Calvinism and Its Practical Application

by William Cunningham

Excerpt from The Reformers and the Theology of the Reformation

One of the leading forms which, in the present day, aversion to divine truth exhibits, is a dislike to precise and definite statements upon the great subjects brought before us in the sacred Scriptures. This dislike to precision and definiteness in doctrinal statements sometimes assumes the form of reverence for the Bible, as if it arose from an absolute deference to the authority of the divine word, and an unwillingness to mix up the reasonings and deductions of men with the direct declarations of God. We believe that it arises much more frequently, and to a much greater extent, from a dislike to the controlling influence of Scripture, - from a desire to escape, as far as possible without denying its authority, from the trammels of its regulating power as an infallible rule of faith and duty. It is abundantly evident, from the statements of Scripture as well as from the experience of every age and country, that men in their natural condition, unrenewed by divine grace, have a strong aversion to right views of the divine character and of the way of salvation, or to the great system of doctrines revealed to us in the Bible; and are anxious to escape from any apparent obligation to believe them. The most obvious and effectual way of accomplishing this, is to deny the divine origin and authority of the sacred Scriptures, - their title and their fitness to be a rule of faith or standard of doctrine. And when men, from whatever cause, do not see their way to do this plainly and openly, they often attempt it, or something like it, in an indirect and insidious way, by distorting and perverting the statements of Scripture, by evading their fair meaning and application, or by devising pretences for declining to turn them to full account as a revelation of God’s will to men, or to derive from them the whole amount of information about divine and eternal things which they seem fitted and intended to convey.

It has been the generally received doctrine of orthodox divines, and it is in entire accordance with reason and common sense, that we are bound to receive as true, on God’s authority, not only what is “expressly set down in Scripture,” but also what, “by good and necessary consequence, may be deduced from Scripture;” and heretics, in every age and of every class, have, even when they made a profession of receiving what is expressly set down in Scripture, shown the greatest aversion to what are sometimes called Scripture consequences, - that is, inferences or deductions from scriptural statements, beyond what is expressly contained in the mere words of Scripture, as they stand in the page of the sacred record. Some interesting discussion on the subject of the warrantableness, the validity, and the binding obligation of Scripture consequences took place in the early part of last century among the English Presbyterians, when some of them had been led to embrace Arian views. With the dishonesty which the history of the church proves to have been so generally a marked characteristic of heretics and men of progress, those of them who had really, in their convictions, abandoned the generally received doctrine of the Trinity, professed at first to object only to the unscriptural terms in which the doctrine was usually embodied; declaimed about freedom of thought and ecclesiastical tyranny; and denounced all Scripture consequences as unwarrantable and precarious, while they were, of course, quite willing to subscribe to the ipsissima verba of Scripture. But the progress of the discussion soon showed that these were hypocritical pretences; and that the men who employed them had deliberately adopted opinions in regard to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, which have been generally repudiated by the church of Christ, and which could no more be brought out fully and distinctly as opposed to what they reckoned error, in the mere words of Scripture, than the sounder views which they rejected.

Upon the occasion to which we have referred, the repudiation of Scripture consequences, and the opposition to precise and definite views on doctrinal subjects, were directed chiefly against the doctrine of the Trinity. In the present day these views and tendencies are directed chiefly against the doctrine of a real vicarious atonement for the sins of men, and against the peculiar doctrines of the Calvinistic system of theology. Not that the true scriptural doctrine of the Trinity is more relished by men of rationalistic and sceptical tendencies, than it was in former times. It is not so. But men of this stamp seem generally, now-a-days, to be disposed to favour the attempt to evade or explain away this great doctrine, by adopting a kind of Platonic Sabellianism; and employing this as a sort of warrant for using not only the ipsissima verba of Scripture, but even a great deal of the language which has been commonly approved of by orthodox divines, as embodying the substance of what Scripture teaches upon this subject. The doctrine of the atonement stands in this somewhat peculiar predicament among the great fundamental articles of revealed truth, that it was never subjected to a thorough, searching, controversial discussion till the time of Socinus. The consequence of this is, that, though there is satisfactory evidence that it was held in substance by the universal church ever since the apostolic age, there is a considerable amount of vagueness and indefiniteness, and a considerable deficiency of precise and accurate statement upon it, in the symbols of the ancient church and in the writings of the Fathers; and that even in the confessions of the Reformed churches, - there being no controversy on this topic with the Church of Rome, - it is not brought out so fully and precisely as most of the other fundamental doctrines of the Christian system. These facts have tended somewhat to encourage the practice, so common in the present day, of explaining away the true doctrine of the atonement, by concealing it in vague and indefinite language, under the pretence of repudiating Scripture consequences and adhering to the ipsissima verba of revelation. The leading presumption, so far as mere human authority is concerned, in opposition to these latitudinarian tendencies, is this, - that they virtually resolve into a defence of Socinianism; and that Socinus and his followers have been always regarded, both by the Church of Home and by the great body of the Protestant churches, as deniers and opposers of the great fundamental principles of the scheme of revealed truth, and as unworthy of the designation of Christians.

The doctrines of Calvinism are, as might be expected, dealt with, in this rationalistic and sceptical age, very much in the same way as the doctrines of the Trinity and the atonement. It is, indeed, only in the Calvinistic system of theology, that the doctrines of the proper divinity and vicarious atonement of Christ, and of the agency of the Holy Spirit, are fully developed in their practical application. Arminians admit the doctrines of the divinity and atonement of Christ, and ‘the agency of the Spirit, into their system of theology. But they do not fully apply them in some of their most important practical bearings and consequences. And, more especially, the general principles of their system preclude them from admitting the certain and infallible efficacy of these great provisions in securing the results which they were intended to accomplish. If the eternal and only-begotten Son of God assumed human nature into personal union with the divine; if He suffered and died as the surety and substitute of sinners, that He might satisfy divine justice and reconcile us to God; and if, as one leading result of His mediation, He has brought into operation the agency of the third Person of the Godhead in order to complete the work of saving sinners, - it seems a certain and unavoidable inference, that such stupendous arrangements as these must embody a provision for certainly effecting the whole result contemplated, whether that result was the salvation of all, or only of a portion, of the fallen race of man. Now, the Arminian system of theology not only does not exhibit any provision adequate to secure this result, but plainly precludes it; inasmuch as it is quite possible, for anything which that system contains, that the whole human race might perish - that no sinner might be saved. Arminianism thus tends to depreciate and disparage both the work of Christ and the work of the Spirit, in their bearing upon the great object they were intended to accomplish, the salvation of sinful men. It is only the Calvinistic views of the work of Christ and of the Holy Spirit, that are free from the great fundamental objection to which we have referred, of making no adequate provision for securing the result intended.

The Calvinistic doctrines in regard to the work of Christ and the agency of the Spirit are thus in beautiful harmony with the other departments of that system of theology, - with those doctrines which are commonly regarded as the special peculiarities of Calvinism. It is, we are persuaded, in some measure, because of the vague and indefinite position in which the other departments of the Arminian system require its adherents to leave the subjects of the work of Christ and the work of the Spirit, viewed in their relation to the practical result contemplated,, that they have been able to retain a profession of the divinity and atonement of Christ and of the agency of the Spirit, notwithstanding the rationalism on which the Arminian system of theology is really based. The tendency of Arminianism is to throw the work of the Son and of the Spirit in the salvation of sinners into the background, and to lead to vagueness and indefiniteness in the statement of the truth concerning them; while in regard to those great doctrines which Calvinists and Arminians hold in common, in opposition to the Socinians, as well as in regard to the peculiar doctrines of their own system, Calvinists hold clear, precise, and definite opinions. This, in right reason, ought to be held to be a presumption of their truth; although with many, especially in the present day, it is held to furnish a plausible argument against them. Calvinism unfolds most fully and explicitly the whole system of doctrine revealed in the sacred Scriptures. It brings out most prominently and explicitly the sovereign agency of God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, in the salvation of sinners; while it most thoroughly humbles and abases men, as the worthless and helpless recipients of the divine mercy and bounty.

Calvinism thus comes into full and direct collision with all the strongest tendencies and prepossessions of ungodly and unrenewed men, and has, of course, been assailed with every species of objection. It cannot, indeed, with any great plausibility, be alleged, that it is founded only on Scripture consequences, - that is, inferences or deductions from scriptural statements. For Calvinists undertake to produce from Scripture, statements which directly and explicitly assert all their leading peculiar doctrines; and if the Calvinistic interpretation of these statements be just and well founded, it is plain that their fundamental principles are directly and explicitly sanctioned by the word of God. The case is very different with their opponents. Arminians, of course, undertake to show that the statements founded on by Calvinists are erroneously interpreted by them; and that, when rightly understood, they furnish no adequate support to Calvinism. But they scarcely allege that there are any scriptural statements which directly and explicitly either assert Arminianism, or contradict Calvinistic doctrines. The defence of Arminianism, and the opposition to Calvinism, are based chiefly upon inferences or deductions from Scripture statements; and statements, too, it is important to remark, which do not bear directly and immediately upon the precise points controverted. The scriptural argument for Arminianism and against Calvinism consists chiefly in a proof that God is holy, and just, and good; that He is not the author of sin, and is not a respecter of persons; that men are responsible for all their actions, and are justly chargeable with guilt and liable to punishment, when they refuse to obey God’s law and to believe in the Lord Jesus Christ; and then, in the inference or deduction, that the undeniable truth of these views of God and man. excludes Calvinism, and establishes Arminianism. This is really the substance of the scriptural argument for Arminianism and against Calvinism; while it is scarcely alleged by Arminians that there are any scriptural statements which directly and immediately disprove or exclude the doctrines of Calvinism. On the other hand, it is contended by Calvinists that their views are not only directly and explicitly asserted in many scriptural statements, but are also sanctioned by inferences or deductions from scriptural views of the attributes and moral government of God, and of the natural condition and capacities of man.

But though on these grounds, and by these processes, an impregnable argument can be built up in favour of Calvinism, yet it has many formidable difficulties to contend with. The views which it unfolds of the attributes and moral government of God, of the natural condition and capacities of man, and of the way of salvation as regulated and determined by these views of what God is and of what man is, are utterly opposed to all the natural notions and tendencies of ignorant and irreligious men; and the very clearness, definiteness, and precision with which all these views are brought out and applied, are felt by many, especially in the present day, as strengthening and aggravating all the objections against them. The leading objections against Calvinism, though based principally upon inferences or deductions from admitted truths, are so obvious as to occur at once to every one, whenever the subject is presented to him; and they are possessed of very considerable plausibility. They are just in substance those which the Apostle Paul plainly gives us to understand would certainly, and as a matter of course, be directed against the doctrine which he taught. The apostle had laid down and established the great principle, “It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy,” - “He hath mercy on whom He will, and whom He will He hardeneth.” He then assumes that, as a matter of course, this principle would be objected to, - that men’s natural notions would rise up in rebellion against it. “Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth He yet find fault? For who hath resisted His will?” - which is just, in plain terms, alleging that the apostle’s doctrine made God the author of sin, and destroyed man’s responsibility. And the apostle, in dealing in the following verses with this objection, makes no attempt to explain away the doctrine which he had laid down, or to back out of it; he does not withdraw or qualify the outspoken Calvinism which he had so plainly enunciated, and substitute for it the smooth and plausible Arminianism, which would at once have completely removed all appearance of ground for the objection. On the contrary, he, without qualification or hesitation, adheres to the doctrine he had stated; and disposes of the objection just as Calvinists - following his example - have always done, by resolving the whole matter into the unsearchable perfections and the sovereign supremacy of God, and the natural ignorance, helplessness, and worthlessness of man.

The whole substance of what has been, or can be, plausibly alleged against Calvinism, is contained in the objection which the apostle expected to be adduced against the doctrine he taught; and the whole substance of what is necessary for defending Calvinism, is contained in, or suggested by, the way in which he disposed of the objection. But the subject has given rise in every age to a great deal of ingenious and elaborate speculation; and this speculation has been frequently of a very unwarranted, presumptuous, and even offensive description, - the presumption and offensiveness being principally, though we admit not exclusively, exhibited on the side of the Arminians. We do not intend to enter upon a general discussion of the great leading objections which have been adduced against the Calvinistic system of theology, and of the way and manner in which these objections should be dealt with and disposed of. We have already indicated briefly the leading considerations which should be brought to bear upon this subject, and which, when expounded and applied, are quite sufficient to dispose of all the plausible - and, at first sight, apparently formidable - objections that are commonly adduced against Calvinism; and thus to show that the whole of the strong, positive evidence in support of it - founded both on direct and express statements of Scripture, bearing immediately upon the points controverted, and also on clear and satisfactory inferences or deductions from the great general principles unfolded there, concerning God and man, the work of the Son and the Spirit, and the way of salvation - stands untouched and unimpaired, and ought to command the assent and consent of our understandings and our hearts. We mean to confine ourselves, in a great measure, to a consideration of some misapprehensions which have been put forth in the present day in regard to the practical application of Calvinism; and to an attempt to show that these misapprehensions arise from partial, defective, and erroneous conceptions on this whole subject.

There is only one topic connected with the more speculative aspects of the question, on which we wish to make some observations, viz. the connection between election and reprobation, - as it is often called, - and the use which the Arminians commonly attempt to make in controversial discussion of the latter of these doctrines. We had occasion formerly to censure the course of procedure usually adopted by the Arminians in this matter. But we think it deserving of somewhat further discussion, as this will afford us an opportunity of exposing a very unfair, but very plausible, controversial artifice, which we fear has done much injury to what we believe to be the cause of God and truth.

It is the common practice of theologians - though there are some diversities in this respect - to employ the word predestination as comprehending the whole of God’s decrees or purposes, His resolutions or determinations, with respect to the ultimate destiny, the eternal condition, of mankind; and to regard election and reprobation as two divisions of the subject, falling under the general head of predestination, and exhausting it. Election comprehends the decrees or purposes of God in regard to those of the human race who are ultimately saved; while reprobation is commonly used as a general designation of His decrees or purposes in regard to those men who finally perish. It is admitted by Arminians as well as Calvinists that God decreed or resolved from eternity to do whatever He does or effects in time; and conversely, that whatever He does in time, He from eternity decreed or resolved to do. This is not, on the part of the Arminians, anything tantamount to an admission of the great fundamental principle of Calvinism, - viz. that “God from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of His own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass;” for they hold that many things come to pass, - such as the actions of free and morally responsible beings, - of which God is not the author or cause. These things, Arminians allege, God does not do or effect; and consequently He did not from eternity resolve to do or effect them. But whatever God really does or effects in time, - whatever comes to pass by His agency, so that He is to be regarded as the author or efficient cause of it, - they admit that He must be regarded as having from eternity decreed or resolved to do or effect. It is important to remember that intelligent Arminians concede this general principle; for it is very common among the lower class of Arminian writers to talk as if there was some special and peculiar difficulty in the eternity of the divine decrees or purposes, beyond and in addition to what is involved in the execution of them in time. But this is a mere fallacy, intended to make an impression upon the minds of unreflecting men. It cannot be disputed, that whatever God does or effects in time, He from eternity decreed or resolved to do or effect; and there is plainly no greater or additional difficulty, no deeper or more inexplicable mystery, attaching to the eternal purpose to do a thing - to effect a result, - than to the actual doing or effecting of it in time. If God does or effects anything in time, - such as the production of faith and repentance in the heart of a moral and responsible being, - there can be no greater difficulty, so far as concerns either the character of God or the capacities of men, in His having resolved from eternity to effect this result. Whatever God really does in time, He not only may, but He must, from eternity have resolved or determined to do.

Arminians do not deny this general principle; but they are commonly disposed to throw it into the background, or at least to abstain from giving it prominence; partly in order to leave room for appealing to men’s feelings, as if there was something specially harsh and repulsive in the eternity of the decree as distinguished from the execution of it in time, - and partly to keep out of sight the compound or duplicate evidence which Calvinists can produce from Scripture in support of their leading doctrines, by the legitimate application of this principle of the certain and necessary identity of the purpose and the execution of it. Whatever indications are given us in Scripture, as to what God decreed or purposed in regard either to those who are saved or those who perish, go equally to establish what it is that He does in time in regard to these two classes respectively; and whatever information is given us as to what He does in time with reference to the salvation of men individually, equally indicates what we must regard Him as having from eternity determined to do. And thus the scriptural evidence bearing upon both of these topics goes equally, and with combined force, to establish one great general conclusion, which is just the fundamental principle of the Calvinistic system of theology. But this by the way, - for we are not at present attempting a general discussion of predestination. We have adverted to this topic chiefly for the purpose of reminding our readers, that the words election and reprobation may be used, correctly enough, as general designations, either of what God purposed from eternity to do, or of what He does in time, in relation to the saved and the lost respectively; and that, so far as our present object is concerned, it is not necessary to have respect to this distinction between the eternal purpose and the execution of it.

