight; but yet besides these, he hath also a beginning to reason and understand, which are a beginning of another life, such as the sensitive wight hath not, and this life is to be perfected in another place. In the life to come he hath his actions

free and full perfected, a large ground to work upon, able to suffice him to the full, and a light to his understanding in stead of a light to the eye. And like as in coming into the world, he came as it were out of another world; so in going yet into another world, he must also go out of this world. He cometh out of the first world into the second, as it were failing in nourishment, but growing in strength unto moving and sense: and he goeth out of the second into the third, failing in senses and moving, but growing in reason and understanding. Now seeing we call the passage out of the first world into the second a birth, what reason is it that we should call the passage out of the second into the third a death? To be short, he that considereth how all the actions of man's mind tend to the time to come, without possibility of staying upon the present time, how pleasant and delightful soever it be: we may well discern by them all, that his being (which in everything (as saith Aristotle) followeth the working thereof) is also wholly bent towards the time to come; as who would say this present life were unto it but as a narrow grindle, on the further side whereof (as it were on the bank of some stream or running water,) he were to find his true dwelling place and very home in deed.

But now is it time to see what is said to the contrary: wherein we have to consider oftentimes that which we spoke of afore; namely, that if all that ever is in us were transitory and mortal, we should not be so witty to examine the Immortality as we be: for of contraries, the skill is all one. If a man were not mortal, that is to say, if he had no life, he could not dispute of the mortal life; neither could he speak of the immortal, if he himself also were not immortal. Therefore let us go back retrieve. Some man will say, that the soul dieth with the body, because the soul and the body are but one thing, and he believeth that they be both but one, because he seeth no more

but the body. This argument is all one with theirs, which denied that there is any God, because they saw him not. But yet by his doings thou mayest perceive that there is a God: discern likewise by the doings of thy soul, that thou hast a soul. For in a dead body thou seest the same parts remain, but thou seest not the same doings that were in it afore. When a man is dead, his eye seeth nothing at all, and yet is there nothing changed of his eye: but while he is alive he seeth infinite things that are diverse. The power then which seeth is not of the body. Yet notwithstanding, how lively and quick-sighted soever the eye be; it seeth not itself. Wonder not therefore though thou have a soul, and that the same soul see not itself. For if thine eyesight saw itself, it were not a power or ability of seeing, but a visible thing: likewise, if thy soul saw itself, it were no more a Soul, that is to say, the worker and quickener of the body, but a very body, unable to do anything of itself, and a massive substance subject to suffering. For we see nothing but the body and bodily substances. But in this thou perceivest somewhat else than a body (as I have said afore) that if thine eye had any peculiar color of its own, it could not discern any other color than that. Seeing then that thou conceivest so many diverse bodies at once in imagination: needs must thou have a power in thee which is not a body. Be it (say they) that we have a power of sense; yet have we not a power of reason; for that which we call the power of reason or understanding, is nothing but an excellence or rather a consequence of sense, insomuch that when sense dieth, the residue dieth therewith also. Soothly in this which thou hast said, thou hast surmounted sense; which thing thou hadst not done, if thou hadst nothing in thee beyond sense. For whereas thou sayest, if the sense die, the rest dieth also; it is a reason that proceedeth from one term to another, and it is a gathering of reasons which conclude one thing by another. Now the senses do indeed

perceive their objects, but yet how lively so ever they be, they reason not. We see a Smoke; so far extendeth the sense. But if we infer, therefore there must needs be fire, and thereupon seek who was the kindler thereof: that surmounteth the ability of sense. We hear a piece of Music; that may any beast do as well as we. But his hearing of it is but as of a bare sound; whereas our hearing thereof is as of a harmony, and we discern the cause of the concords and discords, which either delight or offend our sense. The thing that heareth the sound is the sense; but the thing that judgeth of that which the sense conceiveth, is another thing than the sense. The like is to be said of Smelling, Tasting, and Feeling. Our smelling of scents, our tasting of savors, and our feeling of substances, is indeed the work of our senses. But as for our judging of the inward virtue of the thing by the outward scent thereof, or of the wholesomeness or unwholesomeness of food by the taste thereof, or of the hotness or vehemency of a Fever by feeling the Pulse; yea, and our proceeding even into the very bowels of a man, whither the eye being the quickest of all senses is not able to attain; surely it is the work of a more mighty power than the Sense is. And in very deed there are Beasts which do hear, see, smell, taste, and feel much better and more quickly than man doth. Yet notwithstanding none of them conferreth the contraries of colors, sounds, scents, and savors, none sorteth them out to the serving one of another, or to the serving of themselves. Whereby it appeareth, that man excelleth the beasts by another power than the senses, and that whereas a man is a Painter, a Musician, or a Physician, he hath it from elsewhere than from his senses. Nay, I say farther, that oftentimes we conclude clean contrary to the report of our senses. One eye perchance telleth us that a Tower which we see afar off is round, whereas our reason deemeth it to be square: or that a thing is small, which our reason telleth us is great: or that

the ends of lines in a long walk do meet in a point, whereas our reason certifieth us that they run right forth with equal distance one from another. For want of this discretion, certain Elephants (saith Vitellio) which were passing over a long bridge, turned back being deceived; and yet they wanted not sight no more than we do. But they that lead them were not deceived. Their leaders then besides their eyesight, had in them another virtue or power which corrected their sight, and therefore ought to be of higher estimation. In like case is it with the rest of the other senses. For our hearing telleth us, that the thunder-clap is after the lightning; but skill assureth us that they be both together, for there is a certain power in us, which can skill to discern what proportion is between hearing and seeing. Also the tongue of him that hath an ague, beareth him on hand that even sugar is bitter, which thing he knoweth by his reason to be untrue. To be short, those which have their senses most quick and lively, be not of the greatest wisdom and understanding. A man therefore differeth from a beast, and excelleth man by some other power than sense. For whereas it is commonly said, that such as have seen most are commonly of greatest skill, we see that many have traveled far both by Sea and land, which have come home as wise as they went forth. A horse hath as good eyes as he that rides upon him, and yet for all his traveling, neither he, nor perchance his rider whom he beareth become any whit the wiser by that which they have seen: whereby it appeareth that it is not enough to see things unless a man do also mind them to his benefit.

Now there is great difference between the liveliness of the Sense, and the power that governeth the Sense; like as the report of a Spy is one thing, and the Spy himself is another, and the wisdom of the Captain that receiveth the report of the Spy is a third. Nay, who can deny, that sense and reason are

diverse things; or rather: who will not grant, that in many things they be clean contrary? Sense biddeth us shun and eschew grief; whereas reason willeth us to proffer our leg sometime to the Surgeon to be cut off. Sense plucketh our hand out of the fire, and yet we ourselves put fire to our bare skin. He that should see a Scaevola burn off his own hand, without so much as once gnashing his teeth at it, would think he were utterly senseless: so mightily doth reason over-rule sense. To be short, Sense hath his peculiar inclination, which is appetite, and reason likewise hath his, which is will. And like as reason doth often times over rule sense, and is contrary to it, so will correcteth the sensual appetite or lust that is in us, and warreth against it. For in an Ague we covet to drink, and in an Apoplexy we covet to sleep, and in hunger we covet to eat, and yet from all those things doth our will restrain us. The more a man followeth his lust, the less is he led by will: and the more he standeth upon the pleasing of his senses, the less reason useth he ordinarily.

Again, let us consider the brute beasts which have the sensitive part as well as we. If we have no more than that, how cometh it to pass that a little child driveth whole flocks and herds of them whither he listeth, and sometimes whither they would not? Whereof cometh it that every of them in their kind, do all live, nestle, and sing after one sort, whereas men have their Laws, Commonwealths, manners of building, and forms of reasoning, not only diverse, but also commonly contrary? Now what can harbor these contrarieties together, but only that which hath not anything contrary unto it, and wherein all contrary things, do lay away their contrariety? Surely it is not the sense that can do it, whose proper or peculiar object is most contrary to the sense. Besides this (as I have said afore) whereas we conceive wisdom, skill, virtue, and such other things which are all bodiless, our

senses have none other thing to work upon, than the qualities of bodily substances. And whereas we make universal rules of particular things, the senses attain no farther than to the particular things themselves. And whereas we conclude of the causes by their effects, our senses perceive no more but the bare effects: And whereas concerning the things that belong to understanding, the more understandable they be, the more they refresh us; contrariwise, the stronger that the sensible things are, the more do they offend the sense: To be short, the selfsame thing which we speak in behalf of the senses, proceedeth from elsewhere than from the Senses. And we will easily discern, that he which denieth that besides the common sense, there is in man a reason or understanding, distinct and severed from the sense, is void both of understanding and of sense.

