In this article I examine and challenge David Hume's contention that it is in principle always irrational to believe reports of the miraculous.
David Hume argues that it is never rational to believe in the testimony of
a miraculous event (Earman 141). He believes that this conclusion follows from
a principle he holds to be true: the prior improbability of an event, if great,
defeats the probability that the witness of the event is telling the truth.
Put in general terms, testimony is always subservient to induction. As applied
to miracles, since the probability of a miracle happening is by definition astronomical,
we should never believe the report of someone who testifies of it. I endeavor
to show that Hume's project has failed because the principle upon which his
argument rests is flawed. In particular, there are contexts in which the improbability
of an event happening, though great, is defeated by the reports of witnesses.
Assuming my argument to be sound, I will offer a context in which the improbability
of a miraculous event is defeated by the reports of eye-witnesses. I will then
show that all I need in order to diffuse Hume's critique is the possibility
that this context obtains.
From the start of his essay, Hume makes it clear that he is seeking for a general
principle that would enable him to rule out testimony of the miraculous without
having to examine each report case by case. As long as the world endures, "so
long...will the accounts of miracles and prodigies be found in all history,
sacred and profane" (141). To avoid the indefinite toil of examining each
account, Hume claims that he has found an argument that will be "an everlasting
check," effective against any claim of the miraculous (141). To further
buttress this interpretation, Hume claims elsewhere that his principle, when
applied to religions that are founded on the testimony of the miraculous, "amounts
to an entire annihilation" (46). At the end of Part 1, Hume summarizes
his position by stating that "no testimony is sufficient to establish a
miracle" (144).
What is Hume's argument that testimony is always subservient to induction? Hume
starts with the platitude that a rational person will believe something on the
basis of good evidence (141). What counts as being good evidence is connected
to our own observations and experiences. Of this Hume states "experience
is our only guide in reasoning concerning matters of fact" (141). A rational
person, then, will believe something insofar as it is confirmed by his or her
experiences. By "experiences," Hume seems to mean the objects of our
sense perceptions. Thus, rational beliefs are confirmed by a person's sense
perceptions. Since testimony is a "matter of fact," then it must also
be subject to the scrutiny of experience or sense perception. As Hume puts it,
"the ultimate standard, by which we determine all disputes, that may arise
concerning them (i.e. testimonies), is always derived from experience and observation"
(142). Consequently, testimony is intrinsically subordinate to induction.
In order to establish his thesis, it is crucial that Hume demonstrate how probabilities
are handled by a rational person. To this end, he emphasizes the various probabilities
that attend to various beliefs. To adapt an example used by Hume (145), an Indian
prince has observed that the sun, when visible, always travels across the sky
uninterrupted. This phenomena is invariable. He has also observed that usually
there is better weather in July than in January. However, this phenomena has
exceptions. On the other hand, the prince has never observed water changing
into ice, something reported to him by an emissary of a distant country. This
phenomena is invariable. Since the prince is rational, he knows that there is
a broad spectrum of assurance that can attend to his reasoning concerning matters
of fact. Moreover, he always proportions his assurance for any belief to the
degree of regularity with which he observes those things. According to Hume,
what conclusions does he draw from these three phenomena?
As to the sun's uninterrupted course, the prince has the highest assurance that
is allowed for in terms of probability. He concludes that this phenomena will
never vary, for it is a law of nature. As to the weather, the prince observes
that the number of instances of better weather in June is greater than the number
of counter-instances. So, his assurance for this phenomena is proportionate
to the difference between instances and counter instances. As to the phase change
of water to ice, the prince scrutinizes the event reported and the report with
the final arbiter, experience. With respect to the alleged event, the prince
might conclude that the phenomena of water not turning into ice is like the
sun's invariable course, for he has seen no counter instance. With respect to
testimony, experience demonstrates that it is more like the varying weather
patterns than the immutable course of the sun. Most of the time people tell
the truth, but there are plenty of counter-instances. Since the prince proportions
his beliefs to the degree of regularity with which he has observed any phenomena,
and he has never seen water change into ice but has observed faulty testimony,
he will reject the report.