Election, then, may be regarded as descriptive generally of what God purposed from eternity and does in time, in regard to the salvation of those who are saved; and reprobation as descriptive of what He purposed and does in regard to the fate of those who ultimately perish. And as those who are saved and those who perish comprehend all the individuals of the human race, it is evident, from the nature of the case, that election and reprobation must stand in a very close and intimate mutual relation; so that, if we have full and accurate conceptions of the one, we must thereby necessarily also know something of the other. Election, taken in this wide and general sense, is evidently a subject of much greater practical importance than reprobation; and, accordingly, there is much fuller and more direct information given us about it in Scripture. There is a great deal told us there about God’s purposes and procedure with respect to those who are saved; and there is very little, comparatively, told us about God’s purposes and procedure with respect to those who perish. We have, indeed, full information supplied to us, as to what it is that men must do to be saved, - as to what is required of them that they may escape God’s wrath and curse due to them for their sins; and we are assured that those to whom this information is communicated, and who fail to improve it for their own salvation, are themselves responsible for the fearful result. This information is of the last importance, and it is fully furnished to us in Scripture. But beyond this there is little told us in regard to those who perish, - very little, especially, in regard to any purposes or actings of God bearing upon their ultimate destiny as individuals. We have much information given us in Scripture about God’s purposes and actings in regard to those who are saved. We are told plainly of His eternal choice or selection of them for salvation, out of the human race all equally sunk in guilt and depravity; of His absolute, unconditional determination to save these persons so chosen or selected, in accordance with the provisions of a great scheme, which secures the glory of the divine character, the honour of the divine law, and the interests of personal holiness; and of the execution of this decree - the accomplishment of this purpose - by giving to these persons, or effecting in them, faith and regeneration, with all their appropriate results, by watching over them with special care after these great changes have been effected, by upholding and preserving them in the exercise of faith and in the practice of holiness, and by preparing them fully for the inheritance of the saints in light. By the application of these principles, we are able to give a full account of the great leading features and events in the history of every soul that is saved, from the eternal sovereign purpose of God to save that soul till its final admission to glory.

Calvinists contend that all these principles are set forth very directly and explicitly in the statements of Scripture; and in this state of things, common sense and common fairness plainly dictate, that the first thing to be done is to investigate and ascertain whether or not Scripture sanctions them; and if the result of the inquiry be a conviction that it does, to receive them as true and certain, along with all that is involved in, or results from them. Arminians, of course, deny that Scripture sanctions these principles, and endeavour to show the insufficiency of the grounds on which scriptural support is claimed for them. But they often prefer to conduct the discussion in a different way. They are usually anxious to give priority and prominence to the subject of reprobation; and having refuted, as they think, the Calvinistic doctrine upon this subject, they then draw the inference or deduction, that since election and reprobation are correlatives, and necessarily imply each other, the disproof of reprobation involves a disproof of election. Their reasons for adopting this line of policy in conducting the discussion are abundantly obvious, and somewhat tempting, but very far from being satisfactory or creditable. The Calvinistic doctrine of reprobation admits more easily of being distorted and perverted by misrepresentation than the doctrine of election; and of this facility many Arminians have not scrupled to avail themselves. The awful and mysterious subject of reprobation can likewise be easily presented in lights which make it appear harsh and repulsive to men’s natural feelings; and this is one main reason why Arminians are so fond of dwelling upon it, and labouring to give it great prominence in the discussion of this whole matter. The injustice and unfairness of this mode of dealing with the question is established by the consideration already adverted to, - viz. that there is much fuller and more explicit information given us in Scripture on the subject of election than of reprobation. If this be so, then it is plainly the dictate of common sense and common fairness, that we should investigate the evidence of the doctrine of election before we proceed to consider that of reprobation; and that we should not allow the conclusions we may have reached, upon satisfactory evidence, with respect to the subject that is more clearly revealed, to be disturbed by difficulties with respect to a subject which God has left shrouded in somewhat greater mystery.

Calvinists not only admit, but contend, that both as to their import and meaning, and as to their proof or evidence, the doctrines of election and reprobation are closely connected with each other; and that inferences or deductions with respect to the one may be legitimately and conclusively derived from the other. In the nature of the case, God’s purposes and procedure in regard to those who are saved must affect or regulate His purposes and procedure in regard to those who perish; and the knowledge of the one must throw some light upon the other. Calvinists have always maintained that the whole of what they believe and teach upon the subject of reprobation may be deduced, by undeniable logical inference, from the doctrine which they hold to be clearly taught in Scripture on the subject of election; and that it is also confirmed by the more vague and imperfect information given us in Scripture, bearing directly upon the subject of the fate of those who perish. No intelligent Calvinist has ever disputed the position, that election necessarily implies and leads to a corresponding reprobation. No Calvinists, indeed, have ever disputed this; except some of the weaker brethren among the evangelical churchmen in England, who have professed to believe in Calvinistic election as plainly set forth in their 17th Article, but who have declined to admit the doctrine of reprobation in any sense. We can sympathize with the feeling which leads men to shrink from giving prominence to this awful and mysterious subject, and even with the feeling which led to the omission of any formal deliverance regarding it, both in the Articles of the Church of England and in the original Scotch Confession of 1560, though both prepared by Calvinists. But there is no reason why men, in their investigation of divine truth, should not ascertain and state, and when necessary maintain and defend, the whole of what is contained in, or may be deduced from, Scripture on this as on other subjects.

Arminians, for controversial purposes, have frequently given great and undue prominence to this subject of reprobation; and some Calvinists, provoked by this unfair and discreditable procedure, have been occasionally tempted to follow their opponents into a minuteness and rashness of speculation that was painful and unbecoming. But Calvinists in general, while not shrinking from the discussion of this subject, have never shown any desire to enlarge upon it, beyond what was rendered necessary by the importunity of their opponents; and have usually conducted the discussion under the influence of a sense of the imperative obligation to keep strictly within the limits of what is revealed, and to carry on the whole investigation under a deep feeling of reverence and holy awe. Very different have been the spirit and conduct of many Arminians in dealing with this mysterious subject. They often shrink from meeting fairly and manfully the great mass of direct and positive evidence which can be produced from Scripture in support of the Calvinistic doctrine of election. They prefer to assail it indirectly by an attack upon the doctrine of reprobation; and they adopt this course because, as we have said, there is much less information given us in Scripture about reprobation than election, and because it is easier to distort and misrepresent the Calvinistic doctrine upon the one subject than the other, and to excite a prejudice against it. No man of ordinary candour will deny, that a great deal of evidence, which is at least very plausible, has been produced from statements contained in Scripture, in support of the Calvinistic doctrine of election. And if this be so, Calvinists are entitled to insist, that men who profess to be seeking the truth, and not merely contending for victory, shall, in the first place, deal with this direct and positive evidence, and dispose of it, by either admitting or disproving its validity; and shall not, in the first instance, have recourse to any indirect, inferential, and circuitous process for deciding the point at issue. But this mode of procedure, though plainly demanded by sound logic and an honest love of truth, is one which Arminians rather dislike and avoid; and hence the anxiety they have often shown to give priority and prominence to the subject of reprobation, and to attempt to settle the whole question about predestination by inferences deduced from it.

When the Remonstrants or Arminians were cited before the Synod of Dort, they insisted that, under the first article, which treated of predestination in general, the discussion should begin with an investigation of the doctrine of reprobation; and when the Synod, upon the obvious grounds of sound logic, common sense, and ordinary fairness, to which we have referred, - and which are fully set forth in the Judgments of the different Colleges of the Foreign Divines, embodied in the Acts of the Synod, - refused to concede this demand, the Arminians loudly complained of this as an act of great hardship and injustice. The excuse they gave for making this demand was this: that the difficulties which they had been led to entertain in regard to the truth of the system of doctrine generally received in the Reformed churches, were chiefly connected with the subject of reprobation; and that if this point could be cleared up to their satisfaction, there might be some hope of the two parties coming to an agreement. But this, besides being a mere pretence, was, upon the grounds which we have already adduced, plainly untenable upon any right basis of argument. It is conclusively answered by the fair application of the considerations, - that there is much fuller and clearer information given us in Scripture about election than about reprobation; that Calvinists really hold nothing on the subject of reprobation but what is virtually contained in, and necessarily deducible from, what is plainly taught in Scripture on the subject of election; and that the scriptural evidence for the doctrine of reprobation is, mainly and principally, though not exclusively, to be found in the scriptural proof of the doctrine of election, - that is, in the fair and legitimate application of the views revealed to us as to what God has purposed and does with respect to those who are saved, to the investigation of the question as to what He has purposed and does, or rather has not purposed and does not do, with respect to those who perish.

This unreasonable, unfair, and discreditable mode of procedure, adopted by Episcopius and his associates at the Synod of Dort, has been often since exhibited by Arminian controversialists, at least practically and in substance; though perhaps it has not been so explicitly stated, and so openly defended, as upon that occasion. We may refer to two or three instances of this.

The first work that appeared in England containing a formal and elaborate attack upon the Calvinistic system of theology, was published anonymously in 1633. Its author was Samuel Hoard, rector of Moreton, and its title was, “God’s Love to Mankind manifested by disproving His Absolute Decree for their Damnation.” And in accordance with this title, the work just consists of an attack upon the Calvinistic doctrine of reprobation, grossly distorted and misrepresented; without an attempt to answer the great mass of direct and positive proof, which Calvinists have produced from Scripture, in support of their doctrine of election. This work of Hoard’s had the honour of being formally answered by three great theologians, - Davenant, Twisse, and Amyraut, - the diversity of whose views upon some points, while they agreed in the main, gave, perhaps, to the discussion as a whole, additional interest and value. Davenant’s answer to Hoard was published in 1641, and is entitled, “Animadversions written by the Right Rev. Father in God, John, Lord Bishop of Salisbury, upon a Treatise entitled, ‘God’s Love to Mankind.’” Amyraut’s answer to Hoard was also published in 1641, and is entitled, “Doctrinae J. Calvini de Absoluto Reprobationis Deere to Defensio.” Hoard’s work had been translated into Latin, and published at Amsterdam, under the auspices of Grotius. Amyraut, who had incurred the suspicion of orthodox divines, by advocating - in his treatise on predestination, published in 1634 - the doctrine of universal redemption, seized this opportunity of showing that he zealously maintained the fundamental principles of the Calvinistic system of theology, by preparing and publishing a reply to this work, in defence of the doctrine of Calvin. Twisse’s reply to Hoard,, though written before any of the other answers, and, indeed, principally before the publication of Hoard’s work, which had been sent to him in manuscript, was not published till some years after its author’s death. It is entitled, “The Riches of God’s Love unto the Vessels of Mercy consistent with His Absolute Hatred or Reprobation of the Vessels of Wrath.” It was published in 1653, and was licensed and recommended by Dr Owen, at that time Vice Chancellor of Oxford. The first sentence of Owen’s prefatory recommendation of Twisse’s work is admirably pertinent to our purpose, and, indeed, brings out the only point with which we have at present to do in connection with this matter. It is this: -

£‘Of all those weighty parcels of gospel truth which the Arminians have chosen to oppose, there is not any about which they so much delight to try and exercise the strength of fleshly reasonings, as that of God’s eternal decree of reprobation; partly, because the Scripture doth not so abound in the delivery of this doctrine, as of some others lying in a more immediate subserviency to the obedience and consolation of the saints (though it be sufficiently revealed in them to the quieting of their spirits who have learned to captivate their understandings to the obedience of faith), - and partly, because they apprehend the truth thereof to be more exposed to the riotous oppositions of men’s tumultuating, carnal affections, whose help and assistance they by all means court and solicit in their contests against it.”

These three replies to Hoard rank among the most important and valuable works in this department of controversial theology. But at present we have to do with them only in this respect, that they all fully expose the erroneous and distorted account which Hoard gives of what it is that Calvinists really hold upon the subject of reprobation, and bring out the absurdity and unfairness of giving so much prominence to this topic in discussing the general question of predestination, - instead of beginning with the much more important subject of election, about which we have much fuller information given us in Scripture; and then, when the doctrine of Scripture upon the subject of election has been investigated and ascertained, proceeding to apply this, in connection with the fewer and obscurer intimations given us directly concerning reprobation, in determining what we ought to believe regarding it. We may give two or three extracts on these points from Davenant, whom - notwithstanding his somewhat unsound views as to the extent of the atonement - we consider one of the greatest divines the Church of England has ever produced. He thus points out the unfairness of the title, and of the general scope and object, of Hoard’s work, while admitting - as, of course, every intelligent theologian must do - that the election of some men necessarily implies a corresponding reprobation of the rest; and indicating, at the same time, the true use and application that should be made of the fact, that the 17th Article of the Church of England, though explicitly asserting the Calvinistic doctrine of election, makes no direct mention of reprobation.

“. . . Obliquely to oppose the eternal, free, and absolute decree of predestination or election, under colour of disapproving an absolute decree for any man’s damnation, befitteth not any divine who acknowledgeth the truth of that doctrine which the Scriptures have delivered, St. Augustine cleared, and the Church of England established in the 17th Article. But if the author of this treatise had no other aim than the overthrowing of such an eternal decree of predestination and preterition, as is fondly supposed will save men whether they repent or not repent, believe or not believe, persevere or not persevere; and such an absolute decree of reprobation as will damn men, though they should repent and believe, or will hinder any man from repenting or believing, or will cause and work any man’s impenitency or infidelity; we both wish, and shall endeavour together with him, to root such erroneous fancies out of all Christian minds.”

“The title of the book justly rejecteth an absolute decree for the damnation of any particular person: for such a decree was never enacted in God’s eternal counsel, nor ever published in His revealed word. But for absolute reprobation, - if by this word be understood only that preterition, non-election, or negative decree of predestination, which is contradictorily opposed to the decree of election, - the one is as absolute as the other, and neither dependeth upon the foreseen difference of men’s actions, but upon the absolute will of God. For if God from eternity absolutely elected some unto the infallible attainment of grace and glory, we cannot but grant that those who are not comprised within this absolute decree are as absolutely passed by, as the other are chosen. The decree of damnation, therefore, must not be confounded with the decree of negative predestination, which (according to the phrase of the school rather than of the Scripture) is usually termed reprobation. By which term of reprobation some understand only the denial of election or predestination. And because the negation is to be measured by the affirmation, unless we be agreed what is meant when we say, Peter was predestinated before the foundations of the world were laid, we can never rightly judge what is meant when, on the contrary, we avouch, Judas was reprobated before the foundations of the world were laid. Some others, under the name of reprobation, involve not only the negative decree of preparing such effectual grace as would bring them most certainly unto glory, but an affirmative decree also for the punishing of men eternally in hell-fire.

“So far forth as this author seemeth to oppose the absolute decree of predestination, and the absolute decree of negative reprobation or non-election, reducing them to the contrary foreseen conditions of good or bad acts in men, he crosseth the received doctrine of the Church of England. But if he intend only to prove that the adjudication of men unto eternal life or eternal death, and the temporal introduction of men into the kingdom of heaven, or casting of men into the torments of hell, are always accompanied with the divine prescience or intuition of contrary acts or qualities in those which are to be saved or condemned, we hold it and acknowledge it a most certain truth. Yet we must here add, that predestination and preterition are eternal acts immanent in God the Creator, whereas salvation and damnation are temporal effects terminated unto the creature: and therefore the latter may be suspended upon many conditions, though the former be in God never so absolute.

“The treatise ensuing would have had much more perspicuity if the author had briefly and plainly set down what he understandeth by this word predestination or election, and whether he conceive it to be an absolute or a concditional decree. If conditional, he should have showed us with whom God conditioned, upon what terms, and where the conditions stand upon record. If he grant absolute predestination, his plea for conditionate preterition will be to little purpose, with those who understand that the absolute election of such a certain number doth in eodem signo rationis as absolutely imply a certain number of men not elected.

“The wisdom of our Church of England in the 17th Article layeth down the doctrine of predestination, and doth not so much as in one word meddle with the point of reprobation; leaving men to conceive that the one is the bare negation or denial of that special favour and benefit which is freely intended and mercifully bestowed in the other. Would to God the children of this church had imitated the wisdom of their mother, and had not taken a quite contrary course, baulking the doctrine of predestination, and breaking in abruptly upon the doctrine of reprobation.

“I know not whether I should think him more defective who, in disputing about reprobation, runneth out into impertinent vagaries, or him that under -taketh the handling of this question without premising and opening the true nature of predestination.

“And no man need fear but (with all that are judicious, religious, and loving their own salvation) that manner of handling this controversy will be best accepted, which so reduceth man’s sin and damnation to himself, as withal it forgetteth not to reduce his justification, sanctification, glorification, not to any foreseen goodness springing out of man’s free-will, but to the free mercy of God, according to His eternal purpose effectually working in men those gifts and acts of grace which are the means to bring them unto glory.”