But see here a gross reason of theirs. This reason or power of understanding (say they) which is in man, is corruptible as well as the power of perceiving by the Senses. I think I have proved the contrary already, nevertheless, let us examine their reasons yet further. The form or shape of every thing (say they) doth perish with the matter. Now the soul is as you would say the form or shape of the body therefore it corrupteth with the body. This argument were rightly concluded, if it were meant of the material form. But I have proved that the soul is immaterial, and hath a continuance of itself. And indeed the more it is discharged of matter, the more it retaineth its own peculiar form. Therefore the corruption of the matter toucheth not the soul at all. Again, if men's souls live (say they) after their bodies, then are they infinite, for the world is without beginning and without ending, and (as we know) nature can away with no infinite thing: therefore they live not after their bodies. Yes, say I, for I have proved that the world hath a beginning, and that with so substantial reasons, as thou art

not able to disprove. Therefore it followeth that the inconvenience which thou allegest can have no place. Another saith, If dead men's souls live still, why come they not to tell us so? And he thinketh he hath stumbled upon a wonderful subtle device. But how doth this follow in reason? There hath not come any man unto us from the Indies a long time: ergo there be no Indies. May not the same argument serve as well to prove that we ourselves are not, because we never went thither? Again, what intercourse is there between things that have bodies, and things that have no bodies, or between heaven and earth, considering that there is so small intercourse even between men which live under one selfsame Sun? He that is made a Magistrate in his own Country, doth not willingly return to the place of his banishment. Likewise the Soul that is lodged in the lap of his God, and come home into his native soil, forgoeth the desire of these lower things, which to his sight beholding them from above, and less than the point of a needle. On the other side, he that is put in close prison, (how desirous soever he be) cannot go out; so that soul which is in the Jail of his sovereign Lord God, hath no respite or sporting time to come tell us what is done there. Unto the one, the beholding of the everlasting God is as a Paradise wherein he is willing to remain; and unto the other his own condemnation is an imprisonment of his will. But we would have God to send both the one and the other unto us to make us to believe. As who would say, it stood him greatly on hand to have us to believe, and not rather us that we should believe. And in effect what else is all this, but a desiring that some man might return into his mother's womb again, to encourage young babes against the pinches and pains which they abide in their birth, whereof they would be as shy as we be of death, if they had the like knowledge of them? But let us let such vanities pass, and come to the ground.

Ye bear us on hand (say they) that the soul of man is but one, though it have diverse powers. Whereof we see the sensitive, and the growing powers to be corrupted and to perish: therefore it should seem that the understanding or reasonable power also should do the like. At a word, this is all one as if a man should say, you tell me that this man, is both a good man, a good Sword-player, and a good lute player altogether, and that because his sword falls out of his hand, or his hand itself becometh lame, therefore he cannot be a good or honest man still as you reported him to be. Nay though he lose those instruments, yet ceaseth he not therefore to be an honest man, yea, and both a Sword-player, and a Lute-player too, as in respect of skill. Likewise when our souls have forgone these exercises, yet cease they not to be the same they were afore. To enlighten this point yet more; of the powers of our Soul, some are exercised by the instruments of the body, and othersome without any help or furtherance of the body at all. Those which are exercised by the body, are the senses and the powers of the senses, and the powers of the growing, which may carry the same likeness that is between a Luter and a Lute. Break the Luter's Lute, and his cunning remaineth still, but his putting of it in practice faileth. Give him another Lute and he falls to playing new again. Put out a man's eye, and yet the ability of seeing abideth still with him, though the very act of seeing be disappointed. But give unto the oldest Hag that is, the same eyes that he had when he was young, and he shall see as well as ever he did. After the same manner is it with the growing or thriving power. Restore unto it a good stomach, a sound liver, and a perfect heart; and it shall execute its functions as well as ever it did afore. The power that worketh of itself and without the body, is the power of reason or understanding, which if we will we may call the mind. And if thou yet still doubt thereof, consider when thou mindest a

thing earnestly what thy body furthereth thy mind therein, and thou shalt perceive that the more fixedly thou thinkest upon it, the less thou seest the things before thee, and the more thy mind wandereth the more thy body resteth: as who would say that the workings of the body, are the greatest hindrance and impediment that can be to the peculiar doings of the mind. And this ability of understanding may be likened to a man, which though he have lost both his hand and his lute; ceaseth not therefore to be a man still, and to do the true deeds of a man, that is to wit, to discourse of things, to mind them, to use reason and such like; yea, and to be both a Luter and a man as he was afore, notwithstanding that he cannot put his Lute-playing in exercise for want of instruments. Nay, (which more is) this understanding part groweth so much the stronger and greater, as it is less occupied and busied about these base and corruptible things, and is altogether drawn home wholly to itself, as is to be seen in those which want their eyes, whose minds are commonly most apt to understand, and most firm to remember. Do we debate of a thing in ourselves? Neither our body nor our senses are busied about it. Do we will the same? As little do they stir for that too. To understand and to will (which are the operations of the mind) the soul hath no need of the body, and as for working and being, they accompany one another saith Aristotle. Therefore to continue still in being, the soul hath not to do with the body, nor any need of the body: but rather to work well and to be well, the soul ought either to be without the body, or at leastwise to be utterly unsubject to the body.

Yea (say they) but yet we see men forgo their reason, as fools and melancholy persons: and seeing it is forgone, it may also be corrupted, and if corrupted, it may also die; for what is death but an utter and full corruptness? Nay, thou shouldest say rather; I have seen diverse, which

having seemed to have lost their right wits, have recovered them again by good diet and medicinal drinks. But had they been utterly lost and forgone, no physic could have restored them again: and had they been utterly perished, the parties themselves should have had neither sense nor life remaining. Therefore of necessity the soul of them was as sound as afore. But our souls we see not otherwise than by the body and by the instruments of the body as it were by Spectacles, and our mind which beholdeth and seeth through its imaginations as it were through a cloud, is after a sort troubled by the dimming of the spectacles, and by the smokiness of the imaginations. After that manner the Sun seemeth to be dimmed and eclipsed; and that is but by the coming of the moon or of some clouds between him and us, for in his light there is no abatement at all. Likewise our eyesight conceiveth things according to the spectacles wherethrough it looketh or according to the color that over thwarteth the things which it looketh upon. Take away the impediments, and our eyes shall see clear, purge away the humors, and our imagination shall be pure: and so our understanding shall see as bright as it did afore, even as the Sun shineth after the putting away of the Clouds. And it fareth not with our Souls as it doth with our bodies, which after a long sickness retain still either a hardness of the Spleen, or a shortness of breath, or a falling of the Rheum upon the Lungs, or a scar of some great wound that cannot be worn out because of the break that was made in the whole. For neither in their understanding, neither in their wills do our Souls feel any abatement, saving that there abideth some maim or blemish in the instruments; to wit (as I will declare hereafter) so far forth as it pleaseth GOD for a just punishment, to put the Soul in subjection to the body whose sovereign it was created to have been, because it hath neglected the will of the Creator, to follow the

lusts and likings of the body. This appeareth in Lunatic folks and such others, which have their wits troubled at times and by fits. For they be not vexed but at the stirring of their humors, being at other times sober and well enough stayed in their wits. The like is seen in them that have the falling sickness. For their understanding seemeth to be eclipsed, and as it were stricken with a Thunderclap, during the time of their fits; but afterward they be as discreet as though they ailed nothing. To be short, the body is subject to a thousand diseases, wherewith we see the understanding to be no whit altered, because they touch not the instruments of the Sense and of the Imaginations, which move the understanding. Troubled it is indeed by those few things only, which infect the Sense and the Imagination, which by that means report the things unfaithfully whereon the mind debateth. Therefore ye shall never see any body out of his wits or out of his right mind, in whom the Physicians may not manifestly perceive, either some default of the instruments, as a misshapen and misproportioned head; or else an overabounding of some melancholic humor, that troubled and marred his body afore it troubled or impaired his mind. And like as the wisest men being deceived by false Spies, do make wrong deliberations, albeit yet grounded upon good reason, which thing they could not do unless they were wise indeed: So the reason that is in our mind maketh false discourses, and gathereth wrong conclusions, upon the false reports of the imagination; which it could not do, if it were either diminished or impaired, or done away. Whereunto accordeth this ancient saying, That there be certain follies which none but wise men can commit, and certain Errors which none but learned men can fall into: because that in some cases, discretion and wisdom are requisite in the party that is to be deceived, even to the intent he may be deceived; and learning is required in a man that he may conceive

and hold a wrong opinion. As for example, to be beguiled by a double-dealing Spy or by the surprising of a cozening letter, belongeth to none but to a wise man. For a gross-headed fool never breaketh his brain about such matters as might bring him to the making of false conclusions by mistaking likelihoods instead of truth. Likewise to fall into Heresy by misconceiving some high and deep point, befalleth not to an ignorant person; for he is not of capacity, neither doth his understanding mount so high. To be short, Whosoever saith that man's Soul perisheth with the body, because it is troubled by the distemperature or misproportionateness of the body; may as well uphold that the Child in the mother's womb dieth with his mother, because he moveth with her, and is partaker with her of her harms and throes, by reason of the strait conjunction that is between them; albeit that many children have lived safe and sound, notwithstanding that their mothers have died; yea and some have come into the World even by the death of their mothers.

And whereas some say, that because our mind conceiveth not anything here, but by help of Imagination; therefore when the Imagination is gone with the instruments whereunto it is tied, the Soul cannot work alone by itself, nor consequently be alone by itself: surely it is alone as if they should say, that because the Child being in his mother's womb taketh nourishment of her blood by his navel; therefore he cannot live when he is come out her womb, if his navel-strings be cut off. Nay contrariwise, then is the time that the mouth, the tongue, and the other parts of the Child do their duty, which served erst to no purpose, saving that they were prepared for the time to come. After the same manner also do we cherish our mind by Imagination in this second life; which in the third life being (as ye would say) escaped out of prison, shall begin to utter its operations by itself, and that so much

the more certainly, for that it shall not be subject to false reports, nor to the senses either inward or outward, but to the very things themselves which it shall have seen and learned. To be short, it shall live, but not in prison; it shall see but not through spectacles; it shall understand, but not by reports; it shall list, but not by way of lusting: the infirmity which the body casteth upon it as now shall then be away: the force which it bringeth now to the body, shall then be more fresh and lively than afore. Now then notwithstanding these vain reasons of theirs, let us conclude, That our soul is an understanding or reasonable power; over the which neither death nor corruption have naturally any power, although it be fitted to the body to govern it. And if any man doubt hereof, let him but examine himself, for even his own doubts will prove it unto him. Or if he will stand in contention still, let him fall to reasoning with himself: for by concluding his arguments to prove his soul mortal, he shall give judgment himself that it is immortal. And if I have left anything unalleged which might make to this purpose, (for why may I not, seeing that even the selfsame things which I have been able to allege on the behalf of mine adversaries, do drive them thereunto?) let us think also that he which feeleth himself convicted in himself, and for whose behoof and benefit it were greatly, both to believe it and to confess it, needeth no more diligent proof than hath been made already. But if any man will yet of spite stand willfully still against himself, let him try how he can make answer to my foresaid arguments: and in the meanwhile let us see what the said opinion of the wisest men, yea, and of the whole world hath been upon this matter.