Given the relationship that Hume believes holds between experience and testimony,
he proceeds to argue that it would be irrational for a person to believe any
report of a miracle. A rational person believes someone's testimony insofar
as the facts reported conform to his or her experience. Some kinds of experiences
are unalterable, and as such are regarded as laws of nature (143). Miracles,
however, are by definition violations of the laws of nature. By definition,
then, the prior improbability of a miraculous event happening always swamps
the probability that the person is reporting correctly. Therefore, a rational
person would never believe the report of a miracle.
To make his case iron clad, Hume grants that it may be the case that someone's
testimony of a miracle is of the highest quality, so that it might be considered
an entire proof (143). In this instance we have the proof of testimony pinned
against the proof of induction. But, as Hume has argued, the evidence of testimony
is a species of the evidence of experience. Since uniform experience amounts
to a "full proof," no report about an exception to the uniform experience
should induce belief in that report. Just as a river never rises higher than
its source, so testimony can never lead rational people to jettison uniform
experience for it.
It is important to note that Hume believes that there is crucial difference
between the miraculous and the marvelous. The sun altering its course would
be miraculous, while the phase change of water to ice is regarded a marvel.
The difference is that marvels are repeatable and covered under the laws of
nature. Consequently, the prince could test the report, in principle, by traveling
to the emissaries' land to see whether the phenomena happens. Hume thinks that
miracles permit no conditions under which the event could be observed. Because
of this difference, Hume suggests that there is testimony strong enough to warrant
belief in the face of uniform experience when it comes to the marvelous (143).
It's not that the probabilities are overwhelmed by testimony, it's just that
we are ignorant of the true probabilities. When it comes to the miraculous,
however, even testimony of the highest quality is insufficient. We might say
that in the case of the phase change, the prince has a default-defeater. With
the claim that the sun has altered its course, we have a clear-defeater.
While Hume seems to say that the probabilities of events matter in all contexts,
I want to suggest that the context determines whether or not the probabilities
matter. What I see, then, are two extremes that have been taken in this debate.
One extreme is taken by Hume, in which the probabilities associated with an
event's occurrence should always be taken into account. Price, reacting to Hume,
errors on the other extreme: "that improbabilities as such do not lessen
the capacity of testimony to report truth" (165). If my assessment is true,
it may be the case that Hume has failed in his endeavor to provide a general
principle which would settle all debates about particular claims to miracles.
Contrary to Price, it is clear that in some contexts we are rational to discard
testimony given the improbability of the event reported. Let's say that Rick
reports to his best friend Martin that he had been visited by aliens. With all
sincerity and passion, he relates a story in which while traveling on a lonely
desert road, he sees a strange luminescent object streaking erratically through
the night sky, only to land next to his vehicle. Creatures with small bodies,
big heads, and large dark eyes proceed from the ship, telepathically communicating
that they have come from a distant galaxy for the sake of studying humanity.
With this brief conversation, the aliens leave Rick alone on the highway.
Martin sees the passion and sincerity of Rick. He has good reason to think that
Rick wouldn't lie, wouldn't jest, and wouldn't believe fanciful stories. Despite
all of this, Martin concludes that the report is false. In this case, his background
information makes the judgment sound. For example, being an astronomer, he has
good grounds for the belief that the universe is the kind of place in which
life-permitting planets are nearly impossible. But, even if two life-permitting
planets existed, he knows the prospects that intelligent life would evolve on
two planets in the universe is also highly unlikely. Furthermore, even if life
did evolve on each planet, the probability that a species, separated by millions
of light years, could both locate this other planet and travel this distance
is astronomical. Considerations such as these justify Martin's refusal to believe
Rick. Consequently, this justifies the notion that in some contexts, the improbability
of an event happening should defeat the probability that the person reporting
the event is telling the truth.