“If striving to be close he a probable argument of a bad cause, those who are afraid to deal with the more lightsome part of this controversy which concerneth election and predestination, and thrust themselves, without borrowing any light from this, into the other (which, taken by itself, is much more dark and obscure), are the men who strive to wrap themselves and others in an obscure and ‘dark cloud. Our Church of England was more willing and desirous to set down expressly the doctrine of absolute predestination, I mean of predestination causing faith and perseverance, than it was of absolute negative reprobation, I mean of such reprobation as implieth in God a will of permitting some men’s final impiety and impenitency, and of justly ordaining them unto punishment for the same: and yet the latter doth plainly follow upon the truth of the former. It was wisdom, and not Jewish or Turkish fear, which made our church so clear in the article for absolute predestination, and yet so reserved in the other; easily perceiving that predestination of some men cannot be affirmed, but non-predestination or preterition or negative reprobation (call it as you please) of some others must needs therewith be understood.

“Though truth be best uncovered, yet all truths are not of the same nature, nor alike profitable to be debated upon: yet for the truth of absolute reprobation, so far forth as it is connected and conjoined with absolute predestination, when the main intent of the Remonstrants is by opposing of the former to overthrow the latter, it importeth those who have subscribed to the 17th Article not to suffer it to be obliquely undermined.”

“The opinion here aimed at is the doctrine of absolute reprobation, concerning which all disputes are frivolous, if it be not first agreed upon what is understood by these two words, absolute reprobation.

“For the understanding whereof, observe first, what our church conceiveth under the term of predestination. If a decree of God first beholding and foreseeing certain particular persons as believing and constantly persevering unto the end in faith and godliness, and thereupon electing them unto eternal happiness, then we will grant that the Remonstrants (whom this author followeth) embrace the doctrine of the Church of England. But if, in our 17th Article, God in His eternal predestination beholdeth all men as lying in massa corrupta, and decreeth out of this generality of mankind, being all in a like damnable condition, to elect some by His secret counsel, to deliver them from the curse and damnation by a special calling according to His eternal purpose, and by working in them faith and perseverance; then it is plain that the Remonstrants and this author have left the doctrine of the Church of England in the point of predestination, and therefore may well be suspected also in the point of reprobation, which must have its true measure taken from that other.

“Secondly, take notice, what the word absolute importeth when it is applied unto the eternal and immanent acts or decrees of the divine predestination. Not (as the Remonstrants continually mistake it) a peremptory decree of saving persons elected, whether they believe or not believe, nor yet a decree of forcing or necessitating predestinate persons unto the acts of believing, repenting, persevering, or walking in the way which leadeth unto everlasting life; but a gracious and absolute decree of bestowing as well faith, repentance, and perseverance, as eternal life, upon all those to whom, in His everlasting purpose, He vouchsafed the special benefit of predestination. And that God can and doth according to His eternal purpose infallibly work faith and perseverance in the elect, without any coaction or necessitation of man’s will, is agreed upon by all catholic divines, and was never opposed but by Pelagius. And this absolute intending of eternal life to persons elected, and absolute intending of giving unto such the special grace of a perseverant faith, is that absolute predestination which our mother the church hath commended unto us, and which we must defend against the error of the semi-Pelagians and Remonstrants, who strive to bring in a predestination or election wherein God seeth faith and perseverance in certain men going before predestination, and doth not prepare it for them in eternity by His special act of predestination, nor bestow it upon them in due time, as a consequent effect of His eternal predestination.

“Thirdly, it is to be observed, that our church, in not speaking one word of reprobation in the Article, would have us to be more sparing in discussing this point than that other of election; quite contrary to the humour of the Remonstrants, who hang back when they are called to dispute upon predestination, but will by no authority be beat off from rushing at the first dash upon the point of reprobation.

“But further, from hence we may well collect, that our church, which by predestination understandeth a special benefit out of God’s mercy and absolute freedom, absolutely prepared from all eternity, and in time bestowed infallibly upon the elect, would have us conceive no further of the silenced decree of reprobation, than the not preparing of such effectual grace, the not decreeing of such persons unto the infallible attainment of glory, the decreeing to permit them through their own default deservedly and infallibly to procure their own misery. All this is no more than God himself hath avouched of himself, ‘miserebor cui voluero, et clemens ero in quem mihi placuerit.’ And that which the apostle attributeth unto God.

Fourthly, this non-predestinatio, non-electio, prseteritio or negatwa re-probatio (for by all these names divines speak of it), doth as absolutely leave some out of the number of the predestinate, as predestination doth include others within the same number. And the number of both, formally and materially, is so certain, that the diminution or augmentation of either is, by the general consent of orthodox divines, condemned for an erroneous opinion: though the semi-Pelagians spurned against this truth. If, under the name of absolute predestination, any conceive a violent decree of God thrusting men into a state of grace and glory, and under the name of absolute reprobation, a violent decree of God thrusting men into sin and misery, let who will confute them: for their opinion is erroneous concerning the one, and blasphemous concerning the other. But under colour of opposing such imaginary decrees, to bring in a conditionate predestination, to exclude this negative reprobation, to settle them both upon provision of human acts, is opposite to the doctrine of St Augustine, approved anciently by the catholic church, and till this new-fangled age, generally and commonly allowed and embraced both by the Romanists and by the Protestants.” Arminians, in more modern times, have not been slow to follow the example set them by their predecessors, in the mode of dealing with this subject. Whitby, in his Discourse on the Five Points, - which, though not a work of any great ability, was for a century, and until superseded by Tomline’s “Refutation of Calvinism,” the great oracle and text-book of the anti-evangelical Arminians of the Church of England, - devotes the two first chapters to the subject of reprobation. But perhaps the folly and unfairness of the Arminian mode of dealing with this subject, may be regarded as having reached its acme in John Wesley’s treatise, entitled, “Predestination calmly considered,” which was published about the middle of last century, and is contained in the tenth volume of the collected edition of his works. Wesley, in this treatise, begins with proving - what no intelligent Calvinist disputes - that the election of some men to everlasting life, necessarily implies what may be called a reprobation of the rest; or, as he expresses it, that “unconditional election cannot appear without the cloven foot of reprobation.” And having established this, he straightway commences an elaborate and violent attack upon reprobation, which he describes as “that mil1stone which hangs about the neck of your whole hypothesis,”! without attempting to grapple with the direct positive scriptural evidence, by which the doctrine of unconditional election has been established. Dr Gill, in an excellent reply to this treatise, entitled, “The Doctrine of Predestination stated/’ truly describes it in this way: - “Though he calls his pamphlet ‘Predestination calmly considered,’ yet it only considers one part of it, reprobation; and that not in a way of argument but harangue, not taking notice of our argument from Scripture or reason, only making some cavilling exceptions to it.” Wesley, indeed, is so engrossed and excited by reprobation, that he calls out, in a sort of frenzy, “Find out any election which does not imply reprobation, and I will gladly agree to it. But reprobation I can never agree to, while I believe the Scripture to be of God.” This mode of contemplating and dealing with the subject is manifestly inconsistent with sound reason and an honest love of truth. The first duty incumbent upon Wesley, and upon all men, in this matter, was just to “find out” what Scripture taught upon the subject of election, to receive its teaching upon that point with implicit submission, and to follow out the doctrine thus ascertained to all its legitimate consequences. He tells us, indeed, that he could not find the Calvinistic doctrine of election in Scripture; but he has not explained to us how he managed to dispose of the direct positive evidence usually adduced from Scripture in support of it. And we venture to think that if he had examined Scripture with due impartiality, without allowing himself to be scared by the bugbear of what he calls “the cloven foot of reprobation,” he would have found, as Calvinists have done, this election to be taught there, - viz., that God from eternity, out of the good pleasure of His own will, elected some men, absolutely and unconditionally, to everlasting life; and that, in the execution of this purpose, He invariably and infallibly bestows upon these men that faith, regeneration, and perseverance, which He alone can bestow, and without which they cannot be saved. We admit that this election necessarily implies a corresponding reprobation; but we really believe nothing more upon the subject of reprobation than what the election plainly taught in Scripture necessarily implies, - viz. this, that God passes by the rest of men, the non-elect, and leaves them in their natural state of guilt and depravity, withholding from them, or de facto not conferring upon them, that special grace, which, as He of course well knows, is necessary to the production of faith and regeneration; and doing this, as well as ultimately punishing them for their sin, in accordance with a decree or purpose which He had formed from eternity. We find in Scripture an election which necessarily implies this reprobation; and therefore we believe both upon the testimony of God. We do not consider ourselves at liberty to agree to “any election,” as Wesley says, but what we find taught in Scripture; and we regard ourselves as bound to agree to this election because taught there, even though it necessarily involves all that we believe on the subject of reprobation.

But we have said enough, we think, to show the unreasonableness and unfairness of the course frequently pursued by the Arminians, in labouring to excite a prejudice against the doctrine of election, by giving priority and prominence to the discussion of reprobation; and to enforce the obligation of the duty plainly imposed by logic, common sense, and candour, to deal in the first place, deliberately and impartially, with the mass of direct and positive scriptural evidence which Calvinists adduce in support of their doctrine of election, - without being prepossessed or prejudiced by any inferences or deductions that may be drawn from it, whether warrantably or the reverse, or by any collateral and extraneous considerations, Without pretending to discuss this subject, we would like, before leaving it, to make a few explanatory remarks, in the way of guarding against misapprehensions and misrepresentations of the doctrine generally held by Calvinists regarding it.

O O The sum and substance of what Calvinists believe upon the subject is this, that God decreed or purposed from eternity to do what He actually does in time, in regard to those who perish as well as in regard to those who are saved; and that this is in substance withholding from them, or abstaining from communicating to them, those gracious and insuperable influences of His Spirit, by which alone faith and regeneration can be produced, leaving them in their natural state of sin and misery, and then at last inflicting upon them the punishment which by their sin they have deserved. In stating and discussing the question about reprobation, Calvinistic divines are careful, as may be seen in the extracts quoted above from Davenant, to distinguish between two different acts, decreed or resolved on by God from eternity and executed by Him in time; the one negative and the other positive, - the one sovereign and the other judicial, - and both frequently comprehended under the general name of reprobation. The first of these, the negative or sovereign, - which is commonly called nonelection, preterition, or passing by, - is simply resolving to leave (and in consequence leaving) some men, those not chosen to everlasting life, in their natural state of sin and misery, - to withhold from them, or to abstain from conferring upon them, those supernatural gracious influences which are necessary to enable any man to repent and believe; so that the result is, that they continue in their sin, with the guilt of all their transgressions upon their head. The second act - the positive or judicial - is more properly that which is called in the Westminster Confession of Faith, “foreordaining to everlasting death,” and “ordaining” those who have been passed by “to dishonour and wrath for their sin.” God ordains no men to wrath or punishment except on account of their sin; and makes no decree, forms no purpose, to subject any to punishment, but what has reference to, and is founded on, their sin, as a thing certain and contemplated. But the first or negative act of non-election - preterition, or passing by - may be said to be absolute, since it is not founded on sin, and perseverance in it, as foreseen. Sin foreseen cannot be the proper ground or cause why some men are elected and others are passed by, for all men are sinners, and were foreseen as such. It cannot be alleged that those who were not elected, and who are passed by in the communication of special supernatural grace, have always been greater sinners than those who have been chosen and brought to eternal life. And with respect to the idea which might naturally suggest itself, - viz. that final impenitence, or unbelief foreseen might be the ground or cause, not only of the positive or judicial act of foreordination to punishment and misery, but also of the negative act of preterition, - this Calvinists hold to be inconsistent with the scriptural statements which so plainly ascribe the production of faith and regeneration, and of perseverance in faith and holiness, wherever they are produced, solely to the good pleasure of God and the efficacious operation of His Spirit, viewed in connection with the undoubted truth that He could, if He had chosen, have as easily produced the same results in others; and inconsistent likewise with the intimations plainly given us in Scripture, that there is something in God’s purposes and procedure, even in regard to those who perish, which can be resolved only into His own good pleasure, into the most wise and holy counsel of His will.

The leading objections against the Calvinistic doctrine of reprobation are founded upon misapprehensions and misrepresentations of its real import and bearings. The objections usually adduced against it are chiefly these; that it implies, 1st, That God created many men in order that He might at last consign them to everlasting misery; and 2d, That His decree of reprobation, or His eternal purpose concerning those who perish, is the proper cause or source of the sin and unbelief, on account of which they are ultimately condemned to destruction. Now Calvinists do not teach these doctrines, but repudiate and abjure them. They maintain that these doctrines cannot be shown to be fairly involved in anything which they do teach upon this subject. The answer to both these objections is mainly based upon the views we hold with respect to the original state and condition of man at his creation, and the sin and misery into which he afterwards fell. God made man upright, after His own image, in knowledge, righteousness, and holiness, - fitted and designed to glorify and enjoy his Maker; and this brings out the only true and proper end for which man was created. Calvinists have always not only admitted but contended, that there are important differences between the relation in which the divine foresight of the unbelief and impenitence of those who perish stands to the decree of reprobation, and that in which the foresight of the faith and perseverance of those who are saved stands to the decree of election; and between the way and manner in which these two decrees operate in the production of the means by which they are executed, means which may be said to consist substantially in the character and actions of their respective objects. We cannot dwell upon these differences. It is sufficient to say, that while Calvinists maintain that the decree of election is the cause or source of faith, holiness, and perseverance, in all in whom they are produced; they hold that the preterition of some men - that is, the first or negative act in the decree of reprobation, based upon God’s good pleasure, the counsel of His will - puts nothing in men, causes or effects no change in them, but simply leaves them as it found them, in the state of guilt and depravity to which they had fallen; while they admit that the second or positive part of the decree of reprobation, the foreordination to wrath and misery, as distinguished from preterition, is founded upon the foresight of men’s continuance in sin. God, in the purpose and act of preterition, took from them nothing which they had, withheld from them nothing to which they had a claim, exerted upon them no influence to constrain them to continue in sin, or to prevent them from repenting and believing; and in further appointing them to dishonour and wrath for their sin, He was not resolving to inflict upon them anything but what He foresaw that they would then have fully merited.

The considerations which have now been hinted at are amply sufficient, when expounded and applied, as they have been by Calvinistic divines, to answer the objections of the Arminians, - that is, the special objections which they usually adduce against the doctrine of reprobation, as distinguished from the more general objections commonly directed against the Calvinistic system of theology as a whole; and to expose the injustice and unfairness of the misrepresentations which they often give of our sentiments, that they may give greater plausibility to their objections.

We have stated that we do not mean to enter into the consideration of any of the great leading objections against Calvinism, based upon its alleged inconsistency with the moral attributes of God and the responsibility of man; or of the more abstract theoretical speculations which have been brought to bear upon the investigation of this subject. We propose to consider only some of the misapprehensions that have been put forth, and some of the difficulties that have been started, in regard to its practical application.

There is one general form of misrepresentation which Arminians often employ in dealing with the doctrines of Calvinism. It is exhibited in the practice of taking a part of our doctrine, disjoined from the rest, representing it as the whole of what we teach upon the point; and then showing, that thus viewed it is liable to serious objections and leads to injurious consequences. It is by a process of this sort that they give plausibility to their very common and favourite allegation, that the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination discourages or renders unnecessary the use of means, the employment of efforts for the attainment of ends, which we may be under an obligation to aim at, or influenced, by a desire to effect, - that it tends to discourage or preclude the steady pursuit of holiness, the conscientious discharge of duty, and the diligent improvement of the means of grace. Now this common allegation is possessed of plausibility, only if it be assumed as the doctrine of Calvinists, that God has foreordained the end without having also foreordained the means; and when their true and real doctrine upon the subject is brought out in all its extent and completeness, the plausibility of the objection entirely disappears.

The doctrine of the Westminster Confession upon this point is this, - that by God’s decree ordaining from eternity whatsoever cometh to pass, the liberty or contingency of second causes is not taken away but rather established; and that “although in relation to the foreknowledge and decree of God, the first cause, all things come to pass immutably and infallibly, yet by the same providence He ordereth them to fall out according to the nature of second causes, either necessarily, freely, or contingently;”! - that is, necessary things - things necessary from the nature or constitution which He has conferred on them, or the laws which He has prescribed to them - He ordereth to fall out, or take place, necessarily, or in accordance with their constitution and laws; and in like manner, He ordereth free things, as men’s actions, to fall out or take place freely, and contingent things contingently, according to their respective natures and proper regulating principles. The Confession also teaches, with more special reference to men’s eternal destinies, “that as God hath appointed the elect unto glory, so hath He, by the eternal and most free purpose of His will, foreordained all the means thereunto.” { And these means, of course, comprehend their faith, conversion, sanctification, and perseverance, - means indispensably necessary in every instance to the attainment of the end. Now, this doctrine of the foreordination of the means as well as the end - a foreordination which not only leaves unimpaired to second causes the operation of their own proper nature, constitution, and laws, but preserves and secures them in the possession and exercise of all these - is not only quite consistent with the Calvinistic scheme of doctrine, but forms a necessary and indispensable part of it. No doctrine does or can establish so firmly as this the actual invariable connection between the means and the end; and no doctrine is fitted to preserve in the minds of men so deep a sense of the reality and certainty of this connection. No Calvinist who understands the doctrine he professes to believe, and who takes it in and applies it in all its extent, can be in any danger of neglecting the use of means, which he knows to be fitting, in their own nature or by God’s appointment, as means, for the attainment of an end which he desires to have accomplished; because he must see, that to act in this way is practically to deny a part of the truth which he professes to hold, - that is, to deny that God has foreordained the means as well as the end, and has thus established a certain and invariable connection between them. Calvinists are in danger of being tempted to act upon this principle, only when they cherish defective and erroneous views of. the doctrines which they profess to believe; and in like manner it is only from the same defective and erroneous views of the true nature and the full import and bearing of the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination, that Arminians are led to charge it with a tendency to lead men to neglect or disregard the use of appropriate or prescribed means, in order to the attainment of ends.