CHAP. II. That the immortality of the Soul hath been taught by the Philosophers of old time, and believed by all people and Nations.

Soothly it had been a very hard case, if this mind of ours which searcheth so many things in nature, had not taken some leisure to search itself and the nature thereof, and by searching attained to some point in that behalf. And therefore as there have at all times been men, so shall we see also that men have at all times believed and admitted the immortality of the soul, I say not some one man, or some one Nation, but the whole world with general consent, because all men universally and particularly have learned it in one school, and at the mouth of one Teacher, namely even their own knowledge in themselves. The holy Scripture which teacheth us our salvation, useth no school arguments to make us believe that there is a God: and that is because we cannot step out of ourselves never so little, but we must needs find him present to all our senses. And it seemeth to speak unto us the less expressly of the immortality of our souls, especially in the first books thereof, because we cannot enter into ourselves be it never so little, but we must needs perceive it. But inasmuch as from the one end thereof to the other, it declareth unto us the will of God: in so doing, it doth us to

understand, that it is a thing, whereof it is not lawful for us to doubt. And whereas it setteth forth so precisely from age to age; the great and manifold troubles and pains which good and godly men have suffered in endeavoring to follow that will, it showeth infallibly that their so doing was in another respect than for this present wretched life. For who is he that would depart with any piece of his own liking in this life, but in hope of better things? And what were it for him to lose his life, if there were not another life after this? This serveth to answer in one word to such as demand express texts of Scripture, and are loath to find that thing in the Bible, which is contained there, not only in every leaf, but almost in every line. For whereas God created man after the world was fully finished and perfected: it was as much as if he had brought him into a Theater prepared for him, howbeit after another sort than all the other living things which were to do him service. As for beasts, birds, plants, and such other things, the elements brought them forth, but man received his soul by inspiration from God. Also the brute beasts are put in subjection to man, but man is in subjection only unto God. And the conveying of that good man Enoch out of this life for his godliness, was to none other end, but to set him in another life void of all evil, and full of all good. But when we read the persecutions of Noah; the overthwartings of Abraham, the banishment and wayfarings of Jacob, and the distresses of Joseph, Moses, and all the residue of the Fathers; they be all of them demonstrations, that they did certainly trust and believe that the soul is immortal, that there is another life after this, and that there is a judgment to come. For had they been of opinion that there is none other life after this; the flesh would have persuaded them to have held themselves in quiet here, and they would have liked nothing better than to have followed sweetly the common trade of the world, Noah among his friends, Abraham

among the Chaldees, Moses in Pharaoh's Court, and so forth. So then, although the Scripture seem to conceal it; yet doth it speak very loud thereof indeed, considering that all the cries of the good and godly, and all the despairs of the wicked which it describeth unto us, do sound none other things unto us, if we have ears to hear it. And it may be, that in the same respect, this article of the Immortality of the Soul was not put into the ancient Creed of the Jews, nor also peculiarly into the Creed of us Christians, because we believe beyond reason, and this is within the bounds of reason; and whosoever treateth of Religion must needs presuppose God eternal and man immortal, without the which two, all Religion were in vain. Also, when we see that Godliness, Justice, and virtue were commended among the Heathen of all ages: it is all one as if we should hear them preach in express words the Immortality of the Soul. For their so doing is builded every whit upon that, as upon a foundation without the which those things could not stand. I will spend my goods or my life for the maintenance of Justice. What is this Justice but a vain name, or to what end have I so many respects, if I look for nothing out of this present world here: I will (said a man of old time) rather lose even the reputation of an honest man, than behave myself otherwise than honestly. But why should I do so, if I look for no good in another world, seeing I have nothing but evil here: Surely if there be none other thing than this life, then is virtue to be used no further, than profit and commodity may grow upon it; and so should it become a Chaffer and Merchandise, and not virtue indeed. Yet notwithstanding, those are the ordinary speeches, even of such as speak doubtfully of the Immortality of the Soul. Therefore they do but deny the ground and yet grant the consequence; which is all one as if a man having first been burned

should fall to disputing whether fire be hot or no. But now (which is better for us) I will here gather together their own speeches one after another.

Hermes declareth in his Poemander, how at the voice of the everlasting, the Elements yielded forth all reasonless living wights as it had been out of their bosoms. But when he cometh to man, he saith, He made him like unto himself, he linked himself to him as to his Son, (for he was beautiful and made after his own Image) and gave him all his works to use at his pleasure. Again, he exhorteth him to forsake his body, (notwithstanding that he wonder greatly at the cunning workmanship thereof) as the very cause of his death, and to manure his soul which is capable of immortality, and to consider the original root from whence it sprang, which is not earthly but heavenly, and to withdraw himself even from his senses, and from their traitorous allurements to gather himself wholly into that mind of his which he hath from God, and by the which, he following God's word, may become as God. Discharge thyself (saith he) of this body which thou bearest about thee, for it is but a cloak of ignorance, a foundation of infection, a place of corruption, a living death, a sensible carrion, a portable grave, and a household thief. It flattereth thee because it hateth thee, and it hateth thee because it envieth thee. As long as that liveth it bereaveth thee of life, and thou hast not a greater enemy than that. Now, to what purpose were it for him to forsake this light, this dwelling place, and this life, if he were not sure of a better in another world (as he himself saith more largely afterward.) On the other side, what is the soul?) The soul (saith he) is the garment of the mind, and the garment of the soul is a certain spirit, whereby it is united to the body. And this mind is the thing which we call properly the man, that is to say, a heavenly wight which is not to be compared with beasts, but rather with the Gods of heaven, if he be not yet more than they.

The heavenly cannot come down to the earth without leaving the heaven, but man measureth the heaven without removing from the earth. The earthly man then is as a mortal God, and the heavenly God is as an immortal man. To be short, his conclusion is, That man is double, mortal as touching his body, and immortal as touching his soul, which soul, is the substantial man, and the very man created immediately of God (saith he) as the light is bred immediately of the Sun. And Chalcidius saith, that at his death he spake these words. I go home again into mine own country, where my better forefathers and kinsfolk be.

Of Zoroaster who is yet of more antiquity than Hermes, we have nothing but fragments. Nevertheless, many report this argument to be one of his, That men's souls are immortal, and that one day there shall be a general rising again of their bodies; and the answers of the wise men of Chaldea (who are the heirs of his Doctrine) do answer sufficiently for him. There is one that exhorteth men to return with speed to their heavenly father, who hath sent them from above, a soul endowed with much understanding, and another that exhorteth them to seek paradise, as the peculiar dwelling place of the soul. A third saith that the soul of man hath God as it were shut up in it, and that it hath not any mortality therein. For (saith he) the soul is as it were drunken with God, and showeth forth his wonders in the harmony of this mortal body. And again, another saith, It is a clear fire proceeding from the power of the heavenly father, an incorruptible substance, and the maintainer of life, containing almost all the whole world with the full plenty thereof in his bosom. But one of them proceedeth yet further, affirming that he which setteth his mind upon godliness, shall save his body, frail though it be. And by those words he acknowledgeth the very glorifying of the body.

Now, all these sayings are reported by the Platonists, and namely by Psellus; and they refuse not to be known that Pythagoras and Plato learned them of the Chaldeans; insomuch that some think, that the foresaid Hermes and Zoroaster, and the residue afore-mentioned, are the same of whom Plato speaketh in his second Epistle, and in his eleventh Book of Laws, when he saith that the ancient and holy Oracles are to be believed, which affirm men's Souls to be Immortal, and that in another life they must come before a Judge that will require an account of all their doings: The effect whereof cometh to this, That the Soul of man proceedeth immediately from God, that is to say, that the father of the body is one, and the Father of the Soul is another: That the Soul is not a bodily substance, but a Spirit and a Light: That at the departure thereof from hence, it is to go into a Paradise, and therefore ought to make haste unto death: And that it is so far from mortality, that it maketh even the body Immortal. What can we say more at this day, even in the time of light wherein we be? Pherecydes the Syrian, the first that was known among the Greeks to have written prose, taught the same. And that which Virgil saith in his second Eclogue concerning the Drug or Spice of Assyria, and the growing thereof everywhere is interpreted of some men to be meant of the Immortality of the Soul, the doctrine whereof Pherecydes brought from thence into Greece; namely, that it should be understood everywhere throughout the whole world. Also Phocylides who was at the same time, speaketh thereof in these words,

The Soul of man immortal is, and never wears away

With any age or length of time, but liveth fresh for aye.

And again:

The Remnants which remain of men unburied in the grave,

Become as Gods, and in the Heavens a life most blessed have.

*For though their bodies turn to dust, as daily we do see,
Their Souls live still for evermore from all corruption free.*

And in another place he says again:

*We hope that we shall come again
Out of the earth to light more plain.*

And if ye ask him the cause of all this: he will answer you in another verse thus:

Because the Soul, God's Instrument and Image also is.