Secondly, there are other contexts in which we seem rational to believe the
reports of people, despite the fact that the probability that the event happened
is astronomical. Price asks us to consider a lottery. The chance that any particular
individual will win "exceeds all conception" (164). Modifying Price's
example, imagine that while at Starbucks, a customer reports to Conin the clerk
that Betty Gamble from Redlands California won the jackpot. Though he has never
known a lottery winner, and doesn't know the person reporting this information,
he believes. Because he has never known a lottery winner, and doesn't know the
reporter, he might think that there is a vast conspiracy orchestrated by the
state to fool the populous into believing that there is a winner for the sake
of generating revenue from the sale of lottery tickets. But, he doesn't. And
though the chance that this patron of Starbucks is reporting falsely is far
greater than the chance that Betty (of all people) won the lottery, Conin seems
rational in believing the report. Hume seems to argue that the clerk is irrational.
Modifying this example further, Hume would argue that the clerk would not be
rational to believe the report, even when there are good reasons for trusting
the reporter. In this version, Conin is watching the news after his shift. The
news anchors announce that Betty Gamble from Redlands California won the lottery.
Being a part-time statistician, Conin knows that the odds that Betty would win
is mind-boggling. But, he also knows that the accuracy of this news organization
is 99.99%. Hume would argue that the improbability of the event happening overwhelms
the probability that the news anchors are telling the truth, and so one must
discard the report. Yet, in this case it looks rational for Conin to believe
the reports (Craig 324).
If my examples are sound, then they seem to suggest that the context will somehow
determine whether or not the probabilities of events should be taken into consideration.
The question then is this: From these two examples, what is the feature in each
context in virtue of which a belief is labeled rational or irrational? The answer
seems to be the expectation born from one's background knowledge. In the case
of the astronomer Martin, his background knowledge gives him grounds for thinking
that aliens did not visit his friend, for the odds are against it. In the case
of Conin, his background knowledge gives him assurance that someone will win
despite the odds being against Betty winning. It's sort of common knowledge
that people have won, and hence someone will win. But, certainly in the case
of alien visitation there is no common knowledge that aliens do exist, and hence
we have no expectation that we will be visited.
Since a certain kind of context determines whether or not the probabilities
of events matter, what kind of context obtains when reports of miracles are
given? Are reports of miracles like reports of alien visitations, or like reports
of lottery winners?
Paley offers a context in which reports of miracles are like reports of lottery
winners (41-42). He asks us to assume that there is a God who is quite interested
in our well-being, not only for this life, but ultimately for the afterlife.
Furthermore, we are asked to assume that we are free both to obey and disobey
God's will. However, due to some flaw in humanity, we don't have the knowledge
that we need in order to attain the well-being that God intends. Given all this,
Paley thinks that it is reasonable that God would give revelation about this
most important subject. And since a revelation requires miracles for its confirmation,
then it is reasonable that we should expect miracles from God.
One might object that this does little to provide an actual context in which
belief in miracles is rational. It might be the case that all evidence goes
against Paley's assumptions. Imagine, after Martin gives Rick all the reasons
why he doesn't believe his report of the alien visitation, Rick employs Paley's
strategy: "Suppose that the universe is arranged in such a way that life-permitting
planets are more probable than life-prohibiting planets. Suppose further that
macro-evolution occurs all the time. Also, suppose that aliens could travel
through wormholes to any place in the universe, and that they really want to
talk to us. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe my report." Of course,
this tactic would be futile, since it is in a way begging the question.
It is an objection like this that leads J.L. Mackie to distinguish between two
different contexts in which the debate about miracles could take place. The
first context might be one in which the individuals involved already accept
some notion of theism. It may very well be rational for someone in this context
to believe the reports of miracles. As Mackie puts it, "In this context
supernatural intervention, though prima facie unlikely on any particular occasion,
is, generally speaking, on the cards: it is not altogether outside of the range
of reasonable expectation for these parties" (94). Put differently, Mackie
is saying that reports about miracles are like reports about lotteries just
in case the person is a theist.
The second context that Mackie addresses in one in which the truth of theism
is at issue. Since it is only the existence of a particular kind of God that
gives one an expectation of the miraculous, the miraculous can never serve as
evidence for this deity in a context where the existence of this deity is at
issue. As he puts the matter, "it is pretty well impossible that reported
miracles should provide a worthwhile argument for theism addressed to those
who are initially inclined to atheism or even to agnosticism" (95).