All this is quite clear and certain, and it is perfectly conclusive as an answer to the objection we are considering. But how do the Arminians deal with this answer to their objection? They commonly just shut their eyes to the answer, or disregard or evade it, and continue to repeat the objection, as if it had not been, and could not be, answered. A very remarkable and honourable exception to this common policy of Arminians in dealing with this matter, has occurred in the present day in the case of Archbishop Whately. He has admitted that the word election, as used in Scripture, relates in most instances “to an arbitrary, irrespective, unconditional decree;” and he has also admitted that the arguments commonly directed against Calvinism, from its alleged inconsistency with the moral attributes of God, ought to be set aside as invalid; inasmuch as, in reality and substance, they are directed against facts or results, which undoubtedly occur under God's moral government, and must therefore be equally dealt with and disposed of by all parties. He has made a concession equally important to us, and equally honourable to him, upon the point which we are at present considering. He has distinctly admitted that the common allegation of the Arminians - that the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination overturns the necessity of means and efforts, and thereby tends to lead to a sinful, or to a careless and inactive, life - is unfounded; and is, indeed, disproved by the application which all intelligent Calvinists make of this essential part of their general doctrine - viz. that God has foreordained the means as well as the end, and has thereby established and secured a certain and invariable connection between them. He has, indeed, coupled this admission with the allegation that, by the very same process of argument and exposition by which, as he concedes, Calvinism can be vindicated from the charge of having an immoral or injurious tendency, by discouraging the conscientious discharge of duty and the diligent improvement of means, it can be shown that it admits of no practical application whatever, but is a mere barren, useless speculation. This allegation we propose now to consider, and we hope to be able to show that it is founded upon misconception and fallacy. But before doing so, it may be proper to give a specimen or two of the way in which the topic we have been considering is dealt with by Arminians who have less sagacity and candour than Dr Whately. We shall take our specimens from men who have sounder and more evangelical views of some of the fundamental principles of Christian theology than he has, and from whom, therefore, better things might have been expected, - John Wesley, the founder of the Methodists; and Richard Watson, perhaps the ablest and most accomplished theologian that important and useful body has yet produced.

Wesley,. certainly, w?as not a great theologian, and in that character is not entitled to much deference. His treatise on “Original Sin,” in reply to Dr John Taylor, is perhaps his best theological work, - and it is a respectable specimen of doctrinal exposition and discussion. Most of his other theological productions are characterized by inadequate information, and by hasty, superficial thinking; and these qualities were most conspicuously manifested when he was dealing with the doctrines of Calvinism. His leading objections to Calvinism he was accustomed to put, compendiously and popularly, in this format The sum of all this is this: One in twenty, suppose, of mankind are elected; nineteen in twenty are reprobated. The elect shall be saved, do what they will; the reprobate shall be damned, do what they can.”

The first part of this statement about the comparative number of the elect and the reprobate, the saved and the lost, though not very closely related to the subject at present under consideration, may be adverted to in passing, as suggesting a topic which Arminians often adduce in order to excite a prejudice against Calvinism, though it is really altogether irrelevant. A dogmatic assertion as to the comparative numbers of those of the human race who are saved, and of those who perish in the ultimate result of things, certainly forms no part of Calvinism. There is nothing to prevent Calvinists, as such, from believing that, as the result of Christ’s mediation, a great majority of the descendants of Adam shall be saved; nothing that should require them to deny salvation to any to whom Arminians could consistently concede it. The actual result of salvation in the case of a portion of the human race, and of destruction in the case of the rest, is the same in both systems, though they differ in the exposition of the principles according to which the result is regulated and brought about. In surveying the past history of the world, or in looking around on those who now occupy the earth, with the view of forming a sort of estimate of the fate that has overtaken, or that yet awaits, the generations of their fellow-men, Calvinists introduce no other principle, and apply no other standard, than just the will of God plainly revealed in His word as to what those things are which accompany salvation; and consequently, if in doing so, they should form a different estimate as to the comparative result from what Arminians would admit, this could not arise from anything peculiar to them as holding Calvinistic doctrines, but only from their having formed and applied a higher standard of the personal character, that is, of the holiness and morality, which are necessary to prepare men for admission to heaven, than the Arminians are willing to countenance. And yet it is very common to represent Calvinistic doctrines as leading, or tending to lead, those who hold them, to consign to everlasting misery a large portion of the human race whom the Arminians would admit to the enjoyment of heaven.

Neither is there anything in Calvinism necessarily requiring or implying a more unfavourable view than Arminianism exhibits, of the ultimate destiny of those of the human race who die in infancy, without having given any palpable manifestation of 'moral character. Calvinists believe that no one of the descendants of Adam is saved, unless he has been chosen of God in Christ before the foundation of the world, redeemed with Christ’s precious blood, and regenerated by the almighty agency of the Holy Spirit. And while all Calvinists hold that many infants, baptized and unbaptized, are saved in this way, there is nothing in their Calvinism to prevent them from believing, that all who die in infancy may have been elected, and may be saved through Christ. They are not, indeed, so bold and dogmatic as their opponents, in pronouncing what is or what is not consistent with the divine character in this matter. They are more fully alive to the fair influence of the consideration, that this subject is, from its very nature, an inscrutable mystery, and that very little light is thrown upon it by any information given us in Scripture. Upon these grounds, Calvinists have thought it right to abstain from dogmatic deliverances upon this subject; but many of them have been of opinion that there are indications in Scripture, though not very clear or explicit, which favour the idea, that all dying in infancy are elected and saved, and there is nothing in their Calvinism to prevent them from believing this.

But this topic is only incidental to the statement of Wesley, which we proposed to consider. The main point of it is, that he asserts that the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination necessarily implies a that the elect shall be saved, do what they will, and the reprobate shall be damned, do what they can.” Toplady published an excellent exposure of this offensive misrepresentation, based, of course, upon the principle which we have been explaining, that the means have been ordained as well as the end. Wesley attempted to defend himself in a small tract called "The Consequence Proved,” contained in his collected works. In this tract he undertakes to show that the sentence we quoted from him in introducing this topic “is a fair state of the case, this consequence does naturally and necessarily follow from the doctrine of absolute predestination.” His defence of himself just consists of a proof, which of course was very easy, that the Calvinistic doctrine implies, that the end in both cases was foreordained, and therefore infallibly certain, - of an assertion, that from this principle “the whole consequence follows clear as the noonday sun,”f - and of an attempt to excite odium against the doctrine of reprobation, by alleging that it necessarily produced or implied a putting forth of God’s agency in the actual production of depravity and unbelief in those who perish. He does not venture to look even at the principle, that the means are foreordained as well as the end, or attempt to show the inconclusiveness of this principle as an answer to his allegation. He simply repeats his allegation with increased audacity, and asserts that the “consequence follows clear as the noonday sun.” It is true that, in regard to the elect, the end is in each case foreordained, and of course their salvation is infallibly secured. But it is also true that this is only a part of our doctrine, - that we hold also that the means are foreordained and secured as well as the end, - and that these means, as God has plainly declared, and as all men, Calvinists as well as others, admit and believe, are faith in Christ, repentance unto life, holiness, and perseverance. God has just as fully and certainly provided for securing these means, as for securing the ultimate end of salvation, in regard to every one of the elect; and has made provision for all this in a way fully accordant with the nature of the subject, - viz. man as he is, with all his capacities and incapacities as they are. To suppose that any elect person should, in fact, continue till the end of his life, in a state of ungodliness and unbelief, is to suppose an impossibility. Our opponents have no right to make this supposition, because our doctrine, when fully apprehended and fairly applied, not only does not admit of it, but positively and infallibly precludes it, - that is, demonstrates and establishes its impossibility. It is true that all who are elected to eternal life shall certainly be saved. But it is also true, and it is equally a part of our doctrine, that all who are elected to eternal life shall certainly repent and believe, and shall certainly enter on, and persevere in, a course of new obedience. We can thus hold, and in entire consistency with all our peculiar principles, that no man shall be saved unless he repent and believe, and unless he persevere to the end in faith and holiness. And in this way it is manifest that - notwithstanding the truth of the doctrine, that all the elect shall infallibly be saved, and in perfect consistency with it - all the obligations incumbent upon men to believe and to persevere in faith and holiness, - of whatever kind these obligations may be, and from whatever source they may arise, - and the consequent obligations to use all the means which, according to God’s revealed arrangements, may contribute to the production of these intermediate results, continue, to say the least, wholly unimpaired.

The same principles apply, mutatis mutandis, to the case of the reprobate, though here, as we have explained, the subject is involved in deeper and more inscrutable mystery, and the information given us in Scripture is much less full and explicit; considerations which have generally led Calvinists to treat of it with brevity, caution, and reverence, while they have too often tempted Arminians to enlarge upon it presumptuously and offensively. We have already explained that Calvinists repudiate the representation which Wesley here gives of their doctrine of reprobation, as implying that God’s agency is the proper cause or source of the depravity and unbelief, on account of which the reprobate are finally consigned to misery. They deny that they hold this, and that anything they do hold can be proved necessarily to involve this consequence. Calvinists believe that men in their natural state of guilt and depravity are not able, by their own strength, to repent and believe; and that God bestows only on the elect, and not on the reprobate, that special supernatural grace which is necessary, in every instance, to the production of faith, holiness, and perseverance. They admit that they cannot give a full and adequate explanation of the consistency of these doctrines, with men’s undoubted and admitted, responsibility for their character and destiny. The doctrines of men’s inability in their natural condition to repent and believe, and of the nonbestowal upon all men of the supernatural grace which is necessary to enable them to do so, are just statements of matters of fact as to what man is, and as to what God does, and can be fully proved to be true and real both from Scripture and observation; and it is not a sufficient reason for rejecting these doctrines or facts, which can be satisfactorily established by their appropriate evidence, that we cannot fully explain how they are to be reconciled with the doctrine or fact of man’s responsibility. All that is logically incumbent upon us in these circumstances is just to prove, that the alleged inconsistency cannot be clearly and conclusively established; and this Calvinists undertake to do. And this being assumed, all that is further necessary in order to answer the Arminian objection, - as directed even against this most profound and mysterious department of the subject, - is to show, as can be easily done upon the principles already explained, that while men are responsible for not repenting and believing, there is nothing in our Calvinistic principles which precludes us from maintaining that every man who repents and believes shall certainly be saved.

So far then from Wesley’s assertion, that the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination necessarily implies that “the elect shall be saved, do what they will, and the reprobate shall be damned, do what they can,” giving “a fair state of the case,” it is evident that we can maintain, in full consistency with all our peculiar principles, that no man shall be saved unless he repent and believe, and persevere to the end in faith and holiness; and that every man who does so shall certainly be admitted to the enjoyment of eternal life.

The other instance we have to adduce, of an evasion of the fair application of the doctrine, that the means are foreordained as well as the end, is connected, not with predestination, as bearing upon the eternal destinies of man, hurt with the wider subject of the foreordination of all events, - of “whatsoever cometh to pass - and it is taken from Richard Watson, the great theologian of the Wesleyan Methodists. It occurs in a review, contained in the seventh volume of the collected edition of his works, of a volume of sermons by Dr Chalmers, published originally under the title “Sermons preached in St John’s Church, Glasgow.” This volume of sermons contains a masterly discourse upon Acts xxvii. 31, “Paul said to the centurion and the soldiers, Except these abide in the ship, ye cannot be saved;” and Mr. Watson’s review is chiefly occupied with an attempt to answer it. Dr Chalmers’ discourse is virtually an exposition and defence of the Calvinistic doctrine, that God hath unchangeably foreordained whatsoever comes to pass. It is based upon the assumption that the ultimate result in this matter, viz. the preservation of the whole ship’s company, had been absolutely predicted and promised by God to the apostle, and, of course, was infallibly and infrustrably certain; and it is mainly occupied with an exposition of the grounds which bring out the consistency of the absolute certainty of the result with the conditionality, contingency, or uncertainty which may seem to be implied in the apostle’s statement, that this result could not be effected, unless another event, dependent apparently upon the free agency of responsible beings, viz. the continuance of the crew in the ship, had previously taken place. The apparent inconsistency of the absoluteness and unconditionality of the final result - decreed, predicted, promised - with the seeming contingency or uncertainty of the intermediate step - the continuance of the crew in the ship - is explained, of course, by the application of the principle, that God had foreordained the means as well as the end; had foreordained, and made provision for certainly effecting or bringing about, the continuance of the crew in the ship, as well as the ultimate preservation of all who were on board. There was then no strict and proper conditionality - no real and ultimate contingency or uncertainty - attaching to this intermediate event. It was, equally with the ultimate result, comprehended in God’s plan or purpose; and equally certain provision, adapted to the nature of the case and the position and relations of all the parties concerned, had been made for securing that it should come to pass. The hypothetical or conditional statement of the apostle does not necessarily imply more than this, that an indissoluble connection had been established, and did really subsist, between the two events, the one as a means and the other as an end. If this connection really subsisted in God’s purpose and plan, then the apostle’s hypothetical statement was true; while it did not imply or assume real or actual uncertainty as attaching to either event, and was indeed fitted and intended, in accordance with the natural and appropriate operation of second causes, to contribute to bring about the result which God had resolved should come to pass. The whole history then of this matter, and all the different statements put on record regarding it, are fully explained by the doctrine, that the means are foreordained as well as the end; while in their turn they confirm and illustrate that doctrine, and confirm and illustrate also the principle formerly explained, which may be regarded as an expansion and application of that doctrine, - viz. that “although in relation to the foreknowledge and decree of God, the first cause, all things come to pass immutably and infallibly, yet by the same providence He ordereth them to fall out according to the nature of second causes, either necessarily, freely, or contingently.”

The apostle’s hypothetical or conditional statement here is to be explained and defended in the very same way as such statements as these, - “Except ye repent, ye shall perish;” “Whosoever believeth shall be saved.” These statements are virtually hypothetical or conditional in their form; they assert an invariable connection between the means and the end, and the existence of this connection is sufficient to show that they are true and warrantable. The statements being thus true and warrantable in themselves, are fitted to lead men who desire the end to adopt the means without which it cannot be attained; while they are not in the least inconsistent with the doctrine - resting upon its own proper scriptural grounds - that God alone can produce faith and repentance, and that He. certainly and infallibly bestows them on all whom He hath chosen to salvation.

This is the substance of the common Calvinistic argument; and it is brought out by Dr Chalmers in this sermon in a very powerful and impressive way. How is it met by Mr. Watson? He first of all tries to throw doubt upon the import and bearing of God’s declaration to the apostle, of His purpose or resolution to save the lives of all who were in the ship. He says, “The declaration was not that of a purpose, in the sense of a decree, at all, but of a promise.” But this is really nothing better than a quibble. God had said to the apostle, “There shall be no loss of any man’s life among you, but of the ship.” This was both a purpose and a promise, - it was the one just as much as the other; and it might also be regarded as a prediction, for a prediction is just a revelation of a purpose which God has formed in regard to a thing yet future. The words plainly import a declaration of an absolute and unconditional purpose of God, - an explicit prediction and promise of a definite event as certainly future, as infallibly and inevitably to take place. And this is so clear and certain, that it must be taken as a fixed principle in the interpretation of the whole narrative. Nothing must be admitted which contradicts this; and everything must, if possible, be so explained as to accord with it. Mr. Watson ventures to say, that the history shows that the apostle did not understand this as an absolute purpose on God’s part; for, “if he had, there was no motive to induce him to oppose the going away of the mariners in the boat.” This is a melancholy specimen of what able and upright men are sometimes tempted to do by the exigencies of controversy. That the apostle believed, upon God’s authority, that it was His absolute, irrevocable, and infrustrable purpose, that there was to be no loss of life, is made as clear and certain as words can make anything. He had also been told, upon the same infallible authority, that it was a part of God’s plan that the crew were to continue in the ship; not as if this were a condition on which the ultimate result was really and properly suspended, but as an intermediate step, through means of which that result was to be brought about. He knew that this mean had been foreordained as well as that end; and that thus a necessary connection had been established de facto between them. This is all that is necessarily implied in this hypothetical statement, “Except these abide in the ship, ye cannot be saved;” and he was guided to put the matter in this form, because this was the provision best fitted in itself, and was also foreordained in God’s purpose, for bringing about this intermediate event as a mean, and thereby effecting the end. Mr. Watson holds that the continuance of the crew in the ship was a condition on which the result of the preservation of the lives of all was, strictly and properly speaking, suspended; and infers from this that there was no absolute purpose to save them. That there was an absolute purpose to save them, is, to say the least, much more clear and certain than that there was any condition, strictly and properly so called, upon which the accomplishment of the result was suspended. And, independently of this, his argument is a mere quibble on the meaning of the word condition. He just asserts, over and over again, that an absolute purpose is an unconditional purpose assumes that a condition is something on which the result purposed or contemplated is really suspended; and then infers that, wherever there is a condition attached, there can be no absolute purpose. This is his whole argument; and it is really nothing better than a quibble, combined with a resolute determination to refuse to look at the explanations and arguments which Calvinists have brought forward in expounding and defending their views upon this subject.