Which saying he seemeth to have taken out of this verse of Sibylle:

*In very reason Man should be
The Image and the shape of me.*

Of the same opinion also are Orpheus, Theognis, Homer, Hesiod, Pindar, and all the Poets of old time; which may answer both for themselves and their own Countries, and for the residue of their ages. Likewise, Pythagoras, a disciple of Pherecydes, held the opinion that the Soul is a bodiless and immortal substance, put into this body as into a Prison for sinning. And whereas the fleeting of souls out of one body into another is fathered upon him; although the opinion is not directly against the immortality of the soul, yet do many men think that he hath wrong done unto him. And his disciple Timaeus of Locres reporteth otherwise of him. For what punishment were it to a voluptuous man, to have his Soul put into a beast, that he might become the more voluptuous without remorse of sin? Soothly, it is all one as if, in punishment of murder or theft, ye would make the murderer to cut the throats of his own father and mother, or the thief to commit treachery against God. Howsoever the case stand, he teacheth in his verses that man is of heavenly race, and that (as Jamblichus reporteth) he is set in this world to behold God. And his disciple Archytas saith, that God breatheth reason and

understanding into him. Likewise, Philolaus affirmeth that the Divines and Prophets of old time bear record, that the soul was coupled with the body for her sins, and buried in the same as in a grave. Of Epicharmus we have this saying: If thou be a good man in thy heart, death can do thee no harm, for thy soul shall live happily in heaven, &c. Also, of Heraclides we have this saying: We live the death of them (that is to say, of the blessed). His meaning is that we be not buried with our bodies, and we die their life, that is to say, we be still after this body of ours is dead. Of the like opinion are Thales, Anaxagoras, and Diogenes concerning this point; yea, and so is Zeno too, howbeit that he thought the soul to be begotten of man, wherein he was contrary to himself. To be short, scarcely were there any to be found among the men of old time, save only Democritus and Epicurus, that held the contrary way; whom the Poet Lucretius imitated afterward in his Verses. Yet notwithstanding, when Epicurus should die, he commanded an Anniversary or Year-mind to be kept in remembrance of him by his Disciples: so greatly delighted he in a vain shadow of immortality, having shaken off the very thing itself. And Lucretius (as it is written of him) made his book being mad, at such times as the fits of his madness were off him, surely more mad when he thought himself wisest, than when the fits of his frenzy were strongest upon him. Whosoever readeth the goodly discourses of Socrates upon his drinking of poison, as they be reported by Plato and Xenophon himself; cannot doubt of his opinion in this case. For he not only believed it himself, but also persuaded many men to it with lively reasons, yea, and by his own death much more than by all his life. And so ye see we be come unto Plato and Aristotle, with consent of all the wise men of old time, ungainsaid of any, saving of two or three malapert wretches, whom the ungraciousness of our days would esteem but as drunken sots and

disards. Certes, Plato (who might peradventure have heard speak of the Books of Moses) doth in his Timaeus bring in God giving commandment to the under-gods whom he created, that they should make man both of mortal and of immortal substances. Wherein it may be that he alluded to this saying in Genesis, Let us make man after our own image and likeness. In which case, the Jews say that GOD directed his speech to his Angels; but our Divines say he spake to himself. But anon after, both in the same book, and in many other places, Plato (as it were coming to himself again) teacheth that GOD created Man by himself, yea, and even his Liver and his Brain and all his Senses; that is to say, the Soul of him, not only endued with reason and understanding, but also with sense and ability of growing and increasing; and also the instruments whereby the same do work. Moreover, he maketh such a manifest difference between the Soul and the Body; as that he match them not together as matter and form, as Aristotle doth: but as a Pilot and a Ship, a Commonwealth and a Magistrate, an Image and him that beareth it upon him. What greater thing can there be than to be like God? Now (saith Plato in his Phaedo) The Soul of Man is very like the Godhead; Immortal, Reasonable, Uniform, Indissoluble, and evermore of one sort, which are conditions (saith he, in his matters of State) that cannot agree but to things most divine. And therefore at his departing out of the World, he willed his Soul to return home to her kindred and to her first original, that is to wit, (as he himself saith there) to the wise and Immortal Godhead the Fountain of all goodness, as called home from banishment into her own native Country. He termeth it ordinarily, of kin unto God, and consequently, Everlasting, and of one self-same name with the immortal ones, a Heavenly Plant and not an Earthly, rooted in Heaven not in Earth, begotten from above and not here beneath, and finally such as

cannot die here for as much as it liveth still in another place. To be short, seeing (saith he) that it comprehendeth the things that are Divine and Immortal, that is to wit, the Godhead, and the things that are unchangeable and uncorruptible, as truth is: it cannot be accounted to be of any other nature than they. The same opinion doth Plutarch also attribute unto him, which appeareth almost in every leaf of his Writings. As touching the ancients sort of Platonists, they agree all with one accord in the Immortality of the Soul, saving that some of them derive it from God, and some from the Soul of the World, some make but the Reason or Mind only to be Immortal, and some the whole Soul: which disagreement may well be solved if we say that the Soul all whole together is Immortal in power or ability, though the execution and performance of the actions which are to be done by the body, be forgone with the instruments or members of the body.

The disagreement concerning this point among such as a man may vouchsafe to call by the name of Philosophers, seemeth to have begun at Aristotle, howbeit that his Disciples count it a commendation to him, that he hath given occasion to doubt of his opinion in that behalf. For it is certain that his new-found Doctrine of the eternity or everlastingness of the world, hath disquieted his brain in many other things, as commonly it falleth out, that one error breedeth many other. Because nature (saith he) could not make every man particularly to continue for ever by himself, therefore she continueth him in the kind by matching male and female together. This is spoken either grossly or doubtfully. But whereas he saith that if the mind have any inworking of its own without any help of the Senses or of the body, it may also continue of itself, concluding thereupon, that then it may also be separated from the body, as an immortal thing from a thing that is transitory and mortal: It followeth consequently also, that the

soul may have continuance of itself, as whereof he uttereth these words, namely, That the soul cometh from without, and not of the seed of man, as the body doth, and that the Soul is the only part in us that is Divine. Now, to be Divine and to be Human, to be of seed and to be from without, that is to say, from GOD; are things flat contrary, whereof the one sort is subject to corruption, and the other not. In the tenth book of his Morals, he acknowledgeth two sorts of life in man; the one as in respect that he is composed of body and soul, the other as in respect of mind only, the one occupied in the powers which are called human and bodily, which is also accompanied with a felicity in this life, and the other occupied in the virtues of the mind, which is accompanied also with a felicity in another life, This which consisteth in contemplation, is better than the other; and the felicity thereto belonging, is peculiarly described by him in his books of Heaven above Time, as which consisteth in the frank and free working of the mind, and in beholding the sovereign God. And in good sooth, fulwell doth Michael of Ephesus upon this saying of his conclude, that the soul is immortal; and so must all his morals also needs do, considering that to live well, whether it be to a man's self or towards other men, were else a vain thing and to no purpose, but to vex our minds in this life. In his books of the soul, he not only separateth the body from the soul, but also putteth a difference betwixt the soul itself and the mind, terming the soul the inworking of the body, and of the bodily instruments, and the mind that reasonable substance which is in us, whereof the doings have no fellowship with the doings of the body, and whereof the soul is (as Plato saith) but the garment. This mind (saith he) may be severed from the body, it is not in any wise mingled with it, it is of such substance as cannot be hurt or wrought upon, it hath being and continuance actually and of itself, and even when it

is separated from the body, then is it immortal and everlasting. To be short, it hath not anything like unto the body. For it is not any of all those things which have being afore it understand them. And therefore which of all bodily things can it be? And in another place he saith thus: As concerning the mind, and the contemplative power, it is not yet sufficiently apparent what it is, Nevertheless, it seemeth to be another kind of soul, and it is that only which can be separated from the corruptible, as the which is Everlasting. To be short, when as he putteth this question, whether a Natural Philosopher is to dispute of all manner of Souls, or but only of that Soul which is immortal: it followeth that he granteth that there is such a one. And again, when as he maketh this argument, Look what God is everlastingly, that are we in possibility, according to our measure; but he is everlastingly separated from bodily things, therefore the time will come that we shall be so too. He taketh it that there is an image of God in us, yea even of the Divine nature which hath continuance of itself. Very well and rightly therefore doth Simplicius gather thereof, the immortality of the soul. For it dependeth upon this separation, and upon continuance of being of itself. Besides this he saith also, that hunting of beasts is granted to man by the law of nature, because that thereby man challengeth nothing but that which naturally is his own. But what right I pray you, if there be no more in himself than in them? And what is there more in him than in them; if they have a soul equal unto his? Hereunto make all his commendations of godliness, of Religion, of blessedness, and of contemplation. For to what end serve all these, which do but cumber us here below? Therefore surely it is to be concluded, that as he spake doubtfully in some one place, so he both termed and also taught to speak better in many other places, as appeareth by

his Disciple Theophrastus, who speaketh yet more evidently thereof than he.

The Latins (as I have said before) fell to Philosophy somewhat later than the Greeks. And as touching their common opinion, the exercises of superstition that were among them, the manner of speeches which we mark in their Histories, their contempt of death, and their hope of another life; can give sufficient warrant thereof, Cicero speaketh unto us in these words. The original of our souls and minds, cannot be found in this low earth, for there is not any mixture in them, or any compounding that may seem to be bred or made of the earth. Neither is there any moisture, any windiness, or any fiery matter in them. For no such thing could have in it the power of memory, understanding, and conceit, to bear in mind things past to foresee things to come, and to consider things present, which are matters altogether divine. And his conclusion is, that therefore they be derived from the mind of God, that is to say, not bred or begotten of man, but created of God: not bodily, but unbodily; whereupon it followeth that the soul cannot be corrupted by these transitory things. The same Cicero in another place saith that between God and man there is a kindred of reason, as there is between man and man a kindred of blood. That the fellowship between man and man cometh of the mortal body, but the fellowship between God and man, cometh of God himself, who created the soul in us. By reason whereof (saith he) we may say we have alliance with the heavenly sort, as folk that are descended of the same race and root, whereof that we may ever more be mindful, we must look up to heaven as to the place of our birth, whether we must one day return. And therefore yet once again he concludeth thus of himself. Think not (saith he) that thou thyself art mortal, it is but thy body that is so. For thou art not that which this outward shape pretendeth to be,

the mind of man is the man indeed, and not this lump which may be pointed at with one's finger. Assure thyself therefore that thou art a God; For needs must that be a God, which liveth, perceiveth, remembreth, foreseeeth, and finally reigneth in thy body as the great God the maker of all things doth in the universal world. For as the eternal God ruleth and moveth this transitory world, so doth the immortal spirit of our soul move and rule our frail body. Hereunto consent all the writers of his time, as Ovid, Virgil and others, whose verses are in every man's remembrance.

