CLARK'S SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF EVIL
In his writings, Gordon Clark attempted to answer the question,
"How can the existence of God be harmonized with the existence of evil?" 54 If God is all-good, He would want to destroy evil. If God is all-powerful, He is able to destroy evil. But evil still exists. It seems that God cannot be both all-good and all-powerful. However, Christianity teaches that He is both. This is the problem of evil. 55
Zoroastrianism attempts to resolve the problem by teaching that there are two gods. One is good while the other is evil. Neither of the two gods is infinite since they have both failed to destroy the opposing god. Plato's views also result in an unresolved dualism. In his thought, God is not the creator of all things. There exists eternal and chaotic space which the Demiurge cannot control. 56
According to Clark, even Augustine's answer to the dilemma was inadequate. Clark stated that Augustine taught that evil is metaphysically unreal. It does not exist. Therefore, all that God created is good since evil is non-being. 57 (Whether or not Clark treated Augustine's view fairly will be discussed at a later point in this chapter.)
Clark pointed out that Augustine added to his response the doctrine of human free will. Though God is all-powerful, He has sovereignly chosen to give mankind free will. God allows man to make his own choices. Mankind has chosen evil. Therefore, all that God created is good. Evil can be blamed not on God, but on the abuse of free will by man. 58
But Clark rejected this view of free will. Clark believed that the Bible does not teach that man is free to choose that which is right as opposed to that which is wrong. Clark stated that "free will is not only futile, but false. Certainly, if the Bible is the Word of God, free will is false; for the Bible consistently denies free will." 59
Though Clark rejected the doctrine of free will, he believed man has free agency. "Free will means there is no determining factor operating on the will, not even God. Free will means that either of two incompatible actions are equally possible." 60 This Clark rejected. On the other hand, "Free agency goes with the view that all choices are inevitable. The liberty that the Westminster Confession ascribes to the will is a liberty from compulsion, coaction, or force of inanimate objects; it is not a liberty from the power of God." 61 Clark argued that a man can still be responsible for his actions even without the freedom to do other than he has done. Clark stated that, "a man is responsible if he must answer for what he does . . . a person is responsible if he can be justly rewarded or punished for his deeds. This implies, of course, that he must be answerable to someone." 62
Clark then asked the question, "Is it just then for God to punish a man for deeds that God Himself 'determined before to be done?'" 63 He answered in the affirmative. He stated that, "Whatever God does is just." 64 Man is responsible to God; but God is responsible to no one.
Clark openly admitted that his view makes God the cause of sin. For, in his thinking, "God is the sole ultimate cause of everything." 65 But, while God is the ultimate cause of sin, He is not the author of sin. The author is the immediate cause of an action. Man is the immediate cause of his sin. But he was not free to do otherwise. For God is the ultimate cause of sin. 66
Clark stated that, "God's causing a man to sin is not sin. There is no law, superior to God, which forbids him to decree sinful acts. Sin presupposes a law, for sin is lawlessness." 67 Clark explained that "God is above law" because "the laws that God imposes on men do not apply to the divine nature." 68
This was Clark's proposed solution to the problem of evil. God is in fact the ultimate cause of sin. But He is not evil, for He committed no sin. And He is not responsible for sin, for there is no one to whom He is responsible. God is just, for whatever He does is just. Therefore, the creature has no right to stand in judgment over his Creator.
56 Ibid., 195-196.
57 Ibid., 196.
58 Ibid., 199.
59 Ibid., 206.
60 Ibid., 227.
62 Ibid., 231.
64 Ibid., 232-233.
65 Ibid., 237-238.
66 Ibid., 237-239.
67 Ibid., 239-240.
68 Ibid., 240.
69 Ibid., 241.