If I have understood Mackie correctly, it looks as if reports of the miraculous
are like alien visitations for atheists and agnostics, and like lotteries for
theists. Neither Hume, nor I, would want to accept this conclusion. It appears
as strange as saying that Rick and Martin are both rational because they are
operating with different background assumptions. Intuitively, I want to say
that Rick can never be rational about this belief precisely because he operating
from the wrong context. If the context is in error, so are the beliefs grounded
in it. Resisting this notion, I want to find the context in which it would be
irrational for an atheist or agnostic to view miracles like alien visitations.
So the question is this: what must the theist provide, by way of argumentation,
to illicit an admission from the atheist or agnostic that it may be the case
that miracles are like lotteries (so that theist isn't unreasonable in believing
a particular miracle report)?
At this point, Paley's reply to Hume gives us direction. As we have seen, Paley
argues that Hume erred in not seeing that there might be a context in which
miracles might be expected. The context Paley provides in one in which God exists
and has certain attributes which would incline him to perform "wonders"
on earth. Of this Paley says, "We do not assume the attributes of the Deity,
or the existence of a future state, in order to prove the reality of miracles.
That reality must be proved by evidence" (42). What "evidence"
is Paley alluding to? It is plausible to read him as alluding to the evidence
provided by natural theology (where natural theology refers to knowledge of
God derived from consulting nature). For Paley, then, the context in which it
would be irrational for an atheist or agnostic to view miracles like alien visitations
in one in which natural theology is successful.
I would like to provide a schema in which natural theology might be successful.
First of all, arguments provided from natural theology need not be demonstrable.
All that is needed is plausibility, where this refers to an argument whose premises
are more plausible than their negations (Craig 50). Secondly, the case from
natural theology should be cumulative (180). The Kalam Cosmological Argument
might make it plausible to believe that the universe was caused by a powerful
agent. By itself, however, it is unable to hold the weight of miraculous expectation.
By adding other plausible arguments, we might have a sufficient ground for believing
that miracles are like lotteries. So, the argument from design might be offered
in such a way that the powerful agent is seen to be really smart. Likewise,
the ontological argument might make plausible the notion that this being is
one, and perfect. The argument from morality might make it reasonable to think
that this being is moral. In sum, natural theology is successful when a cumulative
case, comprised of plausible arguments for theism, makes the expectation of
the miraculous reasonable.
If there is such a natural theology available, it might in turn find support
or confirmation by reports of miracles. If the theist has mounted a plausible
case, the burden in the theist's case might shift from natural theology to historical
investigation. She is able to look over the vast amount of data provided by
history and determine whether there are any reports of miracles that stand up
to reasonable criteria used for judging testimony. Among other things, this
criteria includes the following: (1) the coherence and consistency of testimony;
(2) the character, number, and independence of witnesses (Mackie 93); (3) the
manner in which the testimony is delivered; (4) the implausibility of alternative
explanations (Craig 125). If the theist were to find testimony of a miracle
that met these criteria, and the miracle confirms revelation that attests to
Paley's initial assumptions, the testimony would have the effect of reinforcing
her conclusions about natural theology.
To illustrate how natural theology and testimony of the miraculous can mutually
support each other, I appeal to an example given in the history of science.
At the turn of the last century, two models of physics were in competition for
acceptance. The long standing tradition of Newtonian Mechanics viewed space,
time, and motion as absolute. The fixed frame was thought to be provided by
an invisible medium called ether, through which light traveled and stars wandered
(Barnett 41). Another tradition which was to emerge viewed space, time, and
motion as relative, and light as absolute. On this view, there is no fixed frame,
and hence no ether. Michelson and Morely, two American physicists, hypothesized
the following: If ether exists and is a substance, then it can be measured.
Since the earth moves through ether, there should be a disturbance as the earth
moves through it. Using experiments with light, one should detect a variation
in the speed of light given our motion relative to the ether. When Michelson
and Morely performed their experiment, the speed of light remained the same.