*There wanted yet the wight that should all other wights exceed
In lofty reach of stately mind, who like a Lord indeed
Should over all the residue reign. Then shortly came forth man,
Whom either he that made the World, and all things else began,
Created out of seed divine, or else the earth yet young
And lately parted from the sky, the seed thereof unclung,
Retained still in fruitful womb: which Japet's son did take
And tempering it with water pure, a wight thereof did make,
Which should resemble even the Gods which sovereign state do hold.
And where all other things the ground with groveling eye behold,
He gave to man a stately look and full of majesty,
Commanding him with steadfast look, to face the starry sky.*

Here a man might bring in almost all Seneca's writings, but I will content myself with a few sayings of his. Our Souls (saith he) are a part of God's Spirit, and sparks of holy things shining upon the earth. They come from another place than this low one. Whereas they seem to be conversant in the body, yet is the better part of them in heaven, always near unto him which sent them hither. And how is it possible that they should be from beneath, or from any where else than from above, seeing they overpass all these lower

things as nothing, and hold scorn of all that ever we can hope or fear? Thus ye see how he teacheth that our souls come into our bodies from above. But whither go they again, when they depart hence? Let us hear him what he says of the Lady Martia's son that was dead. He is now everlasting (saith he) and in the best state, bereft of this earthly baggage which was none of his, and set free to himself. For these bones, these sinews, this coat of skin, this face, and these serviceable hands, are but fetters and prisons of the soul. By them the soul is overwhelmed, beaten down, and chased away. It hath not a greater battle, than with that mass of flesh. For fear of being torn in pieces, it laboureth to return from whence it came, where it hath ready for it a happy and everlasting rest. And again: This soul cannot be made an outlaw: for it is akin to the Gods, equal to the whole world, and to all time; and the thought or conceit thereof goeth about the whole Heaven, extending itself from the beginning of all time to the uttermost point of that which is to come. The wretched course being the jail and fetters of the soul, is tossed to and fro. Upon that are torments, murders, and diseases executed. As for the soul, it is holy and everlasting, and cannot be laid hand on. When it is out of this body, it is at liberty and set free from all bondage, and is conversant in that beautiful place (wheresoever it be) which receiveth men's souls into the blessed rest thereof as soon as they be delivered from hence. To be short, he seemeth to prick very near to the rising again of the dead. For in a certain Epistle to Lucillus, his words are these: Death, whereof we be so much afraid, doth not bereave us of life, but only discontinue it for a time; and a day will come that shall bring us to light again. This may suffice to give us knowledge of the opinion of that great personage, in whom we see that the more he grew in age, the nearer he came still to the true birth.

For in his latest books he treateth always both more assuredly and more evidently thereof.

Also the saying of Phavorinus is notable. There is nothing great in earth, (saith he) but Man; and nothing great in Man, but his soul. If thou mount up thither, thou mountest above Heaven. And if thou stoop down again to the body, and compare it with the Heaven; it is less than a fly, or rather a thing of nothing. At one word, this is as much to say, as that in this clod of clay, there dwelleth a divine and uncorruptible nature: for how could it else be greater than the whole world?

As touching the Nations of old time, we read of them all, that they had certain Religions and divine Services, so as they believed that there is a Hell, and certain fields which they call the Elysian fields, as we see in the Poets Pindarus, Diphilus, Sophocles, Euripides and others. The more superstitious that they were, the more sufficiently do they witness unto us what was in their Conscience. For true Religion and Superstition have both one ground, namely the soul of man; and there could be no Religion at all, if the soul lived not when it is gone hence. We read of the Indians, that they burned themselves afore they came to extreme old age, terming it the letting of men loose, and the freeing of the soul from the body: and the sooner that a man did it, the wiser was he esteemed. Which custom is observed still at this day among the people that dwell by the River Niger otherwise called the people of Senega in Africa, who offer themselves willingly to be buried quick with their Masters. All the demonstrations of Logic and Mathematics (saith Zeno) have not so much force to prove the immortality of the soul, as this only doing of theirs hath. Also great Alexander having taken prisoners ten of their Philosophers, (whom they call Gymnosophists) asked of one of them to try their wisdom, whether there were more men alive or dead. The

Philosopher answered, that there were more alive: Because (said he) there are none dead. Ye may well think they gave a dry mock to all the arguments of Aristotle and Callisthenes, which with all their Philosophy had taught their scholar Alexander so ill. Of the Thracians, we read that they sorrowed at the birth of men and rejoiced at the death of them, yea even of their own children. And that was because they thought that which we call death, not to be a death indeed, but rather a very happy birth. And these be the people whom Herodotus reporteth to have been called the Never-dying Getes, and whom the Greeks called the Never-dying Getes or Thracians. Who were of opinion that at their departing out of this world, they went to Zamolxis or Gebeleizie, that is to say (after the interpretation of the Getish or Gothic tongue) to him that gave them health, salvation or welfare, and gathered them together. The like is said of the Gauls, chiefly of the inhabitants about Marseilles and of their Druids; of the Hetruscans and their Bishops; and of the Scythians and their Sages; of whom all the learning and wisdom was grounded upon this point. For look how men did spread abroad, so also did this doctrine, which is so deeply printed in man, that he cannot but carry it continually with him. Which thing is to be seen yet more in that which we read concerning the hearers of Hegesias the Cyrenian, who died willingly after they had heard him discourse of the state of men's souls after this life; and likewise concerning Cleombrotus the Ambraciot, who slew himself when he had read a certain treatise of the immortality of the soul. For had it not been a doctrine most evident to man's wit, they would never have been carried so far by it, as to the hurting of their bodies. And if among so many people, there be perchance some few wretched caitiffs, that have borne themselves on hand the contrary; which thing nevertheless they could never yet fully persuade themselves to be out of all doubt or question: surely we

may believe that they had very much ado and were utterly besotted like drunkards, afore they could come to that point: so as we may well say of them as Hierocles the Pythagorist said: namely, That the wicked would not have their souls to be immortal, to the intent they might not be punished for their faults. But yet that they prevent the sentence of their Judge, by condemning themselves unto death afore hand. But if they will neither hear God, nor the whole world, nor themselves: let them at leastwise hearken to the Devil as well as they do in other things; who (as saith Plutarch) made this answer to Corax of Naxus and others in these verses:

It were a great wickedness for thee to say

The Soul to be mortal or for to decay.

And unto Polytes he answered thus:

As long as the Soul to the body is tied,

Though loath, yet all sorrows it needs must abide.

But when from the body Death doth it remove,

To heaven by and by then it flies up above.

And there ever youthful in bliss it doth rest,

As God by his wisdom hath set for the best.

Not that any saying of the Devil's own is to be alleged in witness of the truth; further forth than to show that he speaks it by compulsion of God's mighty power, as wicked men divers times do when they be upon the rack. Now we be come to the time or near to the time that the heavenly doctrine of Jesus Christ was spread over the whole world, unto which time I have proved the continual succession of that doctrine, which could not but be inseparably joined with the succession of men. But from this time forth it came so to light among all Nations and all persons; that Saint Austin after a short triumphing over ungodliness, crieth out in divers places, saying: Who

is now so very a fool or so wicked, as to doubt still of the immortality of the Soul? Epictetus, a Stoic philosopher, who was had in very great reputation among all the men of his time, is full of goodly sayings to the same purpose. May we not be ashamed (saith he) to lead an dishonest life, and to suffer ourselves to be vanquished by adversity? we be allied unto God, we came from thence, and we have leave to return thither from whence we came. One while, as in respect of the soul, he termeth man the offspring of GOD, or as it were a branch of the Godhead; and another while he calleth him a divine Impe or a spark of God: by all which words (howbeit that they be somewhat improper) (for what words can a man find to fit that matter?) he showeth the uncorruptibleness of the substance of man's soul. And whereas the Philosopher Simplicius hath so diligently commented upon his books, it doth sufficiently answer for his opinion in that case, without expressing his words here. Plotinus, the excellentest of all the Platonists, hath made nine treatises expressly concerning the nature of the soul, besides the things which he hath written dispersedly here and there in other places. His chief conclusions are these. That men's souls proceed not of their bodies, nor of the seed of the Parent, but come from above, and are as ye would say grafted into our bodies by the hand of God: That the soul is partly tied to the body and to the instruments thereof, and partly frank, free, workful, and continuing of itself; and yet notwithstanding that it is neither a body nor the harmony of the body, but (if we consider the life and operation which it giveth to the body) it is after a sort the perfection [or rather the perfecter] of the body; and if we have an eye to the understanding whereby it guideth the movings and doings of the body; it is as a Governor of the body: That the further it is withdrawn from the Senses, the better it discourseth of things; insomuch that when it is utterly separated from them,

it understandeth things without discoursing, reasoning or debating, yea even in a moment; because this debating is but a certain lightening or brightness of the mind, which now taketh advisement in matter whereof it doubteth, and it doubteth wheresoever the body yieldeth any impediments unto it; but it shall neither doubt nor seek advisement any more when it is once out of the body, but shall conceive the truth without wavering: That the soul in the body is not properly there as in a place, or as in a ground, because it is not contained or comprehended therein, and may also be separated from it; but rather if a man had eyes to see it withal, he should see that the body is in the soul, as an accessory is in a principal, or as a thing contained in a container, or a shedding or liquid thing in a thing that is not liquid, because the Soul embraceth the body, and quickeneth it, and moveth it equally and alike in all parts. That every ability thereof is in every part of the body, as much in one part as in another, as a whole soul in every part; notwithstanding that every several ability thereof seem to be severally in some particular member or part, because the instruments thereof are there; as the sensitive ability seemeth to rest in the head, the ireful in the heart, and the quickening in the liver, because the sinews, heart-strings, and veins come from those parts: Whereas the reasonable power is not in any part, saving so far forth as it worketh and hath its operation there, neither hath it any need of place or instrument for the executing of itself. And to be short, that the soul is a life by itself, a life all in one, unpartable, which causeth to grow, and groweth not itself; which goeth through the body, and yet is not contained of the body; which uniteth the senses, and is not divided by the Senses, and therefore that it is a bodiless substance, which cannot be touched, neither from within nor from without, having no need of the body either outwardly or inwardly, and consequently is immortal, divine, yea and almost a very