Calvinists admit that the terms “absolute” and “conditional,” as applied to the divine decrees, are contradictory, or exclusive the one of the other; and that absolute and unconditional, in this application of them, are synonymous. But they deny that there are any divine decrees or purposes, or any predictions or promises, which can, in strict propriety of speech, be called conditional; while they admit that there are senses in which the word “condition” may be loosely and improperly applied to them. There are few words, indeed, which admit of, and have been employed in, a greater variety of senses and applications, than the word “condition.” So much is this the case, that Dr. Owen, in treating of the subject of the alleged conditions of justification, lays it down, as a sort of canon or axiom, “We cannot obtain a determinate sense of this word condition, but from a particular declaration of what is intended by it wherever it is used.” Accordingly, the exposition of the ambiguity of this word “condition,” with an exact specification of the different senses in which it may be and has been employed, - in relation to the divine purposes, predictions, and promises, - forms one of the best known and most important commonplaces in this controversy, and has been fully and largely handled by all the leading Calvinistic divines. But all this Mr. Watson resolutely ignores. He just assumes that a condition is a condition, as if it had only one meaning or signification; and as the apostle’s statement plainly implies, that in some sense or other the continuance of the crew in the ship might be called a condition of the result of saving the lives of all, and as Calvinists admit this, he infers that, as an absolute and a conditional purpose are contradictories, God could not have formed and declared an absolute purpose in the matter; and that, of course, notwithstanding anything which He had either foreordained or foreseen, the crew might have succeeded in their purpose of leaving the ship, and thus have frustrated the purpose, and prevented the result, which the apostle, speaking in God’s name, had absolutely and unconditionally predicted. Calvinists do not deny that there is a loose and improper sense in which the continuance of the crew in the ship might be called a condition of the saving of the lives of all on board; inasmuch as it was God’s purpose or plan that the one event should precede, and be a mean of bringing about, the other, - an indissoluble connection being thus established and secured between them. But they deny that the one was a condition of the other, in the strict and proper sense of that word. To represent it as a condition, strictly and properly so called, implies not merely that the ultimate result was suspended upon it, - for this, in a sense, might be said to be true, in virtue of the connection de facto established between them as means and end, - but also, that God could not make, or at least had not made, any certain and effectual provision for bringing it about; so that the first event, and of course the second also, was left in a position of absolute contingency or uncertainty, dependent for its coming into existence upon causes or influences over which God could not, or at least did not, exert any effectual control. It is only when the word a condition” is taken in this, its strict and proper sense, that an absolute and a conditional purpose are contradictories; and in this sense Calvinists deny that a conditional purpose was ever formed in the divine mind, or was ever embodied in a divine prediction or promise. There are no conditions, properly so called, attaching to the divine purposes, predictions, and promises. God has, absolutely and unconditionally, foreordained certain ends or ultimate results; and He has, with equal absoluteness and unconditionality, foreordained the means - that is, the intermediate steps or stages - by which they are to be brought about. And the conditional or hypothetical form in which predictions and promises are often put in Scripture, simply implies the existence of a de facto connection, or interdependence of events, as means and end; and is intended to operate upon men’s minds in the way of bringing about the accomplishment of ends, by leading to the use and improvement of the natural, ordinary, and appropriate means.

Mr. Watson refers to the great principle by which we answer the Arminian objection about the practical application of the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination, - viz. that God. has foreordained, the means as well as the end.; but he does so merely for the purpose of throwing it aside as irrelevant and fallacious. He does not venture to look it fairly in the face, or to realize its true import and bearing. He does not even attempt to point out either its fallacy or its irrelevancy. He disposes of it just by repeating his favourite axiom, - which is really the sum and substance of all that he has been able to produce upon this important department of the argument, - “It follows, if the predestination be absolute, that there are no conditions at all,” - a position which we can admit to be true as it stands, but the ambiguity and futility of which, in its bearing upon this branch of the controversy, we think we have sufficiently established.

The discussions in which we have been engaged may serve to illustrate the unfairness often practised by Arminians in basing their objections upon defective and erroneous notions of the real doctrines of Calvinism; and may be useful, also, in reminding Calvinists of the importance, with a view at once to the defence of truth against opponents, and the personal application of it in their own case, of seeking to form full and comprehensive views of the whole system of Christian doctrine, and of its different parts in all their bearings and relations.

The misrepresentations and evasions which we have pointed out in Wesley and Watson, are fair specimens of what is to be found in the generality of Arminian writers, in treating of this subject; and it is surely not wonderful that the penetration and sagacity of Archbishop Whately - though himself an Arminian - should have enabled him to perceive, and that his candour and courage should have led him to proclaim, the folly and futility of all this. He has, as we have explained, distinctly and fully admitted that the doctrine that God has foreordained the means as well as the end, and has thereby established a certain and indissoluble connection between them, as expounded and applied by Calvinistic divines, furnishes a conclusive answer to the common allegation, that Calvinism is injurious in its moral bearing and tendency, by leading men to neglect the discharge of duties and the use and improvement of means. The Calvinistic argument, indeed, upon this point, is so clear and conclusive, that the wonder is not that Whately should have admitted it to be satisfactory, but that Wesley, Watson, and Arminians in general should have denied it. The admission, however, is not the less honourable to Whately’s sagacity and candour; because, so far as we remember, he was the first Arminian who fully and openly made this important concession. If we could have believed that Whately’s example, on this point, would have been followed by Arminians, and that they would have admitted, as he has done, that the common allegation about the injurious moral bearing of Calvinism is answered or neutralized by a fair application of the whole of what Calvinists teach upon this subject, we would scarcely have taken the trouble to expose the statements of Wesley and Watson. But the whole history of theological controversy prevents us from cherishing this expectation, and constrains us to fear that the generality of Arminian writers will continue to reiterate the old objection, and to disregard or evade the conclusive answer which has been so often given to it.

Whately, as we have stated, while admitting that Calvinism can be successfully vindicated from the charge of having an injurious moral tendency, maintains that, by the same process by which this allegation is refuted, it can be proved that our doctrine has no practical bearing or effect whatever, but is a perfectly useless, barren speculation. His views upon this point are brought out in this way: “It may be admitted that one who does practically adopt and conform to this explanation of the doctrine, will not be led into any evil by it, since his conduct w~ill not be in any respect influenced by it. When thus explained, it is reduced to a purely speculative dogma, barren of all practical results.” “It is not contended that the doctrines in question have a hurtful influence on human conduct, and consequently are untrue, but that they have, according to the soundest exposition of them, no influence on our conduct whatever, and consequently (revelation not being designed to impart mere speculative knowledge) that they are not to be taught as revealed truths.” “The doctrine is, if rightly viewed, of a purely speculative character, not 6 belonging to us’ practically, and which ought not, at least, in any way to influence our conduct.” “Taking the system, then, as expounded by its soundest advocates, it is impossible to show any one point in which a person is called upon either to act or to feel in any respect differently in consequence of his adopting it.” “The preacher, in short, is to act in all respects as if the system were not true.” The general principle here laid down, of judging whether a doctrine be revealed or not by an application of the test whether it be merely speculative, or have a practical bearing upon conduct, is a very unsound and dangerous one. Even though we were to concede the truth of his abstract position, that et revelation is not designed to impart mere speculative knowledge,” - a position which is obscure and ambiguous, and the truth of which, consequently, is at least very doubtful, - we would still dispute the soundness and validity of the application he makes of it as a test. If we have a revelation from God, surely the right and reasonable course is, that we should do our utmost to ascertain correctly the whole of what it teaches upon every subject which it brings before us; assured that, whatever it reveals, it is incumbent upon us to believe and proclaim, and, in some way or other, useful or beneficial for us to know. And if there be fair ground for believing that, in some sense or other, “revelation is not designed to impart to us mere speculative knowledge,” then we should draw from this the inference, that the doctrine which we have ascertained to be revealed is not merely speculative, but has - more or less directly, and more or less obviously - some practical bearing or tendency. The soundness of this general inference is not in the least invalidated by the difficulty we may feel, in particular instances, in pointing out any very direct or obvious practical application of which a doctrine admits. Revelation was undoubtedly intended to convey to us what may be called speculative or theoretical knowledge; and though it may be admitted that the general and ultimate bearing and tendency of the whole system of revealed doctrine is to tell practically upon character and conduct, it does not follow that every particular doctrine must have a direct, and still less an obvious, practical application. Some doctrines may have been revealed to us chiefly, or even solely, for the purpose of completing the general system of doctrine which God intended to teach us, and of aiding us in forming more clear and enlarged conceptions of other doctrines of more fundamental importance, without having by themselves any direct and immediate practical bearing.

Such doctrines might with some plausibility be ranked under the head of what Whately calls “mere speculative knowledge and yet there is plainly no ground for regarding this as a proof, or even a presumption, that they have not been revealed, - if there be adequate ground, on a careful examination of the statements of Scripture, for believing that they are taught or indicated there. To set up our notions or impressions upon the question, whether a particular doctrine, alleged to be revealed in Scripture, is purely speculative or has a practical influence upon conduct, as furnishing anything like a test of the sufficiency of its scriptural evidence, is nothing better than presumptuous rationalism, and is fitted to undermine the supreme authority and the right application of Scripture as the infallible standard of truth. Dr. Whately, to do him justice, has exhibited a good deal of obscurity and confusion in treating of this point. He says: “I have waived the question as to the truth or falsity of the Calvinistic doctrine of election, inquiring only whether it be revealed;” and then he goes on to assert, that “one of the reasons for deciding that question in the negative” is, that “the doctrine is, if rightly viewed, of a purely speculative character;” and again, “I purposely abstain throughout from entering on the question as to what is absolutely true, inquiring only what is or is not to be received and taught as a portion of revealed gospel truth.” Now we may surely assume that whatever is really taught in Scripture is to be received as “revealed gospel truth;” and if so, then this forced and arbitrary distinction between the absolute truth of the Calvinistic doctrine, and its claim as a revealed truth, entirely disappears. The whole question resolves into this, What saith the Scripture 1 and this question must be determined upon its own proper grounds. If the Scripture sanctions the Calvinistic doctrine of election, then this establishes both its absolute truth and its position and claims as a revealed truth. If the Scripture does not sanction it, then it is not to be received either as true or as revealed; for Calvinists, while maintaining that the fundamental principles of their system derive support and confirmation from the doctrines of natural theology, have never imagined that their doctrine of election, with all that it necessarily implies, could be conclusively proved to be true, except from the testimony of revelation. It would almost seem (for this is really the only supposition which can give anything like clearness or consistency to his statement) that he had a sort of vague notion - a kind of lurking suspicion - that the Calvinistic doctrine of election, though not revealed in Scripture, might or could be established by evidence derived from some other source, might be true though not revealed. But this is a position which probably he will not venture openly to assume; and, therefore, we must continue to adhere to the conviction, that his statements upon this subject are characterized by obscurity and confusion.

We have thought it proper to animadvert upon the fallacious and dangerous notions which seem to be involved in Dr. Whately’s general views upon the subject of applying the practical influence of doctrines as a test, not of whether they are true, but of whether they are revealed. But we have no hesitation in denying his more specific position, that the Calvinistic doctrine of election, when so expounded as to stand clear of any injurious tendency, has no practical bearing or effect, but is a mere useless, barren speculation. All that has been or can be proved upon this point is simply this, that the practical application of the Calvinistic doctrine does not extend over so wide a sphere, and does not bear so directly upon certain topics, as has sometimes been alleged both by its supporters and its opponents.

The alleged practical tendencies and effects of Calvinism have always, entered very largely into the discussion of this whole controversy. Objections to the truth of Calvinism on the ground of its practical moral tendency, very obviously suggest themselves to men’s minds, and carry with them a considerable measure of plausibility; and men professing to believe Calvinistic doctrines have occasionally spoken and acted in such a way as to afford some countenance to these objections of opponents. Considering the obviousness and the plausibility of these objections, and the prominent place they have usually occupied in the writings of Arminians, it is of great importance that we have it now conceded by so able an opponent as Whately, that they are utterly baseless. In discussing this subject of the practical tendency of their system, Calvinists have acted chiefly upon the defensive. They have usually contented themselves, in a great measure, with repelling these objections, and proving that they are destitute of all solid foundation; and having accomplished this, they have then fallen back again upon the direct and positive scriptural proof of their doctrine as establishing at once its truth, its importance, and its practical usefulness. The two principal rules by which we ought to be guided in discussing this branch of the subject, both with a view to the defence of our doctrine against opponents, and also to the discharge of the duty of making ourselves a right and profitable application of it, are these: - 1st, That the whole of the doctrine, and all that it necessarily involves, be fairly and fully taken into account, and a due application made of every part of it; and especially that it never be forgotten that God’s decrees and purposes, in reference to the eternal destinies of men, comprehend or include the means as well as the end, and thus provide for and secure an invariable connection in fact between the means and the end - a connection which is not, and cannot be, in any instance dissolved; and 2d, That we fully and freely admit, and apply at the same time, all other doctrines and principles which are established by satisfactory scriptural evidence, even though we may not be able fully to explain how they can be shown to be consistent with the peculiar doctrines of our system. A careful attention to these two rules will enable us easily and conclusively to repel the objections of our opponents; and at the same time will effectually preserve us from falling into any serious error, in our own personal practical application of the doctrines we profess to believe.

This is quite sufficient for all merely controversial purposes. But it is due to Dr. Whately, who has shown so much candour and fairness in admitting the insufficiency of several arguments generally employed by the Arminians, to advert somewhat more particularly to his allegation, that the Calvinistic doctrine of election, though admitted to be, when rightly and fully explained, harmless and unobjectionable, is shown by the same process to be a mere barren, useless speculation, having no practical influence whatever; or, as he puts it, that “it is impossible to show any one point in which a person is called upon either to act or to feel in any respect differently in consequence of his adopting it.” Calvinists do not profess to found much upon the practical application which may be made of their doctrine of election, as affording a positive argument in support of it. They are usually satisfied with proving from Scripture that it is true; that it is revealed there as an object of faith; and that, with respect to its practical application, it can be shown to be liable to no serious or solid objection. They admit that it is not fitted or intended to exert so comprehensive and so direct an influence upon character and conduct, as the great fundamental doctrines revealed in Scripture concerning the guilt and depravity of men in their natural state, the person and work of the Redeemer, and the agency of the Holy Spirit; and therefore should not hold so prominent a place as these in the ordinary course of public instruction. But they deny that it is a barren, useless speculation. They maintain that it has an appropriate practical influence, in its own proper place and sphere; and that this influence, in its own department, and whenever it comes legitimately into operation, is most wholesome and beneficial. There are, as all intelligent Calvinists admit, important departments of the duties imposed upon us by Scripture, - important steps which men must take in order to the salvation of their souls, - on which the Calvinistic doctrine of election has no direct practical bearing. It is upon a perversion or exaggeration of this fact, admitted by us, that the whole plausibility of Whately’s allegation rests; and it will be a sufficient answer to the substance of his statements upon this subject, and may at the same time serve other useful purposes, if - while indicating how far and in what sense his allegation is true - we briefly point out some legitimate practical applications of this doctrine, which are peculiar to it, and which cannot be derived from any other source. In doing so, we shall restrict our attention, as Whately does, to the subject of predestination in its bearing upon the eternal destinies of men, without including the more comprehensive subject of the foreordination of whatsoever comes to pass; and shall of course now assume that the Calvinistic doctrine is true, and is held intelligently by those who profess to believe it. We hope to be able to show that Whately’s error upon this point is traceable principally to this, that he has not here made the same full and candid estimate, as in some other branches of the argument, of the whole of what Calvinists usually adduce in explaining the practical application of their doctrine, and confines his observation to some of the features of the subject, and these not the most important and peculiar.