This was thought to be the critical experiment that forever sealed the case
against Newtonian Mechanics and was later thought to secure Relativity Theory
(41-44). The crucial experiment, however, was thought to be anything but decisive
for the Newtonians. In fact, they simply theorized that the reason we don't
detect variation in the speed of light is because the earth drags some fraction
of ether with it. This portion of ether isn't moving, relative to the earth
(Kuhn 73).
The apparent standstill facing the physicists of both camps was that the facts
could be made to fit either theory. So, it looks as if each side could in principle
preserve their theories by interpreting the data differently. However, there
comes a point in which reinterpretation becomes ad hoc. At this juncture, one
theory is implicated, while the other is vindicated. This is exactly what happened
in the struggle between Newtonian Mechanics and Einsteinian Mechanics.
When it comes to the testimony given of the miraculous, there are two opposed
background theories that conclude different things. One theory is that there
is no God, or at least we can't know that there's one. As such, any evidence
provided by historical investigation is interpreted within this framework. So,
for any reported testimony, a proponent of this theory will argue that the data
fits within his own schema and concludes that the testimony is in error. Another
theory is that God exists. The same data is thought, by the theists, to fit
far better with her theory. Presuming that both theism and atheism are plausible
positions, it may be the case that one's interpretation of historical data is
ad hoc. Now, if the testimony is the kind that fits the criteria mentioned heretofore,
I want to suggest that the explanation given by the atheist or agnostic is ad
hoc. If this is true, theism receives support for that which it in some way
expects.
One of the biggest obstacles that Hume could raise against my proposal is to
argue that I can never get the natural theology that I need without begging
the question. To get all the attributes listed by Paley, and which are necessary
for my proposal, I must rely upon what is already assumed as being revelation.
It's from Scripture that I derive that there is a certain kind of God who intends
for us to experience a blissful eternity, not from nature. In short, miracles
are like lotteries only in the context in which Scripture is already assumed
true, which presumes the validity of the miracles that attests to its truth.
In reply, I suggest that this is irrelevant to my case against Hume. As we have
seen, Hume offers a general principle which he asserts will always doom reports
of the miraculous to the realms of irrationality. His assertion is that, in
all contexts, the improbability of an event defeats the probability that the
person reporting is not deceived. Against Hume, I have argued that there are
some contexts in which the improbability of an event is defeated by testimony.
Furthermore, I suggested a context of theism, supported by natural theology,
in which the same is true for the testimony of the miraculous. It isn't necessary
for my thesis to show that this context actually obtains, but only that it could
obtain.
Following what I think Paley was endeavoring to do, I'm arguing that all that
is needed to defeat Hume is the possibility of a persuasive natural theology.
This in turn would make our expectations for miracles legitimate. It may be
the case that all the proofs for God's existence fail miserably. In this, all
Hume could charge is that it is irrational to believe in the reports of miracles
because the context needed to ground these reports hasn't obtained. Yet, I could
imagine a world in which the argument from design is persuasive given that there
is relatively little dysteleology in the world. I could imagine a world in which
the moral argument is persuasive, given there is only small pockets of evils
in the world. If such a world is possible, then Hume's principle is flawed.
If my assessment is right, then in reality Hume has begged the question in the
presentation of his argument. Given his failure to recognize that the context
determines whether the prior improbabilities of an event are to be regarded,
he hasn't shown that natural theology doesn't provide the context needed by
the theists. What he needs to make part of his case work is what is at issue.
He seeks a way out of the toils of examining claims of the miraculous case by
case, but this is precisely what he might need in order to say that it is irrational
to believe the testimony of the miraculous (that is if natural theology turns
out to be plausible).
Perhaps Hume might have recourse to the principled distinction that he makes
between miracles and marvels. He suggests that a person may be rational to believe
the reports of the marvelous, so long as the testimony was strong enough (143).
The reason why Hume allows for testimony to defeat uniform experience in cases
of the marvelous is because a subject could place herself in the situation to
see whether or not the testimony is true. So, the Indian prince might be justified
in believing that water changes into ice because he could put himself in the
circumstance and observe if the contrary happens. In the case of the miraculous,
Hume thinks that we have a clear-defeater, in that placing ourselves in the
circumstance will yield only the uniform experience of the laws of nature.