God: Which things he proveth by many reasons, which were too long to be rehearsed here. Yea, he proceedeth so far as to say, that they which are passed into another world, have their memory still, notwithstanding that to some men's seeming, it go away with the senses as the treasury of the senses. Howbeit he affirmeth it to be the more excellent kind of memory, not that which calleth things again to mind as already past, but that which holdeth and beholdeth them still as always present. Of which two sorts this latter he calleth Mindfulness, and the other he calleth Remembrance. I will add but only one sentence more of his for a full president of his Doctrine. The soul (saith he) hath had company with the Gods, and is immortal, and so would we say of it (as Plato affirmeth) if we saw it fair and clear. But for as much as we see it commonly troubled, we think it not to be either divine or immortal, howbeit that he which will discern the nature of a thing perfectly, must consider it in its very own substance or being, utterly unmingled with any other thing. For whatsoever else is added unto it, doth hinder the perfect discerning of the same. Therefore let every man behold himself naked, without anything save himself, so as he look upon nothing else than his bare soul: and surely when he hath viewed himself in his own nature, merely as in respect of his mind, he shall believe himself to be immortal. For he shall see that his mind aimeth not properly at the sensible and mortal things, but that by a certain everlasting power, it taketh hold of the things that are everlasting, and of whatsoever is possible to be conceived in understanding: insomuch that even itself becometh after a sort a very world of understanding and light. This is against those which pretend a weakness of the soul, by reason of the inconveniences which it endureth very often in the body.

Of the same opinion are Numenius, Jamblichus, Porphyrius, and Proclus, notwithstanding that now and then they pass their bounds, suffering their wits to run riot. For in their Philosophy they had none other rule than only the drift of their own reason. It was commonly thought that Alexander of Aphrodise believed not the immortality of the soul, because he defined it to be the form of the body, proceeding of the mixture and temperature of the Elements. Surely these words of his do us to understand, either that he meant to define but the sensitive life only (as many others do) and not the reasonable soul, or else that he varieth from himself in other places. And in very deed he saith immediately afterward, that he speaketh of the things which are subject to generation and corruption. But speaking of the soul he saith it is separable, unmaterial, unmixed, and void of passions, unless, perchance we may think as some do, that by this soul he mean but only God, and not also the soul that is in us; for the which thing he is sharply rebuked by Themistius, who notwithstanding spake never a whit better thereof himself. Howsoever he deal elsewhere, these words of his following are without any doubtfulness at all. That the Soul (saith he) which is in us, cometh from without, and is uncorruptible. I say uncorruptible because the nature thereof is such, and it is the very same that Aristotle affirmeth to come from without. And in his second Book of Problems, searching the cause why the abilities of the soul are oftentimes impeached: If a man's brain be hurt (saith he) the reasonable soul doth not well execute the actions that depend thereon. But yet for all that, it abideth still in itself, unchangeable of nature, ability, and power, through the immortality thereof. And if it recover a sound instrument, it putteth her abilities in execution as well as it did afore. But I will reason more at large hereafter against the opinion that is fathered upon him.

What shall we say of Galen, (who fathereth the causes of all things as much as he can, upon the Elements, and the mixture and agreeable concord of them) if after his disputing against his own soul, he be constrained to yield that it is immortal? Surely in his book concerning the manners of the soul, he doth the worst that he can against Plato: and in another place he doubteth whether it be immortal, and whether it have continuance of itself or no. Yet notwithstanding in his book of the doctrine of Hippocrates and Plato, It must needs be granted (saith he) that the Soul is either a sheer body, and of the nature of the sky, (as the Stoicks and Aristotle himself, are enforced to confess) or else a bodiless substance, whereof the body is, as it were, the Chariot, and whereby it hath fellowship with other bodies. And it appeareth that he inclineth to this latter part. For he maketh the vital spirit to be the excellentest of all bodily things, and yet he granteth the soul to be a far more excellent thing than that. What shall we then do? Let us weigh his words set down in his book of the conception of a child in the mother's womb. The Soul of man (saith he) is an influence of the universal Soul that descendeth from the heavenly Region, a substance that is capable of knowledge, which aspireth always to one substance like unto itself, which leaveth all these lower things to seek the things that are above, which is partaker of the heavenly Godhead, and which by mounting up to the beholding of things that are above the heavens, putting itself into the presence of him that ruleth all things. Were it reason then that such a substance coming from elsewhere than of the body, and mounting so far above the body, should in the end die with the body, because it useth the service of the body?

Now hereunto I could add infinite other sayings of the ancient Authors both Greek and Latin Philosophers, Poets, and Orators from age to age,

wherein they treat of the judgment to come, of the reward of good men, of the punishment of evil men, of Paradise and of Hell, which are appendants to the immortality of the Soul: but as now I will but put the reader in mind of them by the way, reserving them to their peculiar places. To be short, let us run at this day from East to West, and from North to South, I say not among the Turks, Arabians or Persians, (for their Alcoran teacheth them that man's soul was breathed into him of God, and consequently that it is uncorruptible) but even among the most barbarous, ignorant, and beastly people of the World, I mean the very Caribbees and Cannibals, and we shall find this belief received and embraced of them all. Which giveth us to understand, that it is not a doctrine invented by speculations of some Philosophers, conveyed from Country to Country by their Disciples, persuaded by likelihoods of reasons, or (to be short) entered into man's wit by his ears: but a native knowledge, which every man findeth and readeth in himself which he carrieth everywhere about with himself, and which is as easy to be persuaded unto all such as view themselves in themselves, as it is easy to persuade a man that never saw his own face, to believe that he hath a face, by causing him to behold himself in a glass.

There remain yet two opinions to be confuted. The one is the opinion of Averrhoes, and the other is the opinion of Alexander of Aphrodise, who affirm themselves to hold both of Aristotle; namely in that they uphold that there is but one universal reasonable soul or mind, which worketh all our discourses in us, howbeit diversely in every several person. And this thing (if we believe Averrhoes) is done according to the diversity of the Phantasies or imaginations wherewith the mind is served as with instruments. But if we believe Alexander, it is done according to the diversities of the capable mind, as they term it, that is to say, of the ability

or capability that is in men to understand things, by receiving the impression of the universal mind that worketh into every of them which in respect thereof is called of them the worker. Soothly these opinions are such as may be disproved in one word. For this only one mind, whether in possibility or in action, could not have received or imprinted in every man one selfsame common belief and conceit of the immortality of the Soul, in so great diversity of imaginations, and in so many Nations, as we see do believe it, considering that the very same conceit is directly repugnant against it. Nay, it may well be said that Averrhoes and Alexander had very divers conceits and imaginations one from another, and very contrary to all other men's, seeing they had so diverse and contrary opinions imprinted either in their mind or in their imagination. Howbeit for as much as there may be some, that will make a doubt of it; let us examine them severally yet more advisedly. First, Averrhoes will needs bear Aristotle on hand, that Aristotle is of that opinion. Let us see how this furnace of his can agree with the propositions which Aristotle hath left us. Aristotle telleth us that the soul is knit to the body as the form or shape to the matter; that the soul hath three chief powers, namely, of life, of sense, and of understanding; and that the understanding part containeth in his power both the other two powers, as a five square containeth both a foresquare and a Triangle. Whereupon it followeth, that if any one of the three powers of the soul be joined to the body as a form to the matter; all the three be joined so to, as which are all in one soul as in their root. Now Averrhoes neither can nor will deny that the powers of growing and of perceiving by the senses are joined after that manner to the body; and therefore it followeth that the understanding power is so joined also, and consequently that according to Aristotle, as every body hath his form, so every body hath his soul. The

same Aristotle findeth fault with the former Philosophers for holding opinion that a soul might pass out of one man into another: because (saith he) that every certain soul must needs be apportioned and appointed to some one certain body. Now look by what soul a man liveth, by the same soul doth he understand: for it is but one soul endued with three divers abilities, as he himself teacheth openly. One understanding or mind therefore, must (according to Aristotle) work but in one several body, and not in many bodies. Also according to Aristotle, a man and a beast agree in this, that both of them have one sensitive power, and one selfsame imagination of things perceived by the senses, and that they differ in this, that man hath yet further a mind and reason above the beast, which thing the beast hath not. Now if this understanding or mind be without the man, as the sun is without the chamber, that it shineth into and enlighteneth, then cannot he be called reasonable, or endued with understanding, neither doth he consequently differ from a beast. For the difference must be in nature, and not in accident. And so should it ensue that Aristotle's foresaid definition of a man is false, as if he should define a chamber by the shining of the sun into it: Or say that a dog differeth not from a man in kind; yea, and that beasts are capable of understanding, for as much as they have imagination ready beforehand to receive the influence thereof as well as we. But Aristotle is always one in his defining both of beast and of man; and Averrhoes also holdeth himself to it, without doubting thereof at all. This conclusion therefore cannot in any wise be upheld by such grounds.