The Calvinistic doctrine of predestination casts important light upon the character and moral government of God, a knowledge of which may be said to be the foundation of all religion. God makes himself known to us by all that He does, and by all that He permits to take place; and if it be true that He has from eternity formed certain decrees and purposes with regard to the everlasting destinies of men, and is executing these decrees or purposes in time, and if He has made known to us that He has done and is doing so, this must, from the nature of the case, afford important materials for knowing Him, and for understanding the principles that regulate His dealings with His creatures. Whatever He does or has purposed to do, must be in entire accordance with all the attributes and perfections of His nature, and is thus fitted to afford us materials for forming right apprehensions of their true bearing and results. We must form no conceptions of the supposed holiness, justice, or goodness of God, or of the way and manner in which these attributes would lead Him to act, inconsistent with what He has done or purposed to do. On the contrary, we must employ all that we know concerning His procedure to regulate our views of His attributes and character. It is very common for men, especially those who reject the doctrines of Calvinism, to frame to themselves certain conceptions of the divine attributes, and then to deduce from them certain notions as to what God must do or cannot do. But this mode of reasoning is unphilosophical and dangerous, unsuited to our powers and capacities, which manifestly require of us that we should adopt an opposite course of procedure, and form our conceptions of the divine attributes from what we know of the divine purposes and actions; and at least admit nothing into our conceptions of God’s character, inconsistent with what we know that He has done or has purposed. The doctrine of predestination is to be regarded as serving a purpose, in this respect, analogous to that of the fall of the angels, - an event which has occurred under God’s moral government, and is fitted to throw important light upon His character. The fact revealed to us, that some angels fell from their first estate, and that all who fell were left to perish irremediably, without any provision having been made for restoring them, or any opportunity of repentance having been allowed to them, refutes some of the conceptions which men are apt to form in regard to the divine character; and it should be remembered and applied in the way of leading us to form juster conceptions upon this subject than generally obtain among us. The fact that, from the race of man, - all of them equally fallen and involved in guilt and depravity, - God of His good pleasure has predestinated some men to everlasting life, and passed by the rest and left them to perish in their sins, suggests nothing concerning the divine character inconsistent with what is indicated by the history of the fallen angels; but while, in so far as concerns those men who perish, it confirms all the views of God which the history of the fallen angels suggests, and which we are usually most unwilling to receive, it supplies, in the purpose to save some men with an everlasting salvation, a new and most impressive manifestation of the divine character and moral government, which could not, so far as we can see, have been furnished in any other way. It is important then that we should realize what the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination, as a general truth revealed in Scripture, represents God as having purposed from eternity, both in regard to those who are saved and those who perish; and that we should apply this, as a great reality, in forming our conceptions of God’s character and moral government, that thus we may know Him as fully as He has made himself known to us; and may be enabled to glorify Him, by cherishing and expressing emotions, corresponding in every respect to all the perfections which He possesses, and to all the principles which actually regulate His dealings with His creatures.

Dr. Whately might probably call this 66 mere speculative knowledge.” But this would be an abuse of language; for it is certain that all the knowledge which God has been pleased to communicate to us concerning himself, concerning the perfections of His nature and the principles of His moral government, is both fitted and intended to exert a practical influence upon the feelings and conduct of men.

But while it is thus plain that the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination - contemplated simply as a truth about God revealed in Scripture - is fitted to exert a general practical influence upon men’s views and feelings, we have further to inquire, whether there be any direct personal application which men can legitimately make of it, in its bearing upon themselves singly and individually. And upon this question, the substance of what we believe to be true is this, - 1st, That men cannot legitimately make any direct personal application of this doctrine to themselves individually, unless and until they have good reason to believe that they themselves individually have been elected to eternal life, - that is, of course (for there is no other way of ascertaining this), good reason to believe that they have been enabled to receive and submit to Christ as their Saviour, and have been born again of His word and Spirit; and 2d, That when men have come to believe, upon good grounds, that they have been elected, the personal practical application of the doctrine is most obvious and most wholesome.

Men cannot make any direct personal application of the doctrine of predestination to themselves individually, so long as they continue in their natural state of guilt and estrangement from God, and while they have not yet embraced the offers and invitations of the gospel and entered the service of Christ; and therefore, with reference to all the duties and obligations attaching to this condition of things, the doctrine is not to be taken into account, or to exert any direct practical influence. We admit, nay, we contend, that this doctrine has no immediate practical bearing upon the process of setting before sinners, and urging upon them, the commands and invitations addressed to them in connection with the scheme of salvation, or on the right regulation of their conduct in dealing with these commands and invitations. This arises manifestly from the very nature of the case. Preachers of the gospel are not only warranted but bound to address the offers and invitations of God’s word to men indiscriminately, without distinction and exception; and having God’s sanction and command for this, they should do”it without hesitation and without restriction. God does this, in order that He may thereby execute the purpose which He formed from eternity concerning the everlasting destinies of men; and that He may do so in accordance with the principles of man’s moral constitution, and with all his capacities and responsibilities; and ministers are bound to do this in God’s name, just because He requires it at their hands. Those who have not yet submitted to, or complied with, the commands and invitations of the gospel, cannot, in their present state, - though they may know, and profess to believe, the general doctrine of predestination as a part of God’s revealed truth, - know anything whatever bearing in any way upon the question, whether they themselves individually have been elected or not; and therefore they have no right to take any opinion or impression upon this point into account, in dealing with the commands and invitations which are addressed to them. As they can know nothing about it, they should in the meantime leave it out of view, and give it no practical weight or effect whatever. The general doctrine of predestination - the truth that God has chosen some men to everlasting life, and has resolved to pass by the rest and to leave them to perish in their sins - is taught in Scripture; and therefore all who have access to the Bible ought to believe it. But men are to apply and to act upon only what they do know; and as, at the time when they are in the condition of considering how they should deal with the commands and invitations of the gospel, addressed to them and pressed upon them, they cannot know whether they themselves have been elected or not, they are not at liberty to take either an affirmative or a negative opinion upon this point into account, and to act upon it as a reality - as a thing known. The general truth, that God has elected some and passed by others, - which is the whole of the doctrine of predestination as taught in Scripture, - does not furnish any materials whatever for practically influencing their conduct in their present circumstances, or with reference to the point which they have at present under consideration, and with which they are bound to deal; and therefore their duty, in right reason, is just to abstain from applying it to the particular matter on hand, and to proceed at once to obey the command and to accept of the invitation addressed to them. Any other course of procedure,in the circumstances is manifestly irrational, as resting upon no actual ground of knowledge; and as the doctrine of predestination taught in Scripture does not rationally produce, or tend to produce, a hesitation or a refusal to accept of the offers and invitations of the gospel, so it is in no way legitimately responsible for this result in any instance in which it may have been exhibited.

All this is abundantly evident; and though denied by most Arminians, who would fain represent the doctrine of predestination as throwing rational and legitimate obstacles in the way of men receiving and submitting to the gospel, it is admitted by Dr. Whately, who makes it an objection to our doctrine, that “the preacher” (and, of course, also the hearer) “is to act in all respects as if the system were not true.” This is not a correct representation of the state of the case. The preacher is bound to state the whole truth of God, as it is revealed in His word; and to urge upon every man to apply every truth according to its true nature and real import, viewed in connection with his actual circumstances. The doctrine of predestination, as we have seen, casts much light upon the character and moral government of God; and it must always be a matter of great practical importance, that men have full and correct views and impressions upon these points. Whenever they have learned this doctrine, they are bound to apply it, according to its true nature and all that it fairly involves. But at the time when they have not yet embraced the offers and invitations of the gospel, and are only considering how they should deal with them, they have not yet any materials whatever for applying it, in the way of bearing upon the question, whether they have been elected or not; and therefore, so far as that point is concerned,'they are to act, not as Dr. Whately says, as if the system or general doctrine of predestination were not true, but merely (for this is evidently the true state of the case) as if it did not then, at that time, afford any materials for determining one particular question concerning themselves individually; and thus did not afford any materials for deciding upon the one point of how they should deal with the commands and invitations addressed to them. Thus far, and to this extent, it is true that neither preacher nor hearer can make a direct, personal, individual application of the doctrine; but this is very far from warranting Whately’s assertion, that the doctrine does not admit of any personal practical application whatever.

For men may come at length to know upon sound and rational grounds that they have been elected to everlasting life; and it is then, and then only, that the practical personal application of the doctrine to men individually is brought out. Arminians are accustomed to represent the matter as if the belief of the general scriptural doctrine, that God has elected some men to life and passed by the rest, must necessarily include in it the means of knowing directly and immediately what men individually have been elected, and what have been passed by; and they often insinuate, moreover, that all who profess to believe in the doctrine of election, imagine, upon the mere ground of the truth of this doctrine, and without any intermediate process, that they themselves have been elected. God might have revealed to us this general doctrine, and required us to apply it in the way of regulating our general conceptions of His character and moral government, and yet might have afforded us no materials for deciding certainly at any time, whether we individually had been elected or not. And in connection with this point, it is most important to remember that He has not provided any materials from which any man upon earth can ever, without a special revelation, be warranted in drawing the conclusion that he himself, or that any one of his fellow-men, has not been elected; and that consequently no man is ever warranted to act upon this conviction as certainly true of himself. Arminians are fond of representing the doctrine of predestination as fitted to throw men into despair, by making them believe that they are foreordained to everlasting death. But while the doctrine implies that this is true of some men, in the sense which has been explained, it does not contain in itself, or when viewed in connection with any materials which are within our reach, any ground to warrant any man to come to this conclusion with respect to himself. And, therefore, despair is not in any case the proper legitimate result of the application of this doctrine, but must arise, wherever it exists, from the perversion or abuse of it, or of some other principle connected with it. Men may, indeed, have abundant ground for the conclusion that their present condition is one of guilt and depravity; and that, consequently, if they were to die now, they would inevitably be consigned to misery. But there is evidently nothing in this that affords any legitimate ground for the conclusion that God has from eternity passed them by and resolved to withhold from them His grace. This was once the condition of all men; and many have been rescued from it who had gone to a fearful excess of depravity. If men, indeed, did or could know that they had been guilty of the sin against the Holy Ghost, or of the sin unto death, they might then legitimately draw the inference, that their eternal doom was fixed and could not be changed. But while we know the general truth that such sins may be committed, there are no materials provided in Scripture, by the application of which any man is warranted in coming to the certain and positive conclusion that he has committed them. And, in like manner, while we know that God has resolved to leave some men to perish in their sin, we have no materials provided by which any man is warranted, while he is upon earth, in coming to the conclusion that he belongs to this number; and consequently there is no legitimate ground in the doctrine of predestination, or in any other doctrine taught in Scripture, why any man should despair, - should renounce all hope of salvation, - should act as if his condemnation were unchangeably determined, and on this account should refuse to comply with the offers and invitations of the gospel.

But although no man while upon earth can have any good ground for despairing of salvation, - as if he had full warrant for the conclusion that he has not been elected, - men may have good ground for believing that they have been from eternity elected to everlasting life; and of course are called upon to apply this conviction according to its true nature and bearings. This important point is thus admirably stated in the Westminster Confession: - “The doctrine of this high mystery of predestination is to be handled with special prudence and care, that men attending to the will of God revealed in His word, and yielding obedience thereunto, may, from the certainty of their effectual vocation, be assured of their eternal election. So shall this doctrine afford matter of praise, reverence, and admiration of God; and of humility, diligence, and abundant consolation, to all that sincerely obey the gospel.” No man has any ground to conclude that he has been elected, merely because Scripture teaches the general doctrine, that God has chosen some men to everlasting life. Other materials must be furnished and applied, before any man is warranted to cherish this conviction. Some change must be effected in him, which is a necessary or invariable accompaniment or consequence of eternal election, and which may thus test and establish its reality in reference to him. It is a part of our doctrine, that every man who has been elected to life from eternity is in time effectually called, or has faith and regeneration produced in him by the operation of God’s Spirit. No man has or can have any sufficient ground for believing that he has been elected, unless and until he has been enabled to believe in Christ Jesus, and has been born again of the word of God through the belief of the truth; and wherever these changes have been effected, this must have been done in the execution of God’s eternal purpose; and thus, taken in connection with the Scripture doctrines of election and perseverance, they afford satisfactory grounds for the conclusion, that every one in whom they have been wrought has been from eternity elected to life, and shall certainly be saved. It is only from the certainty of their effectual vocation that men can be assured of their eternal election. But all who have been effectually called, and who are assured of this by a right application of the scriptural materials bearing upon the point, are bound, in the application of the doctrine of election, to believe that they have been elected, and to apply this conclusion according to its true nature and bearings.

The materials by which men may attain to certainty as to their effectual vocation are to be found partly in Scripture, and partly in themselves; and by a right use of these materials, men may, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, attain to a firm and well-grounded conviction upon this point; and thus arrive at decided conclusions, both with respect to God’s eternal purposes in regard to them, and with respect to their own everlasting destiny. If they have fallen into error in the application of these materials, if they have been persuaded of the certainty of their effectual vocation without good grounds, - that is, if they believe that they have been effectually called when they have not, - then, of course, all their ulterior conclusions about the certainty of their election and of their perseverance fall to the ground; they too must be equally erroneous, and therefore can exert only an injurious influence. But the doctrine of election is not responsible for this error, or for any of the injurious consequences that may have resulted from it. The error was solely their own, arising either from ignorance of what Scripture teaches upon the subject of effectual calling, or from ignorance of themselves, - or from both. Such cases afford no specimen of the right and legitimate application, or the natural and appropriate tendency, of the doctrine of election, or of any doctrine that is connected with it. The full and legitimate application of this doctrine is exhibited only in the case of those who have been effectually called, - who are persuaded of this upon solid and satisfactory grounds, - and who, from this fact, viewed in connection with the general doctrine of election taught in Scripture, have drawn the inference or conclusion, that they have been elected to everlasting life, and that they shall certainly persevere in faith and holiness unto the end, and be eternally saved.

And what is the natural and appropriate result of this state of mind, - of these views and convictions about our present condition and future prospects, and the whole procedure of God in connection with them? The legitimate result of this state of mind, and consequently the right application of the doctrine, as soon as it comes to admit of a direct practical bearing on the case of men individually, is not to encourage them in carelessness or indifference about the regulation of their conduct, about the discharge of their duty, as if the result were secured do what they might, - that is, as if God had not established an invariable connection between the means and the end, or had not left all the moral obligations under which men he at least unimpaired. Dr. Whately admits that our doctrine is not liable to any charge of injurious tendency on this ground. But it is surely manifest that it is fitted to exert, directly and positively, an important practical influence. When men who have been effectually called, infer from their effectual vocation, established by its appropriate evidence, that they have been elected and shall certainly be saved; and when they realize and apply aright all the views which are thus presented of their condition, obligations, and prospects, - of all that God has done and will yet do with regard to them; the result must be, that the doctrine of election, or the special aspect in which that doctrine presents and impresses all the considerations, retrospective and prospective, which ought to influence and affect the mind, will afford, as the Confession says, “matter of praise, reverence, and admiration of God;” inasmuch as it brings out, in a light, clearer, more palpable, and more impressive than could be derived from any other source, how entirely God is the author of our salvation and of all that leads to it, - of all that we have and all that we hope for, - how gloriously His perfections have been manifested in all that He has done for us, - and how supremely we should feel ourselves constrained to show forth His praises, and to yield ourselves unto Him. It must afford, also, “matter of humility, diligence, and abundant consolation to all who sincerely obey the gospel,” - most effectually bringing down every high thought and every imagination that exalteth itself, filling with peace and joy in believing amid every difficulty and danger, and keeping alive at all times a sense of the most profound and powerful obligation to aim supremely and unceasingly at the great object to which God’s electing purpose was directed, - on account of which, in the execution of that purpose, Christ gave himself for us, and sent forth His Spirit into our hearts, - viz. that we should be holy and without blame before Him in love, that we should be cleansed from all filthiness of the flesh and of the spirit, and be enabled to perfect holiness in the fear of the Lord, that we should be made meet for the everlasting enjoyment of His glorious presence.

When, then, men are assured of their eternal election, as an inference or deduction from the certainty of their effectual vocation, this suggests and inculcates views of God and of themselves - of what He has purposed and done for them, and of the relation in which they stand to Him - of their past history, present condition, and future prospects - which cannot be derived, at least in the same measure and degree, or of so definite and effective a character, from any other form or aspect in which these subjects can be presented; views fitted to cherish in the heart all those feelings, desires, and motives that constitute or produce true piety and genuine godliness, and thus to assimilate men’s character and conduct on earth to the life of heaven.