In opposition to Hume, I want to argue that since there is no principled difference
between miracles and marvels, Hume must allow for testimony of the miraculous
that is strong enough to induce rational belief. Firstly, it's not quite clear
what counts as being able "to place ourselves in the circumstances."
Let's say, for example, that the prince has a horrible reaction to cold climates,
in that his sensory faculties cease to operate. Conceptually, he is able to
position himself in the circumstances, but because of his ailment it's of no
use. So, instead of going himself, he sends his most trusted adviser to determine
whether the emissary is telling the truth. Upon his return, the prince's adviser
testifies with zeal and fervor that the water does turn to ice. Intuitively,
it looks as if the Prince would be justified in believing the report.
What would Hume say?
Hume might say that the prince wouldn't be justified. But that seems overly
restrictive. In science, for example, people depend upon instruments to "observe"
what humans are unable to "observe." In the sub-atomic world, our
sensory faculties cease to operate. Conceptually, however, it seems possible
to see the microscopic world. To add to our knowledge of this realm, scientists
use reliable and precise instruments to get a view of that world. Their knowledge
is justified despite the fact that it is mediated by something else. In the
same way, the prince seems to be justified in believing the report given by
his most trusted and reliable adviser, even though the knowledge obtained is
mediated. In Campbell's words, testimony looks like perception second hand (166).
Hume might argue that the prince would be justified because it is conceptually
possible for him to put himself in the circumstance where he would observe the
phenomena reported. In this move, however, the defender of miracles could argue
that it is conceptually possible for us to go back in time and place ourselves
in the context in which the miracles were alleged to take place. Furthermore,
he might argue that just as scientific knowledge is mediated by reliable instruments,
so historical knowledge is mediated by reliable procedures. In the rigorous
application of the procedures available to historians, we are "placing
ourselves in the circumstances" in which the miracles were alleged to take
place.
If my assessment is correct, then Hume can have no clear-defeater for miracles.
He argues that attending to all the dead bodies that remain dead in our life
time is a clear-defeater that the resurrection of any man has not taken place
(143). This conclusion follows, he thinks, because he has placed himself in
the circumstance, and no resurrections occur. But I have charged that he hasn't
placed himself in the circumstance, and thus can have no clear-defeater. Consequently,
if a person can be rational in believing strong testimony of the marvelous,
and there is no principled difference between the miraculous and the marvelous,
so a person can be rational in believing the strong testimony of the miraculous.
In conclusion, I have argued that Hume has failed in his endeavor to find a
general principle that would serve to always defeat the reports given of miracles.
The principle that he offers suffers from counter-instances. In some contexts,
it is rational to believe the testimony of events despite the events' inherent
improbability. In other contexts, it is irrational to believe. This implies
that context determines the rationality of belief in testimony. I have sought
to sketch a context in which it would be rational to believe the reports of
miracles. All that I need to make my case against Hume is the conceptual possibility
that this context could obtain, not that it does. This then forces Hume to deal
with whether such a context obtains, which contravenes his attempt to devise
a principle that would avoid this dirty work.
Works Cited
Barnett, Lincoln. The Universe and Dr. Einstein. New York: Bantam Books, 1968.
Cowan, Steven.ed. Five Views On Apologetics. Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing
House, 2000.
--Craig, William Lane. "Classical Apologetics" Cowen.
Earman, John.,ed. Hume's Abject Failure: The Argument Against Miracles. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000.
--Campbell, George. "A Dissertation on Miracles" Earman.
--Earman, John. "Hume on Miracles."
--Hume, David. "Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding" Earman.
--Price, Richard. "Four Dissertations" Earman
Kuhn, T. S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press,
1962.
Swinburne, Richard.,ed. Miracles. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1989.
--Mackie, J.L. "Miracles and Testimony-Hume's Argument" Swinburne.
--Paley, William. "Evidences of Christianity-Preparatory Considerations"
Swinburne.