Again, if there be not in every several man a several mind, but only one universal mind common to all men, which becometh divers by the only diversity of our imaginations: Then in respect that we have sundry imaginations, we shall by sundry living wights; and in respect that we have

all but one mind, we shall be all but one man. For man is not man in respect of the sensitive power, but in respect of the reasonable part which is the mind. But Aristotle granteth that we be not only divers living wights, but also divers men. And therefore he must needs mean also, that we have not only divers imaginations, but also divers minds. Now besides many other reasons that might be alleged, ye might add this also, That otherwise Aristotle's Morals and his discourses concerning Justice, Freewill, the Immortality of the soul, the happy bliss, the reward of the good, and the pains of the wicked, were utterly fruitless and to no purpose: For as our fancies or imaginations did come and go, so would all those things come and go likewise, and so should they have no continuance of themselves, but only be as a shadow and vain fantasy. But let Aristotle alone, (for he hath wrong) and let us come to the matter itself. The Philosophers do ordinarily make a double mind; the one which they call possible or impossible, which is capable and of ability to understand things; and this they liken to a smooth table; the other they call working or workful, which bringeth the ability into act, whereas notwithstanding they be not two minds, but two several abilities of only one mind. Now, as for this ability or possibility of understanding, we affirm it to be in the soul of every man. Contrariwise, Averrhoes affirmed only one universal capable mind to be shed abroad everywhere throughout all men; and that the same is diversely perfected and brought into act in every several man, according to the diversity of the imaginations which the man conceiveth, even by the help or influence of the said universal workful mind, which he saith is also a substance severed, from man, and (in respect of the understanding in possibility) is as the sun is to the sight of our eyes, and the understanding in possibility is to the imaginations as the sight is unto colors. Now, I demand first of all, whether

these universal minds of his, be substances created or uncreated. If they be created, where becometh then his conclusion, That the world is without beginning, and without ending, seeing that he will have them to be continued everlastingly in all men that have been, are, or shall be? If they be uncreated, how can so excellent substances be made subject to our fond imaginations, to yield influence into them at their pleasures?

Or rather how happeneth it that they correct them not? How happeneth it that they leave them in such errors, yea even in the knowledge of themselves, seeing that by the erring of the imaginations, the very understanding and reason themselves must also needs be so often beguiled? Again, as concerning these substances, which extend into so many places; are they Bodies or Spirits? How can they be bodies, seeing they be in infinite places at one instant, and do infinite things, yea, and flat contraries? And if they be Spirits, doth it not follow thereupon, that they be wholly in all men and wholly in every man; that is to say, that every man hath them wholly to himself? And therefore that if they be deceived by the fancy of any one man, they be consequently deceived in all men? And whereof comes it then, that one man overcometh his imaginations, and another man not? Or that one man resisteth them, and another suffereth himself to be carried away by them? Moreover, who can deny that a man willeth things, whereof he hath understanding; and likewise that he willeth some things which he understandeth not: and that he understandeth some things which he willeth not? And also that he willeth things even contrary to his appetites, and concludeth oftentimes contrary to his imaginations, as cometh to pass in dreams and in looking-glasses; which thing the brute beasts do not? When a man willeth contrary to his appetites, willeth he not contrary to his senses, yea, and contrary to his imaginations too: for what

else is fancy or imagination, than the rebounding back of the senses: And if this workful understanding be the only worker in his possible understanding by mean of imagination; how cometh it to pass that a man willeth contrary to his imagination? Again, when either in dreaming or in debating, reason concludeth clean contrary to that which fancy or imagination offereth; whereof cometh it that a man is contrary to himself, or that the deed is contrary both to that which imprinted it, and to that wherein it is imprinted? Also what else is imagination (according to the opinion of Averrhoes,) than a certain operation annexed to the body, steaming up from the Heart to the Brain: And on the contrary part who can say nay, but that the Will and Understanding are able to perform their operations without the instruments of the body, seeing that a man doth both will and debate things that are most repugnant to the body: Yea and that (as Aristotle saith) those be not actions which pass into the outward man, but those which abide within and make perfect the inner man. And who can make Will and Understanding to be things depending upon imagination, seeing that both waking and sleeping and all manner of ways else, they daily utter infinite judgments and determinations against it: Now, if we have nothing in us above Imagination: then considering that we do both will and understand, it must needs be that this power or ability to will and understand is shed into us from without. And if it be but only one universally in all men; then seeing that the actions thereof are executed without the imagination, without the senses, and without the instruments of the body, yea and against them: it followeth that it willeth and understandeth in us whatsoever it liketh and listeth, even in despite of all impediments and lets of the body; and that as it is but one, so it shall will but one selfsame thing, and likewise also understand but one selfsame thing in all men. For if (as Aristotle confesseth) our imaginations

make not our will and reason subject unto them; much less do they make the foresaid universal mind subject to them as Averrhoes pretendeth. But now contrariwise we see there be as many Wills as men, yea even in one matter; and that the understandings of men are not only divers, but also contrary. It followeth then that every particular person hath in that behalf a particular substance, which willeth and understandeth, frank and free from all imaginations whensoever it listeth to retire into itself; and not that there is but one universal mind which willeth and understandeth all things in all men. Besides this; by the judgment of Aristotle as I said afore, this universal mind could not work will and understanding in us: for to will and understand (saith he) are operations that pass not into the matter nor into the outward thing, but abide still in the worker, that is to say in the mind, as actions and perfections thereof.

Let us yet again take of that which hath been said afore. If the said universal only one working mind, have wrought from everlasting in the said universal only one capable mind, by the Imaginations of men: then has the knowledge of all things been evermore imprinted in the said capable mind; for it shall evermore have brought the ability into act: And therewithal, the working and perfection of the thing that is everlasting, shall have depended upon a thing that is temporal; which is impossible. And although Averroes supposed not the World to be everlasting: yet notwithstanding the said capable mind which has been set awork so many hundred years, by so many imaginations of men, and in so many sundry Nations, could not now meet with any new thing whereof it had not the knowledge afore. For this capable mind (saith Averroes) is a certain spiritual substance, which spreadeth itself forth into all men and into all ages, and the nature of such sort of substances is to be all in the whole, and all in every part thereof. For

they be not tied to any one place, but are wheresoever they work, and their working is in respect of the whole, and not in respect of any one part, forasmuch as they be undividable. Therefore it should follow by his opinion (as I have said afore) that the one universal capable mind is and worketh whole and unparted in every man. And if it be so, then is that being of it there, not in way of mere ability or possibility only, but in way of operation and perfect inworking, as a wicked spirit is in a witch, in a Pythoness or in a possessed person: which spirit (were he possessed of the man as he himself possesseth the man, after which manner Averroes affirmeth us to possess the understanding in possibility, by our imaginations;) would make the man capable of all that ever the Spirit himself knoweth or is. Whereupon it will follow, that this understanding in possibility, shall everlastingly in all men from their very birth, actually understand and know all things that all men understand, as well in the old as the young, and in the ignorant as the skillful; so as we shall have no more need of senses; nor of imagination to understand withal. To be short, although Averroes admitteth not the World to be without beginning: yet at leastwise he will not deny, but that [by his reckoning] they which come into the world at this day, should come far more skillful than all their predecessors, and the children of them more skillful than their fathers, and the offspring of those children more skillful than those children themselves, and so forth on, because they should succeed in the knowledge continued throughout all ages. Whereupon it will also ensue, that all Sciences shall be equal in all men that make profession of them. As for example, we will speak here, but of some one special Science, as Grammar and Arithmetic. Now if there be any diversity in the skill thereof, that diversity cannot come but of the diversity of the subject or ground wherein the skill is. Now the ground of the skill is the capacity of

the mind or understanding, (which Averroes supposeth to be but only one, common to all men) and not the Imagination, which is but a reflection or rebounding back of the Sense. And so forasmuch as there is (by his saying) but one ground in all men; it followeth that the knowledge or skill of this or that Science must needs be equal and alike in all men: or else that if it be not equal, but do vary, as we see it doth in divers degrees; then the same varying or diversity happeneth through the diversity of the ground wherein the skill is, and consequently that there is one particular understanding or one peculiar mind in every man, and not one universal mind common to all men. Also it is a general rule, that the receiver of a thing hath not the thing afore he receive it. For (as Aristotle saith) that which is to receive a thing, must needs be first utterly void of the thing which it receiveth. Now afore that our Sense and Imagination had any being at all, this universal common mind had received and possessed all things aforehand; and not only received them, but also kept them together. For as Aristotle himself saith, that manner of mind is the place of all under kinds and sorts of things, and thereto hath no less power than the Imagination, to retain whatsoever the Senses receive. In vain therefore should that universal mind understand by our Imaginations, considering that it understandeth by itself: in vain likewise should the Imaginations imprint those things in it, which were imprinted in it so long afore: and in vain is Aristotle's setting down of a workful understanding, which should bring our understanding in ability, from possibility into action; if the said only one universal mind or understanding be perfect of itself from everlasting, as it followeth to be upon the opinion of Averroes. Neither is it to be said, that although the conceivable underkinds of things have been imprinted everlastingly in the said universal mind; yet notwithstanding there needed an Imagination for