In a note subjoined to his “Essay on Election,” Dr. Whately makes an ingenious attempt to get some countenance to his notion, that the Calvinistic doctrine of election has no practical effect or bearing, from the 17th Article of the Church of England; while at the same time he tries to undermine the testimony in favour of Calvinism, which has been derived from that Article; and it may tend to throw further light upon the subject we have been considering, if we briefly examine his statements upon this point. He begins with quoting from one of his previous works some observations upon the principles which have often regulated the composition, and should therefore regulate the interpretation, of public ecclesiastical documents or symbolical books. He dwells especially upon the idea that these documents have been often the results of a compromise among men who differed somewhat from each other in their opinions, and illustrates the bearing of this consideration upon the right mode of explaining and applying them. His general views upon this subject are very sound and judicious, and may be most usefully applied in the explanation of many important ecclesiastical documents; but we think he utterly fails in the attempt he makes to apply them to the 17th Article of his own church. We quote the whole of his statement upon this point, and we request our readers to give it their special attention: -

“Our 17th Article is a striking exemplification of what has been said; for it contains modifications and limitations in one part of what is laid down in another, such as go near to neutralize the one by the other.

“It begins by stating the doctrine of predestination in a form which certainly may be, and we know often has been, understood in the Calvinistic sense; and then it proceeds to point out the danger of dwelling on that doctrine, if so understood, before curious and carnal persons, of whom one may presume there will usually be some in any congregation or mixed company, so that such a doctrine is seldom if ever to be publicly set forth. Next, it cautions us against taking the divine promises otherwise than as they are generally (generaliter) set forth in Scripture; that is, as made to classes of men, - those of such and such a description, and not to individuals. We are not, in short, to pronounce this or that man one of the elect (in the Calvinistic sense), except so far as we may judge from the kind of character he manifests. And lastly, we are warned, in our own conduct, not to vindicate any act as conformable to God’s will, on the ground that whatever takes place must have been decreed by Him, but are to consider conformity to His will as consisting in obedience to His injunctions.

“If, then, some may say, this doctrine is (1) not to be publicly set forth, nor (2) applied in owe judgment of any individual, nor (3) applied in our own conduct, why need it have been at all mentioned?

“As for the comfort enjoyed from the ‘godly consideration’ of it by those who ‘feel within themselves the working of God’s Holy Spirit,’ etc., it would be most unreasonable to suppose that this cannot be equally enjoyed by those who do not hold predestinarian views, but who not the less fully trust in and love their Redeemer, and ‘keep His saying.’

“But the Article is manifestly the result of a compromise between conflicting views; one party insisting on the insertion of certain statements, which the other consented to admit only on condition of the insertion of certain limitations and cautions, to guard against the dangers that might attend the reception of the doctrine in a sense of which the former passage is capable.”

The views set forth in this passage may be considered in two different aspects: - 1st, In their bearing generally upon the Calvinism of the Articles; and 2d, In their bearing upon Whately’s special allegation, that the Calvinistic doctrine does not admit of any practical application.

On the first of these topics,. Whately seems to intend to insinuate that the 17th Article, as it stands, was the result of a compromise between men holding different and opposite views on the subjects controverted between Calvinists and Arminians; some statements being put in to please or satisfy the one party, and some to please or satisfy the other. It is on the ground of some notion of this sort that many have contended that the theology of the Church of England is neither Calvinism nor Arminianism; while others have embodied the same general idea in a somewhat different form, by maintaining that it is both the one and the other. But there is nothing whatever to support the idea of any such compromise, either in the actual statements of the Article itself, or in the historical facts as to the theological sentiments of its authors, and the circumstances in which it was composed. It must now be regarded as a conclusively established historical fact, - a fact about which there is scarcely room for an honest difference of opinion, - that the framers of the English Articles were Calvinists, and of course intended to teach Calvinism; or at least could not have intended to teach anything at all inconsistent with it. And there is certainly nothing in the Article itself to contradict or discountenance this conclusion, to which the whole history of the matter so plainly points. There is not one statement contained in the Article to which any reasonable and intelligent Calvinist ever has objected, or ever could have thought of objecting. How honest and intelligent men who are not Calvinists can satisfy or pacify their consciences in subscribing it, is a mystery which we never have been able to solve. But with this we are not at present concerned. It is certain that there is nothing in the 17th Article - not a thought or idea - but what is found in other confessions undeniably Calvinistic, and in the writings of Calvin himself, and of all the ablest and most eminent Calvinistic divines. The framers of the English Articles were no doubt moderate Calvinists, who were not disposed to give countenance to the more extreme and minute expositions of the subject in which some Calvinists have indulged; and who were anxious to guard against the practical abuses into which some unintelligent and injudicious persons have fallen in the application of the doctrine, and to which we admit the doctrine is obviously liable in the hands of such persons. But there is really not a shadow of ground for Whately’s assertion, that “the Article is manifestly the result of a compromise between conflicting views;” and the conclusive proof of this is, that there is nothing in it which would not naturally and at once suggest itself as a matter of course to any intelligent Calvinist, who wished to give a temperate and careful statement of his opinions. His statements about “modifications and limitations,” “limitations and cautions,” which one party insisted upon in order to neutralize something else; and about this party consenting to admit the leading and general position, which it is admitted has a very Calvinistic aspect, “only on the condition of the insertion” of these limitations and cautions to modify it, are a pure fiction, utterly unsupported by anything either in the history of the Article or in the Article itself. No man could have made such statements who was intelligently acquainted with the writings of Calvinistic divines, which make it manifest that such cautions and limitations constitute a natural and familiar commonplace in the exposition of their system of theology. Not only are the limitations and cautions in the Article perfectly consistent with Calvinism, but some of them are of such a nature as could only have been suggested and required by a previous statement of Calvinistic doctrine; and thus afford a positive proof, that its leading general statement is, and was intended to be, a declaration of the fundamental principle of Calvinism.

It is but fair, however, to remark, that Dr. Whately has not here stated, precisely and explicitly, what were the “conflicting views” which he considers to have been compromised in the Article by modifying and neutralizing limitations; and that thus it may be open to him to allege, in his own defence, that he did not mean to deny the Calvinism of the Article, or to assert that there is anything in it opposed to the views generally held by Calvinistic divines; and that the “conflicting views,” which he says were compromised, referred only to minor points, in which Calvinists might differ among themselves. If this should be pleaded in his defence, then we have to say that he ought to have made his meaning and object more clear and definite than he has done; and that the natural and obvious bearing of his statements, viewed in connection with the common mode of discussing this topic among a large class of Episcopalian divines, decidedly favours the idea, that, by “conflicting views,” he just meant the opposite opinions of Calvinists and Arminians. If his statement about “conflicting views” referred to points of inferior importance, in which Calvinists might differ from each other, it is at once trifling and irrelevant; and if it referred to the differences between Calvinists and Arminians, it is conclusively disproved, at once by all that is known concerning the history and the authors of the Article, and by the fact that there is nothing in it but what is maintained explicitly and unhesitatingly by the great body of Calvinistic theologians.

But we have to do at present chiefly with the attempt made by Whately to get, from the 17th Article, support for his allegation, that the Calvinistic doctrine of election does not admit of any practical application. The Article consists of three divisions. The first, and most important, is a general statement of the doctrine which Whately says “may be, and we know often has been, understood in the Calvinistic sense and which all Calvinists regard as a clear and accurate description of the whole process by which sinners are saved, in full accordance with the distinctive features of their system of theology. The second division sets forth the practical application of this Calvinistic doctrine under two heads, - the first declaring the “sweet and pleasant” use that may be made of it “by godly persons,” “as well because it doth greatly establish and confirm their faith of eternal salvation to be enjoyed through Christ, as because it doth fervently kindle their love towards God;” and the second warning against an abuse to which it may be perverted by “curious and carnal persons lacking (in the Latin destituti) the spirit of Christ,” who, if they “have continually before their eyes the sentence of God’s predestination,” may be led thereby into despair and profligacy. The third and last division consists of two positions, which do not, indeed, quite so clearly and certainly suggest or imply the Calvinistic doctrine, as do the use and abuse under the second division, but which are at least perfectly consistent with it. They may, indeed, be called “limitations and cautions;” since, in exact accordance with the principles we have already explained, they limit the sphere of the practical application of the doctrine, and caution against applying it to' matters on which it has no proper or legitimate bearing. These two limitations or cautions are, - first, “we must receive God’s promises in such wise as they be generally set forth to us in Scripture;5’ and second, “in our doings, that will of God is to be followed which we have expressly declared to us in the word of God.” .

It will be observed that Whately, in the quotation we have given from him, postpones the consideration of the first head under the second division, about the use or application that is and should be made of this doctrine by godly persons; proceeds at once to the abuse of the doctrine condemned in the second head of the second division, and to the two limitations or cautions set forth in the third; and having endeavoured to extort from these three topics some support for his main allegation, he then returns to the explicit declaration of the Article about the right use or practical application of the doctrine, and tries to dispose of it. The whole process is very curious, as a specimen of careful and elaborate sophistry, though it is certainly not very successful.

The way in which he turns to account the statement in the Article, about the abuse that may be made of the doctrine by carnal and ungodly persons, is this: Upon the assumption that there will usually be some such persons in any congregation, he bases the inference that “such a doctrine is seldom if ever to be publicly set forth;” and from the application which he afterwards makes of this inference, in his summing up of the argument, it is plain that he wishes it to be received as suggested by, or involved in, the statement in the Article itself, as if it were intended to be taught there at least by implication. Now, it is surely manifest that there is nothing in the Article which affords any appearance of ground for this inference. The ability of a doctrine to be abused by a certain class of persons is certainly not a sufficient reason why it should be “seldom if ever publicly set forth,” but only a reason why, when it is set forth, the right use and application of it should be carefully pointed out, and the abuse or perversion of it carefully guarded against. To ascribe to the compilers of this Article a notion of so peculiar a kind, as that a doctrine which they had set forth as a great scriptural truth should seldom if ever be publicly taught, when they had not said this, or anything like it, and to do this upon a ground so palpably inadequate, is a kind of procedure which is wholly unwarrantable.

He then proceeds to the two limitations or cautions set forth in the third and last division of the Article; and to the account which, in the first instance, he gives of their import and bearing, we have nothing to object. It is true, as he alleges, that the first of them implies that “we are not to pronounce this or that man one of the elect (in the Calvinistic sense), except so far as we may judge from the kind of character he manifests;” and that the second implies, that we are, “in our own conduct, not to vindicate any act as conformable to God’s will, on the ground that whatever takes place must have been decreed by Him, but to consider conformity to His will as consisting in obedience to His injunctions.” These positions are true in themselves; they are plainly implied in the concluding division of the Article; and they certainly limit materially the sphere of the practical application of the doctrine; but we think it manifest, from the explanations which have already been submitted, that they are altogether irrelevant to Whately’s leading allegation, that the doctrine admits of no practical application whatever.

He then goes on to give the summing up of the preceding argument in this way: 66 If, then, some may say” (he evidently wishes it to be believed that men may say all this truly and justly), “this doctrine is (1) not to be publicly set forth, nor (2) applied in our judgment of any individual, nor (3) applied in our own conduct, why need it have been at all mentioned?” The conclusion here indefinitely and modestly indicated in the shape of a question, is evidently intended as equivalent to an assertion of his favourite position, that the Calvinistic doctrine of election, even if admitted to be true, is a mere barren speculation, destitute of all practical influence. The question in which his conclusion is embodied is virtually addressed to the compilers of the Articles, and it plainly involves a serious charge against them for teaching this doctrine, when, in Whately’s estimation, there was no need to mention it. Their answer to this charge would undoubtedly have been, that there was need to mention it - 1st, because it was a portion of God’s revealed truth; and 2d, because it had an important practical use or application in the case of godly persons, as they had fully set forth in the first head of the second division of the Article. But let us advert to the three points in which he has summed up his argument, and which he represents as all sanctioned by the statements of the Article on which he had been commenting. The first is, that “this doctrine is not to be publicly set forth.” This he had previously put in the modified form, that “it is seldom if ever to be publicly set forth;” but now, when he is summing up his argument, and endeavouring to found upon this consideration a presumption (for he could scarcely regard it as a proof) in support of his conclusion, he drops the qualification, and makes the assertion absolute, - cc the doctrine is not to be publicly set forth.” We have already shown that there is no ground for this assertion in anything contained in the Article. The statement that the doctrine is liable to be abused by a certain class of persons, affords no ground whatever for the inference which Whately deduces from it, even in its qualified form. It furnishes good ground, indeed, for the declaration of the Westminster Confession, that the a doctrine of this high mystery of predestination is to be handled with special prudence and care,” but for nothing more; and with this, we have no doubt, the compilers of the Thirty-nine Articles would have been perfectly satisfied, as embodying all that they meant to teach upon this point.

The second and third points - viz. that this doctrine is not to be applied, or does not admit of any practical application, either in our judgment of any individual, or in the regulation of our own conduct - are intended as a compendious statement of the two limitations or cautions in the concluding section of the Article. These two points he had previously explained more fully and definitely, and, as we have admitted, correctly. But we do not admit that there is the same fairness and correctness in the more indefinite and compendious statement of them which he now gives in his summing up. Our objection to his argument, founded upon these two points, was, that they merely limited the sphere of the practical application of the doctrine of election, but did not prove his allegation, that it had no practical application whatever. He seems to have had a sort of indistinct apprehension of this radical defect in his argument; and in his summing up he tries to conceal it, by putting these two points in the most indefinite and comprehensive form, so as to give them the appearance of covering the whole ground, and thus leaving no room whatever for the practical application of the doctrine. To say absolutely, and without any qualification or explanation, that the doctrine is not to be applied in our judgment of any individual or in our own conduct, is to assert rather more than we can admit to be true in itself, or sanctioned by the statements of the Article, and rather more than is implied in the more full and formal exposition of these statements which he himself had previously given. On these grounds, we cannot but regard Whately’s summing up of his argument upon this subject as exhibiting more of the sophist than of the logician.

After having done what he could to find some materials in the Article to give positive countenance to his allegation, he comes at last to consider what is there set forth about the use and application of the doctrine. This - both from its position in the Article, and its more direct and immediate bearing upon the point in dispute - ought in fairness to have been considered first. But Whately evidently thought it expedient to accumulate something like evidence in support of his position, before he ventured to face the statement which so explicitly and conclusively disproves it. The way in which he attempts to dispose of the statement is this, - “As for the comfort enjoyed from the ‘godly consideration’ of it by those who ‘feel within themselves the workings of God’s Holy Spirit,’ etc., it would be most unreasonable to suppose that this cannot be equally enjoyed by those who do not hold predestinarian views, but who not the less fully trust in and love their Redeemer, and keep His saying.” Now, upon this we have to remark, 1st, That the Article does most expressly ascribe a specific use - a definite practical application - to the godly consideration of this doctrine by truly religious persons; and 2d, That there is nothing unreasonable in ascribing to it this use and application. The Article expressly asserts, that “the godly consideration of predestination and our election in Christ is full of sweet, pleasant, and unspeakable comfort to godly persons;” and the ascription of this result to the “consideration” of this doctrine, is of itself a flat and explicit contradiction to Whately’s position, which no sophistry or shuffling, and no accumulation of probabilities or presumptions, can evade or dispose of. The Article further specifies the process by which the consideration of this doctrine produces this result of “unspeakable comfort to godly persons;” - viz. “as well because it doth greatly establish and confirm their faith of eternal salvation to be enjoyed through Christ, as because it doth fervently kindle their love to God.” To allege that the Article, in ascribing to this doctrine the production of unspeakable comfort, by confirming men’s faith of their eternal salvation, and increasing their love to God, did not intend to state anything peculiar to this doctrine, but merely described what might be derived equally or as fully from the consideration of other doctrines, is plainly to charge the Article with containing downright nonsense or unmeaning verbiage. And here we may remark by the way, that the manifest and exact accordance between the view given in the 17th Article of the Church of England, concerning the right use and application of the doctrine of “predestination and our election in Christ,” with the representation given of the same subject in the Westminster Confession, which we have already explained and illustrated, furnishes a proof of the identity of the system of doctrine taught in these two symbols.