the understanding of them, as there needeth now whensoever we will use the things that we have seen or learned afore. For by that reckoning, to learn all manner of Sciences, we needed no more but to bethink us by imagination, of the things that were already aforehand in the said only universal one mind, as we do the things that have been printed sometime in our memories, and are somewhat slipped out of our remembrance; and so might we ourselves learn all sciences without a teacher, because that in the said universal mind of ours, we should have all the skill that ever any man had attained to, in like manner as the person that hath once had the skill of Arithmetic or Cosmography thoroughly settled in his mind, needeth no teacher to teach it him again, but only to overturn his own imagination, and to search his memory for the finding again of that which he had laid up there. Now we know that whosoever learneth nothing, knoweth nothing, and that ordinarily he which most studyeth, most learneth: and that all the tossing and turmoiling of a man's own imagination that can be all his life long, will never make him to attain of himself to so much as the very principles of the least science that is. By reason whereof it followeth, That we have not the skill of any science in us, until we either be taught it or find it out by beating our wits about it: and that our imagination serveth not to revive the Sciences in us, but to bring them into us, and to plant them in us. And forasmuch as all the Sciences should be in all men from the beginning, if there were but one universal mind in all men, [which is not so] it followeth that there is in every particular person a particular and peculiar mind, and not any one universal mind common to all men. Moreover, our mind attaineth after a sort to the understanding of itself: which thing it could not do in very deed, if there were but one universal mind common to all men. For to understand itself, it must needs work upon itself. But if we

believe Averroes, our mind shall but only be wrought upon and receive into it from the Imagination, as a Window receiveth light from the Sun. Again, the capacity of the universal understanding in possibility, could not do that. For it behoved it to have some other thing besides itself, to bring itself into action. And surely Imagination could not help it, for it doth but offer up the sensible things unto it, and attaineth not so far as to the things that are to be discerned by drift of reason. Yet notwithstanding we understand that we understand, and we reason and judge both of our Imagination, and also of our reasoning and understanding itself. The thing then which doth so enter and pierce into itself, is another manner of power than an Imagination, or that a universal understanding in possibility. What is to be said to this, that of one selfsame Imagination, one selfsame person concludeth now after one sort, and by-and-by after in another sort; and thereout of draweth both contrary arguments and contrary determinations: or that divers persons by divers imaginations do close together in one will and one mind? Is it possible that this should proceed of an everlasting substance in one selfsame person, seeing that everlastingness is not subject to any change of time or place? Or that it should proceed of any one selfsame substance in many men, seeing that the imaginations of them be so diverse one from another? at leastwise if the said substance work not but by such instruments?

As touching the opinion of Alexander of Aphrodise, who upholdeth a certain universal working mind that imprinteth things in the understanding in possibility, that is to say, in every man's several capacity, and bringeth it forth into action: the most part of the reasons alleged afore against Averroes, will also serve against him. Howbeit for as much as by this workful mind, he seemeth to mean God himself, there is thus much more to

be added unto it. That God who is altogether good, and altogether wise, would not imprint in our mind the fond and wicked conceits which we find there, nor leave so great ignorance and darkness as we feel there, but would in all men overcome the infection which the body bringeth: and although he inspired not all men alike with his gracious gifts, according to the diversity of their capacities after the manner of a planed Table, yet would he not at leastwise print the World with so many false Portratures and Trains, as every one of us may perceive to be in ourselves. Again, were there any such inspiration or influence, it should be either continual or but by times. If continual or everlasting, we should without labor and without cunning understand all that ever our imagination offereth unto us. And if it be but at times, then should it not lie in us to list or to understand any thing at all, though we would never so fain. For contrariwise, we have much ado to understand some things, so as we must be fain to win them from our ignorance by piecemeal, and there be some other things, which we understand by and by as soon as they be put unto us, and when we list ourselves, There is then in us a power of Understanding, though very feeble; but yet nevertheless obedient to our will: which thing cannot be fathered upon God. Also if there be but only one mind working in all men, there shall be but one selfsame understanding in all men, I mean naturally, notwithstanding that it differ in degrees. For into what place soever the Sun doth shed his beams, he doth both enlighten it and heat it, howbeit diversely according to the nature and condition of the places and things that receive him, some more, and some less, some brighter, and some dimlier. But howsoever the case stand, his light yieldeth no darkness, nor his heat any cold. So then if the diversities of men's imaginations do cause diversities of effects in the inspiration or influence that floweth into the capacity of our

understanding; surely it must needs be after this manner, namely that one man shall understand one selfsame thing more, and another man less; but not in that any man shall take untruth for truth, unright for right, or one thing for another. Now we see unto how many errors we be subject, I mean not in such things as this namely, that one man seeth better afar off, and another better at hand; but that one man seeth white and another seeth black (which are things contrary) in one selfsame ground and at one selfsame time. It followeth therefore that diverse and sundry minds do work in diverse persons, and not one selfsame mind in all persons. By force of which reasons and of such others, I say that every man shall find in himself and of himself, that every man hath a particular soul by himself, that is to say, a spiritual substance united to his body, which in respect of giving life to the body is as the form thereof, and in respect of giving reason, is as the guide of our actions: That in every man there is a certain Sunbeam of reason, whereby they conceive things and debate upon them; where through it cometh to pass, that oftentimes they agree both in the reason itself which is one, and in the manifest grounds thereof, and in whatsoever dependeth evidently upon the same: That every man hath also a peculiar body by himself, and likewise peculiar complexion, humors, imaginations, education, custom and trade of life: whereof it cometh that every man takes a diverse way, yea, and that one selfsame person swerveth diversely from the unity of reason whereof the path is but one, and the ways to stray from it are infinite: That this Sunbeam of reason which shineth and sheddeth itself from our mind, is properly that understanding which is termed, The understanding in ability or possibility, which is increased and augmented by all the things which it seeth, heareth, or lighteth upon, like fire, which gathereth increase of strength by the abundance of the fuel that is put upon

it, and becometh after a sort infinite by spreading itself abroad: Also it is the same which otherwise we call the Memory of understanding, or mindful Memory, and it is nothing else but an abundance of Reason, and as it were a hoarder up of the continual influence of the Mind: That the Mind from whence this floweth as from his spring, is properly that which they the said Averroes and Alexander do term the working or workful Mind, which is a certain power or force that can skill to extend reason from one thing to another, and to proceed from things sensible to things unsensible, from things movable to things unmovable, from bodily to spiritual, from effects to causes, and from beginnings to ends by the mean cause. This Mind is in respect of Reason, as cunning is in respect of an Instrument or tool; and Reason, as in respect of imagination and of the things that are sensible, is as an Instrument or tool in respect of the matter or stuff that it works upon: Or to speak more fitly, this Mind is unto Reason, as the mover of a thing is to the thing that is movable, and Reason is to her objects, as the movable thing is to the thing whereunto it is moved. For to reason or debate, is nothing else but to proceed from a thing that is understood, to a thing that is not understood, of purpose to understand it: and the understanding thereof is a resting that ensueth upon it, as a staying or resting after moving: That both of them as well the one as the other, are but only one selfsame substance, and like as a man, both when he moveth, and when he resteth is all one and the same man, or as the power that moveth the sinews is one selfsame still, both when it stirreth them, and when it holdeth them still, so the reasonable or understanding soul that is in every man, is but only one selfsame substance bodiless and immortal, executing his powers partly of itself, and partly by our bodies. And seeing that Averroes and Alexander, make so great estimation and account of the effects which are wrought in us, that

they be enforced to attribute them to some uncorruptible and everlasting mind; let us take of them, that in very truth the thing which worketh so great wonders in the body, can be neither sense, nor body, nor imagination, but a divine, uncorruptible and immortal mind, as they themselves say.

But let us learn the thing of more than them, which all wise men teach us, and which every one of us can learn of himself; namely that this understanding or mind is not one universal thing as the sun is that shineth into all the windows of a city, but rather, a particular substance in every several man, as a light to lead him in the darkness of this life; for surely it was no more difficulty to the everlasting GOD, to create many sundry souls, that every man might have one severally alone by himself, than to have created but only one soul for all men together. But it was far more for his glory, to be known, praised, and exalted of many souls, yea and more for our welfare to praise, exalt, and know him, yea, and to live of ourselves both in this life, and in the life to come: than if any other universal spirit, soul, or mind whatsoever, should have lived and understood either in us or after us. Now then for this matter let us conclude, both by reason and by antiquity, and by the knowledge that every one of us hath of himself; That the soul and the body be things diverse: that the soul is a spirit and not a body: That this spirit hath in man three abilities or powers, whereof two be exercised by the body, and the third worketh of itself without the body: That these three abilities are in the one only soul as in their root: whereof two do cease whensoever the body faileth them, and yet notwithstanding the soul abideth whole without abatement of any of her powers, as a craftsman continueth a craftsman though he want tools to work withal: And finally, that this soul is a substance that continueth of itself, and is unmaterial and

spiritual, over the which neither death nor corruption can naturally have any power.

And for a conclusion of all that ever I have treated of hitherto in this book, let us maintain, That there is but only one God, who by his own goodness and wisdom is the Creator and Governor of the world and of all that is therein: That in the world he created Man after his own image as in respect of mind, and after the image of his other creatures as in respect of life, sense, and moving, mortal so far forth as he holdeth the likeness of a creature, and immortal so far forth as he beareth the image of the Creator: That is to wit, in his soul: That he which goeth out of himself to see the world, doth forthwith see that there is a God, for his works declare him everywhere: That he which will yet still doubt thereof, needeth but to enter into himself, and he shall meet him there, for he shall find there a power which he seeth not: That he which believeth there is one God, believeth himself to be immortal; for such consideration could not light into a mortal nature: and that he which believeth himself to be immortal, believeth that there is a God, for without the unutterable power of the one God, the mortal and immortal could never join together: That he which seeth the order of the world, the proportion of man, and the harmony that is in either of them compounded of so many contraries, cannot doubt that there is a Providence for the nature which hath furnished them therewith, cannot be unfurnished thereof itself; but as it once had a care of them, so can it not shake off the same care from them. Thus have we three Articles which follow interchangeably one another. Insomuch that he which proveth any one of them, doth prove them all three, notwithstanding that I have treated of every of them severally by itself. Now let us pray the everlasting God, that we

may glorify him in his works in this world, and he vouchsafe of his mercy to glorify us one day in the World to come.

AMEN.