As to the alleged unreasonableness of ascribing any such use or application specifically to the Calvinistic doctrine of election, we have, we think, sufficiently refuted this in our general observations upon this subject. And, indeed, it is surely self-evident, that this doctrine, when intelligently and rationally applied by persons who have good grounds for believing that they have been elected to eternal life, must produce practical results upon their views and feelings, - results operating beneficially upon their character and conduct, - which cannot be derived equally, if at all, from any other source. We admit, indeed, that the practical results derived from the application of this doctrine are confined within a narrow sphere, and do not bear directly upon the enjoyment of the great essential blessings of the gospel, or upon the production of the fundamental elements of Christian character. They do not bear directly upon justification and regeneration, - the essential blessings on which universally, and in every instance, the salvation of sinners depends. They are connected more immediately with what may be called the secondary or subordinate blessings of the gospel, - “assurance of God’s love, peace of conscience, and joy in the Holy Ghost.” But these form no unimportant part of the gospel provision. They materially affect not only the “comfort of godly persons,” but their growth in grace; and they operate powerfully in aiding their increase in holiness, and in securing their perseverance therein unto the end. Every sinner who has been justified and regenerated shall assuredly be saved. And we have no doubt that many men have been made meet for heaven, and admitted to the enjoyment of it, who never, so long as they continued upon earth, understood or believed the Calvinistic doctrine of election. The specific practical personal application of the doctrine, by men individually in their own case, requires, indeed, as its necessary antecedents and conditions, not only that they have in fact been enabled to repent and believe in Christ, - that they have entered upon the way which leadeth to 'heaven, by embracing Christ as He is freely offered to them in the gospel, - but also, that they are assured, upon good and sufficient grounds, that this is their present condition. And we willingly concede that not a few have been by God’s grace brought into this condition, and at last admitted into the kingdom of glory, who never attained to a distinct “certainty of their effectual vocation,” and therefore could not be rationally “assured of their eternal election;” and who, of course, could make no direct personal application of the doctrine of election to their own case, or derive from it the special spiritual benefit which it is fitted to impart. But we are persuaded that all these persons lived somewhat beneath their privileges, - failed, to some extent, in walking worthily of their high and holy calling, - and came short, more or less, in fully adorning their Christian profession, by their ignorance or unbelief of the information which God has given us in His word, concerning His sovereign purpose of mercy in Christ Jesus in regard to all who are saved; an absolute and unchangeable purpose formed from eternity, and executed in time, by bestowing upon them all those things which accompany salvation, and prepare for the enjoyment of heaven.

We shall conclude with a few additional remarks suggested by the last section of the 17th of the Thirty-nine Articles. It is expressed in these words: - “Furthermore, we must receive God’s promises in such wise as they be generally set forth to us in Holy Scripture; and, in our doings, that will of God is to be followed which we have expressly declared unto us in the word of God.” We have already said enough to show that these two statements - while they certainly limit or restrict the legitimate sphere of the personal practical application of the Calvinistic doctrine of election, and caution against the abuses which have been made of it - contain nothing whatever in the least inconsistent with Calvinism; nothing but what is to be found in the writings of all Calvinistic divines. It is, indeed, a curious circumstance, - and it has been often referred to, in opposition to the attempts which have been made to deduce from this portion of the Article an argument against the Calvinism of its leading position, - that the second and most important part of this statement, which virtually includes or comprehends the first, is expressed in the very words of Calvin; while the first part of it is to be found, in its whole substance and spirit, in many parts of his writings. We concede to the Arminians that the word generally, here, is not to be taken in the sense of usually or ordinarily, but is intended to indicate the character of the promises as set forth in Scripture in a general, indefinite, unlimited, unrestricted way. There is nothing in this, however, which renders any service to their cause. The word promises is to be taken here, as it was used by the Reformers in general, in a wider sense than that in which it is commonly employed in more modern times. The Reformers generally used this word as comprehending all the offers and invitations of the gospel addressed to men in general, - to sinners as such, - freely offering to them all the blessings of salvation, and inviting them to come to God through Christ, that they may receive and enjoy these blessings. In modem times, the word promises is commonly taken in a more restricted sense, as descriptive of those scriptural statements which are addressed specially to believers, - to those who have already been united to Christ by faith, - and which assume, that this is their present position. But the word as used in the Article plainly comprehends, and, indeed, has special reference to, what we now commonly call the offers and invitations of the gospel, or those scriptural statements which tell the human race of the provision which God has made for saving them; and on this ground call upon them to turn from sin unto God, to believe in the Lord Jesus Christ, and to lay hold of the hope set before them. Now, the substance of what is taught in the Article is this, that these offers and invitations are set forth to us in Scripture in a general or universal form, - no restriction being made, no exception being put forth, no previous qualification being required as a condition of accepting them, - and that we must deal with, or apply them, in this their general or unrestricted character, without bringing in, at this stage, either the general doctrine of predestination, or its possible, but wholly unknown, bearing upon individuals, in order to modify or limit the general scriptural representations, or the manner in which they ought to be dealt with. Here, neither the general doctrine of predestination, nor its imagined bearing upon individuals, has any proper place, or can exert any legitimate practical influence. The offers and invitations must be set forth as they stand, in all their unrestricted generality, and should be dealt with unhesitatingly, according to their natural and obvious meaning and import. This is all that is involved in the first part of the statement we are considering; and to all this Calvinists have no hesitation in assenting. They set forth the general offers and invitations of the gospel addressed to mankind at large, in order to lead them from darkness to light; they do all this as freely and fully, as cordially and earnestly, as any other class of theologians; and they think they can show that it cannot be proved that there is anything in all this inconsistent with the peculiar doctrines they hold.

We have said that the second part of this statement about the “will of God” virtually includes the first part about the “promises.” And the reason is this, that the promises - that is, the offers and invitations of the gospel - virtually comprehend or involve commands or injunctions, and of course impose duties and obligations. The offers and invitations of the gospel are intended to lead men to repent and believe, by setting before them motives and encouragements to persuade them to do so. But they at the same time include or imply a command, that those to whom they are addressed should receive them and deal with them according to their true nature and import. God has made this their imperative duty, by explicit injunctions contained in His word. “To escape the wrath and curse of God due to us for sin, God requireth of us faith in Jesus Christ, repentance unto life, with the diligent use of all the outward and ordinary means whereby Christ communicateth to us the benefits of redemption.” It is true, indeed, that the right mode of representing and applying the offers and invitations of the gospel is of such transcendent importance, from its direct and immediate bearing on the only process by which sinners individually are saved, that it was proper to state it distinctly by itself, and to give it the fullest prominence. But it is not the less true, that the substance of what ought to be said upon this topic is virtually comprehended in the wider statement, which the compilers of the Articles expressed in the words of Calvin, - viz. “that, in our doings, that will of God is to be followed which we have expressly declared to us in the word of God.” The general import of this position is, that our whole conduct is to be regulated, in all matters bearing upon our relation to God and our eternal welfare, by the laws, injunctions, or commands which are imposed upon us in Scripture; and not by anything which we may or can know as to God’s purposes or intentions with respect either to ourselves or others, or with respect to any events or results that may be anticipated. This is manifestly a sound principle; and no intelligent Calvinist has ever refused or hesitated to assent to it, and to act upon it. There have, indeed, been great disputes between the Calvinists and the Arminians in regard to the will of God - voluntas Dei; and the right exposition of this subject may be said to enter vitally and fundamentally into the controversy between them. But the disputes do not turn upon the point with which we have at present to do. Calvinists agree with Arminians in holding that the exclusive rule of our duty - of what we are bound to do - is that will of God which is plainly set forth in His word in the form of injunctions or commands. The language employed in the Article - “that will of God” - naturally suggests the idea that there is another will of God besides what is here described, or another sense in which the expression may be employed; and it is about this other will that a great deal of controversy has been carried on. We cannot enter on the consideration of this topic, though it is very important in itself, and though there are indications that it is very ill understood by some in the present day who call themselves Calvinists. We have room only for a few words, not upon the subject itself, but merely upon some of the terms commonly used in the discussion of it.

That will of God which we have expressly declared to us in His word,” and which is universally admitted to be the exclusive rule of our duty, is called by Calvinistic divines by a variety of designations. They call it voluntas praecepti, voluntas revelata, voluntas signi, voluntas εὔαρεστιας. These are just four different designations for one and the same thing; presenting it in somewhat different aspects, but all of them equally intended to indicate that will of God which is set forth in His word by injunctions and commands, and constitutes the sole rule of our duty. But Calvinists have always contended that there is another will of God, indicated by events or results as they take place. They hold that all events are foreordained by God, and that, of course, all events, when they take place, indicate what God had resolved to bring about, or at least to permit; and may thus be regarded as being, in some sense, manifestations of His will. This will of God, by which He regulates events or results, is quite distinct from that will by which He imposes duties and obligations; and yet it must be admitted to be a reality, - to have an existence and an efficacy, - unless He is to be shut out, not only from foreseeing and foreordaining, but from determining and regulating, the whole course of events which constitute the history of the world. This will of God, also, Calvinists usually designate by four different names, corresponding, but contrasted, with the four applied to the divine will in the former sense. They call it voluntas decreti, voluntas arcana, voluntas beneplaciti, voluntas ευδοκίας. These, too, are just four different designations of one and the same thing, - viz. that will of God by which He determines events or results. And about the divine will, in this sense, there has been a good deal of discussion, an acquaintance with which is indispensably necessary to an intelligent knowledge of this great controversy.

Arminians usually deny that events or results, simply as such, are to be regarded as furnishing a manifestation of the divine will; and appeal, in support of this view, to the conditional form in which predictions and promises about future events are frequently put in Scripture, - the conditions attached proving, as they allege, that God had formed no absolute purpose to bring about a certain result, and thus showing that the actual result, when it does occur, is not necessarily to be regarded as-being, in any sense, an indication of the divine will. The fundamental principle of Calvinism is, that God hath unchangeably foreordained whatsoever cometh to pass; and if this principle be true, then there can be no strict and proper conditionality attaching to any events or results, as if their actual occurrence were really suspended upon causes or influences which God had not resolved to regulate and control. Calvinists accordingly deny that there is any true and proper conditionality in the divine predictions and promises; the conditional or hypothetical form in which they are often set forth in Scripture, being intended merely to indicate a fixed connection established in God’s purpose between means and end, and being designed, by indicating this connection, to exert a moral influence upon the minds of men, and thereby to contribute to bring about the result contemplated. Arminians object vehemently to the distinction which Calvinists make between the preceptive and revealed or declared will of God, and what they commonly call His decretive and secret will, - the will of His good pleasure, - as if this were to ascribe to God two opposite and contradictory wills. But there is really no opposition or contradiction between them. His preceptive will, which is revealed or declared, stands out, as all admit, on the face of Scripture, in the injunctions or commands which constitute the only rule of our duty. But His decretive will - voluntas decreti, or beneplaciti - must also be admitted as a reality, unless He is to be excluded from the determination and control of events. And when Calvinists call this will of decree or of good pleasure, by which He determines actual events or results, His secret will, as distinguished from His revealed or declared will, by which He determines duties and imposes obligations, they just mean, that it is in every instance (except where God has issued a prediction or a promise) utterly unknown to us, until the event takes place, and, by its occurrence, reveals or declares to us what God had resolved to do, or at least to permit.

And there is surely nothing in all this but the statement of an undeniable matter of fact. Unless it be denied that the divine will has a determining influence in bringing about events or results, we must introduce some distinctions into the exposition of this matter; and there is no difficulty in showing that the Calvinistic distinction between the preceptive or revealed, and the decretive or secret, will of God, is much more accordant with Scripture, and liable to much less serious objections, than the distinction which Arminians set up in opposition to it, between an antecedent or conditional, and a consequent or absolute will, - made absolute, of course, only by the fulfilment of the conditions.

It has been stated of late, that the older Calvinistic writers maintained the conditional character of the prophetic announcements, in opposition to those who asserted their absolute and unchangeable fixedness; and that, by the distinction which they were accustomed to make between the secret and the revealed will of God, they meant a distinction between His real intention or decree, which is fixed and immutable, and His declared purpose, which may vary from time to time with the changeful conditions of man. We have never met with these views among the older Calvinistic writers; and we venture to assert that such statements as these indicate very great ignorance and misconception, as to the grounds usually taken by Calvinistic divines in expounding and defending the fundamental principles of their system of theology. But we cannot discuss this subject, though it is naturally suggested by the statement on which we have been commenting. We think we have said enough to show that the concluding portion of the 17th Article not only contains nothing which has any appearance of inconsistency with Calvinism, but even furnishes a presumption that it was indeed the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination, and no other, which the leading portion of the Article was intended to set forth.

We have had repeated occasion, in dealing with such questions as these, to advert to the important and useful influence of controversial discussions, as exhibited in the history of the church, in throwing light upon the true meaning of Scripture, and the real import and evidence of the doctrines which are, taught there. We have endeavoured to enforce the obligation, incumbent upon all men, to improve past controversies, for the purpose of aiding them in forming the most accurate, precise, and definite conceptions upon every subject which the Bible brings under our notice; and we have referred to the great Calvinistic systematic divines of the seventeenth century, as the best specimens of the improvement that may and should be made of the fruits and results of polemical discussion, in bringing out a correct and exact exposition of all the doctrines taught in Scripture, in their mutual bearings and relations. But everything is liable to abuse and perversion. There are everywhere dangers, both on the right hand and the left, to which men are exposed, from the weakness and imperfection of their faculties, and the corrupting influences from without and from within, that often tell upon the formation of their opinions and impressions of things, tending to produce defect or excess, and frequently, even when there may not be much of positive error, leading to one-sidedness of conception, in the direction either of narrowness or exaggeration. Though a man may be well versant in some departments of theological literature, we can scarcely regard him as entitled to the character of a theologian, unless he be familiar with the works of the great systematic divines of the seventeenth century, both Calvinistic and Arminian. But an addiction to the study of systematic theology, and to the perusal of systems, has, unless it be carefully regulated, its obvious and serious dangers, which ought to be diligently and assiduously guarded against. No one class of men are to be implicitly followed, as if they were in all respects models for our imitation, with reference to all the objects which we are called upon to aim at. No uninspired men, or body of men, have ever, in the formation and expression of their opinions, risen altogether, and in every respect, above the influences of their position and circumstances.

Controversial discussions have a strong and invariable tendency to lead those who have been engaged in them, to form an exaggerated impression of the magnitude of the topics about which they have exercised their faculties, and spent their time and strength, and for which they may have contended unto victory. And it is usually not until another generation has arisen that men are enabled to gather up fully the fruits of the contest, and to apply its results to the formation of a sound and judicious estimate, not only of the truth, but of the importance of the questions involved in it, and of the best and most effective way of defending the truth and exposing the error. No intelligent and judicious Calvinist will probably dispute, that the great controversy which Arminius raised in the beginning of the seventeenth century, produced the effect of bringing the peculiar doctrines of Calvinism into a position of something like undue prominence, - a greater prominence than they have in the Bible, or than they ought to have, ordinarily and permanently, in the thoughts of men, and in the usual course of pulpit instruction. We have no doubt that the fair result of that great controversy was to establish conclusively the scriptural truth of all the peculiar doctrines of Calvinism. But it does not follow from this that the Calvinists, who so decidedly triumphed over their opponents on the field of argument, entirely escaped the ordinary influence of controversy, and succeeded in retaining as sound an estimate of the comparative importance, as of the actual truth, of the doctrines for which they had been led to contend. There can be no reasonable doubt that the peculiarities of Calvinism were raised for a time to a position of undue prominence, and that there are plain indications of this in some of the features of the theological literature of the seventeenth century. We cannot dwell upon this point; but we may refer, as an illustration of what we mean, to the marked difference, as to the prominence given to the peculiar doctrines of Calvinism, between the Institutions of Calvin himself and the theological systems of the great Calvinistic divines to whom we have referred. We have the highest sense of the value, for many important purposes, of these theological systems; but we cannot doubt that Calvin’s Institutions is fitted to leave upon the mind a juster and sounder impression of the place which the doctrines of Calvinism hold in the Bible, and ought to hold permanently in the usual course of pulpit instruction, or in the ordinary preaching of the gospel.

We have made these observations, not certainly because we have an impression that there is a tendency among us generally, or in any influential quarters, to give undue prominence to the peculiar doctrines of Calvinism, but because it has been alleged of late that professed Calvinists do not now give so much prominence to their peculiar doctrines as was commonly assigned to them in former times, and that this affords evidence that Calvinism has been greatly modified, if not practically abandoned. Our object is just to indicate how the fact founded on, in so far as it is a reality, may be accounted for, in perfect consistency with what we believe to be true, - viz. that professed Calvinists are still thoroughly persuaded of the scriptural truth of the peculiarities of Calvinism, and are resolved to maintain and apply them, according to their true nature and importance, in their due proportions, and in their right relations to the whole scheme of divine truth.

We wish to remind our readers, in conclusion, that we have not professed or attempted to discuss the general subject of predestination, or to deal with its most important and fundamental departments. A full investigation of the whole subject would naturally divide itself into four branches, - viz. lst, The settlement of the true status question is, the real points in dispute between the contending parties; 2d, The examination of the scriptural evidence, direct and indirect, explicit and inferential, in favour of Calvinism, and in opposition to Arminianism; 3d, The objections commonly adduced by Arminians against our real and admitted doctrines; and 4th, The practical application of Calvinism. With the second of these branches of the subject - which is the most important and fundamental - we have not attempted to deal at all; and to the third we have referred only in a very brief and incidental way, without professing to discuss it. Our observations have been almost wholly restricted to the first and fourth of these divisions, including a consideration of the objections commonly adduced against Calvinism, which are based upon misconceptions and misrepresentations of the true meaning and import, and of the practical application, of its doctrines.

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Excerpt from The Reformers and the Theology of the Reformation